

Program on Extremism

THE GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY

JANUARY 2026

# The Egyptian Branch of the Muslim Brotherhood in America:

# Brotherhood in America:

## Yesterday and Today

LORENZO VIDINO  
SERGIO ALTUNA

The views and conclusions expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the official position of the George Washington University Program on Extremism.

All rights reserved. ©2026  
Program on Extremism at George Washington University  
2000 Pennsylvania Avenue NW  
Washington, D.C. 20006

JANUARY 2026

# The Egyptian Branch of the Muslim Brotherhood in America:

## Yesterday and Today

Yesterday and Today

LORENZO VIDINO  
SERGIO ALTUNA

Program on Extremism

---

THE GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY

---

## Executive Summary

- Members of the Egyptian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, some of them top leaders of the group, established a presence in the United States (U.S.) as early as the late 1950s. They replicated in America the group's dynamics from back home: secrecy, selectiveness, sophisticated internal bureaucracy, and the formation of public-facing organizations not openly associated with the Brotherhood. This embryonal infrastructure is still active today, and some of the public-facing organizations they were instrumental in founding, such as the Muslim Students Association (MSA) and the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA), are among the most influential Muslim organizations in the country.
- Over the years, the Egyptian Brotherhood's infrastructure in America allowed the group to recruit many young Egyptians who had come to the U.S. to study. Tellingly, former Egyptian president Mohammed Morsi and Brotherhood secretary general Mahmoud Hussein formally joined the Brotherhood while furthering their studies in American universities.
- In 1992, top members of the Egyptian Brotherhood created the Muslim American Society (MAS). MAS openly admits its historical and ideological connections to the Brotherhood but argues that it has no operational connections to it. Evidence recently uncovered by the Canadian government during an extensive investigation of the Canadian sister organization of MAS challenges this narrative, revealing how members of the Brotherhood in the Middle East and in Canada can seamlessly transfer their membership in the Brotherhood through MAS when moving to America.
- After the 2013 fall of the Morsi government and the crackdown that ensued, some members of the Egyptian Brotherhood settled in the U.S. Their most prominent figures have since built a decentralized yet closely interlinked ecosystem of individuals, institutions, and platforms where religious authority, institutional anchoring, political advocacy, and charitable infrastructure converge through overlapping networks—constituting a durable architecture of influence that advances the Brotherhood's agenda from within American society.

This ecosystem functions through several mutually reinforcing nodes:

- **Advocacy and lobbying** efforts are channeled through organizations that present themselves as civil rights or democracy-focused initiatives. In practice, their campaigns, messaging, and coordination patterns reflect a strategic effort to re-legitimize the Brotherhood's political narrative, particularly in Washington-based policymaking environments.
  - Organizations such as the D.C.-based Center for Egyptian-American Dialogue, the Egyptian Americans for Freedom and Justice, and the Egyptian Americans for Democracy and Human Rights, among other organizations and specific high-profile individuals, support the advancement of the Brotherhood in Egypt and Brotherhood-aligned narratives. These groups are closely interlinked and have lobbied members of Congress.
- **Religious authority** is exercised through key figures embedded in mosques, religious centers, and imam training initiatives across the country. These actors maintain transnational ties to Brotherhood-affiliated theological structures, allowing them to quietly shape ideological discourse at the community level while remaining under the public radar.
  - Individuals connected to the most influential transnational networks of the Brotherhood—such as Mohamed Elbar and Akram Kassab, who also served as a close associate of the late Brotherhood spiritual leader Yusuf al-Qaradawi—embed religious authority and legitimacy within the New York–New Jersey area while simultaneously linking these religious infrastructures to the Brotherhood's broader global sphere.
- **Strategic philanthropy** is a key vector of legitimacy and connectivity. Members of this network hold senior roles in prominent, charitable organizations such as Islamic Relief USA, thus expanding their social credibility, transnational networks, and access to civil society platforms without formally presenting themselves as political actors..
  - Key figures heading philanthropic organizations in the U.S., such as Khaled Lamada and Ahmed Shehata, demonstrate the linkage, intentionally or otherwise, between philanthropic endeavors and Brotherhood-aligned activism.

## Introduction

On November 24, 2025, the White House issued an Executive Order setting in motion the formal process to designate “any Muslim Brotherhood chapters or other subdivisions, including those in Lebanon, Jordan, and Egypt, as foreign terrorist organizations.” The process, overseen by the United States (U.S.) Secretary of State and the Secretary of the Treasury, entails a 75-day review of the group’s activities and ends with the possible designation of any of these branches.<sup>1</sup>

This report aims to analyze the presence inside the U.S. of individuals and networks directly linked to the Egyptian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, the oldest and most influential of all branches of the transnational organization. Based on more than two decades of research on the branch’s presence in America, it seeks to describe its history and evolution, from the arrivals of its first few members on American shores in the late 1950s to today.

This report takes no position on whether the Egyptian branch or any other part of the Brotherhood should be designated as a terrorist organization. It also makes no allegations of any illegal behavior against any individual or organization mentioned. Rather, its aim is simply to inform about the activities of U.S.-based actors that have well established links to the Egyptian branch of the Brotherhood.

## The Foundations of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood in the United States

### Coming to America

The Muslim Brotherhood was founded in Egypt in 1928. The group soon spread throughout the Arab world, as formal branches or affiliated networks began to appear throughout the Middle East shortly after its founding, making the Brotherhood a transnational movement. But, despite the many upheavals it has suffered in its almost century-long history, the Egyptian

---

<sup>1</sup> “Designation of Certain Muslim Brotherhood Chapters as Foreign Terrorist Organizations and Specially Designated Global Terrorists,” The White House, November 24, 2025, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/11/designation-of-certain-muslim-brotherhood-chapters-as-foreign-terrorist-organizations-and-specially-designated-global-terrorists/>

branch has always maintained an undisputed centrality, towering over the others in terms of numbers, prestige, and influence.

The first arrival of some members of the Egyptian Brotherhood to the U.S. coincided with the first of such crises experienced by the group. In 1954, Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser outlawed the Brotherhood, ruthlessly incarcerating many of its members.<sup>2</sup> To avoid persecution, many Brotherhood members fled the country. While many found a safe refuge in Arab Gulf countries whose economies were booming thanks to their oil wealth, others fled to Europe and North America.

One of the most prominent members to flee was Said Ramadan, the son-in-law of Brotherhood founder Hassan al-Banna and one of the group's first leaders. Ramadan settled in Geneva, using the Swiss lake city to establish the first embryonic network of Brotherhood-controlled mosques in various Western countries. Operating at the height of the Cold War, Ramadan was the recipient of various forms of support from the CIA, which saw Islamism as a counter to communism and socialism. As immortalized in an iconic group picture, Ramadan was even welcomed to the White House in 1953, meeting with President Dwight D. Eisenhower.

**Figure 1:** Said Ramadan (second from the right) at the White House, 1953<sup>3</sup>



<sup>2</sup> Ataf Lutfi al-Sayyid Marsot, *A History of Egypt: From the Arab Conquest to the Present*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 1985, pp. 127-131.

<sup>3</sup> White House press photo archive. Uncredited photographer.

If Ramadan was only a privileged and occasional visitor to America, other Egyptian Brotherhood members made America their home. That is the case of Mahmoud Abu Saud, who was one of al-Banna's first followers and instrumental in setting up the group's original infrastructure in Egypt before moving to America. Abu Saud was one of the intellectual fathers of contemporary Islamic banking, conceptualizing sharia-compliant investments and positioning the Brotherhood at the forefront of the then emerging lucrative financial sector.<sup>4</sup> Abu Saud also played an influential role in some of the first organizations created by the Brotherhood in America.

Following a pattern of intermarriage regularly used by the Brotherhood to cement the group's internal cohesion, Abu Saud gave his daughter Iman in marriage to a young Brotherhood member originally from Cairo, Ahmed Elkadi. In 1967, Elkadi and his wife moved to the small town of Monroe, Louisiana, where he furthered his studies in medicine (he went on to become the personal physician to Saudi Arabia's King Faisal). Elkadi played a key role in shaping the growth of the then nascent U.S.-based networks of the Brotherhood.

By the early 1960s, in fact, the Brotherhood had created a stable presence in America, with a capillary network that started on college campuses (particularly in the Midwest) and spread nationwide. In 1963, the network of Brotherhood members and sympathizers—not just from Egypt but from several other Arab and Muslim-majority countries—met on the campus of the University of Illinois in Urbana to create its first, formal organization, the Muslim Student Association (MSA).<sup>5</sup> The MSA was America's first national Muslim student organization. While MSA was not a "pure" Brotherhood organization, its links to it were strong.<sup>6</sup> From its inception, Brotherhood members held key positions, influencing its ideology and direction. Moreover, MSA became a sort of parallel structure of the Brotherhood, independent but, at the same time, representing an inexhaustible recruiting pool and a perfect avenue to disseminate its ideas.<sup>7</sup>

---

<sup>4</sup> Noreen S. Ahmed-Ullah, Sam Roe, and Laurie Cohen, "A Rare Look at Secretive Brotherhood in America," *Chicago Tribune*, September 19, 2004, <https://www.chicagotribune.com/2004/09/19/a-rare-look-at-secretive-brotherhood-in-america/>

<sup>5</sup> Ilyas Ba-Yunus and Kassim Kone, *Muslims in the United States*, (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2006), 49.

<sup>6</sup> Noreen S. Ahmed-Ullah, Sam Roe, and Laurie Cohen, "A Rare Look at Secretive Brotherhood in America," *Chicago Tribune*, September 19, 2004; "A Little Taste of History," MSA-National Website (Archive), <http://web.archive.org/web/20060118061004/http://www.msa-national.org/about/history.html>; Ikhwan in America, Government Exhibit 003-0089 in *United States v. Holy Land Foundation*.

<sup>7</sup> Ikhwan in America, Government Exhibit 003-0089 in *United States v. Holy Land Foundation*.

