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Proven Playbook

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Introduction

The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) was one of the first Palestinian militancy groups, famous for 1970s era airline hijackings. The group's platform was a combination of Marxist-Leninist revolutionary ideology and Palestinian nationalism which underpinned themes of anti-imperialism, armed struggle as the only path to Palestinian liberation, and calls for violent "resistance" based on its followers' perceptions of injustice and grievances. Their propaganda was littered with these themes and was a powerful recruitment tool. A number of events led to PFLP's decline in popularity and impact in the 1980s.

Despite the U.S. government's designation of it as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO, 1997) and a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT, 2001), by the time the "War on Terror" began after 9/11/2001, PFLP actors were largely ignored in counter-terrorism circles, seen as less of a threat in the Palestinian arena than Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ). While law enforcement and intelligence agencies focused on what they deemed as more imminent threats, the PFLP and its supporters were merely simmering. After the 2008 conviction of the Holy Land Foundation and its officers for material support to Hamas, the U.S. government largely looked away from Palestinian terror organizations and their propaganda apparatuses. But by the mid-2010s, those propaganda apparatuses were operating on U.S. soil with impunity. Pro-PFLP/Marxist ideologies spread on U.S. campuses and streets, blending with pro-Islamist calls for resistance against occupation and imperialism. Their voices got louder. And then October 7 happened.

On October 7, 2023, Hamas along with PIJ, PFLP and other terrorists invaded Israel, massacring people at a music festival, in their homes, in their beds, and in their cars. In the wake of that attack, waves of support for the atrocities spilled into U.S. streets and onto U.S. campuses, echoing pro-Hamas and pro-PFLP rhetoric, referring to the attacks as "resistance" and calling for an end to imperialism. Many in the U.S., including governmental agencies and members of society, were caught off guard. But recent actions by the government indicate its officials are aware of and tackling this problem set.

In October 2024, the United States and Canada moved against Samidoun, the Palestinian Prisoner Solidarity Network, not as a fringe protest group but

as part of the PFLP's external support infrastructure.¹ The U.S. Department of the Treasury ("Treasury") designated Samidoun as a "sham charity" and described it as an international fundraiser for the PFLP.² OFAC also designated Khaled Barakat, a Canadian citizen identified by Treasury as part of the PFLP's leadership abroad, for his role in fundraising and recruitment for the group.³ Canada listed Samidoun as a terrorist entity in the same coordinated action.⁴ U.S. designations of PFLP-related entities have continued since that time.

Official Actions Against the PFLP Network

The U.S. government originally took action against the PFLP in 1997. The Department of State designated the PFLP as a Foreign Terrorist Organization in October 1997 and as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist in October 2001.⁵ In October 2024, Treasury described the PFLP as a terrorist group operating in Gaza and the West Bank, active through its armed apparatus, the Martyr Abu Ali Mustafa Brigades, and involved in the October 7 attack against Israeli civilians.⁶ Canada's current terrorist-entities list also keeps the PFLP listed, describes it as a secular, far-left Palestinian organization combining Marxism-Leninism with Palestinian nationalism, and states that the Martyr Abu Ali Mustafa Brigades participated in the October 7 attack. Canada completed its most recent statutory review of the PFLP listing on June 4, 2026.⁷

¹ U.S. Department of the Treasury, "United States and Canada Target Key International Fundraiser for Foreign Terrorist Organization PFLP," Press Release, October 15, 2024, <https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2646>.

² *Ibid.*

³ U.S. Department of the Treasury, "United States and Canada Target Key International Fundraiser for Foreign Terrorist Organization PFLP," Press Release, October 15, 2024, <https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2646>.

⁴ Government of Canada, "Government of Canada Lists Samidoun as a Terrorist Entity," October 15, 2024, <https://www.canada.ca/en/public-safety-canada/news/2024/10/government-of-canada-lists-samidoun-as-a-terrorist-entity.html>

⁵ U.S. Department of the Treasury, "United States and Canada Target Key International Fundraiser for Foreign Terrorist Organization PFLP," Press Release, October 15, 2024, <https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2646>

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ Public Safety Canada, "Currently Listed Entities," entry for "Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)" and June 4, 2026 statutory review notice, <https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/ntnl-scr/cntr-trrrsm/lstd-ntts/crrnt-lstd-ntts-en.aspx#51>

In February 2021, Israel's National Bureau for Counter Terror Financing announced that the defense minister had designated Samidoun as a terrorist organization because it was part of the PFLP and had been founded by PFLP members in 2012. The Israeli notice described Samidoun as active in Europe and North America and led by Khaled Barakat, whom it identified as part of the PFLP's leadership abroad. It also stated that Samidoun's prisoner-solidarity work served in practice as a PFLP front abroad and supported the PFLP's propaganda, fundraising, and recruitment activity.⁸

In October 2024, the U.S. and Canadian governments took additional actions against the PFLP. Treasury, in coordination with Canada, designated Samidoun as a "sham charity" serving as an international fundraiser for the PFLP. Treasury also designated Barakat, identifying him as a member of the PFLP's leadership abroad and describing Samidoun and Barakat as playing critical roles in the PFLP's external fundraising. OFAC's designation notice added Barakat and Samidoun to the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons (SDN) List as specially designated global terrorist (SDGT) designees linked to the PFLP.⁹ Canada's current listing states that Samidoun helps advance the interests of listed terrorist entities, including the PFLP, through social media and public protests, and describes Samidoun's leadership as composed of reported current and former PFLP members.¹⁰

The designation record then moved beyond Samidoun. In June 2025, Treasury designated Addameer Prisoner Support and Human Rights Association (Addameer), a West Bank-based prisoner organization, for being owned, controlled, directed by, or acting for or on behalf of the PFLP. Treasury stated that Addameer had long supported and been affiliated with the PFLP. It also noted that Barakat coordinated with the PFLP in spring 2022 to send funds to Addameer and arrange meetings between Addameer and Samidoun.¹¹

⁸ National Bureau for Counter Terror Financing of Israel, "Israel Designates 'Samidoun' As A Terrorist Organization," February 28, 2021, <https://nbctf.mod.gov.il/en/Pages/SamidounEN.aspx>

⁹ U.S. Department of the Treasury, "United States and Canada Target Key International Fundraiser for Foreign Terrorist Organization PFLP," Press Release, October 15, 2024, <https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2646>

¹⁰ Public Safety Canada, "Government of Canada Lists Samidoun as a Terrorist Entity," October 15, 2024, <https://www.canada.ca/en/public-safety-canada/news/2024/10/government-of-canada-lists-samidoun-as-a-terrorist-entity.html>

¹¹ U.S. Department of the Treasury, "Treasury Disrupts Sham Overseas Charity Networks Funding Hamas and the PFLP," Press Release, June 10, 2025, <https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0162>

Israel had already made its own Addameer designation permanent in August 2022, describing Addameer and two other organizations as branches of the PFLP operating under cover and agency of the group in the West Bank and abroad.¹²

Treasury returned to the Samidoun network in May 2026. In an action targeting flotilla organizers and Muslim Brotherhood-linked Hamas support networks, Treasury described Samidoun as a PFLP front organization and a fundraising platform in countries where the PFLP otherwise faced legal restrictions. The same action designated Mohammed Khatib, Samidoun's Belgium-based European coordinator, and Jaldia Abubakra Aueda, Samidoun's coordinator in Madrid, as leaders or officials of Samidoun.¹³ OFAC's May 19, 2026 list update added both Khatib and Aueda to the SDN List as SDGT designees linked to Samidoun.¹⁴

Samidoun: Prisoner Solidarity or Terror Network

Samidoun's public identity is as a prisoner solidarity movement.¹⁵ That prisoner aspect is not incidental. Samidoun's U.S. activity repeatedly centered on PFLP-linked prisoners and figures. In 2017, Samidoun promoted a New York protest calling for the release of Ahmad Sa'adat,¹⁶ the PFLP secretary general imprisoned in Israel.¹⁷ Barakat delivered a solidarity message as the international spokesperson of the Campaign to Free Ahmad Sa'adat.¹⁸

