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H9mWaliC UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 1 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK 2 3 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 4 16 Cr. 398 (PAE) V. 5 SAJMIR ALIMEHMETI, a/k/a "Abdul Qawii,", 6 7 Conference 8 Defendant. 9 10 New York, N.Y. September 22, 2017 2:30 p.m. 11 12 Before: 13 HON. PAUL A. ENGELMAYER, 14 District Judge 15 16 **APPEARANCES** 17 JOON H. KIM Acting United States Attorney for 18 the Southern District of New York GEORGE D. TURNER 19 Assistant United States Attorney 20 DAVID E. PATTON Federal Defenders of New York, Inc. 21 Attorney for Defendant SYLVIE J. LEVINE 22 23 24 25

(Case called)

 $$\operatorname{MR.}$$ TURNER: Good afternoon, your Honor. George Turner, for the government.

THE COURT: Good afternoon, Mr. Turner.

MS. LEVINE: Good afternoon, your Honor. The Federal Defenders of New York, by Sylvie Levine, on behalf of Mr. Alimehmeti.

THE COURT: Very good. Good afternoon, Ms. Levine.

And good afternoon to you, Mr. Alimehmeti.

THE DEFENDANT: Good afternoon.

THE COURT: Good afternoon as well to the members of the public who are here.

I had indicated that I would have a ruling on the pending motion to suppress on or before today's conference. It turns out to be on. I'm about to read a brief ruling into the record. Here goes.

The Court will rule now on defendant Alimehmeti's pending motion to suppress and for a Franks hearing and for disclosure of FISA orders, applications, and related materials, as well as for notice of and discovery about the use of Executive Order 12333 surveillance.

For your planning purposes, there will not be a written decision. I will simply issue a bottom-line order reflecting my disposition of the motion, so if the Court's reasoning here is significant, you will need to order the

transcript.

Alimehmeti is charged with one count of providing material support to the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, and one count of making a false statement on a passport application.

I will review first the procedural background to these motions.

On July 21, 2016, the government gave Alimehmeti's counsel notice that it intended to rely in its case in chief on information obtained and derived from physical searches conducted pursuant to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, which I will refer to as FISA.

On December 9, 2016, the Court held a status conference and took up with the parties a motions briefing schedule. The defense did not indicate then an intent to file a FISA suppression motion. On December 13, 2016, the Court set a briefing schedule requiring the defense to file any Rule 12(b)(3) suppression motion by January 9, 2017. On January 5, 2017, the Court extended the deadline for the defendant's Rule 12(b)(3) motion to January 23, 2017. On March 23, 2017, two months after that deadline had passed, the parties appeared at another status conference at which defense counsel expressed, for the first time, an intent to file a FISA suppression motion. Defense counsel represented that she had believed such a motion not to be governed by the deadline for Rule 12(b)(3)

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motions. On April 3, 2017, defense counsel filed a letter request for leave, under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(c), to file a FISA suppression motion. On April 17, 2017, the government opposed that request. On April 25, 2017, the Court granted the request for leave to file the motion, notwithstanding its having been noticed delinquently, and set a briefing schedule for the motion.

On May 15, 2017, Alimehmeti moved to suppress the FISA materials the government intends to offer at trial, for a Franks hearing, and to compel disclosure of the FISA application, order, and related materials. Alimehmeti also moved for notice of and discovery about the use of Executive Order 12333 surveillance.

On July 24, 2017, the government submitted an opposition. It was properly filed in camera, ex parte, and under seal. The government also filed an unclassified version of the same memorandum, which had been redacted to remove the classified information that was provided to the Court.

On August 11, 2017, Alimehmeti filed a reply.

The Court has thoroughly reviewed the parties' submissions, which include the FISA materials sought to be The Court has carefully considered the issues raised therein. The Court denies Alimehmeti's motion in its The Court's reasoning is as follows. entirety.