MSA's conferences attracted thousands of participants. At a time when Islam was almost invisible in America, they represented a unique occasion for Muslims from all ethnic backgrounds to come together, shop at an Islamic bazaar, access Islamic literature, hear prominent Muslim speakers, and meet other Muslims. MSA also created professional subgroups, such as the Islamic Medical Association and the Islamic Association of Scientists and Engineers, and others based on ethnic origin, such as the Muslim Arab Youth Association.<sup>8</sup> Entities such as the North American Islamic Trust, MSA's financial holding, the Islamic Book Service, and American Trust Publications were also set up to serve the growing needs of the organization.<sup>9</sup>

By the late 1970s/early 1980s, MSA leaders realized that a student organization, even as sophisticated as MSA, was not enough to fulfill the needs of the growing number of Muslims who had decided to permanently relocate to America. As a consequence, they incorporated the Indianapolis-based Islamic Society of North America (ISNA), an umbrella organization established to coordinate the activities of the MSA and the other organizations born out of the same milieu.

The evolution from student grouping to "adult" organization, serving the needs of a permanent Muslim community in the West, has characterized the evolution of Brotherhood networks in virtually all Western countries. A particularly interesting perspective on this development in the U.S. comes from the internal writings and speeches of members of the Brotherhood operating in America that were introduced as evidence in the Holy Land Foundation (HLF) trial.<sup>10</sup> Among the various sources documenting the first years of the Brotherhood in the U.S., the most authoritative and comprehensive is a lecture given to other Brotherhood members in Kansas City in the early 1980s by Zeid al-Noman, a *mas'ul* (official) of the Executive Office of the U.S. Muslim Brotherhood.<sup>11</sup>

---

<sup>8</sup> Mohamed Nimer, *Muslim Community Life in the United States and Canada* (New York: Routledge, 2002), 64.

<sup>9</sup> Steve A. Johnson, "The Muslims of Indianapolis," in Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad and Jane Idleman Smith, eds., *Muslim Communities in North America* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1994), pp. 270-272.

<sup>10</sup> For further context see: Lorenzo Vidino, *The Hamas Networks in America: A Short History*, GWU Program on Extremism, October 2023, <https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs5746/files/2023-10/hamas-networks-final.pdf>

<sup>11</sup> Ikhwan in America, Government Exhibit 003-0089 in United States v. Holy Land Foundation.

One of the most striking aspects of al-Noman's lecture is the level of organization he describes. While the group had only just established a presence in the country, al-Noman outlines a formal and extremely complex structure. He explains that the group had no less than twenty collegial bodies and committees that operated according to a well-defined hierarchy and met regularly. While some of the committees discussed security or *dawa* methods, the organization's central bodies drafted and oversaw meticulous long-term plans of action. According to al-Noman, the Brotherhood's Shura Council in the U.S. approved five-year plans for the group's activities and the Executive Office, to which al-Noman himself belonged, created annual work programs to implement the Shura Council's guidelines.

According to al-Noman, the plan for the 1975-1980 quinquennium was simply "general work," but the 1981-1985 quinquennium unveiled a major shift in the American Brotherhood's views and perceptions of its goals. The Shura Council and the Executive Office understood that basing the movement's activities on a student organization was limiting and that a more permanent solution needed to be found. Only a permanent network of organizations and not a student group, which by nature changes in membership as its members graduate, could implement the quinquennial plans. "What the Movement should be," said al-Noman, "is to become a Movement for the residents." Al-Noman refers to this new phase as "the settlement of the *dawa*." The transition from MSA to ISNA, organizations that the Brotherhood indirectly controlled, has to be seen, therefore, in light of this change in the American Brotherhood's strategy.

Elkadi played a key role in this evolution. In the 1970s, he moved to Missouri and became the Brotherhood's national treasurer. In 1984, he gained the position of head of the entire U.S. branch of the Brotherhood, which he held until 1994.<sup>12</sup> Other key Brotherhood leaders who had found refuge from the Egyptian regime in America played similarly important roles in the evolution of the network in the U.S. Some, like Elkadi, spent the rest of their lives in the U.S., while some others eventually returned to Egypt, or settled in the Arab Gulf or Europe.

---

<sup>12</sup> Op. Cit. "A Rare Look at Secretive Brotherhood in America."

## *Joining the Muslim Brotherhood in America*

A related but different dynamic is that of young Egyptians who, unlike Abu Saud and Elkadi, came to America not as full-fledged Brotherhood members but joined the group in the U.S. Several Egyptians who might have had their first introduction to the group's thinking in their home countries, in fact, continued their years-long induction into the Brotherhood—a complex process designed to be selective and avoid infiltration by security services—while furthering their studies in America. The networks set up by people like Abu Saud and Elkadi, in fact, operated in close cooperation with Brotherhood structures in the country of origin, making participation in the Brotherhood a seamless transatlantic affair.

A detailed account of how Egyptians joined the Brotherhood in America is provided by a former member named Hussien Elmeshad.<sup>13</sup> Elmeshad grew up in a religious family in Cairo. In the 1960s, while in high school, he began to attend Brotherhood study groups. His interactions and fascination with the group continued while he pursued business studies at al-Azhar. It was only in 1978 that Elmeshad formally joined the Brotherhood—or as he puts it, “became organized.” And, interestingly, his induction did not take place in Egypt but in Jersey City, New Jersey.

Elmeshad had moved to America to continue his studies. Before leaving Egypt, a local leader of the Brotherhood had told him to introduce himself to the late head of a Jersey City mosque “controlled by the Brotherhood” to continue his process of integration in the group. Indeed, just a few weeks after connecting with the head of the Jersey City mosque, Elmeshad was formally inducted. “The process was fast,” Elmeshad explains, “because I had already started it in Egypt and I had come recommended by prominent members in Egypt.” The fact that Elmeshad’s induction process started in Egypt and formalized in America indicates a high level of connectivity between the Brotherhood in the Arab world and that in the West.

Upon induction, Elmeshad was inserted in a complex structure that mirrored, albeit on a smaller scale, that of the Brotherhood in Egypt. He became part of a local *usra* in New Jersey, which was part of a complex regional and national

---

<sup>13</sup> Lorenzo Vidino interview of Hussien Elmeshad in London in October 2018.

structure. The *naqīb*<sup>14</sup> of Elmeshad's own *usra* was an Egyptian graduate of Columbia University who was the director of the Eastern region of the U.S. (which covered the eastern seaboard, from Boston to Virginia), one of the four regions into which the Brotherhood had divided the country.<sup>15</sup> Members of each region would meet regularly, often at outdoor camps. Elmeshad recalls that at some of these camps some 2,500 people were present, although the number includes not just Brothers but also their family members.

According to Elmeshad, areas like Chicago, New York/New Jersey, Washington, DC, and California have historically been the main Brotherhood hubs in the country, but the group had a presence in secondary cities and remote areas as well. “Members of the Brotherhood in America all know each other,” explains Elmeshad, “we are one big family, and everybody helps each other.” While national leaders constantly interact with one another, national conferences of public organizations of the milieu are the occasion in which they all come together. Similarly, these gatherings serve the purpose of reinforcing the sense of belonging upon the cadres and further “bringing in” individuals who are in the process of joining the Brotherhood.

Elmeshad played an integral role in this setting for approximately two decades. He was close to most of the top leaders of the American Brotherhood sphere and top Brotherhood leaders from abroad (former *murshid*<sup>16</sup> Mustafa Mashour and Mohammed Akef, among many others) often stayed at his New Jersey home when visiting America. As it is common, membership in the “secret” structure of the Brotherhood coincided with roles in the “public” organizations. Elmeshad, in fact, was a member of ISNA and served as treasurer of the Muslim Arab Youth Association (MAYA) for six years. Given his business background, he was involved in many financial activities of the American Brotherhood milieu, from fundraising for the local Brotherhood school in Jersey City to occupying key positions in various businesses linked to the organization. “From 9 to 5, I worked as a deputy bursar at Columbia University,” Elmeshad explains, “but all my free time was devoted to the Brotherhood.”

---

<sup>14</sup> *Naqīb* refers to the leader of a local *usra* within the Muslim Brotherhood's organizational structure. The *naqīb* is responsible for supervising members, ensuring ideological discipline, and serving as the link between the *usra* and higher organizational levels.

<sup>15</sup> The other four regions were South, Midwest and West.

<sup>16</sup> *Murshid* (*al-Murshid al-Ām*) refers to the General Guide of the Muslim Brotherhood, the movement's highest-ranking symbolic and organizational authority. The *Murshid* traditionally serves as the principal representative of the organization and presides over its main governing bodies, including the Guidance Bureau, although his authority has varied over time depending on internal dynamics and political context.

Unsurprisingly, as Elmeshad and others explained, Egyptian Brotherhood members replicated the group's complex and hierarchical structure found in Egypt and other Arab countries, just on a smaller scale. Exactly as in Egypt, the Brotherhood networks in America have the *usra* (literally, family) as the core unit; various *usras*<sup>17</sup> come together and meet at the regional level, and an elected leadership presides at the top. Obviously, because the number of Brotherhood members in the U.S. is relatively small, some differences exist, but many defining aspects of the Brotherhood's structure in the Arab world are reproduced in America.

The centrality of the *usra*, the weekly Friday night meetings and the bigger meetings with members of various *usras* from the region, the divisions in specialized committees, the internal bureaucracy, and many other dynamics are substantially the same.<sup>18</sup> Interviews conducted by Egyptian scholar Hazem Kandil with members of the Egyptian Brotherhood confirm this analysis. "On a short trip to Seattle," writes Kandil, "[Egyptian Brotherhood member] Malik felt so emotionally drained that he had to inquire frantically whether there were any family [*usra*] meetings being held in the area. He was directed through a Brotherhood mosque to a family meeting held by a Pakistani, with an Egyptian, a Sudanese, and an American convert in attendance. Malik recounted with amazement how this meeting replicated the ones held back home to the last detail, and how those Brothers, whom he had just met, greeted him as warmly as those he had known all his life."<sup>19</sup>

Examples of Egyptians who joined the Brotherhood in America include individuals who, upon returning to Egypt, acquired top positions in the Brotherhood. The most glaring example is that of Mohammed Morsi, who served as president of Egypt in the short-lived Brotherhood-led government (2012-13). Morsi had joined the Brotherhood in California in the 1980s while pursuing his doctorate in engineering and teaching as an assistant professor at California State University, Northridge.<sup>20</sup> Similarly, Brotherhood Guidance

---

<sup>17</sup> The authors opted for the anglicized plural "*usras*" instead of the Arabic "*usar*" for clarity and simplicity for English-speaking readers unfamiliar with Arabic morphology.