¹² National Bureau for Counter Terror Financing of Israel, "Defense Minister Benny Gantz ratified his designation from October 2021 of the organizations Union of Women's Committees, Bisan and Addameer as terrorist organizations and made the designation permanent under Israeli law," August 22, 2022, <https://nbctf.mod.gov.il/en/Pages/אישרור-הכרזות-מאוקטובר.aspx>

¹³ U.S. Department of the Treasury, "Treasury Targets Flotilla Organizers and Muslim Brotherhood Networks Supporting Hamas," Press Release, May 19, 2026, <https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0501>

¹⁴ Office of Foreign Assets Control, "Counter Terrorism Designations; Iran-related Designations," Press Release, May 19, 2026, <https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20260519>

¹⁵ Samidoun: Palestinian Prisoner Solidarity Network, "About Samidoun." <https://samidoun.net/about-samidoun/>

¹⁶ Liran Aharoni, "Who are the four high-profile prisoners Hamas wants freed in the hostage talks? - explainer," *Jerusalem Post*, October 6, 2025, <https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/article-869626>

¹⁷ Samidoun: Palestinian Prisoner Solidarity Network, "New York Protest Demands Freedom for Ahmad Sa'adat, All Palestinian Prisoners," October 4, 2017, <https://samidoun.net/2017/10/new-york-protest-demands-freedom-for-ahmad-saadat-all-palestinian-prisoners/>

¹⁸ Samidoun Palestinian Prisoner Solidarity Network, "New York Protest Demands Freedom for Ahmad Sa'adat, All Palestinian Prisoners," October 4, 2017, <https://samidoun.net/2017/10/new-york-protest-demands-freedom-for-ahmad-saadat-all-palestinian-prisoners/>

Samidoun later amplified U.S. events around Rasmea Odeh,¹⁹ the former U.S. citizen deported to Jordan after admitting in a U.S. court that she had falsely denied her prior Israeli terror convictions when applying for an immigrant visa and for naturalization. ICE described those convictions as tied to her participation in a 1969 supermarket bombing in Jerusalem that killed two individuals and to her planting a bomb at the British Consulate in Jerusalem.²⁰

Samidoun did not stop at support for PFLP prisoners as it openly condemned the imprisonment of HLF officers who were convicted in 2008 of supporting Hamas, falsely referring to them as political prisoners and omitting the fact they were given due process, a jury trial and a complete appellate record.²¹

Despite its identity as a prisoner solidarity network, the designation record assigns Samidoun a different function. The U.S. Treasury described Samidoun as a Vancouver-based front organization established by the PFLP and involved in fundraising for the group.²² Israel used similar language three years earlier, stating that Samidoun's formal prisoner-support work operated in practice as a PFLP front abroad.²³ Canada's listing added the protest and online-mobilization layer, stating that Samidoun helps advance the interests of listed terrorist entities, including the PFLP, through social media and public protests.²⁴

The U.S. record also shows how Samidoun collaborated with other U.S.-based groups before the October 2024 designation. In April 2022, Samidoun-NY/NJ joined Within Our Lifetime (WOL), Palestinian Youth Movement (PYM), Existence is Resistance, and Decolonize This Place for a New York demonstration using the slogan "Support Palestinian Resistance

¹⁹ Samidoun Palestinian Prisoner Solidarity Network, "Rasmea Odeh," campaign category page, <https://samidoun.net/category/campaigns/rasmea-odeh/>

²⁰ U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, "Former Naturalized Citizen Deported to Jordan for Withholding Ties to Deadly Israel Bombing," News Release, September 19, 2017, <https://www.ice.gov/news/releases/former-naturalized-citizen-deported-jordan-withholding-ties-deadly-israel-bombing>

²¹ Samidoun Palestinian Prisoner Solidarity Network, "20 Years of Struggle: Free the Holy Land 5 & Palestinian Political Prisoners in U.S. Jails," July 27, 2024, <https://samidoun.net/2024/07/20-years-of-struggle-free-the-holy-land-5-palestinian-political-prisoners-in-us-jails/>

²² U.S. Department of the Treasury, "United States and Canada Target Key International Fundraiser for Foreign Terrorist Organization PFLP," Press Release, October 15, 2024, <https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2646>

²³ National Bureau for Counter Terror Financing of Israel, "Israel Designates 'Samidoun' As A Terrorist Organization," February 28, 2021, <https://nbctf.mod.gov.il/en/Pages/SamidounEN.aspx>

²⁴ Public Safety Canada, "Government of Canada Lists Samidoun as a Terrorist Entity," October 15, 2024, <https://www.canada.ca/en/public-safety-canada/news/2024/10/government-of-canada-lists-samidoun-as-a-terrorist-entity.html>

and Liberation by Any Means Necessary.”²⁵ The event was part of a global “10 days of action in commemoration of Palestinian Prisoners’ Day,” “By any means necessary” is a reference used to legitimize the destruction of the country of Israel through violence.²⁶

In November 2022, Samidoun promoted an NYU event co-hosted with Law Students for Justice in Palestine (SJP) and Ending the Prison Industrial Complex, framing Palestinian prisoners through an abolitionist organizing lens.²⁷ In 2023, Samidoun-NY/NJ appeared with WOL around a Jenin-focused event that used language such as “occupied Palestine” and “zionist entity.”²⁸ Thus Samidoun’s themes include prisoner solidarity, reframing violence as legitimate resistance, PFLP-linked symbolism, and collaboration with other U.S. activist groups.

International Pressure on Samidoun

Samidoun had already become an enforcement issue in Europe before the U.S. and Canadian designations. Germany banned Hamas activity and Samidoun in November 2023. The German Interior Ministry said Samidoun operated internationally under the cover of prisoner solidarity while spreading anti-Israel and anti-Jewish propaganda.²⁹ The German action prohibited Hamas activity in Germany and banned Samidoun’s German structures, including activity, symbols, and online presence.

France took a separate action against Collectif Palestine Vaincra, a French pro-Palestinian group that Samidoun itself described in 2023 as a member

²⁵ Samidoun: Palestinian Prisoner Solidarity Network, “New York Demonstration Takes the Streets of Manhattan for Palestine,” April 21, 2022, <https://samidoun.net/2022/04/new-york-demonstration-takes-the-streets-of-manhattan-for-palestine/>

²⁶ Anti-Defamation League, “Slogan: ‘Resistance by Any Means Necessary,’” Backgrounder, January 16, 2024, updated April 1, 2026, <https://www.adl.org/resources/backgrounder/slogan-resistance-any-means-necessary>

²⁷ Samidoun: Palestinian Prisoner Solidarity Network, “17 November, NYC: Free Them All – Abolition Across Borders,” November 13, 2022, <https://samidoun.net/2022/11/17-november-nyc-free-them-all-abolition-across-borders/>

²⁸ Samidoun: Palestinian Prisoner Solidarity Network, “‘Jenin Jenin’ Screening in New York Highlights Palestinian Resistance, Challenges Mayor’s Alliance with Zionism,” August 25, 2023, <https://samidoun.net/2023/08/jenin-jenin-screening-in-new-york-highlights-palestinian-resistance-challenges-mayors-alliance-with-zionism/>

²⁹ Federal Ministry of the Interior and Community, “HAMAS and Samidoun Banned in Germany,” November 2, 2023, <https://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/pressemitteilungen/EN/2023/11/banned-hamas-samidoun.html>

of the Samidoun Network.³⁰ The French government ordered the group dissolved in March 2022. In February 2025, the Conseil d'État upheld the dissolution. The court stated that the group's social-media activity generated especially aggressive and hateful comments targeting Jewish Israeli citizens, including comments that were explicitly antisemitic, and found those comments attributable to the group because it had not sufficiently prevented or moderated them.³¹ The French government did not designate Samidoun. It tied a Samidoun network member to the same wider European enforcement environment around revolutionary pro-Palestinian organizing.

