TRANSCRIPT OF SENTENCING
BEFORE THE HONORABLE BERYL A. HOWELL,
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CHIEF JUDGE

APPEARANCES:

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ALSO PRESENT: ROBERT WALTERS, U.S. Probation Officer

CHRISTINE SCHUCK, Pretrial Agent

Court Reporter: Elizabeth Saint-Loth, RPR, FCRR

Official Court Reporter

Proceedings reported by machine shorthand, transcript produced by computer-aided transcription.

1 PROCEEDINGS 2 THE COURTROOM DEPUTY: Matter before the Court, 3 Criminal Case No. 21-204-02, United States of America versus 4 Eric Chase Torrens. 5 Your Honor, for the record, Probation Officer 6 Robert Walters and Pretrial Agent Christine Schuck are 7 present. 8 Counsel, please come forward and state your names 9 for the record. 10 MS. CARTER: AUSA Jamie Carter on behalf of the United States. We also have Mitra Jafari-Hariri who will be 11 12 back shortly. 13 THE COURT: Okay. Good. Thank you. 14 MR. UNGVARSKY: Good morning, Your Honor. 15 Edward Ungvarsky on behalf of the defendant, Eric Chase 16 Torrens. 17 I just want to advise Your Honor that I was 18 present yesterday; so I heard, and listened, and learned. 19 And Mr. Torrens and I were present for the sentencing 20 earlier this morning to familiarize him with your sentencing 21 hearing process. 22 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. 23 So, Mr. Ungvarsky, are you telling me that because 24 I can just skip telling him how the process is going to go? 25 MR. UNGVARSKY: No. But to -- no, no.

1 advise you that we were here so that you had that 2 information to use --3 THE COURT: Perfect. 4 MR. UNGVARSKY: -- however you wish to use it, in 5 any way, or not at all. 6 THE COURT: All right. I would expect no less, 7 Mr. Ungvarsky. One of the things I try and teach my law clerks, 8 9 if you have a court appearance get there early so you can 10 hear what is coming before; it's usually very instructive. 11 MR. UNGVARSKY: Yes, Your Honor. 12 THE COURT: All right. We're here this morning 13 for the sentencing of the defendant, Eric Chase Torrens. 14 This sentencing hearing is in person, but the 15 public access line is also being made available for persons 16 to listen to these proceedings remotely, rather than being 17 present in the courtroom. 18 Anyone listening to the sentencing hearing over 19 the public teleconference line is reminded that, under my 20 Standing Order 20-20, recording and rebroadcasting of court 21 proceedings, including those held by video conference, is 22 strictly prohibited. Violation of these prohibitions may 23 result in sanctions, including removal of court-issued media 24 credentials, restricted or denial of entry to future 25 hearings, or any other sanctions deemed necessary by the

presiding judge.

All right. So let me just start with a review of all of the materials in -- that have been submitted in connection with this sentencing, starting with the presentence investigation report and the sentencing recommendation from the probation office, docketed at ECFs 107 and 108; and, then, a number of documents submitted by counsel in advance of the hearing: The sentencing memo from the government, docketed at ECF 99, recommending a sentence of two weeks' incarceration and \$500 in restitution; and, then, the government's supplemental memoranda, for both this defendant and codefendant Jack Griffith, on the issue of split sentences for petty offenses, and some other matters, docketed at ECFs 109 and 117; the nine videos detailed in the government's report on video of evidence re Mr. Torrens' plea, docketed at ECF 67.

I have also reviewed the sentencing memoranda submitted on behalf of the defendant, docketed at ECF 97; the supplemental sentencing information regarding the defendant also addressing the issue of split offenses for petty offenses, which are docketed at ECFs 101, 104, 113, 110, 121, and 125; the letter from the defendant, docketed at ECF 97-1; and ten letters or so from his friends, family, and a work supervisor, docketed at ECFs 97-3 through 97-10 and, also, ECF 101-1 and -2; an employment verification