<sup>18</sup> Lorenzo Vidino, *The Closed Circle: Joining and Leaving the Muslim Brotherhood in the West* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2020).

<sup>19</sup> Hazem Kandil, *Inside the Brotherhood* (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2015), 12.

<sup>20</sup> Richard Spencer, Magdy Samaan, and Philip Sherwell, "Mohamed Morsi: from Cairo to California and back," *The Telegraph*, June 30, 2012, <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/egypt/9366944/Mohammed-Morsi-from-Cairo-to-California-and-back.html>

Office member Mohammad Ali Bishr, who served as governor of Menoufiya during the Morsi government, joined while obtaining his PhD in Colorado and teaching in North Carolina.<sup>21</sup> Mahmoud Hussein, who became the Brotherhood's secretary general, obtained his doctorate in Iowa and was also active in various Brotherhood-affiliated entities during his time in the U.S.<sup>22</sup>

### *The Muslim American Society*

By the early 1990s, many Egyptian Brothers felt the group had lost the influence it previously had on some of the organizations it had created years earlier, like MSA and ISNA. "ISNA has developed significantly in the eighties by the Ikhwan's leadership," stated a 1991 internal memorandum of the Shura Council, "and direction of it started to gradually decrease due to their scarce presence."<sup>23</sup> In 1992, to correct this development, Elkadi, then head of the U.S. Brotherhood's Shura Council, met with other top Brotherhood activists, including the future *murshid* of the Egyptian branch, Mohammed Akef, in a hotel on the Alabama-Tennessee border. The men decided to create the Muslim American Society (MAS), a new organization that would more directly reflect the thinking of the Brotherhood.<sup>24</sup>

Incorporated in Chicago but later moved to northern Virginia, MAS has quickly grown to a sprawling organization with forty branches nationwide and tens of thousands of activists involved.<sup>25</sup> While MAS' connections to the Egyptian Brotherhood at its inception is beyond doubt, over time its leadership has arguably waned. In a 2004 interview, Shaker Elsayed, a top MAS official, admitted that roughly 45% of MAS activists were members of the Brotherhood, but highlighted that MAS is operationally independent and "not administered from Egypt." "Ikhwan members founded MAS," specified the Egyptian-born Elsayed, "but MAS went way beyond that point of conception."<sup>26</sup>

---

<sup>21</sup> "Dr. Mohamed Ali Bishr, Life Full of Achievements," IkhwanWeb, January 14, 2007. <https://ikhwanweb.com/dr-mohamed-ali-bishr%2c-life-fu/>

<sup>22</sup> Eric Trager, "Lecture Transcript: What every American Should Know about Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood," Foreign Policy Research Institute, January 16, 2013, <https://www.fpri.org/article/2013/01/lecture-transcript-what-every-american-should-know-about-egypts-muslim-brotherhood-delivered-by-eric-trager/>

<sup>23</sup> Muslim Brotherhood Shura Council, "Shura Council Report on the future of the Group," Government Exhibit 003-0003 in *United States v. Holy Land Foundation*.

<sup>24</sup> Lorenzo Vidino's interview with Yussuf Nada, Campione d'Italia, July 14, 2008; Op. Cit. "A Rare Look at Secretive Brotherhood in America."

<sup>25</sup> "About Us," Muslim American Society official website, <https://muslimamericansociety.org/about-us/>

<sup>26</sup> Op. Cit. "A Rare Look at Secretive Brotherhood in America."

To address the issue, MAS has posted a long answer in the FAQ section of its website

MAS is an independent American organization that aims to move people to strive for God-consciousness, liberty and justice and to contribute to a virtuous and just American society. MAS has no affiliation with the Ikhwan al Muslimoon (Muslim Brotherhood or the Ikhwan) or with any other international organization. Towards the beginning of the 20th century, the Ikhwan evolved in many Arab countries (in many different forms) as a grassroots Islamic movement for reform and revival. As dictatorial regimes came to power, the Ikhwan became the only substantive movement that often found itself in opposition to the authoritarian regimes. To this day, other opposition groups are either fairly small, entirely secular (and hence unpopular), or extremist. Thus anyone who had an activist inclination and was motivated to get involved in grassroots efforts to improve the country in opposition to dictatorial regimes was likely to either join the Ikhwan, or be influenced by its wide-reaching programs. Many of these activists who traveled to the United States as students and continued to have activist inclinations here, not surprisingly, played a role in establishing organizations here. Hence many immigrant organizations that were established early on would likely have had some founders who formerly had some involvement or even membership in the Ikhwan.<sup>27</sup>

These explanations capture a dynamic common to many Western-based organizations originally created by Brotherhood members. As the years went by, these organizations adapted to the environment in which they operated, making their operational connections to the Middle East progressively more tenuous. “We really see that our methods and means are different from the Orient,” argued American Brotherhood leader Zeid al-Noman in a lecture whose text was uncovered by the FBI, “we did not take or borrow a method or a means from the Orient unless it was compatible with the reality of the Islamic Movement over here.”<sup>28</sup> In substance, American-based organizations tracing their origins to the Brotherhood have evolved independently, sharing the movement’s general philosophy and interpretation of Islam, but contextualizing them to their new environment.

---

<sup>27</sup> “FAQ: What is MAS' relationship with the intellectual legacies of other Islamic movements, especially the Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwan)?” Muslim American Society official website, <https://muslimamericansociety.org/faq/>

<sup>28</sup> Ikhwan in America, Government Exhibit 003-0089 in United States v. Holy Land Foundation.

However, evidence recently uncovered in an investigation carried out by the Canadian government casts some doubts over this narrative. In December 2015, the Canada Revenue Agency (CRA), the Canadian federal government's tax authority, opened an audit of the Muslim Association of Canada (MAC).<sup>29</sup> Established in 1997, MAC describes itself as the largest grassroots Muslim charity in Canada. Like MAS, MAC is open about being a Brotherhood legacy group, admitting it was founded by individuals linked to the Brotherhood and is inspired by the group's ideology. MAC is, in substance, the Canadian equivalent of the MAS.

The CRA's audit lasted over 13 months, involved 30 visits to MAC properties, 27 interviews, a review of some one million financial transactions in 60 bank accounts, and a review of 415,874 emails and 63,523 other files. In opening the investigation, the CRA alleged multiple areas of MAC's suspected non-compliance with Canada's Income Tax Act and related regulations. Aside from multiple alleged irregularities related to accounting and funding matters, the CRA opened its inquiry on suspicion that MAC had advanced "unstated non-charitable collateral purposes," namely the advancement of the Brotherhood organization.

The CRA argued that MAC was not just inspired by the ideas of Hassan al-Banna and the Brotherhood, but that it regularly conducted multiple activities that showed that it acted to further the goals of the Muslim Brotherhood as an organization. Doing so is a violation of the requirement established by Canadian law that entities that are registered as charities have charity as their only goal.

The CRA went on to substantiate its decision with hundreds of pages that summarized the ample evidence it collected during the audit. In substance, it argued that three overlapping elements indicated that MAC acted as part of the organization of the Muslim Brotherhood:

1. Many key MAC leaders were deeply involved in activities of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, having occupied senior positions in the Freedom and Justice Party and later in the government of Mohammed Morsi;

---

<sup>29</sup> An extensive analysis of the CRA investigation and detailed references to specific CRA documents are available in: Lorenzo Vidino and Sergio Altuna, *The Muslim Brotherhood in the West? Evidence from a Canadian Tax Authority Investigation*, GWU Program on Extremism, January 2025, <https://extremism.gwu.edu/muslim-brotherhood-west>

2. Many MAC leaders had key roles in Canadian-based organizations that openly supported the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and allowed them to use MAC's premises for free;
3. Members of Middle Eastern branches of the Muslim Brotherhood could almost automatically become members of MAC upon transferring to Canada and vice versa.

This third point is particularly interesting here, as some of the evidence uncovered by the CRA strongly suggested that MAS operated exactly like MAC and in concert with it. CRA's review of MAC's emails yielded evidence suggesting that membership can be easily transferred from MAC to Muslim Brotherhood organizations in other parts of the world and vice versa, therefore strongly suggesting that MAC is not just ideologically inspired by the Brotherhood but that, rather, is inserted in a global family tied also by organizational cooperation. In the words of the CRA:

*A review of the Organization's records appears to indicate that membership in the Organization is not only transferrable to organizations outside of Canada, but that members of other organizations, in other countries, appear to be granted membership in the Organization on the basis of their membership in the foreign organization.*

The CRA provided several examples of Brotherhood members from Egypt, Lebanon, and other Arab countries who were able to transfer their membership to the Canadian branch of the Brotherhood by joining MAC, which facilitated that process. What is noteworthy is that for individuals moving to or from the U.S., MAC regularly liaised with MAS to arrange Brotherhood membership transfers. Evidence of this dynamic uncovered by the CRA include:

- An email dated January 2014 that describes a MAS member as having "transferred from MAS in Detroit to Edmonton's [MAC] chapter;"
- Meetings minutes note from a 2013 Waterloo, Ontario, chapter meeting in which it is written to "provide transfer letter" for a MAC member moving to the U.S. and seeking to join the MAS;
- An August 2014 email which asks "For a MAC member moving to the US, is there any protocol to introduce them to MAS?" to which MAC's Executive Director replied: "Yes, we give them a letter and we can contact the chapter or national if needed."