From PFLP Icons to U.S. Movement Symbols

Samidoun has masterfully used the PFLP's older icons to further its popularity. Figures tied to the group's history were repackaged in Western activist spaces as symbols of resistance, women's liberation, cultural struggle, or political imprisonment. Thus, the group's platform is based on a usable set of names, images, and prisoner campaigns.

Leila Khaled is an obvious example. A longtime PFLP figure, Khaled took part in the 1969 hijacking of TWA Flight 840 and the attempted hijacking of El Al Flight 219 in 1970. She later became one of the most recognizable images of Palestinian militancy.³² In 2020, the fight over an online San Francisco State University event featuring Khaled showed how that image had moved into U.S. activist and academic spaces. Jewish Voice for Peace (JVP) described Khaled as a "Palestinian resistance icon" and said JVP chapters across the country had planned to livestream the event before Facebook removed it from chapter pages.³³

Samidoun also focuses on current prisoners, like Ahmad Sa'adat. Sa'adat, the PFLP secretary general, is imprisoned in Israel for his role as the head of a terrorist organization. Israel also holds him responsible for his role in the 2001

³⁰ Samidoun: Palestinian Prisoner Solidarity Network, "Boycott Tour Demands an End to Toulouse-Tel Aviv Twinning Relationship," March 7, 2023, <https://samidoun.net/2023/03/boycott-tour-demands-an-end-to-toulouse-tel-aviv-twinning-relationship/>

³¹ Conseil d'État, "La dissolution du Collectif Palestine Vaincra est légale," February 20, 2025, <https://www.conseil-etat.fr/actualites/la-dissolution-du-collectif-palestine-vaincra-est-legale>

³² Anti-Defamation League, "Leila Khaled: In Her Own Words," October 6, 2020, <https://www.adl.org/resources/blog/leila-khaled-her-own-words>

³³ Jewish Voice for Peace, "Zoom, Facebook and Youtube: Stop Censoring Palestinians!," September 24, 2020, <https://www.jewishvoiceforpeace.org/2020/09/24/zoom-facebook-youtube-censor-palestinians/>

assassination of Israeli minister Rehavam Ze'evi.³⁴ In January 2022, PYM, Samidoun, BDS Vancouver, Canada Palestine Association, and other groups organized a Vancouver rally calling for Sa'adat's release.³⁵ Samidoun's account placed Sa'adat inside a broader prisoner and liberation campaign, with speakers linking Palestinian prisoners to Indigenous, anti-imperialist, and other transnational causes.³⁶

Rasmea Odeh became the U.S. version of the same strategy. As described above, U.S. prosecutors stated that Odeh had been convicted overseas for participating in two PFLP bombings in Jerusalem in 1969, including the Supersol supermarket bombing that killed Leon Kanner and Eddie Joffe, and the bombing of the British Consulate.³⁷ She served more than 10 years in Israeli prison, before being released in a prisoner exchange. Odeh later entered the United States and did not disclose her terrorism convictions to U.S. authorities. She became active in Chicago's Arab and Palestinian community infrastructure, and was charged after U.S. authorities said she had concealed her prior Israeli convictions on immigration and naturalization forms,³⁸ a fact that she admitted in a later plea deal.³⁹ She lost her U.S. citizenship after admitting that she had falsely denied her prior Israeli convictions when applying for an immigrant visa and for naturalization.⁴⁰ Odeh and her supporters have disputed the Israeli proceedings and said her confession was obtained under torture.⁴¹

³⁴ Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "IDF Operation in Jericho to Arrest Murderers of Israeli Minister Zeevi," Press Release, March 14, 2006, <https://www.gov.il/en/pages/idf-operation-in-jericho-to-arrest-murderers-of-israeli-minister-zeevi-14-mar-2006>

³⁵ Samidoun: Palestinian Prisoner Solidarity Network, "Vancouver Rally Calls for Freedom for Ahmad Sa'adat, Liberation for Palestine," January 23, 2022, <https://samidoun.net/2022/01/vancouver-rally-calls-for-freedom-for-ahmad-saadat-liberation-for-palestine>

³⁶ *Ibid.*

³⁷ U.S. Department of Justice, U.S. Attorney's Office for the Eastern District of Michigan, "Individual Convicted Overseas of Being Terrorist Who Participated in 1969 British Consulate and Supermarket Bombings in Jerusalem Sentenced to Deportation," Press Release, August 17, 2017, <https://www.justice.gov/usao-edmi/pr/individual-convicted-overseas-being-terrorist-who-participated-1969-british-consulate-0>

³⁸ Indictment, *United States v. Rasmieh Yousef Odeh*, 2:13-cr-20772 (E.D. Mich. filed Oct. 22, 2013), <https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.mied.285735.3.0.pdf>

³⁹ Plea Agreement, *United States v. Rasmieh Yousef Odeh*, 2:13-cr-20772 (E.D. Mich. filed Apr. 25, 2017), <https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.mied.285735.250.0.pdf>

⁴⁰ U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, "Former Naturalized Citizen Deported to Jordan for Withholding Ties to Deadly Israel Bombing," News Release, September 21, 2017 <https://www.ice.gov/news/releases/former-naturalized-citizen-deported-jordan-withholding-ties-deadly-israel-bombing>

⁴¹ Asraa Mustafa, "Rasmea Odeh, Deported but Not Defeated," *The Chicago Reporter*, October 1, 2018, <https://www.chicagoreporter.com/rasmea-odeh-deported-but-not-defeated/>

During Odeh's immigration battle, groups like the U.S. Palestine Community Network (USPCN) promoted Odeh as a community elder and movement figure, calling her a founding member of its Chicago chapter, a mentor to its organizers, a "living legend" and a "community icon." USPCN also framed the charges as a government pretext to criminalize her speech in support of Palestine, rather than a legitimate immigration case.⁴²

Odeh's cause was platformed under free speech, with groups often omitting reference to her terrorist activities and involvement in bombings. JVP invited her to speak at its 2017 national membership meeting.⁴³ Northwestern's Students for Justice in Palestine (SJP) chapter hosted her during Israeli Apartheid Week that same year.⁴⁴ PYM and Samidoun circulated statements around her arrest and prosecution.⁴⁵ U.S. Palestinian Community Network (USPCN) later featured Odeh in a 2020 Nakba Day webinar.⁴⁶ The repackaging happened inside ordinary U.S. activist settings: conferences, campus events, legal-defense campaigns, webinars, and community organizations.

