TRANSCRIPT OF SENTENCING HEARING
BEFORE THE HONORABLE JOHN D. BATES,
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SENIOR JUDGE
(Parties appearing via videoconference.)

APPEARANCES:

FOR THE UNITED STATES: SETH ADAM MEINERO

DOJ-USAO

555 4th Street, NW Washington, DC 20904

(202) 252-5847

Email: seth.meinero@usdoj.gov

FOR DEFENDANT NELSON: JESSICA ARDEN ETTINGER

Federal Defender Services of Wisconsin

22 East Mifflin Street

Madison, WI 53703 (608) 260-9900

Email: jessica ettinger@fd.org

FOR DEFENDANT MARKOFSKI:

JONAS BEDNAREK

33 East Main Street Madison, WI 53703 (608) 257-0945

Email: jbednarek@hurleyburish.com

ALSO PRESENT: CRYSTAL LUSTIG, U.S. Probation

Court Reporter: Elizabeth Saint-Loth, RPR, FCRR

Official Court Reporter

This hearing was held via videoconference and telephonically and is, therefore, subject to the limitations associated with the use of technology, static interference, etc.

Proceedings reported by machine shorthand, transcript produced by computer-aided transcription.

PROCEEDINGS

THE COURTROOM DEPUTY: Your Honor, we have Criminal Action 21-344-1 and -2, United States of America versus Brandon Nelson and Abram Markofski.

We have Mr. Seth Meinero representing the government. I hope I said your last name right, sir. And we have Ms. Jessica Ettinger representing Mr. Nelson, and Mr. Jonas Bednarek representing Mr. Markofski; all parties appearing by video. And we also have Ms. Crystal Lustig representing probation, and she, too, as well is appearing by video.

THE COURT: All right. Good afternoon to everyone, at least it is afternoon here.

We are here today for sentencing in these two matters -- one case, but two defendants. My intent is to proceed with most of this with both defendants being treated together, but then to separate it out when I get to the point of individualized sentencing.

Any objection to that from the defendants?

MR. BEDNAREK: No objection from Mr. Markofski.

Thank you.

 $$\operatorname{MS.}$ ETTINGER: No objection from Mr. Nelson. Thank you.

THE COURT: And I assume no objection from the government as well, Mr. Meinero.

1 MR. MEINERO: No, sir. No objection. 2 THE COURT: And as well -- these are sentencings 3 on misdemeanor charges. Count 4 of the information to which 4 each of the defendants has pled is a misdemeanor; and, 5 therefore, we can proceed by videoconference with the 6 consent of the defendants. And it's not really covered by 7 the CARES Act, which is really addressed to felony sentencings; so I have to make sure that I have the consent 8 9 of each defendant to proceed by videoconference with this 10 sentencing. So let's start with Mr. Nelson. 11 12 Ms. Ettinger, do I have consent that this 13 proceeding can go forward by videoconference? 14 MS. ETTINGER: Yes, Your Honor. 15 THE COURT: And on behalf of Mr. Markofski, 16 Mr. Bednarek, do I have consent to proceed by 17 videoconference? 18 MR. BEDNAREK: Yes. Thank you. 19 THE COURT: All right. And we will do so. 20 Now, I guess the first question I will ask of each 21 defendant through counsel is whether you have received the 22 presentence report as it's been revised -- I don't think 23 there have been really any revisions -- and whether there 24 are any remaining issues in dispute with respect to it. 25 Ms. Ettinger?

1 MS. ETTINGER: No there are no -- no further 2 issues, Your Honor. 3 THE COURT: Mr. Bednarek. MR. BEDNAREK: Yes. We have received the 4 5 documents referenced, and we have no additional corrections. 6 Thank you. 7 THE COURT: All right. And the same question to 8 the government. 9 Mr. Meinero, have you received, reviewed, and are 10 there any remaining issues with respect to the presentence 11 report? 12 MR. MEINERO: Not from the government, Your Honor. 13 THE COURT: All right. Under Federal Rule of 14 Criminal Procedure 32(i)(3)(A), I will accept the 15 presentence report as findings of fact on issues not in 16 dispute. 17 We are here because each defendant has pled guilty 18 to Count 4 of the information in this case charging the 19 offense of parading, demonstrating, or picketing in a 20 Capitol Building, in violation of Title 40 of the United 21 States Code, Section 5104(e)(2)(G); and that's a Class B 22 misdemeanor. And this, of course, relates to the events 23 that took place on January 6th, 2021, in and around the 24 United States Capitol. 25 The sentencing guidelines do not apply because

this is a misdemeanor to which each defendant has pled. So

I will be undertaking a review and sentencing decision based
on all of the relevant factors under Section 3553(a) of

Title 18 of the U.S. Code; but the sentencing guidelines do
not apply and will not obviously be considered.

I won't take account of any criminal history that's relevant here; but with respect to each of the defendants, there is no relevant criminal history. Neither Mr. Nelson nor Mr. Markofski has any prior criminal history, with the exception of one speeding violation; but that's not relevant to my consideration and weighing of prior criminal history here.

So, with that, I think I actually can turn right to counsel. And then if the defendants themselves wish to say anything -- to them as well; I will hear from you.

We'll start with Ms. Ettinger on behalf of Mr. Nelson, and then I will hear from Mr. Nelson. And then we'll go to Mr. Bednarek on behalf of Mr. Markofski and, if he wishes to say anything, I will hear from Mr. Markofski.

So, Ms. Ettinger, you are up first.

MS. ETTINGER: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Actually, let me -- lest I forget, I guess I will hear first from the government, not from defense counsel. So, Mr. Meinero, let's hear first from you on both cases.

MR. MEINERO: Very well, sir.

Brandon Nelson and Abram Markofski committed one of the longest breaches, perhaps the longest breach of anyone sentenced so far for breaching the United States Capitol, on January 6, 2021.

I will start with a general statement, Your Honor.

The attack on -- the riot at the Capitol that day was a singularly shameful event in our nation's history, and repugnant to our republic. Every person who participated, including those who committed only misdemeanors, like Mr. Nelson and Mr. Markofski, bears responsibility for that attack on our democratic values.

But focusing on their individual conduct as we must, Mr. Nelson and Mr. Markofski traveled from Wisconsin to attend the rally of the former President held earlier that day; they walked to the Capitol together. They knew before they even set foot in the building that a riot was occurring outside according to Mr. Nelson, who gave a more extensive account of what they observed before entering the building. They spent a significant time, perhaps as much as an hour, outside the building before they entered.

Mr. Nelson told the FBI that he observed people standing on, cutting into, scaffolding outside the building, and police shooting pepper balls.

Mr. Nelson and Mr. Markofski entered at the Senate

wing door, which is in the northwest part of the Capitol, at approximately 2:16 p.m. Just about four or five minutes before they entered, rioters breached that entryway by smashing the windows on either side of the doorway, climbing into that space, kicking open the doors, and smashing a window pane on those doors. After that, rioters began cascading inside that entryway through the doorway and through both of the smashed windows.

And just about 15 seconds before Mr. Nelson and Mr. Markofski entered, Capitol surveillance video captured a rioter climbing through or into one of the smashed windows on the north side of that entryway. When Mr. Nelson and Mr. Markofski crossed the threshold, debris, shattered glass, lay about the floor underneath those smashed windows; but, despite that, they continued further into the Capitol.