The CRA's analyzed these dynamics with these words:

*It is not entirely clear how the Organization, which purports to be entirely Canadian based with no foreign activities, is able to transfer membership to and from foreign organizations. Considering the Organization's leadership's interaction with Muslim Brotherhood leaders, it would appear reasonable to conclude that the transfer of membership is possible due to the Organization's close association with these seemingly foreign Muslim Brotherhood organizations.*

The analysis made by Canadian authorities in relation to MAC appears to be potentially applicable also to MAS in the U.S., therefore questioning whether its relation to the Egyptian branch of the Brotherhood is purely historical and ideological or, rather, also more functional.

### *The post-Morsi wave*

On June 30, 2013, millions of Egyptians filled the streets of Cairo to protest the Muslim Brotherhood-dominated government led by Morsi. A few days later, Morsi was removed from power by the military, paving the way for the beginning of the regime of General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi. Morsi's removal from power triggered a chain of events that culminated in the forced removal of Brotherhood members and supporters who had occupied two Cairo squares, Rabaa al-Adawiya and Nahda. It was a bloodbath; though the total is in dispute, at a minimum hundreds died. This shocked the Brotherhood well beyond Egypt and is considered one of the biggest tragedies in its tormented history. The coup also triggered a new phase, reminiscent of the crackdown implemented by Nasser in the 1950s: the outlawing of the organization, mass imprisonments of its members, summary trials, and poor detention conditions.

The crackdown also involved some Brotherhood members with deep ties to the U.S. Two of them are Salah Sultan and his son Mohammed. A prolific Islamic scholar and a longtime resident of Columbus, where he attended Ohio State University, Salah Sultan was a member of the board of trustees of MAS and a signatory of the fatwa that condemned terrorism and that was issued by the Fiqh Council of North America, an organization close to the U.S. Brotherhood network.<sup>30</sup> In May 2006, less than a year after signing

---

<sup>30</sup> "Fiqh Council of North America Issues Fatwa Against Terrorism," The American Muslim, July 28, 2015, [http://www.theamericanmuslim.org/tam.php/features/articles/fiqh\\_council\\_of\\_north\\_america\\_issues\\_fatwa\\_against\\_terrorism/](http://www.theamericanmuslim.org/tam.php/features/articles/fiqh_council_of_north_america_issues_fatwa_against_terrorism/) "Sultan's biography," IslamOnline, archived version available: <https://shorturl.at/qkgfW>

the fatwa, Sultan appeared on *Risala*, a Saudi TV station, and argued that he did not believe al-Qaeda was behind the terror attack on America on September 11, 2001. “The entire thing was of a large scale and was planned within the U.S.,” claimed Sultan, “in order to enable the U.S. to control and terrorize the entire world, and to get American society to agree to the war declared on terrorism—the definition of which has not yet been determined.”<sup>31</sup> Sultan was incarcerated in Egypt in September 2013 and has been detained ever since. His son Mohammed was imprisoned in Egypt in the summer of 2013 and released in May 2015. He has since been a vocal advocate for his father’s release.

The crackdown caused many Brotherhood members to flee Egypt. While many settled in Qatar and in Turkey—the latter having since become the undisputed center of gravity of the Brotherhood, not only of its Egyptian branch—others found refuge in the West.<sup>32</sup> While London took the lion’s share of Brotherhood members fleeing to the West, some settled in America. Here they found shelter and support in the broad infrastructure of the U.S. Brotherhood. And once in America, they engaged in a broad array of activities aimed at promoting their cause and undermining the Egyptian regime: political lobbying, street protests, social media campaigns, filing legal challenges against the Egyptian regime in various national and international courts, and providing support to individual Brotherhood members seeking to escape from Egypt.

As it is often the case with the Brotherhood, the new wave of Egyptian Brotherhood members in the America network has two faces, one visible and one not. Most of the individuals behind it are core Egyptian Brotherhood members, and while their concerns over the future of democracy in Egypt may be genuine, their aims are largely those of supporting their group. Yet most of the groups they run use names that invoke democracy and human rights, purposely omitting any reference to the Brotherhood. Moreover, these *ad hoc* organizations often include a few individuals who are not Brotherhood members as their most visible members, arguably a tactic used to deflect accusations of being simply Brotherhood fronts. But as the imagery

---

<sup>31</sup> “Columbus, Ohio Muslim Leader Says 9/11 Planned by Americans, Praises the Wanted Al-Qaeda-Linked Yemenite Sheikh Al-Zindani,” MEMRI Special Dispatch 1168, May 19, 2006.

<sup>32</sup> Shaimaa Magued, “The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood’s transnational advocacy in Turkey: a new means of political participation,” *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, Volume 45, Number 3, pp. 480-97. 2018.

(the ubiquitous yellow flags with the Rabaa four fingers in black) and slogans adopted at most of their events clearly show, the Brotherhood's imprint on them is dominant. Moreover, a deeper analysis of the themes (like the periodically organized global "tweetstorms" using hashtags such as #rememberRabaa), timing, advertising methods of the activities organized by these organizations, together with an investigation of who sits on their boards, clearly displays a high level of connectivity among them and with Brotherhood milieus worldwide.

### The designation of HASM

*Ḥarakat Sāwa'd Miṣr* (HASM), or the Arms of the Egypt Movement, first emerged in 2016 by targeting symbols of the el-Sisi government. One of its first internationally recognized operations was an assassination attempt on former Grand Mufti Sheikh Ali Gomaa in August 2016, for which HASM claimed responsibility in an online statement. The statement also provided the motive for the operation, announcing that they "sought to end the 'military occupation of Egypt and militias of [President] Abdel Fattah el-Sisi.'"<sup>33</sup> Gomaa, an ardent critic of Islamist groups—particularly the Muslim Brotherhood as it governed Egypt—was seen as a symbol of the post-coup establishment.<sup>34</sup>

The plot against Gomaa, and its proximity to the anniversary of the Rabaa massacre,<sup>35</sup> was an indication of a possible link between the Muslim Brotherhood and HASM. Other attacks furthered these suspicions. In November 2016, HASM was linked to an assassination attempt against Ahmad Abu al-Fotouh, a judge involved in Morsi's trial.<sup>36</sup> The continuous targeting of el-Sisi government officials, particularly individuals associated with the crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood, aided suspicions of HASM's connections.

<sup>33</sup> Associated Press, "Egypt's former grand mufti survives shooting west of Cairo." *The Washington Post*, August 5, 2016, [https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle\\_east/egypts-former-grand-mufti-survives-shooting-west-of-cairo/2016/08/05/1a140b18-5b25-11e6-831d-0324760ca856\\_story.html](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/egypts-former-grand-mufti-survives-shooting-west-of-cairo/2016/08/05/1a140b18-5b25-11e6-831d-0324760ca856_story.html)

<sup>34</sup> "Egypt's former Grand Mufti survives assassination attempt," *Reuters*, August 5, 2016, <https://www.reuters.com/article/world/egypts-former-grand-mufti-survives-assassination-attempt-idUSKCN10G19P/>

<sup>35</sup> The assassination attempt on Sheikh Ali Gomaa took place on August 5, 2016, while the Rabaa massacre occurred on August 14, 2013.

<sup>36</sup> Al-Masry Al-Youm, "Terrorist group claims responsibility for failed assassination attempt on judge who tried Morsi," *Egypt Independent*, November 6, 2016, <https://www.egyptindependent.com/terrorist-group-claims-responsibility-failed-assassination-attempt-judge-who-tried-morsi/>

By 2017, HASM had widened its scope. That year, it claimed responsibility for an attack on the Myanmar embassy in Cairo, citing the persecution of Rohingya Muslims as its motive.<sup>37</sup> This suggested ideological motivations aligned with broader Islamist causes beyond Egypt. Around this time, Egypt security forces began a crackdown on HASM. During prosecutions under Egypt's anti-terrorism laws, authorities claimed to uncover "transnational links to the Muslim Brotherhood sponsors in Qatar, Sudan, and Turkey".<sup>38</sup> The Muslim Brotherhood, however, denied any connection to HASM.<sup>39</sup>

In December 2017, the UK designated HASM a proscribed terrorist group, noting HASM had claimed responsibility for over 15 attacks.<sup>40</sup> The U.S. designated HASM a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) in January 2018, and then a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) in January 2021.<sup>41</sup> The FTO designation explicitly notes that some leaders in HASM, "were previously associated with the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood."<sup>42</sup>

After a period of relative silence, HASM reemerged in 2025, according to the Egyptian Interior Ministry. In an official statement, the Ministry labeled HASM as the armed wing of the Muslim Brotherhood and cited a newly released propaganda video in which the group threatened to resume operations.<sup>43</sup>

<sup>37</sup> Eric Trager, "Cairo Bombing Exposes the Muslim Brotherhood's Jihadist Tilt," *The Washington Institute for Near East Policy*, October 2, 2017, <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/cairo-bombing-exposes-muslim-brotherhoods-jihadist-tilt>

<sup>38</sup> Ryan Cummings, "What Is the HasM Movement?" *The Tony Blair Institute for Global Change*, November 3, 2017, <https://institute.global/insights/geopolitics-and-security/what-hasm-movement>

<sup>39</sup> "Muslim Brotherhood denies link to Egypt militant group," *Anadolu Agency*, December 13, 2016, <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/muslim-brotherhood-denies-link-to-egypt-militant-group/703784>

<sup>40</sup> Government of the United Kingdom, "Proscribed terrorist groups or organisations," last updated November 11, 2025, <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/proscribed-terror-groups-or-organisations--2/proscribed-terrorist-groups-or-organisations-accessible-version>

<sup>41</sup> United States Department of State, "State Department Terrorist Designations of HASM and Its Leaders and Maintenance of PIJ FTO Designation," January 14, 2021, <https://2017-2021.state.gov/state-department-terrorist-designations-of-hasm-and-its-leaders-and-maintenance-of-pij-fto-designation/#:~:text=The%20Department%20of%20State%20has,in%20any%20transactions%20with%20them>

<sup>42</sup> Ibid.