Some figures were presented through militancy or prisoner campaigns. Others, like Ghassan Kanafani, were presented through literature, art, and revolutionary culture. Kanafani was a writer and PFLP spokesman killed in Beirut in 1972.⁴⁷ PYM and Samidoun helped organize a 2022 campaign marking the fiftieth anniversary of his death, urging Palestinian youth to draw inspiration from his "legacy of struggle."⁴⁸ PYM also runs a Ghassan Kanafani Resistance Arts

⁴² U.S. Palestinian Community Network, "USPCN Strongly Condemns Arrest and Indictment of Rasmea Yousef Odeh," October 29, 2013, <https://www.uspcn.org/2013/10/29/uspcn-strongly-condemns-arrest-and-indictment-of-rasmea-yousef-odeh/>

⁴³ Jewish Voice for Peace, "Jewish Voice for Peace Is Proud to Host Palestinian Organizer Rasmea Odeh," March 7, 2017, <https://www.jewishvoiceforpeace.org/2017/03/07/jewish-voice-peace-proud-host-palestinian-organizer-rasmea-odeh/>

⁴⁴ Catherine Kim, "Organizer Rasmea Odeh Speaks at Northwestern for SJP's Israeli Apartheid Week," *The Daily Northwestern*, May 16, 2017, <https://dailynorthwestern.com/2017/05/16/campus/organizer-rasmea-odeh-speaks-at-northwestern-for-sjps-israeli-apartheid-week/>

⁴⁵ Samidoun: Palestinian Prisoner Solidarity Network, "PYM: Rasmea Odeh's Arrest Is Part of Aggression on Palestinian Homeland and Diaspora," November 5, 2013, <https://samidoun.net/2013/11/pym-rasmea-odehs-arrest-is-part-of-aggression-on-palestinian-homeland-and-diaspora/>

⁴⁶ U.S. Palestinian Community Network, "#NakbaDay: Rasmea & George Khoury May 14 & Chicago Palestinian Car Caravan May 15," <https://www.uspcn.org/wp/wp/2020/05/15/uspcn-nakbaday-2020/>

⁴⁷ Committee for Accuracy in Middle East Reporting and Analysis (CAMERA), "Presbyterian Peacemakers Omit Relevant Facts About Ghassan Kanafani," March 25, 2021, <https://www.camera.org/article/presbyterian-peacemakers-omit-relevant-facts-about-ghassan-kanafani/>

⁴⁸ Samidoun: Palestinian Prisoner Solidarity Network, "July 8 2022: Ghassan Lives, Palestine Lives! Call to Organize for the 50th Anniversary of the Assassination of Ghassan Kanafani," May 17, 2022, <https://samidoun.net/2022/05/july-8-2022-ghassan-lives-palestine-lives-call-to-organize-for-the-50th-anniversary-of-the-assassination-of-ghassan-kanafani/>

Scholarship, presenting him as an “iconic national hero” while leaving the PFLP frame mostly outside the public-facing description.⁴⁹

The Alliances

The alliances discussed herein are not necessarily formal in nature; rather, they center around anti-Western themes, conferences, prisoner support, protest campaigns, campus activism, fiscal sponsors, calls for “resistance,” and donation platforms. As shown herein, these alliances were forged over a decade ago.

Palestinian Youth Movement

PYM describes itself as a grassroots organization of young Palestinians in exile, formed around the national struggle for Palestinian liberation.⁵⁰ Its public materials place the organization inside a diaspora youth, with chapters and activities across North America and other Western countries.⁵¹ This arrangement gives PYM a role distinct from Samidoun, the designated PFLP anchor. PYM itself is not designated by the United States. Its relevance in this record lies in five areas: public mobilization; PFLP-linked symbols; prisoner campaigns; overlap with Samidoun; and donation infrastructure.⁵²

The strongest PFLP-linked record around PYM is symbolic and campaign-based. PYM’s materials list the Ghassan Kanafani Resistance Arts Scholarship as one of the organization’s first projects.⁵³ The page describes Kanafani as a political leader, thinker, and novelist whose cultural work teaches struggle, exile, organization, and political commitment. It does not foreground that Kanafani was also a PFLP spokesman. In 2022, PYM and Samidoun jointly promoted a campaign marking the fiftieth anniversary of Kanafani’s death, urging Palestinian youth to draw on his “legacy of struggle.”⁵⁴

⁴⁹ Palestinian Youth Movement, “Annual Ghassan Kanafani Resistance Arts Scholarship,” archived page, <https://archive.md/uZEbw>

⁵⁰ Palestinian Youth Movement, “Palestinian Youth Movement,” <https://www.palestinyouthmovement.com/>

⁵¹ Palestinian Youth Movement, “Chapters,” archived page <https://archive.md/JRxQk>

⁵² Palestinian Youth Movement, “Palestinian Youth Movement,” Action Network, <https://actionnetwork.org/groups/palestinian-youth-movement-2>

⁵³ Palestinian Youth Movement, “Ghassan Kanafani Resistance Arts Scholarship and Anthology,” <https://www.palestinyouthmovement.com/our-work/ghassan-kanafani-resistance-arts-scholarship>

⁵⁴ Samidoun: Palestinian Prisoner Solidarity Network, “July 8 2022: Ghassan Lives, Palestine Lives! Call to Organize for the 50th Anniversary of the Assassination of Ghassan Kanafani,” May 17, 2022, <https://samidoun.net/2022/05/july-8-2022-ghassan-lives-palestine-lives-call-to-organize-for-the-50th-anniversary-of-the-assassination-of-ghassan-kanafani>

PYM also appears repeatedly alongside Samidoun. In the above-mentioned January 2022 rally, PYM, Samidoun, and other groups united in calling for the release of Ahmad Sa'adat, the imprisoned PFLP secretary general held in Israel for his alleged role in the 2001 assassination of Israeli tourism minister Rehavam Ze'evi, as well as his PFLP leadership. Samidoun's account, echoed by PYM, placed Sa'adat inside a wider liberation frame, linking Palestinian prisoners to Indigenous, anti-imperialist, and other transnational causes.⁵⁵

The same symbolism surfaced during the 2024 campus encampment wave. In April 2024, the PFLP published a statement praising student and youth movements in the United States and specifically named Students for Justice in Palestine (SJP) and PYM at Columbia, Rutgers, Yale, Stanford, and other universities.⁵⁶

Students for Justice in Palestine (SJP) is a student organization that operates on US. campuses and purports to promote pro-Palestinian activism, but whose agenda appears aligned with pro-terror narratives that label terrorist acts as legitimate "resistance." There is a national SJP, basically a coordinating body, a local chapters throughout the United States(all hereinafter referred to as SJP). SJP is closely aligned with the BDS movement, and their first chapter was reportedly created by AMP co-founder Hatem Bazian in the 1990s or early 2000s at UC Berkeley. The SJP now boasts hundreds of chapters around the United States. The AMP helped found the National Students for Justice in Palestine (NSJP), in 2010, where, together, their pro-Hamas campus activism significantly escalated. The SJP/NSJP are not an official incorporated entity, likely by design to provide plausible deniability for their members' actions. Also in 2010, the AMP hosted a conference for SJP wherein campus activism was the topic and the recognition of the need "to engage other groups and form connections that will benefit the universal fight for justice and self-identity- tenets that are central to SJP's work.


The Samidoun overlap is recurring and public. PYM and Samidoun jointly hosted a March 2020 webinar on Palestinian unity between "occupied

⁵⁵ Samidoun: Palestinian Prisoner Solidarity Network, "Vancouver Rally Calls for Freedom for Ahmad Sa'adat, Liberation for Palestine," January 23, 2022, <https://samidoun.net/2022/01/vancouver-rally-calls-for-freedom-for-ahmad-saadat-liberation-for-palestine/>

⁵⁶ Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, "The PFLP Condemns the Repressive Practices of the Administrations of Universities in the United States Against Our Students and Calls for Enhancing the Unity of Students and Their Struggle to Divest American Universities from the Zionist Entity," April 23, 2024, <https://pflp.ps/post/24086/the-pflp-condemns-the-repressive-practices-of-the-administrations>

Palestine and the diaspora.”⁵⁷ In May 2022, Samidoun and PYM co-hosted a Brooklyn Nakba Day commemoration with other organizations. Video from the event appears to show PFLP material on a table and a PFLP flag among demonstrators.⁵⁸

Figure 1: PYM and Samidoun webinar. PYM and Samidoun jointly hosted a March 2020 webinar on Palestinian unity between “occupied Palestine and the diaspora.”⁵⁹



Later that year, the two organizations appeared again around the Sa'adat prisoner campaign.⁶⁰ These events place PYM in repeated public activity with a group later designated by the United States and Canada as a PFLP fundraiser.