They proceeded to the area known as the Capitol crypt as a mob there converged on a thin line of police officers defending that space; and as that mob chanted,

Mr. Nelson and Mr. Markofski held up their phones to record what was happening. They were enthusiastic participants.

During the chanting, Mr. Markofski nodded his head affirmatively and pumped his fist for a short time; and Mr. Nelson clapped along for a few seconds while that occurred. Just a little over five minutes after the defendants appeared in the crypt, the mob was able to

overwhelm the officers, breach the defensive line, and gain access to other parts of the Capitol; but, despite that, the defendants continued further.

At about 2:49 p.m., over a half hour after they had entered the building, Mr. Markofski sent a text to a friend boasting from inside the building: We stormed the Capitol and shut it down. He also admitted that at some point, although it's unclear exactly when, a police officer told him he should leave the building for his safety.

The defendants entered the Rotunda for another significant period, and remained there until police officers were finally able to marshal the resources they needed to drive rioters out of that space.

Mr. Nelson acknowledged that he saw rioters accosting police officers, and that officers started to push back in attempt to clear the rooms; and the rioters pushed and shoved to get out of the building.

Mr. Nelson and Mr. Markofski then exited the Capitol at the Rotunda doors adjacent to the Rotunda; and Mr. Nelson observed, and video surveillance confirmed, that the window panes on those doors were also smashed. They left out of the Rotunda doors at approximately 3:41 p.m.

Around that time, at approximately 3:40 p.m., a minute before, around that same time, Mr. Nelson texted his mother that he had been "maced," and that there was "shit

everywhere."

All in all, the defendants spent well over an hour, if we rely on the geolocation data from Mr. Markofski's phone; about 84 to 85 minutes inside the Capitol during the riot. This is a highly aggravating factor, Your Honor.

Each minute a rioter was inside the Capitol, the police had to spend energy addressing the threat and, at times, a violent threat posed to members of Congress, their staff, other police officers, other employees at the Capitol, and even other rioters who were in the building. Each minute was another minute beleaguering law enforcement officers. Further, each minute was a minute our democratic process was delayed; and that delay caused doubt and dismay among the American people that it would resume -- and there was concern that it would resume at all that day.

To give a frame of reference for how unusual the incursion -- the duration of the incursion of these defendants was, I have reviewed the sentencing memo submitted by the government for nearly all of the -- and I have counted 49 Capitol riot defendants sentenced before they're being sentenced today.

There were about four defendants whom I could not tell how long they were in the building. But a little over a quarter of those 49 defendants, Your Honor, they were

1 inside between one and ten minutes. Nearly half of the 49 were inside between 11 and 30 minutes. 2 3 So if we take that first group and that second group, about three-quarters of these 49 defendants were 4 5 inside of the Capitol for 30 minutes or less. 6 Another smaller group, about 10 percent, were 7 inside between 31 to 59 minutes; and then another two were 8 in the Capitol for about 60 minutes, perhaps longer than 60 9 minutes. But I have not been able to identify another 10 defendant who was in the Capitol for over 80 minutes, as 11 these defendants were. 12 After January 6th or after --13 THE COURT: Mr. Meinero --14 MR. MEINERO: Yes. 15 THE COURT: -- why is the length of time inside of 16 the building of such importance in sentencing? 17 MR. MEINERO: As I said, Your Honor, it was more 18 time beleaguering the officers who had to defend the 19 building; it was more time contributing to the delay and the 20 certification of the Electoral College vote. It added to 21 the aggravation caused by everyone inside that building, and 22 even the American people, because of the delay that caused. So --23 24 THE COURT: But there is a list of nine factors 25 that has been developed; where has that been developed from?

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                 MR. MEINERO: That factor in the list of nine
       would go to the first factor when --
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                 THE COURT: No. You are not understanding my
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       question.
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                 MR. MEINERO: I'm sorry.
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                 THE COURT: Where does that list of those factors
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       come from?
                 MR. MEINERO: Oh. That is a list that our office
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       developed, having a bird's-eye view of these cases; and that
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       is a list that our office developed out of --
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                 THE COURT: And the length of time inside the
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       building is one of those nine items. Do any of the other
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       nine factors support a stronger sentencing here?
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                 If I have to look at those nine factors -- if, in
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       your office's view, I should look at those nine factors, is
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       it only one out of nine that actually supports a more
       serious sentence here?
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                 MR. MEINERO: It's the sixth factor we list, the
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       length of the defendant's time and the area the defendant
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       traveled.
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                 THE COURT: It is number six; that's right.
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                 MR. MEINERO: Right. It also goes -- well, the
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       entry is, sort of, a separate issue that we listed, number
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       one, how they entered; but the length is one of the nine
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       factors, Your Honor.
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1 THE COURT: But let me repeat my question and see 2 if you have an answer for it. 3 MR. MEINERO: Sure. THE COURT: Is it only that factor, the length, 4 5 which is factor number six -- is that the only one of the 6 nine factors that actually supports a longer sentence here 7 or a more serious sentence? MR. MEINERO: I think -- I think in that list it 8 9 is the one factor that applies to --10 THE COURT: So the other eight factors generally 11 would be either neutral or supportive of the defendant's 12 request for a lesser sentence? 13 MR. MEINERO: No. No. Certainly the first 14 factor, when and how they entered, because they entered 15 after spending about an hour outside the Capitol --16 THE COURT: So what? 17 MR. MEINERO: -- having had an opportunity --18 THE COURT: So what? 19 MR. MEINERO: So they would have had knowledge 20 about the situation that was brewing at the Capitol; they 21 knew a riot was occurring but went in anyway. 22 They also entered through an entryway that had 23 been breached violently, with smashed windows and a breached doorway, so --24 25 THE COURT: But you can make the argument --

1 that's why I say some of them are neutral. You can make the 2 argument on that factor, when and how the defendants entered 3 the Capitol Building, that this was a nonviolent entry. 4 There was no breaching of a police line; they did not break 5 windows or otherwise breach and open doors or windows. 6 They simply walked in after others had done that. 7 So why isn't that a factor that actually is either neutral or in their favor? 8 9 MR. MEINERO: I don't think it's neutral, Your 10 Honor, because there is still knowledge of the violent 11 nature of the breach, and they went in anyway. And I --12 THE COURT: So give me an example --13 MR. MEINERO: -- believe you are correct, there is 14 no evidence --15 THE COURT: Give me an example, Mr. Meinero, of 16 someone as for whom that factor -- when and how they entered 17 the Capitol Building -- would be neutral or favor them. It 18 seems to me you are saying that anyone who went in, that's a 19 strike against them. 20 MR. MEINERO: Well, it's whether, when, and how 21 they entered. They entered at a relatively early point. 22 I don't know if I would call them part of the 23 "first wave," but very close to this first wave; very early 24 on they were inside the building. 25 THE COURT: But now you're being inconsistent.

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Now you're being inconsistent, Mr. Meinero, because a moment ago you said that it weighs against them because they were there for a long time outside observing what was happening; and now you are saying that they were one of the first to enter. Those seem to be really inconsistent. MR. MEINERO: I don't think so, Your Honor, because the situation was brewing at the Capitol for quite a while before individuals actually breached the building There was all sort of chaotic activity that was itself. going on outside the building --THE COURT: I am aware of that. MR. MEINERO: -- versus inside. So what I am saying is these defendants were there for a long time. They had a long time to observe the chaos; to make the decision for themselves: This is something we shouldn't be a part of and turn back and get out of there; but they didn't. They saw what was happening; they went in through a -- very soon after one entry point was violently breached, and they remained inside for a -- as far as I can tell, longer than anyone; possibly longer than anyone else who has been sentenced so far. THE COURT: Go ahead. MR. MEINERO: The day after January 6th, Your

Honor -- or, actually, after they left the Capitol, they drove back to Wisconsin.