<sup>43</sup> Egyptian Ministry of Interior statement published in its official X account, July 20, 2025, <https://x.com/moiegy/status/1946893464328704213>

## The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood in the United States Today

Understanding the current presence of Egyptian Brotherhood actors in the U.S. requires navigating a number of conceptual, methodological, and evidentiary challenges. Chief among them is the fact that the Brotherhood lacks any formal organizational structure in the West. Individuals and groups linked to the movement rarely identify publicly with it—often out of strategic concern over reputational and legal consequences.<sup>44</sup>

Thus, this section does not claim to offer an exhaustive inventory of all Brotherhood-linked entities and individuals in the U.S. Rather, it seeks to identify key networks, institutions, and individuals with documented or credible links to the Egyptian Brotherhood to illustrate how Brotherhood-linked influence manifests across religious, charitable, and advocacy domains. Several caveats, however, must be emphasized:

- First, the absence of formal membership rosters and the deliberate opacity of Brotherhood-linked actors make full verification of their status challenging;
- Second, inclusion in this report does not imply illegal activity or that the individual or group in question should be designated or sanctioned;
- Third, all information included here pertains to publicly available sources or widely reported facts;
- Finally, while strong indicators of Brotherhood affiliation are outlined, the presumption of innocence and the need for further verification in any legal or policy proceeding remain fundamental.

The methodology employed in compiling this section combines open-source intelligence (OSINT) collection techniques triangulated with primary documents (e.g. public statements, court records, financial filings) and academic and investigative reporting. Both entities and individuals have been included based on one or more of the following criteria:

1. Leadership held by known Egyptian Brotherhood figures;
2. Organizational history tied to Brotherhood legacy groups;

---

<sup>44</sup> Lorenzo Vidino, *The New Muslim Brotherhood in the West*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010).

3. Public alignment with Brotherhood narratives, campaigns, or ideological framing;
4. Participation in Brotherhood-associated international networks or forums.

This framework aims to offer lawmakers, analysts, and practitioners a structured and credible reference to inform further inquiry.

### *Key Nodes of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood's Ecosystem in the United States*

Rather than operating through a centralized or formalized structure, the Egyptian Brotherhood's presence in the U.S. can be best described as a decentralized yet closely interlinked ecosystem of individuals, institutions, and platforms where religious authority, institutional anchoring, political advocacy, and charitable infrastructure converge through overlapping networks. What emerges is not a top-down organization, but a distributed architecture of influence anchored by a core set of figures who operate across multiple domains and whose affiliations point to sustained ideological and operational ties with the Brotherhood's Egyptian branch.

The following subsections examine this ecosystem through three interrelated spheres of activity: a) political advocacy and lobbying structures; b) religious authority and community platforms; and c) charitable platforms and strategic philanthropy.

To begin mapping this ecosystem, it is fitting to begin with the most senior figure: Dr. Abdul Mawgoud al-Dardery, a former Egyptian parliamentarian who played a central role in articulating the Brotherhood's international messaging during Morsi's Government.<sup>45</sup>

#### **a) Political Advocacy and Lobbying Structures**

In Egypt's short-lived post-revolution parliament (2012), al-Dardery chaired the Foreign Relations Committee and served as the official international spokesperson for the Brotherhood's political arm, the Freedom and Justice Party.<sup>46</sup> Known for his fluent English and polished public presence, he quickly

<sup>45</sup> "Muslim Brotherhood Official: Party Believes in Inclusivity," International Peace Institute, February 4, 2013, <https://www.ipinst.org/2013/02/muslim-brotherhood-official-party-believes-in-inclusivity>

<sup>46</sup> Laiq, Nur. "Interview with Abdul Mawgoud Dardery, Egyptian Parliamentarian," IPI Global Observatory, February 12, 2013, <https://theglobalobservatory.org/2013/02/interview-with-dr-abdul-mawgoud-dardery-director-of-the-luxor-islamic-center-for-global-dialogue-on-egypts-revolution/>

emerged as one of the Brotherhood's key emissaries to Western audiences during and after Morsi's presidency.

Before entering politics in his native Egypt, al-Dardery followed a distinctly academic path. He first earned a BA and MA in English from Assiut University before relocating to the U.S. to pursue a PhD in Cultural Studies at the University of Pittsburgh. Prior to returning to Egypt during the 2011 uprising, he had already held faculty positions in Cultural Studies and Islamic Studies at Seton Hall University (New Jersey) and Metropolitan State University (Minnesota).<sup>47</sup> As is common among Brotherhood members, al-Dardery combined his academic work with active Islamist engagement. During his time as a student in the U.S., he served as President of the Islamic Center of Pittsburgh (1994–2000) and of the local chapters of the MSA (1990–1994).<sup>48</sup> Notably, his engagement with Brotherhood-affiliated activism began much earlier: as far back as 1979, he was a member of the Egyptian Student Union at Assiut University—an institution long regarded as a Brotherhood stronghold since the Sadat era.<sup>49</sup>

Following the military ouster of President Mohamed Morsi in 2013 and the subsequent crackdown on the Brotherhood, al-Dardery returned to the U.S. where he leveraged his personal network and political experience to establish, lead, and participate in a range of advocacy and lobbying platforms aligned with the Brotherhood's agenda. Among these initiatives, three stand out: he is the founder and current president of the Center for Egyptian-American Dialogue (CEAD), established in Springfield (VA) but mostly active in Washington D.C., which claims to pursue "the promotion of stability in Egypt through civilian democracy, human rights, and rule of law;"<sup>50</sup> a founding member of Parliamentarians Against the Coup—a coalition of exiled Egyptian Brotherhood lawmakers rejecting the post-coup regime's legitimacy;<sup>51</sup> and, most notably, one of the founders of the Egyptian Revolutionary Council (ERC), an

---

<sup>47</sup> "Kurzbiografien Interviewpartner," Außenpolitische Jahrestagung, Heinrich Böll Stiftung, November 8-9, 2012, [https://www.boell.de/sites/default/files/assets/boell.de/images/download\\_de/TXT\\_20121030\\_Kurzbios\\_InterviewpartnerInnen\\_Presse.pdf](https://www.boell.de/sites/default/files/assets/boell.de/images/download_de/TXT_20121030_Kurzbios_InterviewpartnerInnen_Presse.pdf)

<sup>48</sup> "A Conversation with Dr. Dardery: Prepping for Ramadan and Finals," The MSA UMN Podcast, May 4, 2019, <https://www.speaker.com/episode/a-conversation-with-dr-dardery-prepping-for-ramadan-and-finals--17835804>

<sup>49</sup> Fady Salah, "Student Union Elections and the Brotherhood's Electoral Mechanism," The Atlantic Council, March 15, 2013, <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/student-union-elections-and-the-brotherhood-s-electoral-mechanism/>

<sup>50</sup> "Our Mission," Center For Egyptian-American Dialogue, <https://ceadusa.org/about/>

<sup>51</sup> "Democracy and Human Rights in Egypt," University of Tennessee at Chattanooga, April 14, 2014, [https://www.facebook.com/events/281957485301150/?source=3&source\\_newsfeed\\_story\\_type=regular](https://www.facebook.com/events/281957485301150/?source=3&source_newsfeed_story_type=regular)

umbrella organization of diaspora-based Brotherhood members advocating for the return of the Egyptian Brotherhood to power, established in Istanbul in 2014.<sup>52</sup>



Founded and presided by former Egyptian parliamentarian Abdul Mawgoud al-Dardery, the Center for Egyptian-American Dialogue (CEAD) presents itself as a platform dedicated to fostering dialogue between Egyptian Americans, policymakers, and civil society actors, with a stated focus on democracy, human rights, and political pluralism in Egypt.

In practice, however, CEAD has functioned largely as a post-2013 advocacy vehicle aligned with narratives advanced by the Egyptian Brotherhood. Its programming and public statements have consistently echoed Brotherhood talking points following the ouster of Mohamed Morsi, and its activities have also overlapped with other Brotherhood-linked advocacy platforms operating in the U.S., reinforcing a tightly knit ecosystem rather than a pluralistic forum.

## The Raba'a symbol

The Raba'a symbol<sup>53</sup> is a gesture whereby four-fingers remain raised and the thumb is tucked into the palm. The symbol gets its name from the events that took place on August 14, 2013, at Cairo's Rabaa al-Adawiya Square. On that day, Egyptian security forces killed over 800 people who were protesting the removal of the Brotherhood-affiliated government of Mohammed Morsi.<sup>54</sup> The Raba'a gesture became inseparable from the events, becoming a symbol of support for the Brotherhood.

<sup>52</sup> Ipek Yezdani, "Egyptian opposition establishes 'Revolutionary Council' in Istanbul," *Hürriyet Daily News*, August 9, 2014, <https://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/egyptian-opposition-establishes-revolutionary-council-in-istanbul-70196>

<sup>53</sup> Raba'a is also sometimes spelled Rabia or Rabbi'ah, and sometimes stylized as R4BIA.