⁵⁷ Palestinian Youth Movement, “Palestinian Unity Between Occupied Palestine and the Diaspora,” Facebook post, March 18, 2020, <https://www.facebook.com/Pal.Youth.Movement/posts/3509562872405155/>

⁵⁸ FREEDOMNEWS TV, “Thousand Palestinians Gather in Bay Ridge for Nakba,” YouTube, May 16, 2022, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=c5rd-n6gPV8>

⁵⁹ Palestinian Youth Movement. “Palestinian Unity Between Occupied Palestine and the Diaspora” Facebook post. March 18, 2020, <https://www.facebook.com/Pal.Youth.Movement/posts/3509562872405155/>

⁶⁰ Israeli Ministry of Diaspora Affairs and Combating Antisemitism, “Special Overview: PYM – Palestinian Youth Movement,” January 30, 2024, https://www.gov.il/BlobFolder/reports/pym_palestinian_youth_movement/en/Research_Reports_PYM%20Report%20eng.pdf

After October 7, PYM became more visible as a mobilizing organization in the United States. The Anti-Defamation League (ADL) reported in 2025 that PYM had co-sponsored at least 450 anti-Israel rallies since the October 7 attack and had supported the campus encampment movement that peaked in April and May 2024.⁶¹ The student aspect was already part of PYM's own account. In a June 2024 interview, PYM organizer Mohammed Nabulsi estimated that "maybe 80 percent" of PYM organizers were former student organizers and described PYM chapters as supplying students with resources and political, strategic, and logistical support.⁶²

PYM's public messaging has used resistance language that reaches beyond ordinary policy advocacy. In a 2018 statement, PYM wrote that it recognized "the legitimacy of our people's resistance to colonization in all of its forms."⁶³ In 2021, marking the anniversary of the Second Intifada, PYM described that period as one of renewed collective resistance against Zionism and posted, "Long Live the Resistance! Long Live the Intifada!"⁶⁴ The Second Intifada, which began in 2000, became a campaign of suicide bombings and other attacks against civilians in Israel, including US citizens, by Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the PFLP, and other armed Palestinian terror groups.⁶⁵ These attacks were perpetrated at night clubs, universities, and social establishments. PYM's methods included youth organization, praising the violent Second Intifada, and legitimization of violence as "resistance."

PYM has also moved from rhetoric into sustained pressure campaigns. Its Mask Off Maersk campaign, launched in May 2024, targets the shipping company Maersk over alleged weapons transport to Israel. PYM's campaign page describes the effort as an international arms-embargo campaign and lists actions at ports, corporate sites, and allied organizations abroad.⁶⁶ PYM

⁶¹ Anti-Defamation League, "Palestinian Youth Movement (PYM): Five Things to Know," July 21, 2025, <https://www.adl.org/resources/article/palestinian-youth-movement-pym-five-things-know>

⁶² Hammer & Hope, "What Comes Next for the Palestinian Youth Movement?," June 26, 2024, <https://hammerandhope.org/article/palestinian-youth-movement>

⁶³ Palestinian Youth Movement, "Commemoration of Palestine Land Day and the Great Return March," March 30, 2018, archived page, <https://archive.md/0ErCA>

⁶⁴ Palestinian Youth Movement (@palyouthmvmt), X post, September 29, 2021, archived page, <https://archive.md/nAXKa>

⁶⁵ Anti-Defamation League, "Second Intifada (2000)," Backgrounder, September 1, 2016, <https://www.adl.org/resources/backgrounder/second-intifada-2000>

⁶⁶ Palestinian Youth Movement, "Mask Off Maersk," <https://www.palestinianyouthmovement.com/our-work/mask-off-maersk>

Dallas promoted a June 2025 action outside Lockheed Martin in Fort Worth targeting Maersk's alleged shipment of F-35 parts.⁶⁷ The same network also appeared in a broader, interconnected protest where Hatem Bazian, the board chairman of American Muslims for Palestine (AMP) and a figure who is associated with SJP, was among the speakers.⁶⁸

American Muslims for Palestine describes its work as education, organizing, advocacy, and grassroots mobilization for Palestinian rights. However, AMP also appears as a national Palestinian organizing platform. AMP has a history as part of the post Holy Land Foundation landscape. According to our 2025 report,⁶⁹ AMP has come under intensified scrutiny after October 7th for pro-Hamas rhetoric and its role in protests and rallies nationwide.⁷⁰ It is also part of the campus protest infrastructure, acting as a platform linked to SJP and other campus groups. It has also come under scrutiny by the House Ways and Means Committee, with a request submitted in 2024 to have its 501(c)(3) status revoked.⁷¹

The ADL reported that PYM appeared to support the vandalism of a Maersk office in Tunisia in April 2025, citing an Instagram post declaring that, "Maersk ships are not welcome in Tunisian waters."⁷²

Government and congressional scrutiny followed. A July 2024 report by the Israeli Ministry for Diaspora Affairs and Combating Antisemitism⁷³ alleged that

⁶⁷ Brayden Garcia, "Palestinian Youth Movement holds protest outside Lockheed Martin in Fort Worth," *Fort Worth Star Telegram*, June 19, 2025, <https://www.star-telegram.com/news/local/fort-worth/article309025210.html>

⁶⁸ Aria Jones, "Pro Palestine Protesters Gather in Downtown Dallas Ahead of Oct. 7 Anniversary," *Dallas Morning News*, October 5, 2024, <https://www.dallasnews.com/news/2024/10/05/pro-palestine-protestors-gather-saturday-in-downtown-dallas-ahead-of-oct-7-anniversary/>

⁶⁹ Barry Jonas and David Collins, "American Muslims for Palestine Faces New Legal Challenges," Program on Extremism at George Washington University, October 2025, https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs5746/files/2025-10/REVISED_American%20Muslims%20for%20Palestine%20faces%20new%20legal%20challenges.pdf

⁷⁰ Program on Extremism at George Washington University, *Hamas's Influence on US Campuses: A Study of Networks, Strategies, and Ideological Advocacy*, November 20, 2024, https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs5746/files/2024-11/Pamphlet_compressed.pdf

⁷¹ Jason Smith, Chairman, U.S. House Committee on Ways and Means, letter to Daniel Werfel, Commissioner, Internal Revenue Service, regarding the tax exempt status of the Americans for Justice in Palestine Educational Foundation and American Muslims for Palestine, September 24, 2024, in *Tax Exempt Status Revocation Letters*, <https://waysandmeans.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Tax-Exempt-Status-Revocation-Letters.pdf>

⁷² Anti-Defamation League, "Palestinian Youth Movement (PYM): Five Things to Know," July 21, 2025, <https://www.adl.org/resources/article/palestinian-youth-movement-pym-five-things-know>

⁷³ Israeli Ministry of Diaspora Affairs and Combating Antisemitism, "PYM – Palestinian Youth Movement," July 31, 2024, https://www.gov.il/en/pages/pym_palestinian_youth_movement

PYM maintained close ties to the PFLP and its affiliates, including Samidoun, pointing to the Kanafani scholarship, the Sa'adat rally, its donation routing, and joint seminars.⁷⁴

In August 2025, Senator Cotton asked the IRS to investigate PYM's funding and alleged ties to terrorist organizations, among other issues, PYM's collaboration with Samidoun.⁷⁵ These are allegations and requests for investigation, not designations.

U.S. Palestine Community Network

The U.S. Palestinian Community Network (USPCN) describes itself as a Palestinian and Arab community-based organization founded in 2006 to rebuild grassroots organizing among Palestinian and Arab communities in the United States. Its stated principles include Palestinian self-determination “from the River to the Sea,” return for Palestinian refugees and their descendants, and the “right of resistance against Zionist occupation and colonization of all Palestinian and Arab lands.” USPCN lists chapters or members in Los Angeles, the Bay Area, Chicago, Youngstown, Cleveland, Milwaukee, Madison, Houston, Detroit/Dearborn, New York, Washington, DC, and other states.⁷⁶

USPCN also built an early student base. Its Student Committee page says the committee emerged from the Second U.S. Palestinian Popular Conference in Chicago in 2010. The committee was created as an autonomous liaison between USPCN's coordinating committee and the SJP/pro-Palestine student movement across the United States. Its listed goals included drafting common principles, building online organizing infrastructure, electing a student representative to USPCN's political advisory committee, and pressing USPCN to include the student committee in its budget.⁷⁷ The page places USPCN in the bridge between community infrastructure and campus activism.