Early in the morning on January 7th, after they would have had time to reflect on their conduct and the consequences of it, they texted each other about their experience of the prior day; they weren't regretful, they were proud. Mr. Nelson texted Mr. Markofski: We held the line, no backing down. Mr. Markofski replied: Oh, fuck yeah, brothers and patriots; won't go down without a fight. Mr. Nelson responded: Not I.

Your Honor, before I address the mitigating factors in this case, I was going to address the issue of disparity. I don't know how much depth you want me to go in or how much weight this Court will place on that factor under 3553(a).

I will say, as a very simple matter, these defendants are distinguishable, as I just mentioned, from practically every other defendant so far in their length of time in the Capitol. And I know the defense has mentioned a few cases, or cited a few cases, and can compare defendants -- those defendants to Mr. Nelson and Mr. Markofski; these are highly fact-specific assessments, Your Honor.

The permutations of aggravating and mitigating factors for each one of the defendants is limitless; but

there were five -- I'm focusing on a few the defense cited.

There was Sean Cordon and Danielle Doyle who received sentences of two months' probation; those sentences appear to be outliers in the table of -- we attached to our sentencing memo. Those --

THE COURT: Let me -- let me give this assessment, and you tell me where it's wrong.

My assessment, from looking -- as you have done -- at the cases that have been sentenced so far for pleas to this offense, one count, 5104(e)(2)(G) -- and there have been more than a handful of those; we are now getting a body of sentencings.

I would say that the most common sentence has been a sentence of probation, and probation for more than the one or two months that you mentioned; something more typically of two years' probation, I think. There have been occasions of more than two years, but not many. There have been occasions of periods of incarceration, but not usually.

So it seems to me that it might be fair to say that the outliers are, as you mentioned, at the bottom; probation for a month or two, or no probation at all -- at least in one instance, I think. And the outliers at the upper end are periods of incarceration or very lengthy periods of probation, five or four years.

Why is that not an accurate assessment of the

sentencings under the 51 -- under this provision to date?

MR. MEINERO: I think the median or means sentence, Your Honor, probably is somewhere in the realm of 24 months -- I'm sorry -- yes, 24 months of probation with home detention; sort of an intermediate between straight probation and incarceration. We are seeing, more recently, more and more sentences of incarceration.

I am just looking at the list we provided. I am trying to count on the fly here how many sentences of incarceration there have been. We have it organized by what the government recommended.

But I am counting 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 -- I have counted 12 sentences of incarceration, Your Honor, at least 12 sentences -- from this table of what the Court's imposed. So that is about one fourth, or so, of the defendants who have been sentenced so far. I may be off by a few here, Your Honor -- and I'm sorry I don't have a more definitive answer of the number of defendants who have received sentences of incarceration; but that sounds about accurate to me.

So a sentence of incarceration here would be in line -- we are getting into some of the more serious cases or -- some of the individuals who were on this spectrum of conduct are more towards the middle or the higher end of criminal conduct for this offense.

1 THE COURT: Why do you say that? What is the 2 evidence that we're now dealing with the more serious cases 3 of this conduct, which is the parading or demonstrating in 4 the Capitol? 5 MR. MEINERO: Well, we're getting more instances 6 of individuals who engaged in belligerent conduct; I know 7 that's what the defense cited to --THE COURT: But that is not this case. 8 9 not this case. 10 MR. MEINERO: In this case there is not 11 belligerent -- the physical belligerent conduct committed by 12 these defendants; that is correct. 13 However, as I noted, what distinguishes them --14 what distinguishes them from the others is the duration. 15 And also, Your Honor, I haven't mentioned this yet --16 because it also goes to mitigation, at least from the 17 defense's perspective -- is these defendants have military 18 service in their background which we see as an aggravating 19 factor here. 20 The reason we see that as an aggravating factor --21 and, first, I want to state very clearly there is possibly 22 no greater service one can render to the nation than that 23 service; and that service is worthy of the highest respect and praise to Mr. Nelson and to Mr. Markofski. 24

However, they also swore an oath to uphold and

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defend the Constitution. They were in a special position to understand that oath and to appreciate what this attack on democracy meant. So we see that as an aggravating factor here because what they did flew in the face of the oath they took.

THE COURT: Well, I see the military service as cutting both ways. It seems to me that normally it's something that cuts in favor of a criminal defendant. That kind of community service — that kind of service to the nation is something that is a plus mark for them in consideration of sentencing; that's part of the nature and characteristics of the defendant.

But, on the other hand, as you say, within a criminal offense, but particularly this offense, where it involved -- with a threat to our democratic process, it is -- and our constitutional considerations -- it is something that gives the Court pause with respect to the individuals who, notwithstanding their obligations, engaged in this conduct; so it seems to me that that cuts both ways.

I would not call it an "aggravating factor"; but I would call it a factor that needs to be considered on both sides of the equation.

MR. MEINERO: And I think the way we see it -- again, crediting them for that service -- we see that as troubling and more confounding as to why they decided to

engage in misconduct; and that's why we mentioned it.

Your Honor, I also want to address some of the other mitigating factors here which you mentioned earlier.

These defendants have no adult convictions, both have complied with the conditions of their pretrial release; both cooperated at an early stage of the investigation.

Mr. Nelson submitted to a prearrest interview and admitted that he entered the Capitol during that prearrest interview. He submitted to a post-arrest interview. He gave consent to search his apartment and identify where FBI agents could find clothing evidence there, which was helpful.

I will say some -- more on the negative end, he did minimize his conduct during his post-arrest interview. He suggested because the doors had been breached already and because the Capitol is a public building -- he suggested that he did not know that that was unlawful. But when the interviewing agent confronted him about that and noted that the doors he had entered had smashed windows, he backed away from that statement; and he said, no, I hear what you are saying.

Mr. Markofski also, he cooperated at an early stage. He submitted to two prearrest interviews; and, at first, he admitted that he entered the Capitol. At the second -- it wasn't so much an interview, as it was a

1 meeting for him to turn over video and photo evidence to the 2 FBI; and he did that. During the post-arrest interview, he 3 confirmed he had entered the building. He identified where 4 evidence could be found in his residence and car, and 5 provided the unlock code to his cell phone. 6 I will say this -- and this was more negative than 7 Mr. Nelson. Mr. Markofski minimized his conduct more in his 8 post-arrest interview and expressed incredulity that he 9 committed a crime because he saw no trespassing signs and 10 because law enforcement did not stop him; that incredulity 11 was misplaced. 12 THE COURT: It's important -- Mr. Meinero, it's 13 important to consider not only just what was said in the 14 post-arrest interviews, but what the positions of the 15 defendants are today. 16 MR. MEINERO: Absolutely, Your Honor. 17 THE COURT: And you are not saying that either 18 defendant is doing anything other than admitting in full 19 their conduct and how wrong they were to engage in that 20 conduct? 21 MR. MEINERO: That -- I was going to mention that 22 in about 30 seconds, Your Honor. 23 THE COURT: Okay. 24

MR. MEINERO: But, before that, I also wanted to underscore that they both expressed an early desire to

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express -- to accept responsibility here.