Alimehmeti challenges the legality of the

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FISA-obtained information on a number of bases. He argues that the government could not have validly asserted that he was "an agent of a foreign power," as required by the statute. He further argues that the government could not have asserted that a "significant purpose of the FISA application was to obtain foreign intelligence," as required by the statute. He argues that the FISA application must have contained intentional or reckless material falsehoods or omissions, thus requiring a hearing under Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978). He argues that required certifications were or may have been insufficient. He argues that the timing of surveillance and searches may have been improper. He argues that the government may not have utilized effective minimization procedures. Finally, Alimehmeti argues that he is entitled to additional discovery and notice regarding Executive Order 12333 surveillance.

The Court first finds that it can properly resolve these challenges and deny disclosure without affording Alimehmeti a hearing. Where, as here, the attorney general certifies "disclosure of FISA materials or an adversary hearing would harm the national security of the United States," the Court, by statute, must "review in camera and ex parte the application, order, and such other materials relating to the surveillance as may be necessary to determine whether the surveillance of the aggrieved person was lawfully authorized

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and conducted, "citing 50 U.S.C. Section a 1806(f). Under that statute, the Court may order disclosure of FISA materials "under appropriate security procedures and protective orders,...only where such disclosure is necessary to make an accurate determination of the legality of the surveillance."

If the Court "determines that the surveillance was lawfully authorized and conducted, it shall deny the motion of the aggrieved person except to the extent that due process requires discovery or disclosure." Id. Section 1806(g). The Second Circuit has explained that disclosure of FISA materials is "the exception and ex parte, in camera determination is the rule".

United States v. Stewart, 590 F.3d 93, 129 (2d Cir. 2009).

In this case, the Court conducted such a review. The Court's in camera, ex parte review of the FISA materials permitted the Court to make an accurate determination of the legality of the challenged surveillance consistent with the requirements of due process. Disclosure and an adversary hearing are therefore not necessary.

The Court next finds, following a comprehensive review of the FISA materials, that the government has complied fully with the FISA warrant requirements of materials and that there is no basis in the record for a *Franks* hearing.

As the Second Circuit has explained, the FISA Court, in reaching a decision on a warrant application, considers "whether (1) the application makes the probable cause showing

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required by FISA, i.e., that the target of the warrant is a foreign power or agent thereof and that the facilities or places to be searched or surveilled are being used or are about to be used by a foreign power organization; (2) the application is otherwise complete and in the proper form; and (3) when the target is a United States person, the application's certifications are not clearly erroneous." United States v. Abu-Jihaad, 630 F.3d 102, 130 (2d Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). The Second Circuit instructs that "FISA warrant applications are subject to minimal scrutiny by the courts, both upon initial presentation and subsequent challenge." Id. The Second Circuit has cautioned, however, that "even minimal scrutiny is not toothless." Id. A district court, in assessing challenges to orders of the FISA Court, presumes valid "the representations and certifications submitted in support of an application for FISA surveillance...absent a showing sufficient to trigger a Franks hearing." Id.

Here, the classified materials, in this Court's assessment, easily satisfy FISA's requirements. application properly makes the required probable cause showing. The certifications do not contain any clear errors. Alimehmeti has not made "a substantial preliminary showing that a false statement knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, was included by the affiant in the warrant affidavit, and...the allegedly false statement is

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necessary to the finding of probable cause." Franks, 438 U.S. There is therefore no need for a Franks hearing. 155-56.

As to Alimehmeti's arguments regarding Executive Order 12333, Alimehmeti does not direct the Court to any legal authority mandating the additional notice and disclosures he seeks. Courts have denied motions for such additional notice of discovery of surveillance techniques where defendants offer only speculation of having been subject to unlawful surveillance. For example, in this district, in the United States v. El Gammal, No. 15 Cr. 588, Judge Ramos recently denied a motion for additional discovery and notice that articulated only "suspicion" of surveillance under Executive Order 12333 and that invoked, as Alimehmeti does here, Title 18 U.S.C. Section 3504, the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, and Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 12(b)(3)(C) and 16(a)(1)(E)(i). Here, just as in El Gammal, the Court understands the government to have complied with its notice and discovery obligations and declines to impose additional obligations at this time.