⁷⁴ Israeli Ministry for Diaspora Affairs and Combating Antisemitism, “Special Overview: PYM – Palestinian Youth Movement,” January 30, 2024, https://www.gov.il/BlobFolder/reports/pym_palestinian_youth_movement/en/Research_Reports_PYM%20Report%20eng.pdf

⁷⁵ Senator Tom Cotton, “Cotton to IRS: Investigate Palestinian Youth Movement's Funding and Ties to Terrorism,” August 22, 2025, <https://www.cotton.senate.gov/news/press-releases/cotton-to-irs-investigate-palestinian-youth-movements-funding-and-ties-to-terrorism>

⁷⁶ U.S. Palestinian Community Network, “About USPCN,” <https://www.uspcn.org/wp/wp/about/>

⁷⁷ U.S. Palestinian Community Network, “USPCN Students,” <https://www.uspcn.org/wp/wp/uspcn-students/>

Figure 2: USPCN's student page describes the creation of a Student Committee after the 2010 Second U.S. Palestinian Popular Conference and states that the committee would serve as a liaison between USPCN's coordinating committee and the SJP/pro-Palestine student movement across the United States.⁷⁸



In 2010, the USPCN network drew federal scrutiny. FBI agents raided Hatem Abudayyeh's Chicago home and the homes of other activists in Chicago and Minneapolis as part of a material-support investigation.⁷⁹ A grand jury subpoena posted by one of the targets demanded records of payments provided directly or indirectly to Abudayyeh, the PFLP, or FARC. Politico reported that the investigation appeared to focus on illegal support for designated terrorist organizations, while also noting that Abudayyeh had not been charged and that the public court documents did not make an explicit allegation of ties between him and those groups.

Abudayyeh denied providing money to terrorist groups and described the investigation as political.⁸⁰


⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁹ Josh Gerstein, "Target of FBI Terror-Support Raid Visited W.H.," Politico, October 1, 2010, <https://www.politico.com/blogs/under-the-radar/2010/10/target-of-fbi-terror-support-raid-visited-wh-029665>

⁸⁰ "Activist: Palestinian Trips Had No Link to Terror," Associated Press, February 7, 2011, <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/activist-palestinian-trips-had-no-link-to-terror/>

In 2011, USPCN encouraged its members and supporters to attend American Muslims for Palestine's AMP national "Conference on Palestine, A New Era of Activism" in Chicago.⁸¹ USPCN praised AMP's work and wrote that its own organizing "could not succeed without AMP's" efforts. This places USPCN and AMP in the same community and national Palestine organizing space years before the post-October 7 protest surge.

Figure 3: In November 2011, USPCN encouraged its members and supporters to attend American Muslims for Palestine's national "Conference on Palestine, A New Era of Activism" in Chicago and described AMP's work as part of the same organizing infrastructure.⁸²



USPCN's clearest PFLP-linked narrative push is Rasmea Odeh. The prior section addressed Odeh's legal record: U.S. authorities⁸³ said she had been convicted overseas for participating in PFLP bombings in Jerusalem, and she later admitted in U.S. court that she had falsely denied those convictions when

⁸¹ U.S. Palestinian Community Network, "USPCN Endorses AMP Conference in Chicago, November 24-27," November 6, 2011, <https://www.uspcn.org/wp/wp/2011/11/06/uspcn-endorses-amp-conference-in-chicago-november-24-27/>

⁸² *Ibid.*

⁸³ U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, "Former Naturalized Citizen Deported to Jordan for Withholding Ties to Deadly Israel Bombing," News Release, September 19, 2017, <https://www.ice.gov/news/releases/former-naturalized-citizen-deported-jordan-withholding-ties-deadly-israel-bombing>

applying for an immigrant visa and for naturalization.⁸⁴ USPCN placed Odeh inside its own organizing space. In 2013, it condemned her immigration arrest and indictment, describing her as a founding member of USPCN's Chicago chapter and a mentor to its organizers.⁸⁵ In 2020, it organized a Nakba Day webinar featuring Odeh.⁸⁶ Samidoun also listed that webinar in its Week of Palestinian Struggle schedule.⁸⁷ A figure tied in the official record to PFLP violence was repackaged and presented inside U.S. community organizing as a political prisoner, mentor, and movement elder.

USPCN's own materials show overlap with PYM and campus groups before October 7, 2023. In 2018, USPCN described a national tour in which members reported back from a Palestine delegation at the University of Michigan, Moraine Valley Community College, the University of Houston, and other campuses. The same post stated that USPCN met with PYM-San Diego leaders for a deeper discussion of political lessons and respective organizing work, then traveled to Los Angeles to participate in the National SJP conference at UCLA. USPCN framed campus engagement as a way to move students from campus activism into grassroots community organizing.⁸⁸

After October 7, USPCN moved quickly into open mobilization. Its statement, dated October 7 and posted on October 14, described the Hamas-led attack as "self-defense operations" by the "unified Palestinian Resistance." On October 7, 2023, Hamas, PIJ, PFLP, and others attacked a music festival and civilian homes where they brutally raped, burned, tortured, and killed over 1200 people and took many more hostage. Despite those atrocities, USPCN said the Resistance was firing rockets at military targets and engaging Israeli soldiers

⁸⁴ U.S. Department of Justice, U.S. Attorney's Office for the Eastern District of Michigan, "Individual Convicted Overseas of Being Terrorist Who Participated in 1969 British Consulate and Supermarket Bombings in Jerusalem Sentenced to Deportation," Press Release, August 17, 2017, <https://www.justice.gov/usao-edmi/pr/individual-convicted-overseas-being-terrorist-who-participated-1969-british-consulate-0>

⁸⁵ U.S. Palestinian Community Network, "USPCN Strongly Condemns Arrest and Indictment of Rasmea Yousef Odeh," October 29, 2013, <https://www.uspcn.org/2013/10/29/uspcn-strongly-condemns-arrest-and-indictment-of-rasmea-yousef-odeh/>

⁸⁶ U.S. Palestinian Community Network, "#NakbaDay: Rasmea & George Khoury May 14 & Chicago Palestinian Car Caravan May 15," May 15, 2020, <https://www.uspcn.org/wp/wp/2020/05/15/uspcn-nakbaday-2020>

⁸⁷ Samidoun: Palestinian Prisoner Solidarity Network, "Week of Palestinian Struggle, 15-22 May 2020," May 15, 2020, <https://samidoun.net/2020/05/week-of-palestinian-struggle-15-22-may-2020-updated-schedule-of-events-actions-more/>

⁸⁸ U.S. Palestinian Community Network, "Join & Support USPCN Today! Read About Our U.S. Tour!," December 28, 2018, <https://www.uspcn.org/2018/12/28/support-uspcn-today/>

and settlers, while Abudayyeh, identified as USPCN's national chair, cast the attacks as a legitimate response to Israeli violence.⁸⁹ In April 2024, USPCN said it worked closely with and “unequivocally supports” SJP, other student activists, Students for a Democratic Society, and faculty and staff building campus encampments and demanding divestment.⁹⁰ In December 2023, USPCN also stated that its Houston elders worked with PYM and others to mobilize “tens of thousands” over a series of protests.⁹¹