Getting to what you just said, Your Honor, and their remorse; in their sentencing submissions, they both made worthy statements of contrition.

Mr. Nelson made, I felt, a very poignant statement about he was ashamed he committed a crime that made fellow citizens and people around him fearful of him. And he acknowledged the irony that if he had still been in the National Guard he would have been called up to restore order; that struck me quite a bit.

In a similar vein, Mr. Markofski, a current guardsman, acknowledged that his actions put his oath in question and, in his words, brought dishonor to his beloved U.S. Army National Guard. So, absolutely, Your Honor, those statements deserve credit. It still brings us, the government, back to having taken those oaths and still going into the building in the first place.

This attack was akin to a battle. There was hand-to-hand combat that occurred at the Capitol over hours; and, unfortunately, they chose the side that was against democracy; and they went in and remained for 85 minutes. Alas, that's something they have to live with and something they must be held accountable for.

THE COURT: Let me make sure that I have the government's position clear on other factors.

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There is no allegation that either of these defendants engaged in any violent conduct, correct? MR. MEINERO: Correct. THE COURT: There is no allegation that they engaged in any acts of destruction, correct? MR. MEINERO: Correct. THE COURT: Is there any allegation that they witnessed acts of violence or destruction and ignored or took some inappropriate steps? MR. MEINERO: The video from inside the crypt that I mentioned, Your Honor -- as I said, they came into view, in the Capitol surveillance video, about five minutes before the mob that preceded them and that grew, after they had entered -- had breached that line and overwhelmed the officers, and then gained entry to the Capitol. I can't say that -- well, I can't say that these defendants represented explicitly that they saw violence committed against anyone. However, Mr. Nelson -- based on what he said he saw before entering, that pepper balls were deployed. He also said that he had witnessed rioters accosting police officers in the Rotunda; and that's at the time that officers began driving rioters out of that space, and rioters were pushing and shoving to get out of the building. So -- and let me also say this. We believe -- or

at least we don't have evidence to the contrary that they were separated for any prolonged period during their time inside the Capitol; as far as we know they were together this whole time. So that is — those are things that Mr. Markofski also would have seen. So I hope that answers your question, Your Honor.

But we do believe that they would have -- during this very long time outside and inside the Capitol, have seen things that would have, at least, been chaotic but, also, they would have seen these interactions with officers and the officers being overwhelmed, and activity of that nature.

THE COURT: Mr. Meinero, I am not going to accept that.

The government has listed one of the factors as being the defendant's reaction to acts of violence or destruction. What you are saying is anyone who was there must have seen acts of violence or destruction, and they didn't stop them; that's not a factor then. That would be something — the way you explain it, it's something that would apply to everyone who was there.

We're trying to differentiate on a spectrum. When differentiating on a spectrum, it seems to me the government has no evidence or indication that they witnessed and had some improper reaction to acts of violence or destruction;

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       otherwise you are saying that anyone --
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                 MR. MEINERO: We have --
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                 THE COURT: -- must have seen things and,
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       therefore, that should be held against them.
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                 MR. MEINERO: Well, we also -- well, let me just
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       get to the first part.
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                 We have Mr. Nelson's words that he saw rioters
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       accosting police officers. So -- now, whether that is the
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       level of violence you are talking about as far as assaults;
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       I can't say that, Your Honor.
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                 However, they would have been in there a long
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       period, as opposed to other rioters who may have gone in for
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       only a few minutes and seen much less than they did.
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                 THE COURT: But you are also saying that they
       would have seen things outside, and that's true of everyone.
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                 MR. MEINERO: Yes.
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                 THE COURT: But enough on this factor. Enough on
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       this factor. I don't think that --
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                 MR. MEINERO: Yes.
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                 THE COURT: I don't think there is a very
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       strong -- I don't think this factor weighs strongly against
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       either of the defendants.
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                 They didn't destroy evidence either, right?
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                 MR. MEINERO: No --
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                 THE COURT: Indeed, to some extent they helped the
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1 government find -- helped the government locate evidence? 2 MR. MEINERO: Correct. 3 THE COURT: There are a couple of -- very 4 minimal -- statements on social media made immediately after 5 or, actually, one during the events. 6 MR. MEINERO: I just want to -- I just want to 7 correct that for a moment, Your Honor. They were texts, private texts; they were not posted on social media. 8 9 THE COURT: I'm sorry. Texts, not social media. 10 Private texts; you are right. 11 MR. MEINERO: Yes. 12 THE COURT: But that's all. There was nothing --13 they weren't -- neither of these individuals said anything 14 beforehand, in terms of anticipation of some great activity 15 at the Capitol; and neither of them exhibited any planning, 16 and neither of them have exhibited in social media, texts or 17 otherwise, much in the way of cheering on what happened. 18 Now, there are these text statements right after 19 they were in the Capitol; but that's it, correct? 20 MR. MEINERO: Yes. That's correct. There is not 21 evidence of preplanning, social media promotion of what 22 occurred; so that is correct, Your Honor. The texts -- we mentioned the texts to show their 23 24 state of mind about how they felt about what they did. 25 Mr. Markofski texted a friend saying he stormed

1 the Capitol -- or we stormed the Capitol and shut it down. Then there was a text the two defendants shared with each 2 3 other after they went home to Wisconsin. 4 THE COURT: Okay. All right. I think we have 5 exhausted the factors. 6 Anything else that you want to say, please do so, 7 Mr. Meinero. 8 MR. MEINERO: Your Honor, I am finished. And that 9 is -- for all of the reasons I mentioned, that's why we 10 recommend a sentence of 14 days' incarceration for the 11 defendants, plus the \$500 restitution to the Architect of the Capitol, and the \$10 special assessment. 12 13 Thank you. 14 THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Mr. Meinero. 15 So, now, Ms. Ettinger, I think -- just because I 16 have listed Mr. Nelson first, I am going to turn to you 17 first, and then to Mr. Nelson; and then I will turn to 18 Mr. Bednarek, and then to Mr. Markofski. 19 Ms. Ettinger. 20 MS. ETTINGER: Certainly, Your Honor. Thank you. 21 People should not have to be fearful of fellow 22 citizens and people they arrest; those are Mr. Nelson's 23 words in reflection on his conduct on January 6th, and they 24 articulate some of the deepest hurt that's flowed from the 25 riots. Americans are fearful of other Americans; Mr. Nelson gets it.

As the defense has set out in its sentencing memo, he is someone who cares very deeply about other people, and about his service to others; and his conduct in this case is an aberration in an otherwise law-abiding life. His role in the breach is limited; and he's shown deep and true remorse for his conduct and, for that reason, the defense is requesting a sentence of probation in this case.

The country is not just feared; it's angry and disappointed about what happened on the 6th. But anger, fear, and disappointment don't define just punishment.

Instead, as Your Honor has mentioned, it's found in assessing the spectrum of misconduct from that day, and finding Mr. Nelson's place along it.

The government has tried to point to three aggravating factors, and I'd like to look at each of them because our position is that none of the three pushes this case into the realm of one deserving incarceration.

First, the government spent quite a bit of time talking about the length of time that Mr. Nelson was inside the Capitol. But any amount of time inside the Capitol was unlawful, and the amount of time spent shouldn't be the metric by which we differentiate terms of probation or terms of jail time.