<sup>54</sup> "Egypt: Rab'a Massacre Reverberates 10 Years Later," Human Rights Watch, August 14, 2023, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/08/14/egypt-raba-massacre-reverberates-10-years-later>

**Figure 2:** Abdul Mawgoud al-Dardery (on the left) at a conference held in Berlin, Germany, on the 100<sup>th</sup> day anniversary of the Raba'a al-Adawiya Square massacre. In the center of the picture is Former Egyptian investment minister Yehia Hamed.<sup>55</sup>



**Figure 3:** Al-Dardery performing the pro-Morsi Raba'a salute with a group of Malaysian kids in the most recent Facebook post available at the time of this report's publication on the Center for Egyptian-American Dialogue's Facebook page.<sup>56</sup>




<sup>55</sup> Khaled Shamet, "Two advisors to Morsi: Supporters of the coup are abandoning him." *Al Jazeera*, November 29, 2013, <https://www.aljazeera.net/news/2013/11/29/مستشاران-لمرسي-مؤيدو-الانقلاب-ينفضون>

<sup>56</sup> Official Facebook page of the Center for Egyptian American Dialogue, August 18, 2024, <https://shorturl.at/53pSB>

A more detailed note is warranted on the activities of the ERC. Given its ties to the MAC, the aforementioned audit conducted by the Canada Revenue Agency on MAC also reviewed some of the ERC-linked activities. According to the CRA's findings, the ERC "appears to operate in support and advancement of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt," and through its social media channels, shared operational guidance on how to "prepare for revolution," including calls for "sieging food supplies for the army" and "disabling Egypt's airports as the last line of defense against the people."<sup>57</sup> These concerns were echoed by the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which, through its embassy in Canada, released an official statement in 2015 accusing the ERC of "releasing subversive statements that incite violence and terrorism in Egypt, and conducting visits to a number of countries to promote misinformation and extremist ideas."<sup>58</sup>

ERC's most visible incursion into the U.S. public sphere came in January 2015, when a high-profile delegation of exiled Egyptian opposition figures with ties to the Brotherhood traveled to Washington, D.C. for a week of lobbying and public events. Other than al-Dardery, the delegation included Brotherhood-linked figures such as Walid Sharabi and Maha Azzam, and even Gamal Heshmat, a member of the Brotherhood's shura council.<sup>59</sup> The delegation visit was notably covered by *Ikhwanweb*, the official English-language platform of the Brotherhood.<sup>60</sup>

Beyond Washington, the delegation also engaged in events organized by other organizations with close ties to the Egyptian Brotherhood, such as Egyptian Americans for Freedom and Justice (EAFJ). EAFJ not only helped coordinate and partially fund the delegation's visit but



**Figure 4:** Walid Sharabi, inside the State Department flashing the pro-Morsi Raba'a salute.<sup>61</sup>

<sup>57</sup> "CRA Audit of the Muslim Association of Canada – Court file No. CV-22-00679625-0000", Canada Revenue Agency, Ministry of National Revenue, Government of Canada. March 17, 2021. Pp. 164-165. <https://www.canadiancharitylaw.ca/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/CRA-Audit-letters-of-Muslim-Association-of-Canada-MAC-dated-March-17-2021.pdf>

<sup>58</sup> *Ibid*, 164.

<sup>59</sup> "Resume," Gamal Heshmat Official Website. <http://gamalheshmat.com/resume/?lang=en>

<sup>60</sup> "Egyptian Revolutionary Council Statement: Revolution Only Strategic Option to End Coup," *Ikhwanweb*, January 31, 2015, <https://ikhwanweb.com/egyptian-revolutionary-council-5/>

<sup>61</sup> Picture originally posted on Facebook by Walid Sharabi; no longer available online. Authors' archive.

also served as a key domestic partner in amplifying its message, bringing the ERC's agenda into local community centers and political advocacy spaces across the U.S.<sup>62</sup>

Formed in the aftermath of the ouster of President Mohamed Morsi, Egyptian Americans for Freedom and Justice emerged as a key advocacy platform for the Egyptian Brotherhood in the U.S.<sup>63</sup> Positioned as a civil rights and democracy-focused group, EAFJ's core objective has consistently been to restore the Brotherhood's political influence in Egypt by shaping American public opinion and policy. Central to its strategy has been persistent lobbying on Capitol Hill, often coordinated to coincide with broader advocacy events organized by umbrella groups like the U.S. Council of Muslim Organizations.

### The U.S. Council of Muslim Organizations

The U.S. Council of Muslim Organizations (USCMO) purports itself to be an umbrella organization for Muslim organizations across the U.S. In April, 2013, its founding organizations consisted of MAS, Islamic Circle of North America (ICNA), Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), American Muslims for Palestine (AMP), Muslim Legal Fund of America (MLFA), Muslim Umma of North America (MUNA) and the Mosque Cares.<sup>64</sup> The majority of these organizations are legacy Brotherhood affiliated organizations in the U.S., some of which have specific historical ties to the Hamas infrastructure in the U.S. Among them is CAIR's co-founder and long-term National Executive Director, Nihad Awad. Awad is a member of the Palestine Committee which was established in 1988 to support Hamas from the U.S. The Palestine Committee effectively became the U.S.-based Hamas infrastructure. CAIR was created by the Palestine Committee in effort to continue the committee's work into the future. Awad is listed as a beneficial owner of USCMO and uses his organization as a significant force behind the USCMO.<sup>65</sup>

<sup>62</sup> "Fact Box: 'Egyptian Revolutionary Council' Visits Washington DC," Atlantic Council, February 5, 2015, <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/fact-box-egyptian-revolutionary-council-visits-washington-dc/>

<sup>63</sup> "Certificate of Inc., (Non Profit) - Egyptian Americans for Freedom and Justice - 0400706256," Division of Revenue and Enterprise Services, New Jersey Department of the Treasury, December 4, 2014. <https://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/misc/914.pdf>

<sup>64</sup> "USCMO Founding: Creating a unified body to better communicate, strategize, and coordinate the activities of American Muslim organizations," The U.S. Council of Muslim Organizations official website, <https://uscmo.org/uscmo-founding/>

<sup>65</sup> "Entity information: US Council of Muslim Organizations (File No. N00004743519)," Corporations Division, Government of the District of Columbia.

EAFJ delegations have lobbied members of Congress across party lines for years since the organization's founding, urging legislators to halt U.S. military aid to Egypt over human rights concerns. These visits, frequently documented on the group's social media accounts, usually include stops at the offices of influential lawmakers and the House Foreign Affairs Committee.<sup>66</sup> However, while presented as grassroots advocacy, EAFJ's lobbying activities warrant closer scrutiny due to the close ties of its leading members with the Brotherhood.

**Figure 5:** EAFJ posing with the pro-Morsi Raba'a salute in front of the Capitol.<sup>67</sup>



The online presence and public activity of its top figures leave little room for doubt. Its president, Hani Elkadi, for example, has not only openly declared his Brotherhood affiliation,<sup>68</sup> but also regularly honors Brotherhood figures, from historical ones like Sayyid Qutb to contemporary and even more controversial ones such as Mohamed Kamal<sup>69</sup>—a member of the Guidance

<sup>66</sup> For further context see: Egyptian Americans for Freedom and Justice official Facebook page. <https://www.facebook.com/EAFJA.OfficialPage/photos>

<sup>67</sup> Hani Elkadi official Facebook page, March 17, 2019. <https://www.facebook.com/elkadihani/photos/pb.100047258825068.-2207520000/2163310020636824/?type=3>

<sup>68</sup> See for example: Hani Elkadi post on Facebook, August 22, 2019. <https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=10156476396921218&set=pb.548251217.-2207520000&type=3>

<sup>69</sup> Hani Elkadi post on Facebook, October 6, 2016. Archived version available: <https://web.archive.org/web/20210203110631/http://archive.is/Bf2V5>

Bureau<sup>70</sup> and responsible for the organization's armed wing.<sup>71</sup> Beyond the Brotherhood iconography that permeates the social media of EAFJ's members, other senior figures such as Mahmoud ElSharkawy, identified as a member of the International Organization of the Muslim Brotherhood,<sup>72</sup> have gone so far as to openly praise attacks carried out by terrorist groups<sup>73</sup> like the Popular Resistance Movement.<sup>74</sup>



Established in 2013, Egyptian Americans for Freedom and Justice (EAFJ) is a Washington, DC–based advocacy organization that presents itself as a civic initiative promoting democracy, human rights, and political accountability in Egypt.

Despite this civic framing, EAFJ has functioned as one of the main lobbying platforms for the Egyptian Brotherhood–aligned actors in the U.S. Its leadership, public messaging, and mobilization efforts have consistently supported Brotherhood narratives, particularly in relation to the legitimacy of the Morsi government and in opposition to the post-2013 Egyptian authorities. EAFJ has played a central role in coordinating demonstrations, congressional outreach, and media engagement, often in close cooperation with other Brotherhood-linked entities, including the Egyptian Revolutionary Council.

This network of lobbying platforms forms the outward-facing dimension of the Egyptian Brotherhood's political presence across the U.S. power corridor. While these organizations do not formally identify as Brotherhood-affiliated, their leadership composition, narrative alignment, and operational behavior point clearly to a functional role within the Egyptian Brotherhood ecosystem and act as ideological amplifiers, advocacy vehicles, and community mobilization tools.

<sup>70</sup> The Guidance Bureau (*Maktab al-Irshād*) is the Muslim Brotherhood's highest executive body. Traditionally composed of senior members elected by the organization's Shura Council, it is responsible for setting strategic direction, issuing guidance, and overseeing the implementation of policies across the movement's structures.

<sup>71</sup> Amina Ismail, "Egypt says it killed senior Muslim Brotherhood leader in shootout," Reuters, October 4, 2016, <https://www.reuters.com/article/world/egypt-says-it-killed-senior-muslim-brotherhood-leader-in-shootout-idUSKCN12400A>

<sup>72</sup> Ahmed Yahya and Mohammed Diyasti, "Details of the Muslim Brotherhood leaders' meetings in New York," *Al-Bawaba News*, April 5, 2015, <https://www.albawabhnews.com/1213841>

<sup>73</sup> Mahmoud ElSharkawy post on Facebook, February 5, 2015. <https://shorturl.at/ckTcj>

<sup>74</sup> For further context see: "(Allied) Popular Resistance Movement," *The Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy*, April 9, 2015, <https://timep.org/2015/04/09/aprm/>

The network's ability to anchor itself socially and institutionally relies equally on actors operating within localized religious, educational, and community frameworks—figures whose influence stems less from public visibility than from their embeddedness in religious infrastructures at the local, regional, and transnational levels.

### **b) Religious Authority and Community Platforms**

A central figure straddling both political and religious spheres is Mohamed Elbar who—despite his lower public profile—is arguably among the most influential figures within EAFJ. He currently serves as imam at the Islamic Society of Bay Ridge (New York) and previously held the same role at the (MAS) of Queens between 2004 and 2006.<sup>75</sup> Beyond his better-known affiliations, Elbar is a member of the Qatar-based International Union of Muslim Scholars (IUMS), one of the brainchildren of the late Yusuf al-Qaradawi. This membership, which Elbar credits to Shaker El Sayed,<sup>76</sup> former Secretary General of the MAS, places Elbar among a select clique of Brotherhood-aligned Islamic scholars with global influence. In addition, his familial connections are equally relevant: his brother, Abderrahman Elbar<sup>77</sup> is a top Brotherhood figure—a member of the Guidance Bureau and also a member of the General Shura Council—<sup>78</sup>and is currently imprisoned in Egypt.