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       letter, docketed at ECF 97-2; photographs of the defendant
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       and his daughter and, also -- perhaps a more recent
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       submission detailing all of his community service hours.
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                 Is that from -- didn't you submit that,
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       Mr. Ungvarsky?
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                 MR. UNGVARSKY: Yes, I did, Judge.
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                 THE COURT: Yes. What is that number?
                 Yes. It's docketed at ECF 121, which I have also
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       reviewed.
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                 Does the government have all of those filings?
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                 MS. CARTER: We do, Your Honor.
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                 THE COURT: And, Mr. Ungvarsky, do you have all of
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       those filings?
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                 MR. UNGVARSKY: I do, Judge.
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                 I also reviewed the Pretrial Services Agency
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       compliance report that issued yesterday; I don't know what
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       the ECF number was.
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                 THE COURT: Yes. And I have seen that.
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                 MR. UNGVARSKY: Very well.
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                 THE COURT: Okay. So, Mr. Torrens, you were here
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       earlier today, so you heard how I do my sentencing hearings
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       in three different steps --
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                 Just stand right where you are.
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                 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am.
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                 THE COURT: -- starting with a review of the
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1 presentence report and finding out whether either side has 2 any objections to anything contained in that report; and, if 3 so, resolving those objections. 4 The second step is when I will hear from the 5 government, first; then your lawyer; and then from you, if 6 you wish to speak directly to me about sentencing in this 7 case; and then the last step requires the Court to explain 8 the reasons for the sentence, and then impose sentence. 9 So do you have any questions about what is going 10 to be happening during the course of this hearing? 11 THE DEFENDANT: No, ma'am. I do not. 12 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. Please be seated. 13 Okay. Step one, presentence investigation report. 14 They were both -- the presentence report and the sentencing 15 recommendation, at 107 and 108 on the docket, were filed on 16 October 21, 2021. And I understand that the government has 17 no objection to any of the factual or other determinations set out in the PSR; is that correct? 18 19 MS. CARTER: Yes, Your Honor. 20 THE COURT: Okay. And, Mr. Ungvarsky, have you 21 and your client read and discussed the PSR? 22 MR. UNGVARSKY: Yes. We have, Your Honor. 23 THE COURT: And do you have any objections to the 24 report? 25 MR. UNGVARSKY: We have no objections, Your Honor.

1 THE COURT: Okay. I saw that there were some 2 detailed in the last page of the report; but, with the 3 probation office's explanations, you are not raising those objections now for a Court resolution? 4 5 MR. UNGVARSKY: That's correct, Your Honor. 6 THE COURT: Thank you. All right. 7 Having -- hearing no objection by either side to the presentence investigation report, the Court will accept 8 9 the factual portions of the PSR as undisputed as my findings 10 of fact at sentencing. 11 Mr. Torrens, stand right where you are, please. 12 Are you fully satisfied with your attorney in this 13 case? 14 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am. 15 THE COURT: And do you feel that you have had 16 enough time to talk to Mr. Ungvarsky about the presentence 17 investigation report in the case, the sentencing 18 recommendation from the probation office, and all of the 19 other papers filed in connection with your sentencing? 20 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am. We have had plenty of 21 time. 22 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. You may be seated. 23 THE DEFENDANT: You're welcome. 24 THE COURT: All right. I will hear from the 25 government first about application of the factors set out in

1 3553(a). 2 MS. CARTER: Thank you, Your Honor. 3 As with yesterday, we have had extensive briefing 4 in the Torrens matter as well as the Griffith matter. 5 I would just highlight something that the Court 6 mentioned during the sentencing prior to this one, which is 7 the challenge in these cases is the sheer volume of defendants and trying to adequately analyze each person and 8 9 where they fall in the bigger picture, as the Court has 10 acknowledged the forest through the trees. 11 THE COURT: Right. And I -- you know, 12 particularly after the press yesterday, which is not always 13 accurately reflecting the tone of interactions between the 14 judge and counsel. 15 I don't underestimate -- you know, given the 16 thousands of people involved in the attack on the Capitol --17 the job that the government has here; but it's also my job 18 to ask questions, and to give the government an opportunity 19 to explain why it's making certain decisions. And I think -- at least in the Court's interactions with 20 21 government counsel, I think you understood that that's what 22 is going on. 23 MS. CARTER: Yes, Your Honor. 24 THE COURT: Okay. So -- and with respect to, as 25 you said, the massive amount of work that this investigation

has taken, I think policies may evolve over time as to how different cases are going to be approached. But I think it's incumbent on the government to articulate what those policies are because it helps judges figure out: Do I agree, or do I not agree? Does that sound right, or does it not sound right? It also helps defense counsel, the defense bar, figure out how are they going to argue this -- either in open court or behind closed doors when you-all are conferring.