Instead, we should be looking at what happened

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inside the Capitol and what were Mr. Nelson's actions afterwards because those are the factors that indicate whether there is a risk that he's going to do something like this again; and that more closely aligns with the analysis under 3553.

So when it comes to Mr. Nelson --

THE COURT: Well, why -- why would you think that the length of time in the building would be irrelevant?

I understand that you want to put it in the context of other factors and other considerations; but why would that be irrelevant?

Doesn't it make a difference if someone was breaching the Capitol and violating the law for two minutes versus two hours?

MS. ETTINGER: I don't mean to suggest it's irrelevant, Your Honor, because the last thing I want to do is to downplay the conduct, but certainly not Mr. Nelson's position. But it can't have such disproportionate weight that it loses meaning; the context is exactly the point that I would like to emphasize.

And so what Mr. Nelson was doing during those 85 minutes is more important than just the mere cosmetic fact that he was there for 85 minutes.

So if I may, Your Honor, adding on to that context, Mr. Nelson's conduct at the Capitol was that he

walked in through a door. He was a wrongful spectator to others' destruction. He made a video that he texted to his mother, and he left.

He is not dressed for battle, like Mr. Sean Cordon; he is not throwing chairs at the police, like Mr. Bradley Rukstales; he is not videotaping police officers being assaulted, like Mr. Robert Reeder. And his behavior from waking hours of January 7th onward has been nothing but remorseful.

And so that bleeds into the second aggravating factor that the government has pointed to, which is this text message exchange between Mr. Nelson and Mr. Markofski. That text exchange doesn't happen, as the government suggested, after there's been real time to reflect on their actions; it happened at one o'clock in the morning after having undertaken a very long drive from Washington back to Wisconsin.

And so what really matters is not how they were feeling so caught up in the buzz of the day, but what they said in the days, months, since then; the weeks that followed. And in that period --

THE COURT: Clarify -- clarify one thing for me.

That text exchange is between them as they are in the car
driving?

MS. ETTINGER: It was at 1:19 to 1:20 in the

1 I am not certain whether they were still in the 2 car versus on the way home. 3 On the way home. THE COURT: Okay. Go ahead. 4 5 MS. ETTINGER: But in the weeks that followed, 6 Mr. Nelson, as the government emphasized, he meets twice 7 with the FBI, cooperates fully, was charged, and pleads 8 quilty. 9 But even more important than those actions, Your 10 Honor, I think that he spent time reflecting on what 11 happened and dedicating himself to making changes in his 12 thinking and his behavior, refocusing on his work, and 13 moving forward with his life. 14 He certainly is not Mr. John Lolos, who is still 15 chanting and giving war cries on the Delta flight home; he 16 is not posting on Facebook like Ms. Dona Sue Bissey; and 17 he's not Ms. Lori Vinson telling the media, in multiple 18 interviews, that she'd do it all over again. 19 Mr. Nelson goes back to work at Mendota; he's 20 pulling overtime shifts to support a very difficult (sic) 21 community of Haitians. And he's distancing himself from 22 politics altogether. 23 I will touch just briefly, Your Honor, on the last 24 of what the government terms an aggravating factor. We, of

course, agree with the Court that it is the wrong thing to

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1 call out somebody's military service; there is no however or 2 but that follows --3 THE COURT: I don't think -- I don't think I said 4 I said that it was a double-edged sword; it both 5 favored and disfavored him. 6 MS. ETTINGER: Understood, Your Honor. 7 have misheard. I think what I would submit to the Court is this: 8 9 Rather than making Mr. Nelson more culpable, Mr. Nelson's 10 military service has made him more contrite. He is 11 horrified to have participated in an act that caused harm to 12 our country, particularly because he wore a uniform; and 13 that shame and guilt is going to reverberate long after this 14 hearing, and it is something that he is going to carry with 15 him for the rest of his life. 16 So in the end, Your Honor, each of the factors 17 weighs in favor of probation here; Mr. Nelson's focus on 18 serving others; his lack of criminal history; his wrongful, 19 but limited role in the riot. He is somebody who helps the 20 public, not somebody from whom the public needs protection. 21 There is not a risk that he is going to 22 participate in anything like this again. A sentence of 23 probation is serious, and it sends a message; it's 24 sufficient, but not greater than necessary. Thank you. 25 THE COURT: Thank you, Ms. Ettinger.

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                 Does Mr. Nelson wish to say something?
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                 DEFENDANT NELSON: Yes, Your Honor.
                 MS. ETTINGER: Yes, sir.
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                 THE COURT: Please. Good afternoon, Mr. Nelson.
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                 DEFENDANT NELSON: Can you hear me?
                 THE COURT: I can.
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                 DEFENDANT NELSON: I just wanted to express how
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       sorry I am for being a part of the breach in and of itself.
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                 Obviously I observed the damage to the building,
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       but I think what is a lot worse was that day we became
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       further apart as a country, not closer. And I wanted to say
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       I'm sorry to the families and anyone affected by the
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       violence; obviously, particularly, law enforcement. And I
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       know there was an officer that took his life in the
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       aftermath of that; and so that doesn't -- that doesn't make
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       me feel very good.
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                 And obviously that day I had bad judgment; there
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       is no question about it. I wish I had made better
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       decisions. But since then I have been working to distance
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       myself from toxic politics, which obviously this was.
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                 I can't go back in time. Sometimes I wish that I
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       could. But I guess what I can do going forward is working
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       as hard as I possibly can to learn from all of this, and
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       hopefully put it behind me.
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                 THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Mr. Nelson.
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Mr. Bednarek, you are up.

MR. BEDNAREK: Thank you, Judge.

And I guess one of the benefits of going last is that I have the benefit of hearing everybody else's positions and arguments to this point; and it's obvious that Mr. Nelson and Mr. Markofski are similarly situated -- obviously legally; but also, I think, in the arguments that I would have made. I mean, many of the arguments that I would have made have been made for me either by the Court or by my esteemed colleague who represents Mr. Nelson; so I am not going to rehash on any of those. In fact, I will try to be fairly brief.

I submitted a sentencing memorandum in which I intended to provide the vast majority of argument. But as with all sentencing hearings of any type -- let alone this type -- you know, things come up that make me want to comment. And one of the things that we have talked a fair bit about is, as you've referred to, the double-edged sword of the military aspect; I really agree with that, Judge.

In fact, in preparation, I was wondering about how to address this with the Court because I understand your concern that it cuts both ways.

But the one thing that we haven't talked about, at least with respect to Mr. Markofski, is that the effect of this case and this conviction -- the collateral effect on

his military career is as yet undetermined. And it seems to me to be very potentially significant and falls into the realm of punishment. And I say that because he -- well, in the letters and in my sentencing memorandum, I indicate that this has had impact on his progression in the military, and potentially a lack thereof.

The other thing that Mr. Markofski benefited from -- and it's clearly in question at this point -- is the financial assistance with his education that is a function of his military career. I don't know what his financial aid future looks like; and I don't know -- and nor does he know -- what his college career looks like from a financial perspective because of the military implications of that.

I say that because I feel as though that collateral consequence is going to be felt by Mr. Markofski no matter what sentence you hand down today. You can give him a fine, and still the military is taking action against him. So there are effects from this conviction that go beyond what we're talking about today, at least with respect to Mr. Markofski.