Resistance 101

In March 2024, Khaled Barakat and his wife, Charlotte Kates, the international coordinator for Samidoun, held an online conference at Columbia University entitled, “Resistance 101.”⁹² Therein, the terror attack on October 7 was lauded as resistance and instruction was given on how to support the resistance. They praised Hamas and Hizballah, and encouraged attendees to “Be of service...to the resistance movements...”⁹³ The Faculty and Staff for Justice in Palestine, essentially the faculty version of the SJP, promoted the event on Instagram.⁹⁴ WOL founder Nirdeen Kiswani also spoke about destroying the country of Israel. Barakat referred to “friends and brothers in Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the PFLP.” For her work in this arena, Kates received the Iranian regime’s Islamic Human Rights and Human Dignity award, reportedly even attending the official ceremony in Iran, attended by judiciary and ‘human rights’ officials.⁹⁵ The Iranian regime is one of the most oppressive in the world,

⁸⁹ U.S. Palestinian Community Network, “USPCN Statement on Unified Palestinian Resistance,” October 14, 2023, <https://www.uspcn.org/wp/wp/2023/10/14/uspcn-statement-unified-palestinian-resistance-attacking-israeli-military-outposts-and-illegal-settlements-in-response-to-months-of-israeli-assaults-on-palestinian-civilians/>

⁹⁰ U.S. Palestinian Community Network, “USPCN Statement: Support the Student Revolutionaries Fighting for a Free Palestine,” April 26, 2024, <https://www.uspcn.org/wp/wp/2024/04/26/uspcn-statement-support-the-student-revolutionaries-fighting-for-a-free-palestine/>

⁹¹ U.S. Palestinian Community Network, “Make an End-of-Year Humanitarian Aid Donation to Gaza, and Also Support USPCN’s Organizing Today!,” December 29, 2023, <https://www.uspcn.org/2023/12/29/make-an-end-of-year-humanitarian-aid-donation-to-gaza-and-also-support-uspcns-organizing-today/>

⁹² Jessica Costescu, “At Columbia, an Israeli-Designated Terror Group Teaches ‘Palestinian Resistance 101’—And Lauds Plane Hijackings,” *Washington Free Beacon*, March 25, 2024, <https://freebeacon.com/campus/at-columbia-an-israeli-designated-terror-group-teaches-palestinian-resistance-101-and-lauds-plane-hijackings/>

⁹³ *Ibid.*

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*

⁹⁵ “Vancouver Activist Appears on Iranian TV Months After Rally Arrest,” *CTV News Vancouver*, August 16, 2024, <https://www.ctvnews.ca/vancouver/article/vancouver-activist-appears-on-iranian-tv-months-after-rally-arrest/>, archived at <https://archive.is/wip/iO2Rc>.

known for its disregard for women's rights and human rights, and it is a long term ally of Hamas, PIJ and PFLP.

People's Conference for Palestine and Masir Badil

The People's Conference for Palestine is another example of this alliance. Its 2025 website listed PYM, USPCN, The People's Forum, Al-Awda, the Palestinian Feminist Collective, ANSWER Coalition, U.S. Campaign for Palestinian Rights, ADC, the People's Center for Palestine, National SJP, Writers Against the War on Gaza, and the Arab Resource Organizing Center as conveners.⁹⁶ The conference placed PYM and USPCN inside the same national organizing space as groups that also appear in prisoner campaigns, campus activism, and anti-Israel mobilization.

Additional connective tissue between the organizations can be seen via Masar Badil through Khaled Barakat and Samidoun. In May 2026, Masar Badil published an interview in which Barakat was identified as a member of its Executive Committee.⁹⁷

Masar Badil, otherwise known as the Palestinian Alternative Revolutionary Path Movement, is closely linked to SDT Samidoun and FTO PFLP, and like Samidoun, advocates in support of terror groups. One of Masar Badil's leaders is SDT Khalid Barakat. Between 2023-2024, Masar Badil hosted multiple webinars featuring Hamas leaders. In the wake of the November 2024 violent attacks in Amsterdam against Israeli soccer fans, Masr Badil seemingly blamed the victims when it issued a statement condemning the Israeli soccer fans as racists that promote genocide.

Donation Infrastructure

Samidoun's financing is somewhat obfuscated through its use of fiscal sponsors as it does not have its own 501(c)(3) status, unlike some of the other referenced groups. The House Ways and Means Committee described Samidoun as a fiscally sponsored project of Alliance for Global Justice (AFGJ) in its 2024 tax-exempt review work.⁹⁸ The committee also referred WESPAC

⁹⁶ People's Conference for Palestine, "About the People's Conference for Palestine," <https://peoplesconferenceforpalestine.org/about-conference>

⁹⁷ Palestinian Alternative Revolutionary Path Movement, "Barakat After the U.S. Sanctions: Targeting Us Has Advanced Our Movement," May 25, 2026 <https://masarbadil.org/en/2026/05/8218/>

⁹⁸ Jason Smith, Chairman, House Committee on Ways and Means, "Tax Exempt Status Revocation Letters," Letter to Commissioner Daniel Werfel, Internal Revenue Service, September 24, 2024, <https://waysandmeans.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Tax-Exempt-Status-Revocation-Letters.pdf>

to the IRS and described WESPAC as working with or funding several sponsored or supported projects, including National SJP, WOL, USPCN, and PYM.⁹⁹ Those congressional characterizations, not criminal findings, identify a recurring structure: activist projects moving through outside nonprofit infrastructure rather than all operating through standalone public filings.

After Samidoun's designation, the public donation route shifted again. Canada corporate records list Samidoun's Canadian not-for-profit corporation as dissolved for non-compliance as of March 27, 2026.¹⁰⁰ Samidoun's own donation page, accessed in July 2026,¹⁰¹ states that because U.S. sanctions are upheld by international banking systems and payment processors, the network welcomes cryptocurrency donations and lists Bitcoin, Ethereum, USDT, and Monero options.

PYM's donation record fits the same recurring pattern. Its current website¹⁰² routes donors to GoodBricks, and GoodBricks states¹⁰³ that PYM has partnered with the platform to process online donations.¹⁰⁴ Earlier donation records show check routing through outside entities. A June 7, 2024 archived GoodBricks page told donors that U.S.-based contributions were tax-deductible and instructed them to make checks payable to WESPAC Foundation with "PYM" in the memo line.¹⁰⁵ A later GoodBricks version instructed donors to make checks payable to Honor the Earth, again with "PYM" in the memo line.¹⁰⁶ The two groups are closely intertwined at the leadership level: Nadya

⁹⁹ Jason Smith, Chairman, House Committee on Ways and Means, "Treasury Sanctions Sham Charity for Terrorist Ties Following Ways and Means Investigation," October 16, 2024 <https://waysandmeans.house.gov/2024/10/16/treasury-sanctions-sham-charity-for-terrorist-ties-following-ways-and-means-investigation/>

¹⁰⁰ Corporations Canada, Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada, "Federal Corporation Information: Samidoun Palestinian Prisoner Solidarity Network / Le Réseau de Solidarité aux Prisonniers palestiniens Samidoun," Corporation No. 1279374-1, <https://ised-isde.canada.ca/cc/lgcy/fdrICrpDtIs.html?corpId=12793741>

¹⁰¹ Samidoun: Palestinian Prisoner Solidarity Network, "Donate to Samidoun Network," <https://samidoun.net/donate-to-samidoun-network/>

¹⁰² Palestinian Youth Movement, "Donate," <https://www.palestinianyouthmovement.com/donate>

¹⁰³ GoodBricks, "Support Palestinian Youth Organizing!," <https://goodbricks.org/cause/palestinianyouthmovement.com/donate-pym>

¹⁰⁴ GoodBricks, "Support Palestinian Youth Organizing!," <https://goodbricks.org/cause/palestinianyouthmovement.com/donate-pym>

¹⁰⁵ GoodBricks, archived donation page for Palestinian Youth Movement, "Donate – Palestinian Youth Movement," archived page, <https://web.archive.org/web/20240607173152/https://goodbricks.org/cause/palestinianyouthmovement.com/donate-pym>