Beyond his individual profile, Mohamed Elbar should be understood as part of a discreet yet structurally important network of Egyptian Brotherhood-aligned figures operating across the New York–New Jersey area. Unlike more visible advocacy actors, his relevance lies in his embeddedness within overlapping religious, institutional, and educational settings that function as conduits for influence rather than platforms for overt mobilization.

Several nodes play a key role within this network. One of the most significant is the North Hudson Islamic Educational Center (NHIEC), located in Union City, New Jersey, but functionally integrated into the broader New York metropolitan religious ecosystem. NHIEC serves as a recurring platform for Brotherhood-

<sup>75</sup> "Faculty Staff - Mohamed Elbar Ph.D." Graduate Theological Foundation. <https://gtfeducation.org/faculty-staff/mohamed-elbar-ph-d/>

<sup>76</sup> Mohamed Elbar post on Facebook, April 27, 2015. Archived version available: <https://web.archive.org/web/20240603053928/https://archive.is/Kiz9w>

<sup>77</sup> Mohamed Elbar post on Facebook, June 24, 2021. <https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=10222688702538806&set=pb.1010902201.-2207520000&type=3>

<sup>78</sup> "Members of the Guidance Bureau - Abderrahman Abdelhamid Ahmed Elbar," Official website of the Muslim Brotherhood. <https://ikhwan.site/pv-83>

affiliated clerics, including Elbar himself, who regularly delivers sermons there,<sup>79</sup> as well as Dr. Akram Kassab,<sup>80</sup> a far more prominent figure within the global Brotherhood milieu. This shared use of NHIEC as a preaching venue is not incidental; rather, it reflects the integration of Brotherhood religious influence and legitimacy into the local religious landscape through access to diverse congregations across the tri-state area.

This role is further reinforced by NHIEC's close ties to regional clerical coordination structures, most notably the Tri-State Imams Council, established in North Brunswick, in central New Jersey. According to its own mission statements, the Council focuses on empowering imams through training programs, workshops, and conferences on current issues—precisely the type of framework through which ideological orientations can be disseminated indirectly under the guise of professionalization.<sup>81</sup> The Tri-State Imam Council is led by Imam Mohamed Moussa, the resident imam of NHIEC, while Elbar serves on its board and Akram Kassab participates intermittently in its activities.<sup>82</sup>

Kassab's profile substantially elevates the importance of all these connections. A long-time confidant and former secretary of Yusuf al-Qaradawi, Kassab is a founding member of the IUMS.<sup>83</sup> His career spans senior preaching and advisory roles at Qatar's Ministry of Religious Endowments, leadership positions within *IslamOnline*,<sup>84</sup> and the direction of the Qaradawi Students Association,<sup>85</sup> placing him at the core of the Brotherhood's contemporary scholarly and ideological infrastructure.

---

<sup>79</sup> See for context: North Hudson Islamic Educational Center (NHIEC)'s post on Facebook, October 16, 2025, <https://www.facebook.com/nhiecmosque/posts/pfbid02dpxRga7FNrRpFFXuNfqisLMJRZMgx9zFpkcaD64DiAxUVtnuCnHFfejrMdSkpXHBI>

<sup>80</sup> See for context: North Hudson Islamic Educational Center (NHIEC)'s post on Facebook, September 6, 2025, <https://shorturl.at/9LQPc>; North Hudson Islamic Educational Center (NHIEC)'s post on Facebook, May 9, 2025, <https://shorturl.at/f3JXb>

<sup>81</sup> "Mission – Vision," Tri-State Imams Council official website. <https://www.imams-council.org/mission-vision>

<sup>82</sup> "Board of Trustees," Tri-State Imams Council official website. <https://www.imams-council.org/board-of-trustees>

<sup>83</sup> "Qaradawi at Qatar conference: Al-Deeb was a complete character that rose above what others seek," International Union of Muslim Scholar official website, October 4, 2012, <https://iumsonline.org/EN/ContentDetails.aspx?ID=1829>

<sup>84</sup> *IslamOnline* is a prominent global Islamic website providing extensive resources and services in multiple languages (articles, fatwas, guidance, etc.). It was founded in 1997 under the spiritual guidance of Yusuf al-Qaradawi. Its office is located in Qatar and its content is managed by the Al-Balagh Cultural Society.

<sup>85</sup> "About the Doctor," Akram al-Kassab official website. <https://www.akramkassab.com/about-us/>

## The International Union of Muslim Scholars

The International Union of Muslim Scholars (IUMS) was established in 2004 in Qatar by Yusuf al-Qaradawi. While officially presented as an independent body of Muslim scholars dedicated to promoting Islamic unity and scholarship, IUMS is now widely viewed as ideologically aligned with the Brotherhood. In fact, several of its founding and current senior members have held leadership roles in Brotherhood-affiliated organizations. In addition, IUMS has also publicly expressed support for terrorist organizations such as Hamas and, since October 7, 2023, it has worked to legitimize their actions and issuing constant calls for mobilization and jihad—further reinforcing concerns about its political and ideological orientation.<sup>86</sup>

### Yusuf al-Qaradawi

Yusuf al-Qaradawi (1926–2022) was widely regarded as the spiritual guide of the global Brotherhood until his death.<sup>87</sup> An Egyptian-born cleric based in Qatar for most of his life, he fused traditional Islamic scholarship with a modern Islamist political vision that significantly influenced contemporary Muslims worldwide. Al-Qaradawi founded or helped lead numerous institutions central to this transnational infrastructure—including the IUMS, the European Council for Fatwa and Research, and the Union of Good, a coalition of over 50 Islamic charities that the U.S. Treasury designated in 2008 as a terrorist organization for its role in providing financial support to Hamas.<sup>88</sup> Though framed as scholarly or humanitarian bodies, many of these entities became ideological engines of the Brotherhood’s global agenda.

In 1995, during a speech in Toledo, Ohio, al-Qaradawi stated, “*We will conquer Europe, we will conquer America, not through the sword but through da’wah,*”<sup>89</sup> encapsulating his strategic focus on religious propagation to achieve political transformation in the West.

<sup>86</sup> Sergio Altuna, “Beyond Islamic Guidance: Qatar-based IUMS as an Agitator in the Israel-Hamas War” The Program on Extremism, George Washington University, December 13, 2023, <https://extremism.gwu.edu/beyond-islamic-guidance>

<sup>87</sup> See for context: Bettina Gräf and Jakob Skovgaard-Petersen (eds.), *The Global Mufti: The Phenomenon of Yusuf al-Qaradawi*, London: Hurst, 2009.

<sup>88</sup> “Treasury Designates the Union of Good,” U.S. Department of Treasury Press Release HP-1267, November 12, 2008. <https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/hp1267>

<sup>89</sup> Yusuf al-Qaradawi, MAYA Conference, 1995, Toledo, Ohio. Transcript available at: [www.investigativeproject.org/profile/167#\\_ftn3](http://www.investigativeproject.org/profile/167#_ftn3)

Al-Qaradawi's influence stemmed not only from institutional reach but from incendiary theological positions that blurred the line between religious guidance, and political provocation. He justified suicide bombings during the Second Intifada, declaring them a form of martyrdom,<sup>90</sup> and infamously proclaimed on Al-Jazeera that he prayed for Hitler's persecution of Jews to be repeated "at the hands of the believers."<sup>91</sup> He issued fatwas supporting the killing of American troops in Iraq and even endorsed violent resistance against the Egyptian judiciary following the 2013 coup.<sup>92</sup> His rhetoric led to bans from the U.S., U.K., France, and Egypt, among others.

Despite these controversies, al-Qaradawi remained a revered figure in Brotherhood circles until his death in September 2022. He viewed the West—precisely because of its freedoms—as fertile ground for the Brotherhood's ideological ambitions. In his words, Muslim Brotherhood members in democratic societies could "play the role of the missing leadership of the Muslim nation."<sup>93</sup> His legacy endures not just in texts or institutions, but in the strategic blueprint he offered for expanding Brotherhood influence globally—especially by embedding within civil society structures in the West

<sup>90</sup> Haim Malka. "Must Innocents Die? The Islamic Debate Over Suicide Attacks," Brookings, March 1, 2003, <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/must-innocents-die-the-islamic-debate-over-suicide-attacks/>

<sup>91</sup> "Allah Willing, the Next Time Will Be at the Hand of the Believers," Arab News, May 22, 2019, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=my8x-7qZ0UI>

<sup>92</sup> "Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi and his impact on the dissemination of radical Islam," The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, October 6, 2022, [https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/app/uploads/2022/10/E\\_166\\_22.pdf](https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/app/uploads/2022/10/E_166_22.pdf)

<sup>93</sup> Yusuf al Qaradawi, *Priorities of the Islamic Movement in the Coming Phase*, (Swansea, UK: Awakening Publications), 2000, 7

Kassab's influence is not confined to institutional or scholarly roles. In the aftermath of mass death sentences handed down against senior Brotherhood figures in Egypt, Kassab was quoted by Reuters publicly endorsing violence against members of the judiciary, describing "getting rid of the military judges and killing them" as "a Shariah duty and a human necessity and a revolutionary desire."<sup>94</sup> Other media and television appearances indicate that this statement was not an isolated reaction. In other interviews on the same topic, Kassab reiterated that judges responsible for issuing death sentences against Brotherhood figures should be subject to *qisās*,<sup>95</sup> framing such acts as both a religious obligation and a revolutionary necessity.<sup>96</sup>

From Elbar and Kassab's religious influence, to the coordination structures for imam training like the Tri-State Imams Council, and the lobbying efforts of EAFJ and ERC, a broader architecture of influence takes shape—one that is further sustained by international charitable infrastructures with strategic reach, such as Islamic Relief USA (IRUSA).