Similarly, in *United States v. Aref*, the Second Circuit affirmed the denial of a defendant's Section 2504 motion for notice and disclosure of surveillance where the defendant "failed to state a colorable basis for his Section 3504 claim" and instead "merely (1) identified representations made by unnamed sources in a newspaper article; and (2) argued H9mWaliC

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that the prosecutor's pattern of objections shows that he must have been surveilled electronically." 285 F.App'x 784, 793 (2d Cir. 2008). The circuit cautioned that, "although [a] Section 3504 claim need not be particularized, it may not be based upon mere suspicion but must at least appear to have a 'colorable' basis before it may function to trigger the government's obligation to respond under Section 3504." Id. (quoting United States v. Pacella, 622 F.2d 640, 643 (2d Cir. 1980)).

I am informed that I misspoke earlier at one point and inadvertently, I think, said 2504 instead of 3504. I meant 3504.

Here, Alimehmeti does not articulate a sufficient basis for his speculation that he has been subjected to unlawful surveillance under Executive Order 12333. Therefore, the Court reaches the same conclusion as did Judge Ramos. Court denies the motion without prejudice "to renew in the event the defense is able to bring something more concrete to the Court's attention," citing Judge Ramos in No. 15 Cr. 588, Dkt. No. 142 at page 25.

Accordingly, the Court denies Alimehmeti's pending motion to suppress and for additional notice of discovery.

That ends the Court's ruling. A bottom-line order reflecting the denial of the motion will shortly follow.

Having taken up that business, counsel, where do we stand?

MR. TURNER: Your Honor, where we stand is, at least having spoken with defense counsel earlier, what remains in our view is setting a trial date at this point, your Honor.

Pretrial briefing has been complete, both on the CIPA side as well as Rule 12, and we submit it would be appropriate to set a trial date.

THE COURT: Have you discussed that with opposing counsel?

MR. TURNER: We have, your Honor, and getting a little more specific, in our discussions earlier today, we both believed that a trial in the early part of the new year would be appropriate at this juncture and given the nature of the case, your Honor, subject to the Court's schedule, of course.

THE COURT: All right. Let me just confirm that with defense counsel and then we can start taking up the trial date and other mechanics.

Ms. Levine.

MS. LEVINE: That's correct, your Honor. I did speak to Mr. Turner and we also think it's appropriate at this juncture to set a trial date.

THE COURT: Is that based on an assessment that this case is going to trial, or that the prudent course is to set a trial date but you're not necessarily projecting that?

MS. LEVINE: I think at this time, it is our expectation that this case will go to trial. There are some

ongoing conversations, as there always are, at precisely this juncture, and if those conversations change the route that we're taking, we'll obviously inform the Court immediately, but I think at this time it would be proper to put a date on the calendar.

THE COURT: OK. I'll do that. Let me ask you, before we start talking about dates and schedules, just to get an understanding, beginning with defense, we've cleared a bunch of hurdles here so far, what do you envision happening between now and trial? Are there motions in limine you have in mind? I'm trying to get a sense of what we will collectively need to work through beforehand, because that may bear on the trial date.

MS. LEVINE: Sure. I think some motions in limine. For example, I think there may yet be expert disclosure by the government. I don't want to speculate, but I perhaps would look to the government at this juncture. I know that they have in others of these types of cases sought to call experts and there's been litigation with regard to the experts. Obviously, that's something that I think I can contemplate now as coming up that the Court can't sort of otherwise foresee. Otherwise, I imagine it's standard motions in limine with regard to 404(b) applications and such.

THE COURT: In other words, what you're envisioning at this point is motion practice that is not unfamiliar for criminal cases, criminal cases in this district that do not

implicate classification-type issues but, rather, issues that involve either expertise or limiting instructions, that sort of thing.

MS. LEVINE: Right, and I think I would look to Mr. Turner, if that's acceptable, to maybe elaborate on any other pretrial testimony or such that we're not aware of at this moment but may be shared shortly.

THE COURT: I'm trying to get a sense as well of the likely volume and complexity of what you would expect to be moving on. Let's assume that, pending what we hear from Mr. Turner, there is potentially expert testimony of the sort that you envision and that you would be moving against it.

MS. LEVINE: Presumably, right. Other than that, I don't know of anything at this moment to bring to the Court's attention.

