	STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DI	ISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERI	•
Plaintiff,	Criminal Action No. 1:21-cr-00034-CRC-1
vs.	Thursday, August 11, 2022 2:04 p.m.
THOMAS ROBERTSON,	
Defendant.	x
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HELD BEFORE THE HON	F SENTENCING HEARING ORABLE CHRISTOPHER R. COOPER ATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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APPEARANCES:	
For the United States:	ELIZABETH ANN ALOI, ESQ. RISA BERKOWER, ESQ. U.S. ATTORNEY'S OFFICE FOR D.C. 555 4th Street, NW Washington, DC 20003 (202) 252-7212 elizabeth.aloi@usdoj.gov
	RISA BERKOWER, ESQ. U.S. ATTORNEY'S OFFICE FOR D.C. 555 4th Street, NW Washington, DC 20003 (202) 252-7212 elizabeth.aloi@usdoj.gov MARK M. ROLLINS, ESQ.
For the United States:	RISA BERKOWER, ESQ. U.S. ATTORNEY'S OFFICE FOR D.C. 555 4th Street, NW Washington, DC 20003 (202) 252-7212 elizabeth.aloi@usdoj.gov MARK M. ROLLINS, ESQ. ROLLINS & CHAN 419 Seventh Street, NW
For the United States:	RISA BERKOWER, ESQ. U.S. ATTORNEY'S OFFICE FOR D.C. 555 4th Street, NW Washington, DC 20003 (202) 252-7212 elizabeth.aloi@usdoj.gov MARK M. ROLLINS, ESQ. ROLLINS & CHAN 419 Seventh Street, NW Suite 405 Washington, DC 20004
For the United States:	RISA BERKOWER, ESQ. U.S. ATTORNEY'S OFFICE FOR D.C. 555 4th Street, NW Washington, DC 20003 (202) 252-7212 elizabeth.aloi@usdoj.gov MARK M. ROLLINS, ESQ. ROLLINS & CHAN 419 Seventh Street, NW Suite 405
For the United States:	RISA BERKOWER, ESQ. U.S. ATTORNEY'S OFFICE FOR D.C. 555 4th Street, NW Washington, DC 20003 (202) 252-7212 elizabeth.aloi@usdoj.gov MARK M. ROLLINS, ESQ. ROLLINS & CHAN 419 Seventh Street, NW Suite 405 Washington, DC 20004 (202) 455-5610 mark@rollinsandchan.com Lisa A. Moreira, RDR, CRR
For the United States: For the Defendant:	RISA BERKOWER, ESQ. U.S. ATTORNEY'S OFFICE FOR D.C. 555 4th Street, NW Washington, DC 20003 (202) 252-7212 elizabeth.aloi@usdoj.gov MARK M. ROLLINS, ESQ. ROLLINS & CHAN 419 Seventh Street, NW Suite 405 Washington, DC 20004 (202) 455-5610 mark@rollinsandchan.com Lisa A. Moreira, RDR, CRR Official Court Reporter U.S. Courthouse, Room 6718
For the United States: For the Defendant:	RISA BERKOWER, ESQ. U.S. ATTORNEY'S OFFICE FOR D.C. 555 4th Street, NW Washington, DC 20003 (202) 252-7212 elizabeth.aloi@usdoj.gov MARK M. ROLLINS, ESQ. ROLLINS & CHAN 419 Seventh Street, NW Suite 405 Washington, DC 20004 (202) 455-5610 mark@rollinsandchan.com Lisa A. Moreira, RDR, CRR Official Court Reporter
For the United States: For the Defendant:	RISA BERKOWER, ESQ. U.S. ATTORNEY'S OFFICE FOR D.C. 555 4th Street, NW Washington, DC 20003 (202) 252-7212 elizabeth.aloi@usdoj.gov MARK M. ROLLINS, ESQ. ROLLINS & CHAN 419 Seventh Street, NW Suite 405 Washington, DC 20004 (202) 455-5610 mark@rollinsandchan.com Lisa A. Moreira, RDR, CRR Official Court Reporter U.S. Courthouse, Room 6718 333 Constitution Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20001

PROCEEDINGS

THE COURTROOM DEPUTY: Your Honor, we're on the record for Criminal Case 21-34, Defendant 1, in *United*States of America vs. Thomas Robertson.

Counsel, approach the lectern and identify yourselves for the record starting with the government.

MS. ALOI: Good afternoon, Your Honor; Liz Aloi for the United States, and with me at counsel table is
Assistant US Attorney Risa Berkower and FBI Special Agents
Kathryn Camiliere and Christen Holcombe.

THE COURT: Okay. Good afternoon, ladies.

MR. ROLLINS: Good afternoon, Your Honor; Mark Rollins on behalf of Thomas Robertson.

THE COURT: Okay. Good afternoon, Mr. Rollins.

Mr. Robertson.

Are we ready to proceed?

Okay. The Court has read the presentencing investigation report -- and I should note that Ms. Baker from probation is here with us -- both the government and the defense memoranda in aid of sentencing and both sets of supporting exhibits, including letters from the defendant and from a number of his former colleagues and family members and friends, including letters from his wife, from his daughter, and from his daughter's father.

Any other written materials for the Court's

1 review? I know I received a PowerPoint from the government earlier today, which I assume you will go through later. 2 3 Any guests you'd like to introduce or acknowledge, Mr. Rollins, and will anyone be addressing the Court? 4 5 MR. ROLLINS: No, just myself. 6 THE COURT: Okay. Starting with the presentence 7 investigation report, are there any objections to just the factual findings? Setting the guidelines calculations to 8 9 the side, any objections that were not noted or otherwise 10 resolved? 11 And I'll tell you what, we're going to spend a lot 12 of back-and-forth, I suspect, on the calculations; so why 13 don't you just address the Court from counsel table with the 14 microphone, and then, when we address the sentencing 15 factors, you can come up to the podium. 16 MS. ALOI: The government has no additional 17 objections not previously identified. THE COURT: Mr. Rollins? 18 MR. ROLLINS: And defense has no additional 19 20 objections other than what we've put -- what we objected to. 21 THE COURT: Mr. Robertson, have you reviewed the 22 presentence investigation report with Mr. Rollins? 23 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir, I have. 24 THE COURT: And have you been satisfied with his 25 and Ms. Wagner's services in the case?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I am. I made corrections, and they were made.

THE COURT: Very well.

All right. Hearing no objections, the Court accepts the factual findings in the presentence investigation report regarding the circumstances of the offense; and, therefore, those facts as stated in the PSR will be adopted by the Court for purposes of this sentencing.

All right, moving to the guidelines calculation.

Before we get to the objections, let me just set out for the record how probation approached the guidelines and the calculations that it arrived at. There are six counts of conviction. Five of them are subject to the guidelines.

Count 5 for disorderly conduct is a Class B misdemeanor; so it's not covered by the guidelines.

Under 3D1.2(a) and (c), probation grouped Count 1, which is obstruction of an official proceeding, Count 3, entering and remaining in a restricted building, Count 4, disorderly conduct in a restricted building, and Count 6, obstruction of justice. It grouped those counts either because they involved the same victim, namely Congress, or in the count of -- or in the case of Count 6, the obstruction of justice count, the count embodied conduct that is treated as either a specific offense characteristic

or an enhancement to another count in that group.

Probation did not group Count 2, which was interfering with law enforcement during a civil disorder because it involved a different victim, namely law enforcement officers.

With respect to the grouped counts, probation applied the guideline for 18 USC Section 1512(c)(2), which is the obstruction of justice guideline set forth at Guideline Section 2J1.2. That offense carries a base offense level of 14. Probation applied two specific offense characteristic enhancements: one, 2J1.2(b)(1)(B), an eight-level enhancement because the offense involved causing or threatening to cause physical injury to a person, and a three-level enhancement under 2J1.2(b)(2) because the offense resulted in substantial interference with the administration of justice.

Probation also applied adjustments for an aggravated role in the offense and obstruction of justice. The aggravated role enhancement is at 3B1.1(c). Probation added two levels for the defendant being an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor in the criminal activity, and an additional enhancement at 3C1.1 for obstruction of justice based on the destruction of the cell phones. That resulted in an adjusted offense level for those grouped offenses of 29.

Probation went on to calculate the offense level for Count 2, the ungrouped count, which resulted in an offense level of 15. Ms. Baker informs me that there may have been a mistake in that calculation, and that the two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice should not, in

THE PROBATION OFFICER: Yes, Your Honor.

probation's view, be included. Is that correct, Ms. Baker?

THE COURT: Okay. And so that count resulted in an Offense Level 13, and because 13 or 15, as per the original calculation, was more than nine levels below the 29, it is the 29 that controls.

The defendant has no criminal history. Offense Level 29 at Criminal History Category 1 results in an advisory guidelines range of 87 to 108 months based on probation's calculation.

Now, before we get to the objections to the various enhancements that were applied, the government had an objection to the approach of grouping the counts prior to calculating the offense level for each individual count. At least that was the objection noted in your responses to the draft presentence report, although in your memo you say that the calculation would have resulted in the same guidelines range, and so I'm not sure I need to deal with that issue here.

Ms. Aloi.

1 That's correct, Your Honor. As to the MS. ALOI: grouping, there's no need to address it because it comes out 2 in the wash once you do the calculation. 3 THE COURT: So we should just move on to your 4 5 objections and the defense's objections to individual 6 enhancements. 7 MS. ALOI: Yes, Your Honor. 8 THE COURT: Okay. 9 So let's start with the government's objection. 10 believe, Ms. Aloi, you indicate that the government believes

that probation should have applied an additional two points based on specific offense characteristics set forth at 2J1.2(b)(3)(C) for an offense involving otherwise-extensivein-scope planning and preparation. Do you want to address that? And probation did not apply that enhancement.