The other one, as I referenced in my memorandum, is his employment; he was immediately terminated. We have -- in Wisconsin there is a fairly large conglomerate of convenience stores and gas stations; they are called Kwik Trip. It's actually headquartered in La Crosse,

1 Wisconsin, very near where to Mr. Markofski lives. He got a job there; they found out about this; they let him go. 2 3 I suspect that future employers may well have 4 concerns, if you will, about Mr. Markofski because of this. 5 I say that because that's another collateral consequence 6 that's going to be felt no matter what happens today. 7 Judge, one of the other things I did in preparation for today -- I have re-read the memorandum, of 8 9 course, and all of the attachments. And I think it's near 10 to the end of the attachments, the letter from 11 Mr. Markofski's father; he said something, I wrote it down 12 here. He said: It's not our mistakes that define us, but 13 it's how we respond to them. I can't script --14 THE COURT: I noted that -- I noted that in his 15 letter as well. 16 I can't script a better MR. BEDNAREK: Yes. 17 response to his actions than what Mr. Markofski has done to 18 date. Right? 19 I mean, we can't condone the actions; I get that. 20 That's why he's here; that's why he's pled guilty. But 21 everything he has done -- frankly, before and after, has 22 been totally consistent with somebody that's deserving of a 23 probation sentence and not worthy of somebody that needs to 24 be incarcerated. I feel pretty strongly about that. And I 25 make a career of defending people that I don't get to say

that about.

Mr. Markofski is the kind of man that everybody would want to call his son, his friend, his colleague, his military partner -- pick the pronoun. And he would be the one that you would want in a foxhole next to you, in a classroom next to you, working with you on a job site.

And so I, for one, am extremely optimistic about his future; and I say that wholeheartedly, Judge. So I just ask that you follow the recommendation that presentence has prepared, and let's do a term of probation. I don't believe incarceration is at all necessary. And let's not forget, if he fails on probation, that's what happens; we incarcerate. I believe he deserves a chance.

So that's what I have for you, Judge. But I stand ready to answer any questions or address concerns that the Court may have. Thank you.

THE COURT: So tell me why, from your perspective, the length of his stay inside the Capitol is not enough of an aggravating factor to warrant a sentence at the higher end of the spectrum?

MR. BEDNAREK: Because I would ask not only how long he was in the Capitol but, really, I think what the touchstone should be: What did he do in the Capitol?

There were lots and lots of people that were breaking windows; that were accosting police officers; that

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       were engaging in behavior both in the Capitol -- that is far
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       more egregious. To me, his -- this is not to condone it,
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       Judge, I don't mean that; but it's to set it apart from
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       others. His was, essentially, a mere presence in the
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       Capitol.
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                 Now, again, that's not legal, as we all know; but
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       he is not in there breaking windows or tossing chairs, as my
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       colleague pointed out. He was -- and I will maybe use air
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       quotes -- he was, sort of, benign in his behavior whilst he
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       was in the Capitol; that's why I don't think the length of
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       time aggravates.
                 THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Mr. Bednarek.
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                 Now, does Mr. Markofski have something he wishes
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       to say?
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                 MR. BEDNAREK: He does. Thank you.
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                 THE COURT: Mr. Markofski, good afternoon.
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                 DEFENDANT MARKOFSKI: Good afternoon, Your Honor.
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                 Your Honor, I understand that my lawyer has
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       provided you with my written allocution and how you have
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       read it already. I want to emphasize only one point, to
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       you, to the government, and to all of the police officers
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       present on the Capitol on January 6th, I'm sorry.
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                 Thank you.
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                 THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Mr. Markofski.
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                 All right. I am going to make some general
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observations -- well, not many -- and then talk about each of the defendants as I determine the sentence to be imposed for each.

First, let me just say that I have received the presentence investigation reports as to Mr. Nelson and Mr. Markofski; sentencing memoranda -- not just from the government, but from each of the defendants; a supplement from Mr. Nelson; and letters of support for both Mr. Nelson and Mr. Markofski. I have read them all and take them all into account, along with what has been said here this afternoon in determining the appropriate sentence in each of these cases.

Both of the defendants have agreed to pay -- and I believe have already taken steps to pay -- the restitution of \$500 that they agreed to; and I will order that amount of restitution as part of the sentence in this case with respect to each of the defendants.

I think they have also paid or taken steps to pay the \$10 statutory assessment that is required as well.

That brings me to the other monetary consideration, which is a fine. And I say this in the context of the remainder of the sentence that I am going to impose in each of these cases. I believe that fines are warranted in these two cases, especially given what I am going to impose as the remainder of the sentence.

Mr. Nelson, based on the information provided to me -- notwithstanding his recent decision with respect to his employment -- I believe Mr. Nelson has an ability to pay a fine; and I am going to impose a fine with respect to Mr. Nelson.

Mr. Markofski's ability to pay a fine is perhaps a little less; but I believe that he, too, has the ability to pay a fine. I am going to impose a fine because I think it is warranted; and it will, however, be a somewhat less significant fine than Mr. Nelson.

So now I am going to go through the reasons for sentences in these cases and also state what the sentences will be.

I will give counsel one final opportunity, after I do so, to make any legal objection before I formally impose the sentence; but I will only go through it once.

 $\label{eq:weak_problem} \mbox{We need to start with the nature of the offenses} \\ \mbox{here.}$

I don't think anyone is going to question that these are very serious offenses. Even though they're just misdemeanors, these are serious offenses; they involved a threat to our democratic process, and an attack on our democratic values. As the D.C. Circuit yesterday stated:

The events of January 6th were the most significant assault on the Capitol since the war of 1812; that was during war

time, this was not.

Indeed, this is the single, as, again, the D.C. Circuit said -- this is the single, most deadly attack on the Capitol, by domestic forces, in the history of the United States; and it took lives, we cannot ignore that. And we cannot ignore the seriousness of the events and, therefore, all of the participants in the events of January 6th.

The defendants participated in an event, basically a riot, or an insurrection, that undermined our electoral process. And the fact that their offenses -- basically entering and roaming about the Capitol -- for over an hour were less serious than those of others who assaulted officers, destroyed property, breached doors or windows, or police lines, encouraged violence, and did those other more serious things -- that does not make these offenses something that is not serious. These offenses remain as very serious offenses and affronts to our democratic values.

On the other hand, they do fall on the lower end of the spectrum of offenses; the fact that these are just misdemeanors, and the plea has been taken to a single misdemeanor of parading and demonstrating in the Capitol Building, is an indication that they are on the lower end of the spectrum of offenses; and it's really only the length that each defendant was inside the Capitol that favors a

harsher sentence in this case.

The government has not really pointed to anything beyond that, with the exception of the military service that I will mention again in a moment.

Everything else about the conduct of these defendants would, under the nine-factor test that the government has identified, would support a lesser sentence.

They did not engage in violent conduct; they did not incite violence; they didn't engage in any acts of destruction; they really didn't witness and have a bad reaction to any acts of violence or destruction, as I have discussed with the government here today; they did not destroy evidence during nor after the riot; and, indeed, were helpful in locating evidence when the government approached them.

They were -- as I mentioned and as has been highlighted by the government, inside the building for a long time, although they did not go into closed offices, it looks like they were more in the open area of the Rotunda and the adjoining areas.