THE COURT: In other words, from the perspective of motion practice, based on what you know now, while there would likely be some, we're not talking about the sort of volume that requires a protracted delay.

MS. LEVINE: I don't believe so, your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Mr. Turner.

MR. TURNER: Your Honor, we agree with that assessment with the CIPA-related litigation as well as the FISA suppression motion having been decided. We envision standard

criminal pretrial motion practice within the spectrum of what would be considered the norm here, I think, your Honor. That will likely include expert disclosure, expert notice, as well as in limine briefing, but at this point, your Honor, we don't foresee something that is outside what your Honor has alluded to.

THE COURT: Give me a sense of when you would make whatever expert disclosures you have in mind making.

MR. TURNER: Your Honor, we could be prepared to make expert disclosure in the range of, say, a couple months before trial, which would seem to be in the range of what is standard practice in these types of cases.

THE COURT: And without holding you to it, is there anything more you could tell me about the number or areas of expertise that you have in mind?

MR. TURNER: Broadly speaking, your Honor, and some of this will depend, of course, on whether and to what extent there are stipulations, for example, related to the extraction, for example, of forensic data from electronic devices. That would be one potential subject of expert testimony. It is also customary, we would anticipate, in this type of case to elicit expert testimony regarding ISIS as a terrorist organization and related topics like that.

THE COURT: One category is more technical involving the receipt of the extraction of data; that's the sort of thing

by its nature often is stipulated to but no obligation that that happen. The other one is more substantive, right, and involves, as you say, ISIS?

MR. TURNER: That's right, your Honor.

THE COURT: Any other areas of expertise that you presently envision? I'm not holding you to it. I'm just trying to get a preview.

MR. TURNER: Your Honor, I think at this point, those are the broad areas. Obviously, we will need some time to consider that as we prepare for trial.

THE COURT: Government, how long would you envision a trial would take?

MR. TURNER: Your Honor, and we did speak about this aspect of it as well a little bit with defense counsel earlier, we would anticipate being able to present the government's case, including opening jury addresses, within two weeks.

THE COURT: From jury selection through the government resting, two weeks. Are you making any assumption about the number of trial days per week?

 $$\operatorname{MR}.$$ TURNER: Your Honor, we did have a question as to whether your Honor sits on Fridays.

THE COURT: My general practice is to sit long days but on Monday through Thursday and not on Friday. That's not etched in stone, and if there's a good reason to sit on Friday, I'm open to considering it, but ordinarily I prefer to give

counsel Friday to catch their breath, and that obviously serves other interests in terms of my docket management, but there have been criminal cases and other cases where I've sat on Friday and am open to considering it.

MR. TURNER: Understood, your Honor. Thank you.

THE COURT: How many trial days do you envision from jury selection through the end of the government's case?

MR. TURNER: Again, your Honor, recognizing that some of this, with the usual caveats as to stipulations, whether custodians will need to be called, things of that nature, I think we're looking at something in the order of ten trial days.

THE COURT: Right, to which, then, needs to be added the defense case, closing arguments, charge and deliberations.

MR. TURNER: That's right, your Honor.

THE COURT: Ms. Levine.

MS. LEVINE: I think at this point, we would, for scheduling purposes, expect to ask the Court for two to three business days for a defense case.

THE COURT: I'm not limiting you in any way. I'm just trying to figure out where we slot this in in the calendar.

MS. LEVINE: Right, so that's my answer.

THE COURT: All right. So putting that together, and then figuring that closing arguments may be substantial and a charge and deliberations, I think we have to block at least

three weeks for this, and probably to play it safe, have to assure ourselves that we have four weeks to work with. Sounds only prudent.

MS. LEVINE: That sounds right, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. I understood from my deputy that you have some scheduling constraints.

MS. LEVINE: Your Honor, I unfortunately have some personal obligations in the month of January that are going to take me out of the country for some of it and out of the office for part of it, such that it would be my request that the Court not schedule the trial before February.

THE COURT: May I ask you, and don't take away any skepticism, because I will accommodate you, but is Ms. Shroff still trying the case with you?