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MS. ALOI: Yes, Your Honor. In our final sentencing submission we did not address that objection. While we think that it arguably applies to the defendant's behavior on January 6th and in the time leading up to it, we are not asking for it to be included in the calculation today.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.

Okay. And finally, Ms. Aloi, does the government also take the position that a second obstruction adjustment enhancement at 3C1.1 -- I'm sorry, 3C1.1 Comment Note 8,

1 does the government take the position that that applies as 2 well? 3 MS. ALOI: Your Honor, we take the same position. I think there is an argument that it applies, but we are not 4 5 seeking it today. THE COURT: Okay. Very well. So we can move to 6 7 the defense's objections. All right. Mr. Rollins, why don't you approach. 8 9 Okay. Let's start with the eight-level adjustment 10 under 2J1.2(b)(1)(B). The offense involved causing or 11 threatening to cause physical injury to a person. 12 MR. ROLLINS: Yes. So if the Court recalls --13 THE COURT: You can take your mask off, if you're 14 comfortable doing it. 15 MR. ROLLINS: As the Court recalls, we had a -- in 16 fact, I think there was a case produced regarding this same 17 issue with whether he was carrying a dangerous weapon or 18 using the dangerous weapon. Here, 2J1.2(b)(1)(B), the 19 offense involves causing or threatening to cause physical 20 injury to a person or property damage to obstruct the 21 administration of justice. 22 What I see the government doing here or 23 requesting is that because he's carrying the walking stick 24 that somehow -- and I don't think there was any testimony --

there was an officer who had indicated that he got touched,

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but it was clear he said he wasn't sure whether it was intentional or mistake. I think that was on cross. But there was no -- there was nothing to suggest that he had used it to cause physical injury to a person or created any property damage.

on and what I read from the presentence writer as well, that the -- after social media -- the conversations in social media about some of the language that was used would suggest that he would have or he had intended to use this weapon.

But, I mean, that really gets into theoretical -- I mean, we're talking about what his actions were on that day in using the actual walking stick.

THE COURT: Okay. Let me just cut to the chase a little bit. Obviously there was no physical injury. There was no use of the stick. He was not charged with using the stick. He was not convicted of using the stick. So the operative language is whether his carrying of the stick — let's put aside the comments, okay? — constituted a threat to cause physical injury to a person, all right?

And so I hear the government to argue that his carrying the stick in the way that he did -- and we've all seen the videos and the stills, and we sat through trial on this very question, and the jury sent out notes on this very question -- under this guideline, does that constitute a

threat to cause physical injury to those officers?

MR. ROLLINS: And I would suggest it doesn't. I mean, if we would just kind of go through the officer's testimony, and the government cited some of it in its memorandum regarding the port arms and the use of it in port arms, and I think they indicated that even in their memorandum that it's used in sort of a blocking fashion or almost a self-defense position. It's not -- when you're holding it in port arms, you're not using it in a threatening manner but more of a self-defense action that you could operate.

THE COURT: Right, but he's blocking their path.

He's wearing a gas mask. He's got a big old stick in his hand, you know, and they have to go around him, and he makes contact with the stick.

MR. ROLLINS: Right.

THE COURT: Would you not feel threatened if you were an officer in that position given everything else that was going on around you where there was physical violence and fighting and hand-to-hand combat?

MR. ROLLINS: So the officers -- and the government is correct with the things that were going on around them, with people throwing stuff and that. But looking at just this individual's actions of what he was doing -- I understand the officer's taking the position and

the jury found that he was in a position of blocking or preventing the officers from doing their job, and that's what the jury found, but this wasn't -- this wasn't an issue presented to the jury, that he was using it in such a manner to threaten or harm the officer.

THE COURT: We're not talking about using it. Was he holding it or carrying it in a manner that conveyed a threat under all the circumstances to those officers in front of him? I think that's the question.

MR. ROLLINS: Right. And I think, if we just take it from a common sense perspective, and that is if I'm holding it at port arms -- if I'm holding it out here and my arms are going -- extended outward or I'm using it in such a manner. But if it's up against my chest exactly as they described it, in a port arms manner, that doesn't indicate that one is using it in a threatening manner.

It's exactly as that officer described, that, when someone's holding it in a port arms manner, it's almost a defensive posture. So I don't see how we get to the next level of threatening by holding it in that position.

THE COURT: Okay. Ms. Aloi?

MS. ALOI: Your Honor, the government's position is that the eight-point adjustment applies for several different reasons. It certainly applies to the defendant's own behavior that day. As you correctly note, it does not

matter whether or not he used the stick so long as he was threatening in his usage of it.

There is, in fact, trial testimony that the stick made contact with the officers. But taking a step back, this actually applies not just to the civil disorder conduct but to the conduct of that day writ large, and once you incorporate the cross references in Section

181.13(a)(1)(A) --

THE COURT: Hold on. Hold on. Give me that reference again.

MS. ALOI: Under 1B1.3 -- I'm sorry, I said "Point 1" earlier, I meant Point 3(a)(1)(A) -- the enhancement applies when -- to both the defendant's actions but also anyone to whom the defendant aided or abetted. And by blocking and interfering with the MPD officers who were trying to move through the crowd on the west front of the building, the defendant aided and abetted those rioters immediately around him who were threatening and assaulting those officers.

THE COURT: I'm going to have you slow down just a little bit. Both for me and for Lisa.

MS. ALOI: I apologize.

THE COURT: Okay. 1B1.3(a)(1)(A), this is relevant conduct. So it says that the specific offense characteristics shall be determined on the basis of the

1 following, and (1)(A) is acts and omissions committed, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, procured, et 2 3 cetera, caused by the defendant. It's still talking about the defendant's acts. 4 5 We're not attributing acts of other people to him, right? 6 MS. ALOI: That's right, Your Honor, but in the 7 moment when the defendant was impeding the movement of law enforcement officers, those MPD officers were also being 8 9 assaulted by the rioters in their very presence and in the 10 path of the defendant, and so his actions directly aided and abetted those individuals in the mob who were threatening 11 12 and assaulting the officers as he impeded their movement. 13 THE COURT: Right, but I don't read that to mean 14 that his impeding the officers means that he gets tagged, 15 under that enhancement or that specific offense 16 characteristic, for threats that somebody else made to those 17 officers. 18 MS. ALOI: The government reads that 19 interpretation of -- reads 1B1.3(a)(1)(A) to encompass both the defendant's own acts and omissions and those who the 20 defendant aided and abetted. 21 22 But the Court need not find that --23 THE COURT: So we can be talking about more than 24 threats. There was actual physical injury under that view.

MS. ALOI: That's right, but here you don't have

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to find that to find that the defendant's own behavior was threatening. At trial you heard the testimony from the MPD officers who felt fear of their own safety by the defendant's own actions holding the wooden stick in their faces, and, in fact, he did make contact with the officers.

I'd also note, and believe this is in our briefing, that the defendant is responsible for acts of others in jointly undertaking criminal activity if those acts are within the scope of the jointly undertaken criminal activity, in furtherance of it, or reasonably foreseeable. It doesn't require evidence of preplanning or conspiracy. In plain terms, it just applies in persons who acted in unison to achieve a common goal.

Here, the defendant is responsible, in part, for the jointly undertaken criminal activity of the crowd of rioters he joined, who charged up the building, through the scaffolding, and overcame the police line. And taken together, the defendant's own conduct, in conjunction with those he aided and abetted, is clearly threatening to cause physical injury or property damage in order to obstruct the administration of justice.

THE COURT: Okay. I'm not sure if I accept your sort of vicarious liability theory for this, but I will apply the enhancement.

As I said, the question is whether the offense

involved a threat of physical injury. A verbal threat is not required. I believe Judge Howell rejected that same argument in the *Rubenacker* case.

While perhaps not aggressively threatening, as I said, if I were an officer, I would have felt physically threatened if I saw the defendant standing in front of me with a backpack and a gas mask holding a stick at port arms standing right in front of me and not moving out of the way and making contact with it as I tried to organize a line to fight off a violent mob. I would consider that threatening or menacing conduct.

In addition, the Webster's definition of "threat" is an expression of intention to inflict injury. That is very close to the instruction that I gave the jury on carrying a dangerous weapon, namely that they had to find that the defendant, quote, carried the stick with the intent to use it in a manner capable of causing serious injury. In my view, carrying a weapon with the intent to use it to inflict injury is tantamount to expressing an intention to inflict injury, which is the dictionary definition of "threat." So I believe the enhancement applies.

That's not to say, Mr. Rollins, that you cannot argue that the Court should -- could vary based on the extent and nature of the threat in this case, but we can get there later in connection with the sentencing factors, okay?

Mr. Rollins, you also objected to the application of 2J1.2(b)(2) regarding substantial interference with the administration of justice. Do you want to press that objection, or no?

MR. ROLLINS: Yes. I was just -THE COURT: Take your time.

MR. ROLLINS: So in this 3C1.1, the directing or procuring another person to destroy or conceal evidence that is material to the investigation or judicial proceeding --

THE COURT: Wait, let's get to 2J1.2(b)(2) first, the substantial interference with the administration of justice.

MR. ROLLINS: Oh, I'm sorry, yes, 2J1.2, the offense resulted in a substantial interference with the administration of justice. And I think I cited some cases here in reference to that charge that the enhancement does not apply when the government fails to identify any expenses in addition to the costs of bringing the defendant to trial.