¹⁰⁶ GoodBricks, "Donate – Palestinian Youth Movement," <https://goodbricks.org/cause/palestinianyouthmovement.com/donate-pym>

Tannous sits on PYM's national executive board¹⁰⁷ while serving as deputy director of Honor the Earth,¹⁰⁸ and Lenna Zahran Nasr is a lead organizer at PYM¹⁰⁹ and a member of Honor the Earth's board of directors.¹¹⁰ In August 2025, Senator Tom Cotton cited PYM's Honor the Earth routing in a letter asking the IRS to investigate both organizations.¹¹¹

USPCN's donation route is narrower. Its current donation page states that USPCN is accepting donations only through Zeffy.¹¹² The linked Zeffy form is titled "Support USPCN via our fiscal sponsor IT IS APARTHEID INC." and states that donations are tax-deductible through that fiscal sponsor.¹¹³

A Look at Gaza's Joint Operations Room

The armed side record shows a separate but related alliance in Gaza among Islamist and Marxist groups. In approximately 2018, Hamas established the Joint Operations Room (JOR) in Gaza which was to serve as a coordinating body among Hamas, PFLP, DFLP, PIJ and other terror factions to coordinate not only militant activity but also communications, operational and intelligence assessments, logistical support, armaments, and annual joint training exercises.^{114 115}

¹⁰⁷ Institute for Palestine Studies, "On Solidarity Delegations," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 48, no. 4 (Summer 2019), <https://www.palestine-studies.org/en/node/1636720>

¹⁰⁸ Honor the Earth, "Nadya Tannous," Honor the Earth, <https://www.honorearth.org/nadya>

¹⁰⁹ Verified Complaint, *Faoro v. Jewish Voice for Peace, Inc.*, 1:25-cv-00289-ABJ (D.D.C. filed Jan. 31, 2025), paragraph 17, <https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.dcd.276970/gov.uscourts.dcd.276970.1.0.pdf>

¹¹⁰ Honor the Earth, About us, "Board of Directors," <https://www.honorearth.org/board>

¹¹¹ Senator Tom Cotton, "Cotton to IRS: Investigate Palestinian Youth Movement's Funding and Ties to Terrorism," August 22, 2025, <https://www.cotton.senate.gov/news/press-releases/cotton-to-irs-investigate-palestinian-youth-movements-funding-and-ties-to-terrorism>

¹¹² U.S. Palestinian Community Network, "Donate to Support USPCN," <https://www.uspcn.org/wp/wp/donate/>

¹¹³ Zeffy, "Make a Tax-Deductible Donation to USPCN via Our Fiscal Sponsor IT IS APARTHEID INC.," <https://www.zeffy.com/en-US/donation-form/84665259-4104-4ba5-bbdc-f08f51824890>

¹¹⁴ Criminal Complaint, *United States v. Mahmoud Amin Yaqub Al Muhtadi*, 6:25-mj-00183 DJA, (W.D. La. filed October 6, 2025), Document 1, https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.lawd.213965/gov.uscourts.lawd.213965.1.0_1.pdf

¹¹⁵ Criminal Complaint and Attached Affidavit in Support of Criminal Complaint, *United States v. Mahmoud Amin Yaqub Al Muhtadi*, 6:25-mj-00183 DJA (W.D. La. filed October 6, 2025), Document 1 and Attachment 1, Paragraphs 21-22, https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.lawd.213965/gov.uscourts.lawd.213965.1.1_3.pdf

In October 2025, federal prosecutors in Louisiana announced the arrest of Mahmoud Amin Ya'qub Al-Muhtadi, a Gaza native living in Lafayette, for alleged involvement in the Hamas-led October 7 attack.¹¹⁶

The Department of Justice (DOJ) said Al-Muhtadi was an operative for the National Resistance Brigades, the military wing of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP). The affidavit accompanying the complaint described the DFLP as a Palestinian communist organization formed as an offshoot of the PFLP and stated that the National Resistance Brigades participated in the October 7 attack. It alleged that Al-Muhtadi armed himself, gathered others, crossed into Israel, and that his phone later used a cell tower near Kibbutz Kfar Aza, where Hamas and its supporters killed civilians, including American citizens.¹¹⁷

The same accompanying affidavit stated that Hamas's relationship with the DFLP predated October 7 and ran through the Joint Operations Room, a Gaza-based coordination mechanism established in 2018. It identified Hamas's al-Qassam Brigades, Palestinian Islamic Jihad's al-Quds Brigades, the DFLP's National Resistance Brigades, and other factions as part of that structure. The affidavit also cited a June 2023 interview with Ayman Nofal, then a senior al-Qassam Brigades figure, describing coordination among the groups that extended beyond wartime to include communications, operational and intelligence assessments, logistical support, armaments, and annual joint training exercises.¹¹⁸

The complaint does not allege that PYM, USPCN, Samidoun, or any U.S. organization was directed by the Joint Operations Room. Rather, it shows a

¹¹⁶ U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Public Affairs, "Gaza Man Arrested for Alleged Involvement in October 7, 2023 Terrorist Attacks," Press Release, October 17, 2025, <https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/gaza-man-arrested-alleged-involvement-october-7-2023-terrorist-attacks>

¹¹⁷ Criminal Complaint and Attached Affidavit in Support of Criminal Complaint, *United States v. Mahmoud Amin Ya'qub Al-Muhtadi*, 6:25-mj-00183-DJA, (W.D. La. filed October 6, 2025), Document 1, and Attachment 1, paragraphs 6, 11-12, 17-21, 28-73 and 84, https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.lawd.213965/gov.uscourts.lawd.213965.1.1_3.pdf. The Criminal Complaint is posted separately at https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.lawd.213965/gov.uscourts.lawd.213965.1.0_1.pdf. See also Superceding Indictment, *United States v. Mahmoud Amin Yaqub Al Muhtadi*, 6:25-cr-00285 (W.D. La. filed June 17, 2026), <https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.lawd.214105/gov.uscourts.lawd.214105.60.0.pdf>

¹¹⁸ Criminal Complaint and Attached Affidavit in Support of Criminal Complaint, *United States v. Mahmoud Amin Yaqub Al Muhtadi*, 6:25-mj-00183 DJA, (W.D. La. filed October 6, 2025), Document 1 and Attachment 1, Paragraphs 21-22, https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.lawd.213965/gov.uscourts.lawd.213965.1.1_3.pdf

narrower point on the armed side: Islamist and secular-left Palestinian factions have coordinated in Gaza under a shared resistance framework.

The U.S. landscape is different because it is not an armed command structure. What has manifested in the U.S. is a support network where Islamist-aligned, secular-left, student, prisoner-solidarity, and community actors appear in the same campaigns driving the same pro-terror, anti-imperialist, anti-Western narratives.

Conclusion

The United States, Canada, and Israel identify Samidoun as part of the PFLP's external support and fundraising structure. While Samidoun's allies in the U.S. are not themselves designated as terror fronts, they platform PFLP-linked figures and causes to enhance their base of support: prisoner campaigns, campus events, national conferences, protest coalitions, fiscal sponsors, and online donation rails. Their use of PFLP icons like Leila Khaled, Ghassan Kanafani, Ahmad Sa'adat, and Rasmea Odeh to galvanize their followers, shows how the PFLP's political inheritance was normalized, translated, and circulated inside U.S. movement spaces and how its popular support is growing. That support increasingly includes the justification for violence, which likely explains the U.S. government's recent actions.

This report demonstrates that far from being a relic of the 1970s, the PFLP adapted by shifting emphasis from spectacular terrorist attacks to influence operations built around propaganda, prisoner campaigns, activist alliances, and transnational support networks. It concludes that recent U.S., Canadian, and European enforcement actions suggest governments are increasingly recognizing these networks as part of the broader infrastructure that sustains and legitimizes designated terrorist organizations.



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