MS. LEVINE: Yes, your Honor. Ms. Shroff and Mr. Bove, who I believe are both going to try this case, are both currently in preparation for a trial that starts Monday here in this district, but Ms. Shroff is certainly going to try this case with me.

THE COURT: OK. So it will be Mr. Turner and Mr. Bove and Ms. Levine and Ms. Shroff.

MS. LEVINE: At least.

THE COURT: And perhaps more. And I take it it is implicit that there is a reason why the case can't be tried before the new year. Just articulate it, because somebody

apparently is going to have to move for the exclusion of time, so I'd like you to explain why you're not seeking a trial before then.

MS. LEVINE: Yes, your Honor. I think including the other trial that I just referenced that Ms. Shroff is committed to, I think, for the entirety of October, I have a trial the first week of December, and therefore, we landed on the beginning of next year.

THE COURT: All right. And you're tied up through January.

MS. LEVINE: I will, of course, accommodate whatever schedule the Court sets, but yes.

THE COURT: Here's the question. Right now it's late September. You have lots of notice of a trial if it's early in the next year. While this will conflict with part 1 obligations I have, I may be able to work through it. I want to get this trial moving sooner rather than later. Would you be able to start, in effect, the last Monday in January? I realize that may or may not have you going back to back, but you have a trial partner, which is why I established it, and you would have many months between now and then to get ready.

MS. LEVINE: It would be my request, given that I'm -- I think for me, my request would be to start the following week or even later in that week, if just a few extra days.

THE COURT: How about this; let me try the following.

Again, I'm just throwing out ideas here.

MS. LEVINE: Sure.

THE COURT: I have had several complex cases that are by their nature both long and challenging as a matter of jury selection. I'm thinking here about several lengthy gang cases, which took many weeks and involved inflammatory facts, multiple murders and the like, and I found it useful in a couple of them to do jury selection one week and the substance of the trial beginning the Monday of the next.

One of the values of that is it allows us to stretch into jury selection and take all the time we need to get it right while everyone can really plan their trial lawyering, by which I mean opening statements and witnesses, with some confidence as to when that work begins. One possibility would be to do jury selection beginning the last Monday of January and then the substance of the trial beginning the following Monday. I will need to make some accommodations with respect to my part 1 obligations, but I think Mr. Alimehmeti's interest in a speedy trial has to trump that.

Thoughts?

MS. LEVINE: I can make that work.

THE COURT: I mean, it seems to me that that represents a fair accommodation of the interests here.

MS. LEVINE: I would agree with that.

THE COURT: If we were to, then, begin the substance

of the trial, Mr. Turner, stripped away of jury selection the first Monday in February, I guess the expectation would be that the trial would presumably run through February. That would be the operating assumption, that we need to all keep that free.

MR. TURNER: I think that's right, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. One moment.

Before I lock in, let me put out for bid exactly what I have in mind to make sure that everyone is comfortable with what I'm proposing. Jury selection would begin on Monday, January 29, and I expect we would be complete with jury selection sometime in the first two days, worst case three days, but in any event, we'll take care of it that week. The substance of the trial, meaning preliminary instructions and opening statements, would then begin February 5. I'm going to reserve on whether or not we would be sitting four days or five days, but you should budget your schedules accordingly.

Beginning with you, Ms. Levine, just making sure that works for the defense.

MS. LEVINE: Yes, and I appreciate the accommodation, your Honor.

THE COURT: Of course. Look, I'm trying to balance everybody's needs.

Mr. Turner, does that work for the government?

MR. TURNER: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. There are a handful of other

things, but those will be our trial dates, the 5th for the substance of the trial of February and the 29th for jury selection of January.

With respect to jury selection, I expect that there would be at least two issues here that would potentially complicate jury selection. One is the length of the trial, which is on the longer side. In longer trials, I have used a questionnaire that the venire submits that helps fence out people who have hardship problems beforehand, and the other issue would be the subject matter of the trial.

Have counsel given any thought, and I'm looking, I guess, particularly to you, Mr. Turner, because the office has done a number of cases in this broad space, to any particular issues the Court needs to be sensitive to with respect to mechanics of jury selection in a case like this?