Here, while this -- and I think, as I stated, there's no question that there's been a substantial amount of money expended in this trial, this case, but I think, when they're referencing substantial interference -- and there's actually a premature or improper termination of a felony investigation, and I think this even went to when someone has caused that investigation to spend more money

such as lying to officers or lying to the FBI to where they're committing perjury, and then the government has to spend more money to kind of go around those lies, and I think that's exactly what that enhancement applies to. And the government hasn't cited anything in this case that would show the unnecessary expenses of resources based on anything that he did.

So I understand that where they're going to probably come to is those cell phones and sort of say, well, the cell phones. But the reality is the cell phones doesn't change the -- the only thing it did was -- if we believe what the government said, and that is that he destroyed the cell phones, that didn't change how they proceeded in this trial. In fact, that count was added at the last, I think, two weeks before the trial started. So that would be the only thing that they could come back and say that somehow substantially interfered with justice, but that wasn't so in this case.

THE COURT: I think the argument, Mr. Rollins, is that the thing that was interfered with was the certification of the vote, and there was both a delay in the certification as a result of the riot, and then substantial costs were incurred to respond to the damage caused by the riot. I don't think the theory is linked to the cell phones.

MR. ROLLINS: So -- but -- and I guess that goes to -- they're asking to -- and I think it comes to that substantial interference, the definition of what that truly means, and it's defined as a premature or improper termination of a felony investigation.

THE COURT: That's just one example, right?

MR. ROLLINS: An indictment or other judicial determination based on perjury, false testimony, or false evidence, or the unnecessary expense of substantial government and court resources.

The charge itself was obstructing Congress, and by adding that word "substantial interference," and if we take the definition of what "substantial interference" means, that doesn't apply here at all. I don't see how that would apply because it almost -- and the cases that I read on this basically it's almost to the after -- what happens after the actual obstruction occurs, not necessarily before. That's why I think a lot of the cases go to the perjury count and talk about perjury in relation to substantial interference of government resources.

But, again, the government's identifying the costs, and I read their costs relating to the case, but that wasn't done after the fact. That was actually in the -- that's the act itself. It doesn't have to do with anything that occurred afterward. And I think that's what this

enhancement is requiring, substantial interference with the administration of justice, but apparently like after the act occurs, and you do something that's causing additional resources for the government to spend to get to that point.

THE COURT: Okay. Ms. Aloi.

MS. ALOI: Thank you, Your Honor.

I think the defendant here is missing the mark. He was convicted of obstructing the election certification, and as a result of the January 6th event, the official proceeding of Congress's joint session, which was required by the Constitution and the federal statute, had to be halted while legislators were physically evacuated for their own safety. That is -- I don't see a scenario in which that is not substantial interference with the administration of justice.

And here, even under the narrow construction proposed by the defendant, he appears to concede that the government had to expend additional resources given the attack, and so it applies.

THE COURT: Okay. The Court finds that the enhancement applies. The offense did result in a substantial interference given both the delay that the riot caused in the certification proceeding, which is the proceeding at issue, and the expenditure of substantial resources that was necessary to fix the damage that was done

to the Capitol. That finding is consistent with findings of Judge Moss in the *Matthew Miller* case and Judge Howell in the *Greg Rubenacker* case where that enhancement was applied as well.

And then finally, Mr. Rollins, 3C1.1, the obstruction of justice enhancement. Are you challenging that?

MR. ROLLINS: Yes. This is the 3C1.1 obstructing administration of justice, directing or procuring another person to destroy or conceal evidence that is material to an official investigation or judicial proceeding or attempting to do so. In this, I believe, the government's relying on the fact that somehow they believe that Mr. Robertson's the lead here; and, therefore, he is directing another person to -- and I assume that person they're referencing is

Mr. Fracker. That's my understanding of what the government is trying to say there; because Mr. Robertson provided the transportation, that somehow he was in a leadership role.

But when I read Mr. Fracker's statement, it essentially says just the opposite, and Mr. Fracker is saying that he takes responsibility for his own actions, and that Mr. Robertson did not cause him to do anything that he didn't want to do that day. So I don't see how the government's showing some form of -- that he's a leader.

THE COURT: Again, I think we're talking past each

other. This is the obstruction of justice two-point enhancement under 3C1.1, which doesn't relate -- as I understand it, Ms. Baker -- to his recruiting of Mr. Fracker or his organization of Mr. Fracker, but rather to his destruction of the cell phones, which he was convicted of.

MR. ROLLINS: Oh, I'm adding on 3B1.1, which is directing or procuring another person.

THE COURT: Okay. That was an aggravating factor that was also applied.

THE PROBATION OFFICER: Yes.

THE COURT: Okay. So you're not objecting to the plus two for obstruction of justice, but the plus two for --

MR. ROLLINS: The leadership role.

THE COURT: -- the leadership role.

Okay. Go ahead.

MR. ROLLINS: And as I stated, it wouldn't take the Court more than to look at Mr. Fracker's own statements to realize that there wasn't essentially a leader here. The position that Mr. Robertson drove the vehicle to Washington, D.C., that day or the position that somehow he operated in a leadership role over Mr. Fracker I think is misplaced, especially given Mr. Fracker's own statements to the Court regarding what he takes as his own responsibility, and even what he said on the stand as to his own responsibility as to what happened that day. And I don't see how the

government's proving that somehow Mr. Robertson was in a leadership role.

THE COURT: All right. Well, the provision is written in the disjunctive. He could have been an organizer; he could have been a leader; he could have been a manager; or he could have been a supervisor. So leaving leadership out and focusing on organizer: He provided the transportation. He bought the gas masks. He drove the truck. He bought the meals ready to eat, right?

MR. ROLLINS: Right.

THE COURT: That's not organization?

MR. ROLLINS: Well, that's organizing.

THE COURT: And it's not just Fracker, but it's the neighbor as well.

MR. ROLLINS: But that may be organizing a trip because you all have planned a trip to go to Washington, D.C., that day to engage in the rally. But when you really look back and consider his actions that day and that Mr. Fracker -- and if we're just talking about Fracker, I'm not talking about the neighbor -- Mr. Fracker goes into the building first, and so to say that somehow he's organizing or that he's created this scene because he's the organizer when -- Mr. Fracker goes into the building first.

And there was no testimony that Mr. Fracker said or he said, "Go in the building" or "This is what I think we

should do." There wasn't that. In fact, Mr. Fracker says there was no planning. I think he used a "we were at a stoplight and everyone says go," something to that extent, but not that Mr. Robertson has somehow organized this so...

And there's nothing to suggest that he organized this other than he had the gas mask, they drove to

Washington, and he was just prepared. And I think maybe they're considering preparing and organizing the same thing, but I don't believe they are. I think he's just prepared.

He's not organizing. He's not doing something to concert or put together this crime.

THE COURT: Okay. Ms. Aloi.

So you say in your papers a number of times that he recruited Mr. Fracker, and I don't recall the evidence of that at trial.

MS. ALOI: Your Honor, at trial -- I can give you the citation. It was on April 6th at Page 691. Mr. Fracker testified that the defendant had invited him to go with him, and that he would not have gone had the defendant not invited him.

The government also has information that the defendant invited other folks at the police department as well, that he was organizing people within the police department where Mr. Fracker was a subordinate and he was a sergeant, to attend -- to participate in the criminal

activity.

THE COURT: Okay. And what about the other organizational aspects of the trip? Is Mr. Rollins -- is he correct or incorrect that just getting the gas and providing transportation doesn't count, and it has to be something related to once they got here?

MS. ALOI: Well, once they got here, they moved in tandem, and Mr. Fracker testified that he agreed with the defendant to go inside the building where they participated --

THE COURT: Just being with a group of friends can't be leadership, right? I mean, then everybody would be a leader. He's got to show something more than that.

MS. ALOI: It was the defendant's leadership that got Mr. Fracker and the neighbor there that day. That's why it was significant that he drove them, provided the gas masks, provided the supplies, the MREs, which was identified. He paid for the MetroCards after they parked the car in Virginia. He took all of the actions necessary to put Mr. Fracker at the Capitol that day.

THE COURT: Okay.

All right. While I would not have applied the extra two points for substantial leadership that the government indicated that it would press for, I will apply the two points based on his organization of the trip, the

1 transportation, the provisions, his inviting and I think 2 it's probably fair to say recruiting Mr. Fracker and others 3 for the trip even though he may not have demonstrated much of a leadership role once they were at the Capitol. 4 5 All right. So I think that that's all of the 6 objections, Counsel. 7 MS. ALOI: Your Honor, if I could just note, the government objects to probation's calculation declining to 8 9 add the obstruction points on the civil disorder count. I 10 would -- I just want to note it for the record. The cell 11 phones that were destroyed contained evidence of --THE COURT: I'm sorry, that's Count 2? 12 13 MS. ALOI: That's right. 14 THE COURT: So the ungrouped count. 15 MS. ALOI: That's right. At the start of this 16 proceeding you had noted that probation had a mistake in the 17 PSR, and that mistake was applying the obstruction to that 18 count. 19 THE COURT: Okay. 20 MS. ALOI: But the government's position is that 21 it does apply because the cell phones contained evidence of 22 the participation in the civil disorder and that the 23 defendant collected the cell phone from Mr. Fracker to 24 destroy it. 25 THE COURT: Okay. Ms. Baker, would you like to