### c) Charitable Platforms and Strategic Philanthropy

Founded in 1993 as the American branch of the UK-based Islamic Relief Worldwide, Islamic Relief USA (IRUSA), which is based in Alexandria, Virginia, has grown into one of the largest Muslim charitable organizations in the country, partnering with high-profile entities such as UNHCR, USAID, and the World Food Program.<sup>97</sup> Officially nonpartisan and dedicated to humanitarian relief, IRUSA has nonetheless faced sustained scrutiny due to longstanding patterns of leadership overlap with Brotherhood-linked figures and organizations. This dynamic mirrors similar patterns observed across Europe, where national branches of Islamic Relief have frequently been headed by prominent members of the local Brotherhood.<sup>98</sup>

<sup>94</sup> Yara Bayoumy and Haitham Ahmed, "Egypt's judges new frontline in battle against militancy" Reuters, May 20, 2015, <https://www.reuters.com/article/world/egypts-judges-new-frontline-in-battle-against-militancy-idUSKBN0051E5/>

<sup>95</sup> *Qisās* is an Islamic legal concept referring to retributive justice, often summarized as "an eye for an eye."

<sup>96</sup> Ashraf Abu al-Hool, "Akram Kassab and Issam Tolima informed satellite channels of the fatwa in response to the rulings against the Brotherhood," *Al-Ahram*, July 1, 2015, <https://gate.ahram.org.eg/daily/News/121587/135/411885/اثن-لسان-على-للسان-اثن-القضاة-وأطلقها-على-لسان-اثن>.aspx

<sup>97</sup> "Our History," Islamic Relief USA. <https://irusa.org/history/>

<sup>98</sup> Lorenzo Vidino and Sergio Altuna, *The Muslim Brotherhood's Pan-European Structure*. Dokumentationsstelle Politischer Islam, February 2021. [https://www.dokumentationsstelle.at/fileadmin/dpi/publikationen/Report\\_EU\\_Strukturen\\_final.pdf](https://www.dokumentationsstelle.at/fileadmin/dpi/publikationen/Report_EU_Strukturen_final.pdf)

Islamic Relief has repeatedly denied any formal ties to the Brotherhood, describing such claims as “defamatory and false,” and affirming its purely humanitarian mission and the transparency of its financial operations.<sup>99</sup> Still, while IRUSA as an institution maintains that it is independent and non-political, the composition of its senior leadership—and the personal activism and affiliations of several of its key figures within Egyptian Brotherhood-linked structures—is hard to ignore.

One of the most illustrative cases is that of Khaled Lamada, a long-standing figure within both the religious and political orbit of Egyptian Brotherhood activism in the U.S. Lamada has held senior roles in IRUSA, including serving as vice chairman of the Board of Directors and remaining an active member of its board to this day.<sup>100</sup> His institutional footprint, however, extends far beyond IRUSA. He has served on the board of the Islamic Society of Bay Ridge, Brooklin, New York<sup>101</sup>—the same mosque where Mohamed Elbar serves as imam—thus reinforcing the tightly woven nature of these institutional and ideological linkages. Additionally, Lamada also served as director of outreach for the MAS<sup>102</sup> and currently leads its New York chapter,<sup>103</sup> which, as this report already highlighted, has also faced sustained scrutiny over its ties to the Egyptian Brotherhood.

Lamada’s public posture openly reflects the fusion of charitable leadership and Islamist political engagement. In a 2012 video he can be seen urging support for Mohamed Morsi during Egypt’s presidential campaign after the revolution.<sup>104</sup> His connection to the lobbying efforts of Egyptian Americans for Freedom and Justice further illustrates this alignment. Furthermore, Lamada also played a coordinating role in organizing the U.S. tour of the Egyptian Revolutionary Council (ERC)—a Brotherhood-aligned coalition of exiled activists

---

<sup>99</sup> "Response to allegations of links to Muslim Brotherhood," Islamic Relief Worldwide, April 18, 2019, <https://islamic-relief.org/news/response-to-allegations-of-links-to-muslim-brotherhood/>

<sup>100</sup> "Organization profile: IRUSA," United Nations Civil Society Participation, 2023, <https://esango.un.org/civilsociety/showProfileDetail.do?method=printProfile&tab=1&profileCode=608418>

<sup>101</sup> "2011 Islamic Relief USA Annual Report," Islamic Relief USA, 2012, [https://irusa.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/IRUSA\\_2011\\_AnnualReport\\_FINAL-1.pdf](https://irusa.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/IRUSA_2011_AnnualReport_FINAL-1.pdf)

<sup>102</sup> Michael Barbaro and Steven Greenhouse, "Wal-Mart envoy quits after racist remarks," *The New York Times*, August 18, 2006, <https://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/18/world/americas/18iht-walmart.2531770.html>

<sup>103</sup> "National Governing Board," The Muslim American Society, <https://muslimamericansociety.org/ngb/>

<sup>104</sup> "Dr Khaled Lamada supports Dr Morsi from New York," Bayadneurosurgeon Youtube Channel, June 5, 2012, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PIVMLgjY7Vs>

that has openly advocated for the return of the Brotherhood to power—doing so through his own vehicle, the Egyptian Americans for Democracy and Human Rights (EADHR), yet another node in the same political ecosystem.<sup>105</sup>

**Figure 6:** Poster of the demonstration in front of the Egyptian Embassy in the U.S. organized by the EADHR in 2013.<sup>106</sup>



<sup>105</sup> For further context see: The Egyptian Americans for Democracy and Human Rights Facebook page, <https://www.facebook.com/eadhr>

<sup>106</sup> "Announcement - Demonstration, Egyptian Americans for Democracy & Human Rights," Egyptian Americans for Democracy and Human Rights, official Facebook page, August 19, 2013, <https://www.facebook.com/eadhr/photos/pb.100064603512744.-2207520000/678016408892870/?type=3>



Established in Clifton, New Jersey, in 2013, Egyptian Americans for Democracy and Human Rights (EADHR) is an advocacy platform that presents itself as a grassroots organization committed to supporting democracy, human rights, and political freedoms in Egypt, framing its activities in the language of civic engagement and democratic accountability.

In practice, EADHR has functioned as a mobilization and coordination vehicle within the broader ecosystem of Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood–aligned activism in the U.S. It has coordinated closely with other Brotherhood-linked platforms, including Egyptian Americans for Freedom and Justice and the Center for Egyptian-American Dialogue, and has facilitated demonstrations, speaking tours, and the public messaging efforts of the Egyptian Revolutionary Council.

The organization's leadership overlaps with figures holding senior positions in major Muslim charitable institutions, notably Islamic Relief USA, highlighting how EADHR operates at the intersection of political advocacy and institutional legitimacy.

EADHR is a platform that allows us to bring into focus Ahmed Shehata, current CEO of IRUSA,<sup>107</sup> who sits on EADHR's board<sup>108</sup> and further exemplifies the overlap between charitable infrastructure and Brotherhood-linked activism. While EADHR presents itself as a grassroots initiative committed to democracy and human rights in Egypt,<sup>109</sup> its consistent support for Brotherhood-aligned campaigns and its coordination with organizations such as EAFJ and ERC paint a different picture—one of political advocacy cloaked in the language of civic engagement.<sup>110</sup> It should be noted that Shehata is not a marginal figure within IRUSA: his two-decade rise through the organization—from fundraising to executive leadership—culminated in his current role as CEO, where he now oversees over \$250 million in humanitarian programming across 40 countries.<sup>111</sup>

<sup>107</sup> "Islamic Relief USA Appoints Ahmed Shehata as Chief Executive Officer," Islamic Relief USA, 2025, <https://irusa.org/islamic-relief-usa-appoints-ahmed-shehata-as-chief-executive-officer/>

<sup>108</sup> Ahmed Shehata, "Group uses democratic rhetoric to push its own agenda," *The Hill*, March 7, 2014, <https://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/foreign-policy/200149-group-uses-democratic-rhetoric-to-push-its-own-agenda/>

<sup>109</sup> "About us," Egyptian Americans for Democracy and Human Rights official website. Archived version available: <https://web.archive.org/web/20141007054915/http://www.eadhr.org/about>

<sup>110</sup> See for context: Egyptian Americans for Democracy and Human Rights official website. Archived version available: <https://web.archive.org/web/20141006142820/http://www.eadhr.org/>; Egyptian Americans for Democracy and Human Rights official Facebook page. <https://www.facebook.com/eadhr>

<sup>111</sup> "About Ahmed Shehata," Ahmed Shehata official website. <https://ahmedshehata.net/ahmed/>

**Figure 7:** Abdul Mawgoud al-Dardery (left) and Ahmed Shehata (right) at the Reviving of the Spirit of Jan 25th Revolution event organized by EADHR in Seattle.<sup>112</sup>



## Conclusion

This report aimed to provide a structured overview of individuals and organizations linked to the Egyptian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood since the first, nascent presence in the late 1950s until today. Mirroring the importance of the foundational organization in shaping the ideological and strategic directions of the movement in the Arab world, Egyptian Brothers played a key role in establishing and leading the first and, still today, most important entities of the Muslim Brotherhood network in America. As seen, the most recent wave of Muslim Brothers coming from Egypt to the US has been primarily focused on supporting the group's efforts in their country of origin after the removal of the Morsi government and these efforts have largely relied on the broader support from the broader US-based Brotherhood infrastructure.

This long, widely documented history becomes topical as the US government deliberates whether to designate the Egyptian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood. While this report does not take a position on the merits of such a designation and attributes no illegal activities to any of the individuals and organizations analyzed, understanding the history, actors and activities of the network is an important exercise.

<sup>112</sup> "Reviving of the Spirit of Jan 25th Revolution event," Egyptian Americans for Democracy and Human Rights, January 23, 2014, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mm-Oi-p29Zg&t=3792s>



Program on Extremism

---

THE GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY

---