MR. TURNER: Your Honor, I think the Court has hit on them. We would defer to the Court's customary and usual practices in that regard with respect to cases of this sort that your Honor has mentioned, and we certainly would have no objection to proceeding as your Honor has described.

THE COURT: All right. I'm just reflecting on this for a moment. In some of the gang-related cases that I've spoken about, we had a couple of cases where we usefully had a hardship questionnaire, which identified five or six hardship questions, and in effect, all the members of the venire,

several hundred, came in and filled out those questionnaires. After they filled them out, counsel reviewed them and sorted them for the Court into categories beginning with jurors who had no hardship "yes" answers; jurors who had answers but where neither counsel felt that they justified being excused; the third category were people who had "yes" answers where one party felt that there was a valid justification; and the fourth category were people who had "yes" answers where both parties believed there was a valid hardship claim. We excused the last category and then sequenced jury selection beginning with category 1, and had it been necessary, we would have gone to categories 2 and 3.

Thinking aloud here, and we need to figure out the schedule for all this, I have in mind the notion that there may be a value in doing something like that here to at least effectively eliminate the hardship question as a major stumbling block to jury selection.

Any preliminary views from counsel as to that?

MR. TURNER: We would be amenable to that, your Honor, particularly if the Court has found it to work well in prior cases.

MS. LEVINE: I would echo that. I haven't seen it done, but I would defer to the Court's expertise on this.

THE COURT: OK. What I am likely to do is reflect on this, but I'm leaning toward doing something like that.

Otherwise we wind up with an enormous amount of time spent, often with robing room conversations with individual jurors about hardship issues that were easily spotted earlier. I'd like to avoid that. How exactly the mechanics of this work in terms of dates is something that Mr. Smallman will need to work out with the jury administrator, but in all likelihood the panel would come in on someday prior to the onset of jury selection to fill out the questionnaire, and then there would need to be a little bit of time in between then so that counsel could sort the questionnaires and make their assessments and give a spreadsheet to the Court.

What I will ask you to do is set aside the trial dates that I have given, but be mindful that it is possible that the week before what I set aside for jury selection, the venire might be coming in to fill out the questionnaire.

What that means, Ms. Levine, is Ms. Shroff would then be presumably with whoever else from your office is covering for you the ones who review the questionnaires and do the sorting in conjunction with the government. But since you wouldn't be present for the jury filling out the questionnaires, it's really a back-office function, but fair warning that if we go this route and the actual human side of jury selection begins on January 29, it's entirely possible we'd need to do this the previous week.

MS. LEVINE: I understand that, your Honor.

THE COURT: With that, I definitely want to set a check-in date with you in the fall just to make sure we're on track in every way we need to be, including, I would expect, nailing down some of the mechanic issues with respect to jury selection.

Other than that, though, I want to set a schedule for expert disclosure and for motion in limine briefing that allows us to resolve all issues amply before trial so that we're not in a scramble right before. Let's work backwards.

Ms. Levine, once you get expert disclosures from the government on the assumption that you are the most likely mover for motion in limine, how much time would you need?

MS. LEVINE: From the time of the expert disclosure or in advance of the trial?

THE COURT: How much time after getting the expert disclosure will you need to move against it and to make any other motions in limine? Two weeks?

MS. LEVINE: Two weeks sounds right.

THE COURT: All right. And then, Mr. Turner, assuming you get a challenge to your expert and some other familiar motion in limine, how long would you need to respond?

MR. TURNER: Two weeks, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. And then I will need, let's say, a week to prepare. If I set a conference date now at which I am apt to hear argument on and review and/or resolve

the motions, we need to back up the dates by about five weeks from there. One moment.

Let me throw out a few dates and tell me how this works for everybody. I would propose to set November 6 as the deadline for expert disclosures and 404(b) disclosures. I would then propose that any motion in limine be filed by the movant on Monday, November 20, trying to avoid the Thanksgiving holiday, but then any opposition to the motion in limine would be due Thursday, December 7. Again, I'm building in time for Thanksgiving for the party in that position, and I will then have a conference at which I will hear argument, if necessary, but in any event expect to rule on or hope to rule on the motions on December 15 at 2:30 p.m.