1 address that now, or do you want to consider that in 2 redrafting or revising the PSR? I know that there may be a 3 pagination or a paragraph numbering issue anyway where you're going to have to revise it in any event. 4 5 MS. ALOI: Just the types of information that are 6 on the cell phone are things like location history and 7 contacts as well as the photos. 8 THE COURT: Okay. 9 THE PROBATION OFFICER: So good afternoon, Your 10 Honor. THE COURT: Good afternoon. 11 12 THE PROBATION OFFICER: Yes, as noted, the 13 paragraph numbers mistakenly are off. When we did the 14 guideline analysis, it threw the numbers off so I would ask 15 the Court the latter, what the Court has suggested or 16 mentioned to consider it. 17 THE COURT: And you can consider and address 18 Ms. Aloi's comments today on that. 19 THE PROBATION OFFICER: Yes. 20 THE COURT: For purposes of the proceeding today, 21 since Count 2 doesn't affect the overall adjusted offense 22 level, consistent with the Court's findings, the Court 23 agrees with probation that the base offense level is -- the

total offense level is 29. The defendant has no criminal

history so Criminal History Category 1. That results in an

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1 advisory guidelines range of 87 months to 108 months. 2 Probation has recommended a period of 3 incarceration of 96 months on the grouped count, 60 months 4 on the ungrouped count, Count 2, and six months on the 5 nonguideline count all to run concurrently resulting in a 6 total recommendation of 87 to 108 as well as three years of 7 supervised release. The government makes essentially the same 8 9 recommendation plus a figure of \$2,000 restitution. 10 All right. Any objections, Counsel? Did I get anything wrong? Your objections to the enhancements are 11 12 noted for the record. 13 MS. ALOI: The government has nothing further with 14 regard to the guidelines calculation. 15 THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Rollins. 16 MR. ROLLINS: We just stand by our objections. 17 THE COURT: Very well. 18 All right. Ms. Aloi, do you want to address the 19 sentencing factors? 20 MS. ALOI: Thank you, Your Honor. Could we -would you mind moving it over to the ELMO? 21 22 THE COURT: Sure. Do you need some time to set 23 up? 24 MS. ALOI: No. I would just hope to use the ELMO, 25 but I can't actually see it on the screen.

1 THE COURTROOM DEPUTY: Because it's not on. 2 THE COURT: There we go. 3 MS. ALOI: Okay. Thank you, Your Honor. THE COURT: Is that displayed in the gallery? 4 5 Ms. Jenkins, do you want to --THE COURTROOM DEPUTY: Not yet. 6 7 THE COURT: Okay. THE COURTROOM DEPUTY: Go ahead. 8 9 MS. ALOI: Can it be seen in the gallery? 10 I think we can proceed with it on one side, if that's amenable to the Court. 11 12 THE COURT: Right, unless there's a quick fix. 13 And if you folks on my right want to move over, feel free 14 to. 15 MS. ALOI: Okay. We can just proceed. THE COURT: Okay. 16 17 MS. ALOI: Your Honor, Thomas Robertson, a police 18 sergeant for the town of Rocky Mount, Virginia, joined the 19 mob which attacked the U.S. Capitol to disrupt the peaceful 20 transition of power on January 6th. As the evidence showed 21 at trial, he used his law enforcement and military training 22 to block MPD officers attempting to hold the mob back. 23 destroyed evidence by gathering and tossing into a lake the 24 cell phones that he and Co-Defendant Fracker used on January 25 6th, and he was convicted at trial of all six counts with

which he was charged for this conduct.

When he was arrested, he showed an utter disregard for the rule of law by flagrantly ignoring the conditions of his release by trafficking in firearms, and only a significant sentence of incarceration will ensure that he does not reoffend. For his efforts to impede law enforcement, overturn the election results, and destroy the evidence, this Court should sentence Defendant Robertson to a guidelines sentence of 96 months incarceration.

Now, this Court must consider the factors set forth in 18 USC 3553(a) in crafting a sentence. One of those factors is the nature and circumstances of the offense. I know Your Honor sat through the testimony, but I just want to briefly remind the Court of the evidence that the jury saw.

The defendant's calls for violence started immediately after the election; not, as the defendant claims, in late November. In his letter to the Court, the defendant blames his radicalization on a person suffering from a terminal illness that he didn't even know about until weeks after this statement. A legitimate --

THE COURT: How do we know that?

MS. ALOI: This is a Facebook post. It was dated November 7th, so immediately after the election.

THE COURT: But how do we know when the friend was

suffering from cancer?

MS. ALOI: It was in the letter that he submitted to the Court.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. ALOI: So "A legitimate republic stands on 4 boxes. The soap box, the ballot box, the jury box, and then the cartridge box. I cannot speak for others, but being disenfranchised by fraud is my hard line. I've spent most of my adult life fighting a counter insurgency. I'm about to become part of one."

The defendant came prepared for violence. He brought gas masks, MREs, and the large wooden sticks. He brought the gas masks for him and his friends.

And here's another example of what he was prepared for.

"Civility has left me. I won't be disenfranchised. I'll follow the path our founders gave us. Redress of grievances (already done), civil disobedience (here now) and then open armed rebellion. I'm prepared to start one here and know a bunch of like minded and trained individuals."

Those like-minded and trained individuals, those are two of the people he recruited to join him that day.

As you saw, he used his baton in military training to threaten the officers to stand in port arms and impede

them when they were there to assist. And in case there can be no doubt, he made contact with the officers.

As you can see here and as the trial testimony showed, he did not stand back. He did not get out of their way.

And then, when all was said and done, he took a victory lap. He and Defendant Fracker took a selfie photo, an obscene selfie photo, in the Capitol's Crypt.

And here's what the defendant had to say about his conduct on January 6th. "Here's the picture in question" — the one you just saw — "and I am fucking PROUD of it. It shows 2 men willing to actually put skin in the game and stand up for their rights. If you are too much of a coward to risk arrest, being fired, and actual gunfire to secure your rights, you have no words to speak I value. Enjoy your feel good protests and fame. I'll simply accept a 'Thank you' for the very blanket of freedom that you live and sleep under."

And that's actually not all he had to say about his conduct on January 6th. Another quote from the trial presentation: "CNN and the Left are just mad because we actually attacked" -- not protested -- "attacked the government who is the problem and not some random small business. The Left rioted all Summer and just burned their own neighborhoods, assaulted numerous civilians, and

destroyed and looted small family owned stores. The Right IN ONE DAY (without weapons) took the fucking US Capitol. Keep poking us."

And that's not all.

"A government scared of its people. The pictures of them huddled in the floor crying is the most American thing I have ever seen. Regardless of what else happens those senators and Congressmen now understand who they truly are accountable to in the end. They have paid lip service to 'Working for the people' for so long its become a hollow phrase. They have been reminded...we...not Antifa. Stormed it."

The defendant is by all accounts proud of his conduct on January 6th.

THE COURT: And, again, remind me when these statements were made?

MS. ALOI: The first statement that you saw was made on November 7th. In the defendant's letter he said that he started caring for his friend, which radicalized him, on November 20th, several weeks later.

The next statement that you saw was made on December 19th. That is the one about recruiting a bunch of like-minded and trained individuals.

And then the other ones were taken almost immediately after the rioting, in which he is remarking on

1 the -- I'm sorry, the attack on which he's remarking on the picture that had been posted of him and Mr. Fracker in the 2 3 Crypt. 4 THE COURT: Okay. 5 MS. ALOI: I'd like to take another moment to 6 remind you of some of the other evidence that the jury saw. 7 The defendant submits in his sentencing presentation or his package for the Court that he did 8 9 not destroy the cell phones, and he blames his conduct on 10 Mr. Fracker despite all evidence to the contrary. These are 11 the text messages that were found on his new phone following 12 its seizure. And this is from January 15, 2021, so 13 contemporaneous with the occurrence. 14 "Anything that may have been problematic is 15 destroyed." "Including my old phone." 16 "Took a lake swim." 17 "And later had a tragic boating accident." 18 19 "They asked for my phone but I'm not a retard." 20 That is what the defendant had to say about law 21 enforcement's investigation of this case. 22 The Court has to consider the need for deterrence 23 and respect for the rule of law when deciding the 24 defendant's sentence. As you just saw, the defendant

continued to call for violence after his arrest and the

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1 charges, but they weren't limited to his public Facebook 2 post. 3 I want to draw your attention to some texts between the defendant and his friend Deacon. This is the 4 5 very same Deacon who submitted the letter to the Court 6 citing the defendant's good character. These were provided 7 in unredacted form to the Court and the defendant earlier this week. 8 9 This is March 10, 2021, and a note to Deacon and 10 others. THE COURT: I'm sorry, Deacon is a member of the 11 12 couple who mentored or quasi adopted him? Is that --13 MS. ALOI: I do not believe he is a member of that 14 couple. 15 THE COURT: Okay. 16 MS. ALOI: I think he is part of a conversation 17 with that couple in this text thread. He submitted a letter 18 on his behalf. 19 "This is not a suicide note or anything crazy like 20 that but I swear to you both that you will never hear of me 21 surrendering to be a political prisoner, and I will make 22 them pay dearly, and think twice before coming for anyone 23 else."

"I love you guys. I'm not planning on doing

anything crazy but I am done being civil about it. If they

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come here again, many will die. Possibly by [sic] me, definitely many of them. I am not thinking crazy. I am not going insane. I'm done. They seem to be pressing a war, and I aim to give them more than they want."

"I can kill every agent that they send for probably 2 weeks. Maybe longer. One man. If they start to realize that it will stop the bullshit tyranny."

And the context for this are the seizures that were occurring at the defendant's house of his firearms arsenal contemporaneous with his arrest and after he was ordered not to have any firearms.

Later on the thread, they're discussing a meme.

The meme says -- it's hard to see here, but it says in the caption, "Never fuck with someone who is prepared to die in battle," to which the defendant responds, "They may get the chance. Call me an insurrectionist so many times and I will oblige you."