So it is also helpful to the Court to hear what factors the government is considering -- as in the last case where the government, you know, expressed its view that somebody with a long military service should be held to a higher standard, in some ways, and may warrant jail time when others without that kind of military service shouldn't; that's an interesting factor for the Court to hear and decide: Do I agree with that or not? And I don't.

But the articulation of the factor is helpful and -- also, if those factors change and policies evolve; and I think that that's something that the government, you know, can own up to. And that kind of transparency is both helpful to the Court, in making an evaluation of the 3553(a)(6) factor of avoiding unwarranted sentencing disparities, and generally helpful to the defense bar and how they're going to focus their conversations as well.

1 So, with that, I will let you say your peace. 2 MS. CARTER: Yes, Your Honor. 3 I agree with the Court's statement. And I actually came prepared this morning just to 4 5 highlight those factors specific to Mr. Torrens so that the 6 Court and everyone else will understand why we came to the 7 conclusion that we came to with regards to our recommendation of two weeks. 8 9 THE COURT: Which stands in such contrast to the 10 three months for his codefendant in the same case. It's 11 like I don't even have to look through my list of, like, 12 what are people getting and what did they do to get that. 13 So, I mean, it's -- that's helpful because that's 14 the most obvious question to ask. Why Mr. Torrens, two 15 weeks? Mr. Griffith was standing right next to him doing 16 the same thing, and also in the Capitol Building, you know, 17 for such a short period of time; why does he get two weeks? 18 So proceed. Why the difference? 19 MS. CARTER: Yes, Your Honor. 20 So there are five factors that I would highlight 21 for the Court. The first factor is the presence of -- in 22 this case, of taking photos and video outside of the 23 Capitol; and I am specifically referencing the photo that 24 was taken of Mr. Torrens and Mr. Griffith as the Capitol is 25 behind them. It would be the lower Senate doors behind them

in the background; that would be the photo or video that I'm specifically referencing.

The presence of witnessing threats against law enforcement in this case, which is documented in the statement that Mr. Torrens made, as well as in the video which we have presented to the Court of them underneath the scaffolding on the northwest stairs.

I would also point to -- the Court to the presence of photo and video inside the Capitol. There are two things I would specifically reference; the first is as they are -- the video of them as they're outside and coming in through that door, which was filmed by the codefendant; the second which would be the photo that Torrens took of Griffith. So he is not in the photo, but he admits to taking the photo inside the crypt. The other --

THE COURT: Is there something in particular about those photos that should warrant jail time?

MS. CARTER: So the photo taken in and of itself in the midst of things is a factor for the Court to consider. But these photos in particular show that they are gleeful in the face of what is going on around them; I think that is a fair assessment from the extremely cheerful looks on their faces that, as this riot is happening, as the Capitol is being attacked, as they have seen law enforcement being attacked -- not by them, but others attacking law

enforcement -- they have seen the tear gas, and yet they are gleeful in their presence both outside and then, again, inside the Capitol Building.

So the taking of photos and video in and of itself

is one part of that, but then the actual content is also something I would ask the Court to consider.

There are two things that account for the difference between Griffith and Torrens' recommendations in our sentencing memorandums; those are really the cooperate -- the choice to cooperate with law enforcement post arrest. In this instance, Torrens chose to give a statement. He waived his right, and chose to fully tell law enforcement what he had done that day. We give him credit for that cooperative choice.

The second difference that I would highlight for the Court is in his post-arrest behavior. So as we highlighted extensively in the Griffith memo, he continued to give interviews and post, and tried to profit off of his crime, which was one of the major considerations that we gave when we were looking at that three-month recommendation.

THE COURT: Can we just talk about that for a second?

MS. CARTER: Yes.

THE COURT: As your evolving factors are coming

along, I thought I would just share my perspective on some of that. I mean, I think I made it pretty clear yesterday, part of it; but let's just have a bit of a conversation about that.