That motion in limine schedule applies in both directions. In other words, although I'm envisioning that the more likely motion will be made by the defense, if the government moves in limine, you, Mr. Turner, would be governed by the same schedule.

Does the schedule make sense?

MR. TURNER: Your Honor, may I have one moment to consult with defense counsel?

THE COURT: Of course.

MR. TURNER: Your Honor, while, of course, the parties will work with whatever schedule the Court sets, our preliminary reaction, I think, is that particularly with

respect to items such as *in limine* briefing, it seems awfully early and awfully far in advance of a trial substantively beginning on February 5 to be briefing *in limine* motions as early as late November. I would have thought that sort of briefing would take place a little bit closer to trial.

THE COURT: Ordinarily it would, but here's the concern, which is I expect there to be more complexity in the motions here than in the average case, and I had the sense that there would be value to all in understanding what the ground rules were going into January, particularly with Ms. Levine effectively being out in January. What I'm trying to do, while being heedful of her schedule as well, is clear away all the underbrush we can so that you can prepare for trial in earnest without having what may be complex motions unresolved. That was the thought process, anyway.

Look, I certainly take this point descriptively, but between Ms. Levine's schedule and the inherent nature of what I suspect will be some of the complicated motions here, this seems to me prudent. I may be able to move the dates a little bit later within November, December, but I was hoping to get this resolved, in effect, before everybody scatters. I'm happy to try to move this into March if that would accommodate counsel and give you a little more time to take stock of the trial needs.

MR. TURNER: Your Honor, we're certainly prepared to

abide by this schedule. I suppose one option could be if you pushed things back by in the range of a couple weeks and the Court were holding the conference and ruling on matters in sort of the early to early-mid part of January, which is still a month in advance of trial.

THE COURT: That may well work.

Ms. Levine, what does that do to you?

MS. LEVINE: That's fine, your Honor. If the conference were scheduled the first week of January, I think that would be fine.

THE COURT: All right. How about this, I'll have a conference and hopefully rule on Friday, January 5, at 2 p.m.

Mr. Turner, I take it that gives you at least some more breathing room.

MR. TURNER: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: And Ms. Levine, you're comfortable with that as well.

MS. LEVINE: Yes, your Honor. Thank you very much.

THE COURT: All right. One moment. Let me propose the dates which lead up to it.

Does anybody have a vacation I need to be sensitive to? I can work this to be sensitive to each of you.

MR. TURNER: Not from the government, your Honor.

MS. LEVINE: I've already shared with the Court my vacation schedule.

THE COURT: All right. How about these dates: On

November 20, any 404(b) or expert disclosures would be due.

That is a Monday. On Friday, December 8, any opening motion in

limine would be due, and on Friday, December 22, any opposition

to any motion in limine would be due.

Does that work for you, Mr. Turner?

MR. TURNER: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: I take it that at least takes some of the edge off of the early schedule.

MR. TURNER: We do think that's a sensible schedule, your Honor.

THE COURT: Ms. Levine.

MS. LEVINE: That works well. Thank you, Judge.

THE COURT: All right. I'll set that schedule.

I also want to have another conference with you just given the complexity of the case. Why don't we do this. Let me change the date of the notice to Friday, the 17th, of November, just moving it up a little bit, and let me meet with you on November the 20th. Once the notice is in, at least that way I'll have some idea of what's coming, and it may help me in scheduling. If, for example, it appears likely that somebody's going to have a factual hearing or a motion that requires something evidentiary, I'd rather know sooner than later.

Mr. Turner.

MR. TURNER: I apologize, your Honor. One thought for

your Honor's consideration is it seems conceivable that your Honor might have a better idea of whether such a hearing or arguments are going to be made after the initial motions in limine are actually presented, because they could involve issues that are not related necessarily to 404(b) or expert disclosure, but other trial-related issues.