This occurs after his arrest.

A significant sentence is needed to keep this defendant from offending again. He has no respect for this Court's order and nothing in his behavior suggests that he will be deterred from participating in future misconduct. I know his disregard for the Court's orders has been well documented before the Court, but I think it's worth the reminder.

Title 18 United States Code Section 922(n) makes it unlawful for any person who is under indictment for a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce any firearms or ammunition. The defendant, he was a police officer. He's aware of what the law requires, and here is a list of firearms that he shipped using a federal firearms licensee in Virginia while under felony indictment. You'll get a sense of the volume.

THE COURT: Okay. Obviously the Court is aware of this issue. It was the subject of a motion for revocation of his conditions of release, which the Court granted. Has he been charged with that offense?

MS. ALOI: That matter remains under investigation.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. ALOI: And I have also the lab report showing by a preponderance of the evidence that he possessed an explosive device at his home after being ordered not to.

This is also in evidence -- in the Court's record at 36.1.

THE COURT: Okay. Tell me more about that. If I recall correctly, there was a suggestion by the defense that this was part of some sort of training mechanism. He had provided training for other law enforcement, and this was a demonstration device that was not operable. Did the FBI

analyze that, and did it come to a different --

MS. ALOI: The defendant just continues to make excuses for his behavior. Even were it --

THE COURT: Well, he was a -- he did train folks in firearms use, correct?

MS. ALOI: Yes, and you would think that his training would have informed him of the way in which these items are supposed to be secured.

First off, the government has no information to suggest that it was, in fact, a training device. But even were it a training device, it was improperly stored, and here in the lab report it details the items that were found and the ways in which they are used to make explosive devices. And this is an independent offense beyond the possession of firearms or the shipping firearms in interstate commerce because there's very specific means by which law enforcement and other individuals are required to store and maintain explosive devices.

And, again, that's even --

THE COURT: I just want to be clear for purposes of sentencing. The implication is when joined up with the text that you just read and the prior seizures of his weapons by FBI agents, that this may have been some sort of booby trap or device that he intended to deploy if they came back.

1 So the natural questions are, you know, was it 2 operative? Was it a training device or a real device? You know, if it wasn't operative, could it have been activated 3 4 within a short period of time? 5 What implication should I draw from the thing that 6 is pictured here? 7 MS. ALOI: Your Honor, I think the implication you should draw is that this speaks directly to the 3553(a) 8 9 factors concerning the defendant's likelihood to reoffend or 10 the need for deterrence and also the defendant's disregard for the rule of law. 11 12 While he certainly engaged in numerous texts 13 suggesting that he was planning for future violence, 14 including against the FBI agents who had seized his house 15 and other individuals who he caused --16 THE COURT: Seized items from his house. 17 MS. ALOI: I am not here saying at this time that 18 this particular device was to be used against the agents. 19 THE COURT: Okay. 20 MS. ALOI: Just that it is evidence that he was 21 amassing an arsenal of illegal weapons, illegal firearms. 22 And the lab report has been provided to the Court. 23 THE COURT: Which I've reviewed. MS. ALOI: The defendant also has a track record 24 25 of lying about his military service. He does this to both

his employer, his friends, and the news media. And just on the same consideration with regard to the rule of law, the Stolen Valor Act makes it a crime to benefit by making false statements about military awards.

On January 11th, just a few days after the attack, in an effort to publicly assert that his own role in the insurrection was peaceful and law abiding, the defendant bragged to a reporter that he achieved the rank of Sergeant First Class E7 and sent a photo that he claimed to be of himself adorned with a Purple Heart. Those photos are in the sentencing materials. He did this even though he knew he was discharged from the Army at the rank of Specialist E4 and was never awarded a Purple Heart.

THE COURT: Can you tell me whether that's under investigation as well?

MS. ALOI: I cannot comment further on the status of criminal investigations.

The victim impact of the defendant's crimes are also not insignificant. As you heard at trial, the officers had to physically move the defendant out of their way to get through in furtherance of their own duties to try to secure the Capitol. His stick struck two separate CD 42 officers as they tried to move past.

Each rioter's actions that day were illegal and contributed directly or indirectly to the violence and

destruction. As a judge in this court recently stated, a mob isn't a mob without the numbers. The people who are committing these violent acts did so because they had the safety of numbers.

And briefly, I just want to take a few more minutes to respond to some of the defendant's sentencing materials.

The defendant provided the Court with letters from several character witnesses. They don't really appear to know him, and they didn't see the evidence that the jury saw. They seem collectively to continue the denial and failure of the defendant to take responsibility for his conduct.

He also included a letter, which I've referenced, attempting to explain his side of the story, but it's riddled with falsehoods. Some of those are detailed in our memo.

I just think it's worth emphasizing here that truth has no meaning to this defendant. He'll say whatever he thinks he needs to say to make excuses for his conduct. He blamed his conduct in part on his wife's absence even while he was out cavorting with other women. He blamed a friend who was sick, which is just wildly inappropriate. And he blamed his co-defendant, Fracker, for destroying the phone even though the text messages, as you just saw,

clearly state otherwise. He is simply not credible.

Going back to his military service for a moment.

In his letter he mentions serving from 2005 to 2011,

including deployment to Afghanistan and Iraq, and he

suggests that he was severely wounded in furtherance of that

service. But he was discharged from the military in 2009

and his total active duty time is only one year and four

months.

It should come as no surprise, though, that the defendant exaggerates his military service. He has a long history of lying about it.

THE COURT: Let's stop there. He was certainly wounded. Do you contest that? And the --

MS. ALOI: I don't contest he was wounded, but he wasn't wounded while in active duty. He was a contractor.

And so his materials suggest that he was in active service when he was wounded. He was wounded later in the region working as a contractor.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. ALOI: In evidence at trial were representations that the defendant made to the city of Rocky Mount, Virginia, in support of his application for employment with the police department, so this is some number of years ago. The defendant identified himself in his resume to be a U.S. Army Ranger School graduate. In

written filings by counsel, he made similar representations to this Court.

For example, in ECF 31 the defendant filed pleadings that said that he served in the United States Army, became a Ranger and sniper school graduate. The government's reviewed the defendant's official military records and confirmed that he is neither an Army Ranger nor a graduate of the U.S. Army School.

He is simply not credible both with regard to what happened on January 6th and whether or not he can be relied on to respect the rule of law in the future.

And going back for a moment, Your Honor, about his injury, we note this in our sentencing materials, but there's even a discrepancy in his materials as to when he was cleared for work for the police department. It was earlier than he represented, which is evidenced by his own record, and so the falsehoods are permeated throughout.

And notably, and I think this is important for the Court's consideration, the defendant lied to his codefendant, a former U.S. Marine and his subordinate officer at the Rocky Mount Police Department. He lied about his military service, and he used those lies to envelop himself in a cloak of credibility, to imbue himself of leadership authority, all of which influenced Co-Defendant Fracker's friendship with his former mentor and ultimately Fracker's

decision to join the defendant at the Capitol. These lies to Fracker continued even after the defendant's arrest at the same time that the defendant was paying Mr. Fracker upwards of \$30,000 following their arraignment.

And here, for the Court, I have a text from the defendant to Mr. Fracker. It is dated March 15, 2021, and it says "Recognizing that I volunteered for a Ranger, fully knowing the hazard of my chosen profession. I will always endeavor to uphold the prestige of my chosen Ranger regiment." That is a lie.

For his participation in the January 6th attack on the Capitol and considering the 3553(a) factors, including the need for the sentence to reflect the rule of law and provide specific and general deterrence and the cover-up and his complete disregard for this Court's authority, the government recommends that the Court impose a 96-month sentence.

THE COURT: Okay. Address the eight-level enhancement. Obviously that's doing a lot of work here, right?

MS. ALOI: So --

THE COURT: Without the enhancement, the range would be 37 to 46, which is less than half of what it is now. It would take him from a 29 to a 21.

When I read the notes to that enhancement, it says

that -- you know, it acknowledges that it encompasses a wide range of conduct from a mere threat to extreme violence, all right. I've applied that enhancement. I agree that it should apply, but I think the commission itself acknowledges that there's a lot of conduct that might qualify for that eight.

So the question is, you know, without any physical violence -- I know it touched the officer, okay? But he didn't hit the guy with it, all right. Without any expressed verbal threats -- and there have been folks where that enhancement has applied who have threatened Minority Leader McConnell or Speaker Pelosi. I think Mr. Reffitt falls in that category.

You know, there's a broad range of conduct. Why should the Court not at least vary? And I get there may be other factors that the guidelines don't take into account that might be aggravating, but just focusing on that, why should the Court not vary because there was no violence, there was no explicit threat, there was no overt, you know, movement of the stick. You see my point, right?

MS. ALOI: Your Honor --

THE COURT: How should I assess his conduct? And we agree on what the conduct is.

MS. ALOI: So his conduct certainly does not warrant a variance here. For starters, I think you can --

THE COURT: So any Court should apply eight regardless of whether it is actual physical violence or a mere threat?

MS. ALOI: Well, here I think you have to look at the threat and moment in the context of the other statements, both before and after. This is not a situation where you could say that this defendant was accidentally threatening. He came with the intention of being violent, and all his conduct after the fact just enforces that point.

It was his intention to be threatening that day in order to obstruct the administration of justice. It's why he brought his gas masks. It's why he brought the gas masks for his friends. It's why he brought the large wooden stick, and it's why he lied about the stick on the day of the law enforcement searches.

It is not an accident that he was in the position that he was threatening those officers. If you recall from the trial presentation, at the very moment that this is going on those officers are fully under attack.