There were not statements made by these defendants in person, on social media, or even through texts that put them in the category of individuals who are continuing to show pride in or support the activities on January 6th; to the contrary, these defendants have cooperated fully with

law enforcement, did so early; have exhibited strong evidence of remorse and contrition; and those factors, with the exception of the length of time, really support placing them on the lower end of the spectrum for sentencing.

How they entered the Capitol Building is, in my view, perhaps slightly in their favor, or at least neutral. They didn't break down a door, breach the police line. They simply walked through the door that had been already opened; now, that doesn't condone their conduct, but that's one factor that the government thinks is important. I think it's either a neutral factor or even slightly in their favor.

It's very important to me that they have shown full remorse and acceptance of responsibility and have acknowledged explicitly that the conduct they engaged in was wrong; there is no equivocation on that.

Now we don't have guidelines to help in sentencing here; but I think that that collection of factors is important. For Mr. Nelson, he has accepted responsibility; shown remorse; admitted that his conduct was wrong and unlawful. He has minimal social media or text comments that would weigh against him; no prior offenses; was not involved in any planning or anticipation with respect to the January 6th events, or praise thereafter. He does have service to his country and to his community, and family and

community support.

Now, the service to the country, as I have already said, it cuts both ways; and I don't think I have to dwell on that anymore; it is a factor in the nature and characteristics of Mr. Nelson, but it also raises the question as to why one who had that training, took those oaths, would nonetheless engage in this kind of conduct. He has been employed, been a contributing member of society; and, again, has recognized that his conduct was wrong and even shameful. His service to others is commendable; and his cooperation in the case is also commendable.

The same is true for Mr. Markofski, generally speaking. He has accepted responsibility; shown remorse; admitted that his conduct was wrong; has minimal social media or texts, or other comments that would continue to support the activities on January 6th. He has been -- he has shown full contrition. He has no prior offenses; was not engaged in any planning or any anticipation with respect to the events of January 6th.

He and Mr. Nelson both have indicated they came to go to the rally and to hear then President Trump at a rally.

He has service to the country and to the community, and has strong family and community support; and that service to the country, through his military service, is the same two-edged sword for him, as it is for

Mr. Nelson.

He has had steady employment and schooling that he has been engaged in; and he knows that his conduct was both criminal and wrong and, indeed, was an affront to his military training. He has, as his counsel has noted, experienced collateral consequences already as a result of his involvement in the January 6th events, and his plea of quilty to this Class B misdemeanor.

So where do I come out on sentencing?

I am going to impose a relatively small fine for each, restitution as well. I am going to impose some hours of community service, and two years of probation. Not a minimal period of probation, but a significant period of probation. Probation is a serious, weighty sentence, as the Supreme Court and other courts have noted.

The primary factor that requires more discussion under 3553(a) -- and there are six factors, the nature and circumstances of the offense, history and characteristics of the defendant -- I have already been through those.

The need to reflect the seriousness of the offense, this sentence that I am going to impose does so, in my view, and will promote respect for the law and provide just punishment and, also, afford adequate deterrence both to the individual defendants and to others, more generally. And I think that is true in the context of these cases

involving January 6th where you really can't isolate one case. It's the overall government effort, with respect to these events and the serious, serious criminal justice effort that the government has initiated with respect to hundreds of individuals that is going to be a great deterrence; and the sentences that Mr. Markofski and Mr. Nelson will be getting are a part of that.

The last factor is the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct; that's a hard one to assess, but we do have more and more cases; and Mr. Meinero has discussed them somewhat.

Looking at the cases that involve pleas to one count of a 5104(e)(2)(G) offense, most of those defendants, by far -- the overwhelming majority -- have received sentences of probation, not incarceration. They range, as has been pointed out, from probation of just a month or two -- one judge has done that in a couple of cases -- all the way up to several years, even, I think, five years of probation in at least one instance. And they -- some, perhaps, now, more than a handful -- but, still, a clear minority of the sentences have involved a short term of incarceration. Two weeks is not an unusual term as requested by the government.

Where incarceration has been imposed, it is my

sense that it is generally based on more reasons for it than we have here. The length of time in the Capitol was the only thing that really supports a more serious sentence here. But for those other cases where incarceration was imposed, you have other factors that have weighed in favor of a sentence of incarceration.

If you have a defendant that is fully remorseful, has fully accepted responsibility, has acknowledged the wrong of their conduct, and that it was an error -- that they were only involved in entering the Capitol, not any violence or destruction of property, or any praising of the events or incitement of others, and that -- they have really not done anything before, during, or after to encourage or praise such conduct -- I conclude that probation is appropriate for these two defendants. It is especially true given their history of service to the community, including military service, and the fact that there is no risk, in my judgment, of their repeating this kind of conduct.

Probation is a sufficient deterrence in the context of the scores of cases that have been brought and, therefore, that is the sentence that the Court will impose.

I am now going to read the sentence to be imposed in each of the cases; I will start with Mr. Nelson.

Pursuant to the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, and in consideration of the provisions of Title 18 of the U.S.

Code, Section 3553, it is the judgment of the Court that you, Brandon Nelson, are hereby sentenced to a term of 24 months, that is two years, of probation on Count 4; in addition, you are ordered to pay a special assessment of \$10, in accordance with 18 U.S.C. Section 3013.

The Court authorizes supervision in the jurisdiction of this case to be transferred to the United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin.

While on supervision, you shall abide by the following mandatory conditions, as well as the standard conditions of supervision, which are imposed to establish the basic expectations for your conduct while on supervision.

The mandatory conditions include that: You must not commit another federal, state, or local crime; that you must not unlawfully possess a controlled substance; you must refrain from any unlawful use of a controlled substance, and submit to one drug test within 15 days of placement on supervision, and at least two periodic drug tests thereafter, as determined by the Court; that you must make restitution, in accordance with Title 18 of the U.S. Code Section 3663 and 3663(a), or any other statute authorizing the sentence or restitution.

You are ordered to make restitution in the amount of \$500 to the Architect of the Capitol. The Court has

determined that you do not have the ability to pay interest and, therefore, waives any interest or penalties that may accrue on that balance.

You shall comply with the following special conditions: You must provide the probation officer access to any requested financial information, and authorize the release of any financial information. The probation office may share financial information with the United States Attorney's Office.

The defendant, Mr. Nelson, must complete 50 hours of community service within 12 months; the probation office will supervise the participation in the program by approving the program. The defendant must provide written verification of completed hours to the probation office.

You are ordered to pay a fine in the amount of \$2,500. The Court has determined that you do not have the ability to pay interest and, therefore, waives any interest or penalties that may accrue on the balance. Having assessed the defendant's ability to pay, payment of the total criminal monetary penalties is due as follows:

Payment in monthly installments of \$150 to commence 30 days after the date of this judgment.

Restitution payments shall be made to the Clerk of the Court for the United States District Court, District of Columbia, for disbursement to the following victim; and that

is the Architect of the Capitol, at the address here in Washington, D.C., in the amount of \$500. The financial obligations are immediately payable to the Clerk of the Court for the United States District Court, here in Washington. Within 30 days of any change of address, you shall notify the Clerk of the Court of the change until such time as the financial obligation is paid in full.

The probation office shall release the presentence investigation report to all appropriate agencies, which includes the United States Probation Office in the approved district of residence in order to execute the sentence of the Court.