THE COURT: Right. OK. Fair enough. Mr. Turner, I think what you just said makes sense, so let me do this. I'll move the notice back to November 20. We'll issue an order to sort out all the confusion, but the next conference, then, would be on December the 12th, which will allow everyone to have a few days to review what has been filed in limine, and that way, if there's scheduling that is prompted by what's been filed, we'll be able to take it up then. In all likelihood, an order will issue between now and then that gives you a little more concreteness as to the jury selection methodology vis-à-vis hardship questionnaires.

Putting aside the exclusion of time motion, which I expect is coming, does anyone else have anything to raise?

MR. TURNER: Your Honor, is the Court inclined to set dates at this point for either the submission of requests to charge and/or the disclosure of 3500 material?

THE COURT: I don't set dates for 3500 material. I admonish the government to provide 3500 material amply in enough time so that there's no bona fide claim of the need for

a trial delay. Let me ask you as to the 3500 material, is there anything you can tell me about the types of witnesses you'll have that might shed light on whether anybody's got deeply voluminous material?

MR. TURNER: Your Honor, at this point, taking the second part of the question first, we do not anticipate particularly voluminous 3500. Witnesses will include law enforcement witnesses as well as some set of civilian witnesses. For example, your Honor, as the Court is aware, even from the charging instruments, there were law enforcement personnel who interacted with the defendant.

THE COURT: Right. How long in advance would you envision being prepared to produce 3500 material?

MR. TURNER: Your Honor, in a case as here where we don't see any reason to depart from the ordinary, we would be producing 3500 in the range of a week before trial.

THE COURT: Can I take that to mean a week before the jury selection part of the trial?

MR. TURNER: We can be prepared to produce 3500 -THE COURT: Look, I'm not directing it, but it
certainly would be helpful.

MR. TURNER: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Obviously, there are exceptions, where there's a sensitivity or witness security or something like that, A, I'm not ordering you to do that, and of course, I'm

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sensitive to that, but it's useful for defense counsel's planning to know when to expect this. Why don't we say proposed requests to charge and voir dire due on January the 8th. OK?

MR. TURNER: Very well, your Honor.

THE COURT: Anything further besides the exclusion of time?

MR. TURNER: Not from the government.

MS. LEVINE: Did the Court set a time for the December 12 conference? I'm sorry if I missed it.

> THE COURT: 2:30.

MS. LEVINE: Thank you.

THE COURT: All right. Anything further from you, Ms. Levine?

MS. LEVINE: No, your Honor.

OK. Is there an application for the THE COURT: exclusion of time?

There is, your Honor. We'd ask that the MR. TURNER: Court exclude time under the Speedy Trial Act between today's date and the conference date that's been set by the Court of December 12. We submit that the exclusion will be in the interests of justice. It will, among other things, allow the parties to prepare for trial; it will provide an opportunity for the parties to engage in discussions about a potential resolution prior to trial, and to begin preparing pretrial

motion practice, your Honor.

Ms. Levine.

MS. LEVINE: No objection.

THE COURT: I'll exclude time between now and December

12. I find that the interests of justice outweigh the interests of the public and the defense in a speedy trial.

To begin with, the defense counsel has asked that the trial be put over so that it doesn't begin until late January, early February specifically to accommodate the conflicting commitments of what appear to be both defense counsel. As a result, the defendant's interests are very much in favor of excluding the time to make sure that counsel are ready and prepared. Beyond that, I am mindful, as counsel are, that this is a case with a significant amount of discovery and some complex discovery. Maxing that and thinking about it from a trial usability and trial-use perspective obviously justifies an exclusion of time.

There will also be, I expect, considerable attention to potential motions practice. Once the government submits its expert disclosure or disclosures, the defense will then need to determine whether there's a basis for moving against that. All of these reasons, separately and together, justify the exclusion of time. And finally, both counsel have now indicated to me that at least at some level they expect there will be and already have apparently been some discussions about

the possibility of a pretrial disposition. It goes without saying, but I encourage you to have fulsome discussions along those lines and to start early and often; it's always better to do that. All these reasons justify the exclusion of time.

Thank you. I look forward to seeing you, I guess, in person next in December. Have a good weekend.

MS. LEVINE: Thank you.

MR. TURNER: Thank you, your Honor.

(Adjourned)

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