THE COURT: Okay. Let me ask the question this way. Are there any circumstances under which a Court should consider a variance because that -- because all eight levels overstates the seriousness of the defendant's conduct? Any circumstances?

MS. ALOI: Your Honor --

1 THE COURT: Or is eight eight in all cases? 2 MR. ALOI: Your Honor, I am not here today to 3 speak to the other hundreds of rioters who were there at the 4 Capitol. What I can say is applying it to this defendant is completely consistent with how it has been applied for 5 6 similarly situated defendants. And I note, Mr. Reffitt got 7 it, and he didn't even enter the building, and many defendants --8 9 THE COURT: No, but he made specific threats 10 against the speaker and minority leader. MS. ALOI: Yes, querying whether or not those 11 12 threats were as physical as Defendant Robertson's --13 THE COURT: I understand. 14 MS. ALOI: -- but also many of the defendants 15 who have agreed, by plea agreement, to accept the eight 16 points acknowledging their behavior, and so to apply any variance here based on this defendant's behavior with this 17 defendant -- with the context for his actions would create a 18 19 disparity. 20 THE COURT: Okay. Anything else? 21 MS. ALOI: No. 22 THE COURT: All right. Mr. Rollins, you're on. 23 Ms. Wagner left you to your own devices today? 24 MR. ROLLINS: Yes. She had another hearing in 25 Superior Court.

THE COURT: Give her my best.

MR. ROLLINS: Thank you.

So I'm going to start with the nature and circumstances of the offense. We already know the facts of this case backwards and forwards, and even his letter to the Court acknowledges the nature of the offense and acknowledges what he did on that day. Now, there is always going to be this dispute about whether there's an obstruction of Congress, which he still stands by that was never his intent when he went in there.

But the nature and circumstances of this case are all on video, to the point to where we see Mr. Robertson carrying the stick in port arms. We never see him use that stick against someone. I understand what the Court's saying, that if you're walking down the street and see somebody with a stick, you may be apprehensive --

THE COURT: In the middle of a violent protest or riot or whatever you want to call it.

MR. ROLLINS: And I completely understand the Court's point in that in that, you know, everything that's happening -- if I see anybody carrying a port arms stick outside I probably wouldn't be, but if I see stuff being thrown and all of that and someone carrying a port arms stick, I may have a little bit more apprehension.

THE COURT: With a gas mask on.

MR. ROLLINS: With a gas mask on. I may not walk up to that individual.

But at the same time, that individual is not coming after me as well, and I think that is the big difference here on what this individual's doing in the nature and circumstances of this case.

THE COURT: Right. So, Mr. Rollins, I sat through the same trial that you did. I agree with you. I saw what I saw, and you saw what you saw.

MR. ROLLINS: But --

excellent job defending a difficult case. And, you know, I think the difficulty of the case and some of these issues we're talking about was reflected in the care with which this jury approached the deliberations and the thoughtful questions that it asked and time that it took to reach a verdict, and I am confident that, you know, it grappled with some of these issues that we've been talking about.

MR. ROLLINS: Yes, so --

THE COURT: And I get -- which is to say, though, as my questions to Ms. Aloi, I think, probably suggested, I get the differing interpretations that can be taken from what he actually did that day, which we all saw.

I think the elephant in the room here is the postarrest conduct, and a lot of that, you know, we dealt with in connection with the revocation proceeding. A lot of it was indicated at trial, but I've seen even more in the sentencing materials which did not come out at trial.

And address whatever you'd like. I don't want to cut you off. But, you know, that is, to me, more of an aggravating factor that you have to deal with.

MR. ROLLINS: So with that said, I'm going to back away a little bit from the nature and circumstances of the offense and kind of go into the history and characteristics of my client.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. ROLLINS: And let me just -- I met

Mr. Robertson over a year ago just by a phone call. And

there's no question that me and Mr. Robertson may not see

eye to eye on politics, but the one thing that Mr. Robertson

and I -- and I've gotten to know him over the year. It's

been a long year.

What you see and what the government's trying to present now with sort of trying to make him out to be this fraud, that is not this man. And I get that they're trying to say, oh, some of the stuff — he may have boasted about his background. He may have boasted about some of the things that occurred in his life. But you can't boast and you can't walk through and say that some of these things did not occur when he saved lives from a fire that occurred in

his town, and that's in one of our exhibits.

You can't boast about his other credentials of being awarded certificates of recognition for courageous actions and unselfish dedication. That's also all in our exhibits.

You can't boast -- these are absolute truths.

Someone has presented this to him. Newspaper articles have been written on him. This is all to say, hey, this gentleman in our community did these good things. And I'm referencing an article just in terms of where he was honored for one of the high DUI arrest rates in his town. I am referencing that he put -- "Cops Offer Gun Locks For Kids."

That was also in his town.

So Ms. Aloi, she comes in here and basically tries to destroy his character, and that's not this man, and that's not who this man is.

Yes, he's made some clear mistakes in life, but if you look at the totality of this human being and what he's done with his life, the fact is he did serve his country. The fact is that he did go overseas, and he was injured; and when he was injured in that contract position, that was still for this country. He was training other officers over in the foreign land. So -- and then I go into the 2005 sexual assault allegation where investigation --

THE COURT: So he embellished, but he didn't lie.

Is that fair to say?

MR. ROLLINS: That is exactly what's happened here. And we had a joke about it. Sometimes you may be trying to tell a woman something to get her to like you, and that may be where his embellishment went. No question.

But like I said, you can't embellish the 2005 sexual assault investigation wherein he got a confession from a child molester. You can't embellish that.

You can't embellish some of the things that he's just done in his life. And I'm not going to go through all of them because there are over 35 pages of letters of commendation to Sergeant Thomas, recognition of Army achievements. These aren't over embellishments.

I'm going to get to the -- I want to move on from his character because I think, you know, you can say what you want, and Ms. Aloi can say what she wants about his character, but I rest on the fact that this man has good character. This man has produced -- he's provided to his community. He's always served his fellow man, whether it was in the Army or in the police force. That's all he's known his entire life.

And when Ms. Aloi speaks to or the government speaks to the request to hold him essentially for 96 months -- and I'm just going to -- I'm going to bring this out.

Mr. Fracker and Mr. Robertson did wrong on that day. No question. They both went into that building. The difference between the two is that Mr. Robertson had the walking stick. They both had on masks. They both were police officers. They both did -- they both were wrong that day, but the government says that Mr. Fracker should be awarded probation for six months, a probation term, because -- and they list four reasons.

The choices and activities that he made on January 6th were not for personal gain but because of misguided, false belief that the actions were altruistic and good for the country. That's exactly what Mr. Robertson thought as well.

They then say, number two, it's because he was influenced by his mentor, father. That does not apply.

They then go into number three. He immediately turned himself in to authorities when he found out he had a warrant. Mr. Robertson also did that.

Number four, he has suffered great personal cost to himself because essentially all Mr. Fracker's ever known is a police officer and serving his country.

The two individuals are almost -- you know, I get there's a huge age difference between the two, but the disparities in sentencing between those two where someone gets six months -- and I'm not saying -- Mr. Fracker, in his

statement to the Court, was essentially saying what I did is on my own, and this is even on the stand when he was asked about the conspiracy. He basically said he did what he did. And I don't think he was trying to throw Mr. Robertson under the bus, but he agreed that his actions were his actions.

And I guess what I'm trying to get to is their actions were almost similar in the entire context, and there was no physical violence from either one of them. And at the end of the day, what we had after the fact is that his age and some of his -- when he got home and some of the stuff that was coming at him -- and you read his statement to the Court, that he started drinking and probably did go down this rabbit hole of this thought process just feeding into what -- when all you watch and you pay attention to that, that's all you hear, and that's all you know. You don't see the other side. And he was being fed into that, and he did go down that rabbit hole.

So the statements that he made that he just listed here today, yes, they're all true. And honestly, he admits it was a complete mistake, wish he had never said it, wish he had never made any of these comments that he made; and, again, somewhat just boasting and angry and everything that's occurring at him -- everything that's occurred. But that was -- that's just how he felt at the time and drinking, and he was angry.

I take absolute issue with the government's response that somehow this man was going to form an arsenal and somehow hurt people. He served this country. And I understand these times, but he served his country. He's bled for this country, and to say that he now would come in and then form an arsenal to try to hurt people and try to destroy them, I suggest that's not who this man is.

THE COURT: All right. But, look, you know, he ordered 34 very dangerous weapons while he's under criminal indictment under conditions. I found that there was probable cause to believe that that violated a federal statute. Combining that -- and this is, you know, six months after his arrest, after he had had plenty of time to reflect on the effects of his conduct, the consequences of his conduct, combined with these statements that -- you know, I'll get to them -- that advance more than just standard partisan political discussion.

How can I have any confidence that he would not be a danger to the community, if released? You're asking for essentially a probationary sentence any time soon. And that obviously is, you know, the -- maybe the primary consideration that this Court has to take into account.

MR. ROLLINS: Well, I mean, whether the government ever charges him with those charges -- and I'm going to -- I mean, to some mitigation, yes, the weapons were ordered.

They were delivered to a firearm dealer. They weren't delivered directly to him. And he is having to say that he didn't -
THE COURT: And the weapons that he was forced to

give up, they're in a neighbor's basement, and he has access to them.

MR. ROLLINS: Right. But he did give them up, and, yes, at some point he still could go into the store, the firearm dealership, as well and get access to it.

THE COURT: And he did apparently.

MR. ROLLINS: No, he never got -- he never went into the firearm dealership to get access to those weapons. He never touched them. He didn't go in -- he didn't go at them.