Now, with respect to Mr. Markofski -- and excuse me for one moment -- pursuant to the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, and in consideration of the provisions of Title 18 of the U.S. Code, Section 3553, it is the judgment of the Court that you, Abram Markofski, are hereby sentenced to a term of 24 months, that is two years, of probation on Count 4. In addition, you are ordered to pay a special assessment of \$10, in accordance with Section 3013 of Title 18.

The Court authorizes supervision and jurisdiction of this case to be transferred to the United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin.

While on supervision, you shall abide by the

following mandatory conditions, as well as the standard conditions of supervision, which are imposed to establish the basic expectations for your conduct while on supervision: The mandatory conditions include that you must not commit another federal, state, or local crime; you must not unlawfully possess a controlled substance; you must refrain from any unlawful use of a controlled substance, you must submit to one drug test within 15 days of placement on supervision, and at least two periodic drug tests thereafter as determined by the Court; and you must make restitution, in accordance with Title 18 of the U.S. Code, Section 35 -- I'm sorry -- 3663 and 3663(a), or any other statute authorizing a sentence of restitution.

You are ordered to make restitution in the amount of \$500 to the Architect of the Capitol. The Court has determined that you do not have the ability to pay interest and, therefore, waives any interest or penalties that may accrue on the balance.

You shall comply with the following special conditions: You must provide the probation officer access to any requested financial information, and authorize the release of any financial information. The probation office may share financial information with the United States Attorney's Office.

The defendant, Mr. Markofski, must complete

50 hours of community service within 12 months. The probation office will supervise the participation in the program by approving the program. The defendant must provide written verification of completed hours to the probation officer.

You are ordered to pay a fine in the amount of \$1,000. The Court determines that you do not have the ability to pay interest and, therefore, waives any interest or penalties that may accrue on the balance.

Having assessed the defendant's ability to pay, payment of the total criminal monetary penalties is due as follows: Payment in monthly installments of \$100 to commence 30 days after this date of the judgment.

Restitution payments shall be made to the Clerk of the Court of the United States District Court here in Washington for disbursement to the Architect of the Capitol at its address here in Washington, and that amount is \$500.

The financial obligations are immediately payable to the Clerk of the Court for the U.S. District Court, in Washington, D.C. Within 30 days of any change of address, you shall notify the Clerk of the Court of the change until such time as the financial obligation is paid in full.

The probation office shall release the presentence investigation report to all appropriate agencies, which includes the United States Probation Office in the approved

district of residence in order to execute the sentence of the Court.

Now, Mr. Nelson and Mr. Markofski, each of you was convicted as a result of a plea of guilty. You can appeal your conviction if you believe that your guilty plea was somehow unlawful or involuntary, or if there is some other fundamental defect in the proceedings that was not waived by your guilty plea. You also have a statutory right to appeal your sentence under certain circumstances, particularly if you think the sentence is contrary to law. However, a defendant may waive those rights as part of a plea agreement; and you have entered into a plea agreement which waives some or all of your rights to appeal your conviction and the sentence itself. Such waivers are generally enforceable; but if you believe the waiver is unenforceable, you can present that theory to the appellate court.

You do have the right, each of you, to apply for leave to appeal in forma pauperis. And if you were to so request and qualify, then the Clerk of the Court would prepare and file a notice of appeal on your behalf; and that would basically be free of cost, that's what that "in forma pauperis" means. But I note that you are represented by very able counsel, in each instance, and presumably they would assist you in this process if you wish to follow it.

With few exceptions, any notice of appeal must be filed

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       within 14 days of the entry of judgment; and I expect that
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       judgment -- given the lateness of the day -- may not be
 3
       entered today, but should be entered by Monday.
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                 With that, let me ask counsel if there is any
 5
       reason, other than reasons that have been indicated here
 6
       today, why this sentence should not be imposed for each
7
       defendant as I have just stated? Ms. Ettinger?
 8
                 MS. ETTINGER: No, Your Honor. No reason not to
 9
       impose the sentence as stated.
10
                 THE COURT: Mr. Bednarek?
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                 MR. BEDNAREK: No. No reason not to impose the
12
       sentence as stated.
13
                 I may have missed this, but were Counts 1 through
14
       3 dismissed?
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                 THE COURT: They will be in a moment.
16
                               Thank you.
                 MR. BEDNAREK:
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                 THE COURT: And then, Mr. Meinero, any reason not
18
       to impose the sentence as I have just indicated, other than
19
       what you have already argued?
20
                 MR. MEINERO: No, sir. No objection from the
21
       government.
22
                 THE COURT: All right. With that, Mr. Meinero, is
23
       there a further step we need to take with respect to the
24
       information in this case?
25
                 MR. MEINERO: There is, Your Honor.
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1 The government moves to dismiss Counts 1 through 3 2 of the information pertaining to both defendants, Mr. Nelson and Mr. Markofski, pursuant to the plea agreement. 3 THE COURT: And that motion is granted. And those 4 5 counts, Counts 1, 2, and 3 of the information in this case, 6 21-344, will be dismissed as to Mr. Nelson and as to 7 Mr. Markofski. 8 Anything else that we need to cover before I 9 formally impose the sentence, Mr. Meinero? 10 MR. MEINERO: No, Your Honor. Thank you. 11 THE COURT: Ms. Ettinger? 12 MS. ETTINGER: No, Your Honor. Thank you. 13 THE COURT: Mr. Bednarek? 14 MR. BEDNAREK: Nothing, Your Honor. Thank you. 15 THE COURT: All right. The sentences, therefore, 16 are imposed, as I have indicated, for Mr. Nelson and for 17 Mr. Markofski; those are the sentences of the Court. 18 And, with that, I believe we are done here today 19 for these cases. 20 I do want to say that I appreciate both the 21 seriousness of these offenses and, also, the remorse, 22 contrition, and acceptance of responsibility that each 23 defendant has indicated; and it is that that has kept you in 24 a sentence of probation rather than any other sentence. 25 I hope that is faith well placed in each of you; I think it

1 is; I certainly would be surprised to hear otherwise in the 2 future. 3 I hope that you will put these -- this conduct 4 behind you, but that you will continue to reflect on it and 5 on the importance of upholding the democratic values of this 6 great country, and abide by the rule of law and the 7 principles that are so valuable in our democratic process. 8 With that, this proceeding is completed; and I 9 thank you all very much. 10 THE COURTROOM DEPUTY: All right. This Honorable 11 Court stands in recess until return of court. And good day, 12 everybody. 13 MR. MEINERO: Thank you, Mr. Bradley. Thank you, 14 Your Honor. Thank you, Counsel. 15 (Whereupon, the proceeding concludes, 2:34 p.m.) CERTIFICATE 16 I, ELIZABETH SAINT-LOTH, RPR, FCRR, do hereby 17 certify that the foregoing constitutes a true and accurate transcript of my stenographic notes, and is a full, true, 18 and complete transcript of the proceedings to the best of my ability. 19 This hearing was held via PLEASE NOTE: videoconference and telephonically, in compliance with the 20 COVID-19 pandemic stay-safer-at-home recommendations and is therefore subject to the limitations associated with the use 21 of technology, including but not limited to telephone signal interference, static, signal interruptions, and other 22 restrictions and limitations associated with remote court reporting via telephone, speakerphone, and/or 23 videoconferencing capabilities. 24 Dated this 21st day December, 2021. 25 /s/ Elizabeth Saint-Loth, RPR, FCRR Official Court Reporter