THE COURT: I recall differently. He didn't take them, but he handled them.

MR. ROLLINS: Okay. Maybe. I don't recall completely, but I don't think that he ever took possession of those weapons, and that's my recollection of that.

But to hold him accountable for that second -- for what he did while he was on pretrial, I mean, I guess it's like squeezing blood out of a turnip. How much more do we take from this man? He has been away from his family for 13 months. He was a police officer the day before all this started, and we've taken everything from him.

Once he gets -- he will eventually be released. I mean, obviously. This is not a life sentence, so obviously he will be released. His life is already in shambles, and I just look at the government: How much more do you want from this man?

His life is in shambles. He will never go back to what he's done. It's all he's ever known. It's all he's ever done. And at this juncture I just think mercy and leniency should be applied here, and I think that's why I just cut across and disagree with the guideline scoring here, and to give someone 96 months for essentially -- and we can disagree on this -- but for essentially unlawful entry, trespassing onto that property, to give him 96 months.

And given the fact of other sentences where people have done some really vicious things, this man did not do those things. And the government's trying to lump him in with people who have swung, thrown things, and hurt officers, trying to lump him in with that same group of people.

And I get why they may think that because of the activity while he was on pretrial, but I don't think that this -- I think this Court should absolutely offer a variance, especially on the eight points. I think that is a -- to give him that full eight points on that I don't

think would be a fair and just position.

THE COURT: Okay. Very well.

MR. ROLLINS: Thank you.

THE COURT: Mr. Robertson, anything you'd like to tell the Court before I impose your sentence?

THE DEFENDANT: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Why don't you approach with Mr. Rollins.

All right. Mr. Robertson, I know we talk a lot about these guideline figures and numbers and offense levels and all that stuff, and I think sometimes defendants think that this is a formulaic exercise, when it's not, okay? I realize I have flesh and blood in front of me with lots of collateral consequences and various considerations that are unique to every defendant, and I try my best to take that into account.

I am not the kind of judge that lectures defendants, but I try to explain thoroughly why I've come out the way that I have. And there are a variety of factors -- we've talked about them today -- that courts are required to consider when sentencing a defendant in federal court, and I will -- I may not touch on all of them, but I'll do my best to touch on the ones that I think are most important in this case.

Our starting point has to be those sentencing

guidelines that we've talked so much about. Your range is 87 to 108 months as the Court has calculated it, and that's a long time, and it's a long time because that reflects the seriousness of the offenses that you were convicted of. But as I said, it's significantly driven by that eight-level enhancement that we've talked about. Without that enhancement, your range would be less than half of what it is.

It's also high because of the fact that you chose to go to trial, and you didn't get a reduction for acceptance of responsibility had you pled guilty. And that is -- that's your choice, but that's the consequence of your choice, and your range would have been about a full two years lower had you made a different choice and maybe lower than that because you were likely -- I don't know what the plea offer was, but you may have been offered, you know, a subset of the counts that you ultimately proceeded to trial on.

The next factor is the offense. It's what you did. I won't review all of the evidence. We've sat through it, but for weeks prior to January 6th after the election you expressed your view that the election had been rigged. You advocated for an armed rebellion and a counter insurgency to overturn the result. So when you invited Mr. Fracker and others to come to D.C. on January 6th, it

was not just to listen to a speech or to protest. I believe that the jury was correct in finding that at least one of your motivations was to interfere with what was going on in Congress that day.

And when you got into your truck, you were at least expecting some form of violence. You brought a gas mask; you brought a gun, which I think you had the good sense to leave in your car, if I'm not mistaken; and you brought that big old stick that we've talked so much about that you had used before as a police officer, not for a walking stick, but for crowd control. You were one of the first ones up the West Terrace stairs, which was one of the most chaotic and violent scenes of that day, and we watched those videos many times, and they're very jarring and disturbing.

You are also one of the first -- you were among the first wave of people in the Capitol. Only three minutes, about, after someone broke through the Senate Wing doors at 2:13 p.m. You stayed in for a number of minutes and proceeded further into the Crypt of the Capitol.

All of this says that you were not some bystander who just got swept up in the crowd and in the emotion, but you were an active and willing participant, and that you were there for the purpose of disrupting the count, which Mr. Fracker testified to and which the jury found.

Now, as to that eight-level enhancement, we all agree that there was no actual physical violence, no verbal threats. Your conduct, I have found, was threatening as contemplated by that particular provision, but it was not the most aggressive and violent thing that the Court has ever seen, and I'll just leave it at that.

As I said before, that enhancement encompasses a wide range of conduct from mere threats to extreme violence. I think your conduct probably falls somewhere in maybe towards the lower end of that continuum. So if I were just assessing your conduct at the Capitol, I would conclude that that eight-level enhancement, which, again, more than doubles your potential sentence, overstates your -- the seriousness of your activity, and I would likely give you a below guidelines sentence.

But there are other things to consider, the most important of which is your acceptance of responsibility.

You obviously chose to go to trial, which is entirely your right, so, as I said, you do not get credit for any acceptance of responsibility from a guidelines perspective.

And despite your letter, which I'll get to in a minute, I don't think that you have accepted responsibility.

Even after having time to reflect on the effect of January 6th, you continued to advocate for violence in response to the purportedly stolen election. Your post on

January 8th, "The next revolution started 1/6, and in case you" -- "I'm ready and standing by, if you guys missed it."
"In case you missed it, I'm ready and standing by."

In March you told one of your closest friends that you were prepared to fight and die in a civil war. "Civil war is anything but civil. I'll take the fight to their homes and their fireside. Never F with someone who is prepared to do battle. Call me an insurrectionist, and I will oblige you."

In June, a full six months after January 6th, you posted on a gun forum, "I have learned very well that if you dip your toe into the rubicon, cross it. Cross it hard and violent and play for all the marbles."

And even more troubling coming from a former law enforcement officer after four officers were killed on January 6th and four more took their lives by their own hand later, you advocated more violence against law enforcement. You told Mr. Deacon, "I can kill every agent they send for me for at least 2 weeks."

We've talked about whether that was hyperbole, whether that was just boasting, whether that was just something you were saying on Facebook, or Instagram, or wherever it was, but it wasn't just your words. It was also your actions. You destroyed evidence. You continued to possess weapons, including an M4 and an explosive device, in

repeated violations of your release conditions, and last summer you ordered -- and we can call it an arsenal, we can call it a cache, we can call it whatever we want -- numerous automatic weapons while you were under federal indictment in violation of not only this Court's orders but likely a federal law.

And while you gave your neighbor your guns in response to a court order, you maintained ready access to them. And except for the destruction of the cell phones, none of that is incorporated in the guidelines analysis.

Now, I read your letter. I appreciate your letter. You do say that you take full responsibility for your actions, but frankly, as Mr. Rollins said, you have no choice but to because it was all on video and in your own words. And I agree with the government that, you know, you can call them excuses, you can call them justifications, but, you know, it's not accepting responsibility when you say that you were taking care of a buddy with cancer who was a big Trump supporter and that's why you came. Your wife was away in New York. You were drinking too much and looking at social media too much.

Some of those things may explain or may go into the mix of reasons why you came to D.C. that day, but they don't explain why you continued to arm yourself and advocate for violence, including against law enforcement well after

your arrest. Nor does your letter say anything about the victims of January 6th, including those law enforcement officers, or the damage that January 6th did to our country or our democratic institutions.

And I want to be clear. I'm focusing on acceptance of responsibility not just for its own sake, all right? It's not my job to make you remorseful. It's not my job to bring you to heel somehow. You make your own choices. You think however you want to think, and that's not my concern. It's not about compliance, but it's about deterrence; the need for me, which is my primary responsibility, to protect the public. And that's the most striking and concerning part about this case from my perspective, is your conduct after the arrest.

You know, I read this stuff, and it really seems like you think of partisan politics as war, you know, and that's just not the right way to think about it, and that you continue to believe these conspiracy theories about the election being stolen despite any evidence of that whatsoever. And I sincerely believe that you would likely answer a call to duty if you were called to go do something like this again, and that's the biggest consideration that this Court has to consider.

Now, I also take into account your history. You have no prior criminal record despite having some challenges

as a kid that I won't go into on the record. You have a supportive family, you seem to have a good relationship with your kids, and you have a network of friends. Now, given some of the texts, I'm not sure how healthy some of those friendships are, but we've already discussed that.

Mr. Rollins has emphasized your professional background quite a bit, and it's sort of a mixed bag.

You're an Army vet and a police officer. Those are very admirable professions. I've read the various commendations and the newspaper stories that you've submitted, and you can be very proud of that service.

But as the government has pointed out, there's also evidence that you have at least exaggerated your military experience, and that you've used that to influence Mr. Fracker, who apparently viewed you as something of a mentor. And as a member of law enforcement, you obviously had an oath to uphold the law, and you violated that oath.

The last thing we have to consider -- the last thing I'll mention is disparities, and Mr. Rollins noted it with respect to Mr. Fracker. I will get to him on Tuesday. I've not read the government's materials or his materials, and rest assured that I will make an independent determination as to what an appropriate sentence is for him.

But I mentioned Mr. Reffitt's case, which was the first January 6th case to go to trial. Yours was the

second. And I think they have some differences, but they have many similarities.

As I said, both went to trial. There was a similar range of convictions. Neither of you had any criminal history. You had the same exact offense level and an 87-to-108-month guideline range, including the eightlevel enhancement that we've discussed.

Both of you had disturbing text messages before

January 6th advocating rebellion against the government

based on the election, although Mr. Reffitt's may have been

a little more specific. You both carried but did not use a

dangerous weapon. Mr. Reffitt had firearms, which is

obviously more concerning than your stick. Neither of you

assaulted police officers.

In terms of the conduct underlying the eight-level enhancement, Mr. Reffitt made clear and direct threats against Speaker Pelosi and Minority Leader McConnell while also attempting to obstruct the certification. As we've discussed, I'm not quite sure that your conduct rose to that level. On the other hand, you entered the Capitol, and Mr. Reffitt did not.

You both engaged in destructive conduct. He by threatening his children and directing others to delete their text messages; you by destroying your cell phones.

And on that point, the jury found that you

destroyed the cell phones, okay? And as I said before, I have confidence in that jury's verdict, and even still, whether you did it or directed Mr. Fracker or somebody else, you certainly knew about it as reflected in the text messages that Ms. Aloi showed.

And the least favorable comparison between you and Mr. Reffitt was that you continued to engage in dangerous and illegal conduct while you were on release and thereafter. He also had some mental health issues that I'm not sure are present here, and I'm not sure that that's a distinguishing factor.

But on balance, I think the two cases are roughly notionally the same, although it is impossible to compare exactly each case.

Furthermore, while I have not compared the facts closely, the three sentences or the three cases noted in the government's memo, all of which involve convictions for 1512(c)(2) with the eight-level enhancement, seem comparable when you consider that those were pleas rather than jury convictions: U.S. v. Fairlamb, where Judge Lamberth sentenced the defendant to 41 months; U.S. v. Duke Wilson, also Judge Lamberth, 51 months; and U.S. v. Greg Rubenacker, Chief Judge Howell, 41 months. So including all of the factors that I have discussed today, the government -- the Court concludes that a low end of the guidelines sentence is

the lowest one necessary to achieve all of the purposes of sentencing.

So with that, pursuant to the Sentencing Reform

Act of 1984 and in consideration of the provisions of 18 USC

3553, as well as the advisory sentencing guidelines, it is
the judgment of the Court that you, Thomas Robertson, are
hereby sentenced to the custody of the Bureau of Prisons for
concurrent terms of 87 months on Counts 1, 3, 4, and 6, 60

months on Count 2, and six months on Count 5. Again, those
counts will run concurrently, and you will be given credit
for time served since your arrest or the revocation of your
conditions. You are further sentenced to serve a concurrent
term of 36 months of supervised release as to Counts 1, 2,

3, 4, and 6.

In addition, you are ordered to pay a special assessment of \$100 on each of Counts 1, 2, 3, 4, and 6 and \$10 on Count 5 for a total of \$510 in accordance with 18 USC 3013. The Court finds that you do not have the ability to pay a fine and, therefore, waives imposition of a fine in this case.

While on supervision, you shall abide by the following mandatory conditions as well as the standard conditions of supervision, which are imposed to establish the basic expectations for your conduct while on supervision. The mandatory conditions include:

1 One, you must not commit another federal, state, or local crime. 2 Two, you must not unlawfully possess a controlled 3 substance. 4 5 Three, you must refrain from any unlawful use of a controlled substance. You must submit to one drug test 6 7 within 15 days of placement on supervision and at least two periodic drug tests thereafter as determined by the Court. 8 9 And, four, you must cooperate in the collection of 10 DNA as directed by your probation officer. You shall also comply with the following special 11 conditions. 12 13 Ms. Baker, I am not going to impose a community 14 service condition. Substance abuse testing, is that 15 necessary beyond the mandatory condition? 16 Mr. Robertson, you can have a seat now. 17 THE PROBATION OFFICER: Your Honor, we had 18 asked --THE COURT: I didn't see a lot of evidence of 19 20 substance abuse in the presentence report. 21 THE PROBATION OFFICER: And our reason or 22 justification for that was the alcohol consumption, 23 particularly after the events of January 6th. 24 THE COURT: Okay. I'm not going to impose a 25 substance abuse testing condition. I will impose a mental

health treatment condition.

You must participate in a mental health treatment program and follow the rules and regulations of that program. The probation officer, in consultation with the treatment provider, will supervise your participation in the program.

Mr. Robertson, I do this with some defendants, but not all, which is to schedule a reentry hearing, so within 45 days of release from incarceration -- or why don't we make that 60 days -- you shall appear before the Court for a reentry progress hearing.

The United States Probation Office in the district you are supervised will submit a progress report to the Court within 30 days of the commencement of supervision.

Upon receipt of the progress report, the Court will determine if your appearance is required.

This is just for me to meet with you to see how things went and to make sure that you're on a good path.

The financial obligations are immediately payable to the Clerk of the Court of the United States District Court, 333 Constitution Avenue, Northwest, Washington, D.C. Within 30 days of any change of address, you shall notify the Clerk of the Court of the change until such time as the financial obligation is paid in full.

The probation office shall release the presentence

1 investigation report to all appropriate agencies, which includes the United States Probation Office in the approved 2 3 district of residence, in order to execute the sentence of 4 the Court. 5 Mr. Robertson resides in the Western District of 6 Virginia, Ms. Baker? 7 THE PROBATION OFFICER: Yes, he does, and we will ask the Court at the progress hearing to determine -- to 8 9 transfer jurisdiction at that time. 10 THE COURT: Very well. We'll defer the jurisdiction. 11 12 Treatment agencies shall return the presentence 13 report to the probation office upon the defendant's 14 completion or termination from probation -- I'm sorry --15 termination from treatment. 16 The matter of restitution, correct? Are we going to deal with that now, Ms. Aloi? 17 18 MS. ALOI: Yes, Your Honor. The government seeks 19 to \$2,000 in restitution consistent with what's set forth in our sentencing memo and the matter in which the other 20 defendants have been handled. 21 THE COURT: Okay. The Court finds that one of the 22 23 counts of conviction, 18 USC 1752(a)(1), triggers mandatory 24 restitution under the mandatory victims protection act, 18

USC Section 3663A. The government has shown by a

25

preponderance of the evidence, namely letters submitted by the Architect of the Capitol and other agencies responsible for the Capitol, that the riots caused, Ms. Aloi, upwards of \$2.7 million; is that correct?

MS. ALOI: At least, Your Honor.

THE COURT: At least \$2.7 million in damage. The Court finds that those agencies were the victims of the riots as contemplated by the statute, and the Court further finds that the government has adequately established that \$2,000 is a reasonable estimate of how much of the damage should be apportioned on to the defendant, and that is consistent with what other defendants have been ordered to pay after trial as well as at least some plea arrangements.

Anything else on restitution, Ms. Aloi?

MS. ALOI: Not from the government.

THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Robertson, you have the right to appeal the verdict and sentence. If you choose to appeal, you must file any appeal within 14 days after the Court enters judgment. If you are unable to afford the cost of an appeal, you may request permission from the Court to file an appeal without cost to you.

As defined in 28 USC 2255, you also have the right to challenge the conviction entered or the sentence imposed if new and currently unavailable information becomes available to you or on a claim that you received ineffective

1 assistance of counsel either in entering -- there was no guilty plea, so ineffective assistance of counsel in 2 3 connection with trial or sentencing. If you are unable to afford the cost of an appeal, you may request permission 4 5 from the Court to file an appeal without cost to you. Counsel, any other objections for the record? 6 7 MR. ROLLINS: No, Your Honor. THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Rollins, do you want to 8 9 make a placement recommendation? 10 MR. ROLLINS: May I submit that in writing in 24 hours? 11 THE COURT: Sure. 12 13 MR. ROLLINS: Thank you. 14 THE COURT: Ms. Baker, no issues with that, right? 15 THE PROBATION OFFICER: No. 16 THE COURT: Mr. Robertson, Mr. Rollins may make a 17 recommendation as to placement. Generally it's proximity to 18 your residence. The Court will make a recommendation, but it's the Bureau of Prisons who will determine the final 19 20 placement. 21 Come up to the microphone. 22 So I read the letter from your wife, which I thought was very thoughtful. She has a criminology 23 24 background, I believe. She talked about the lack of 25 services in the facility where you've been for the last year

or so. I can appreciate that that has been frustrating. I think you -- hopefully you will find that whatever facility you're placed with through the Bureau of Prisons will have more outlets, will have more educational opportunities, professional training opportunities.

I would encourage you to find something that you can connect with that appeals to you that perhaps you can even lead given your background and your experience and your skills. It will be very important for you to stay engaged and to try to get the most out of this opportunity, as unfortunate as it is, okay? And when you come back, maybe we can talk a little bit about your experience. All right?

I often tell defendants that they should not be judged by the worst mistake that they made, and that certainly applies to you. There's a lot to recommend you, a lot that you should be proud of in your life and in your background, and I would just encourage you to put this behind you, to perhaps broaden your perspectives a little bit, and your -- you know, what you rely on to get information and to be a little more discerning about the information that you do get.

You don't have to do that. You don't have to take my word, but it's just my two cents for whatever that's worth. All right?

Okay. We're adjourned. Good luck to you.

1	THE DEFENDANT: Thank you.
2	(Whereupon the hearing was
3	concluded at 3:51 p.m.)
4	
5	CERTIFICATE OF OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER
6	
7	I, LISA A. MOREIRA, RDR, CRR, do hereby
8	certify that the above and foregoing constitutes a true and
9	accurate transcript of my stenographic notes and is a full,
10	true and complete transcript of the proceedings to the best
11	of my ability.
12	Dated this 1st day of September, 2022.
13	
14	/a/liaa A Maraina DDD CDD
15	/s/Lisa A. Moreira, RDR, CRR Official Court Reporter United States Courthouse
16	Room 6718
17	333 Constitution Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20001
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