I think there is a difference between people, certainly post-arrest post-January 6th, continuing to incite political violence and divisiveness in our country by continuing to promote not only that the 2020 presidential election was stolen, but combining that with inciteful language, trying to incite other people to engage in some kind of activity that could amount to more political violence. People who have the view that the 2020 presidential election was stolen, persist in that view, even express that view, is that really sufficiently dangerous on its own to warrant jail time for conduct on January 6th?

Not that this defendant did any of that.

MS. CARTER: Yes, Your Honor.

on Mr. Griffith, that he had post-arrest behavior that was unseemingly immature and was exploitive of his status as a defendant charged in connection with January 6th in order to promote and sell something isn't quite the same as trying to incite political violence. And so I think there is some post-arrest post-January 6th statements, speech, that would be probative of the need for specific deterrence, to put it

1 in legal terms; and I will just leave it at that. 2 I didn't find Mr. Griffith's statements qualifying 3 for that, particularly given his remorse and contrition, 4 which one hopes is real at the time of sentencing. 5 But in terms of this defendant's post-arrest 6 behavior, you didn't see anything that was exhorting people 7 to continue to engage in political violence of any kind; is that correct? 8 9 MS. CARTER: Mr. Torrens? 10 THE COURT: Mr. Torrens. 11 MS. CARTER: No. 12 Mr. Griffith, I would argue the "1776" comment 13 does have that exhortation quality that judges -- that Your 14 Honor is describing, but not Mr. Torrens. 15 THE COURT: Okay. All right. But because -- so 16 that's why -- so these are the two differences to explain; 17 the difference for why one recommendation was for a lot more 18 jail time than for Mr. Torrens, and the reason that Mr. --19 the recommendation for jail time for Mr. Torrens is because 20 of the first three factors you listed; is that right? 21 MS. CARTER: Correct. The first three factors 22 would be applicable in both cases. As far as the 23 cooperative post-arrest conduct and the choice to give a 24 statement, and the lack of attempts to exhort further 25 violence, then yes.

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I would say for both of them another consideration that we had was the short time inside the Capitol relative to others; that applies in both cases, but the difference was what the Court had focused on those. So those would be the things that I would say are different between the two; the last, and the first two things that I described. THE COURT: Well, I am just going to review some of the factors that I found important, just to make sure that the government doesn't have anything to flesh out about any of the factors that I am looking at. The government agrees that this defendant -- the government has no evidence that -- this defendant did not engage in preplanning for an attack on the Capitol Building; he brought no dangerous weapons or any defensive gear for that purpose with them to the Capitol. Is that right? MS. CARTER: Correct. THE COURT: And he was in the Capitol Building for about ten minutes or less? MS. CARTER: It was around ten minutes. I don't know the exact numbers. I don't want to tell the Court -but it was around ten minutes. THE COURT: Correct, around ten minutes. MS. CARTER: Yeah. THE COURT: He did not enter any private offices or rooms in the Capitol Building, and he didn't enter the

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       House or Senate chamber where members of Congress meet?
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                 MS. CARTER: Correct.
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                 THE COURT: And he did not physically attack any
      police officer or any other person?
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                 MS. CARTER: Correct.
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                 THE COURT: And he didn't personally damage any
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      property inside the Capitol?
                 MS. CARTER: Correct. All of those would have
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       come with a different set of charges, correct?
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                 THE COURT: Right. And he fully cooperated with
       law enforcement, voluntarily gave them all asked-for details
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      concerning his conduct and who he traveled with?
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                 MS. CARTER: Correct.
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                 THE COURT: And he had no inflammatory language on
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       social media before, during, or after January 6th, let alone
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      calls for political violence?
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                 MS. CARTER: We don't have access to his social
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      media, so I have no basis in fact to offer the Court any
       information about that.
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                 THE COURT: Okay. But you don't have any evidence
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       as to that?
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                 MS. CARTER: No. We have no evidence of that.
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                 THE COURT: And he promptly agreed to enter a plea
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       agreement after an offer was extended by the government?
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                 MS. CARTER: Yes.
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1 THE COURT: And would you agree that he has shown remorse, embarrassment, and contrition for his criminal 2 3 conduct on January 6th? 4 MS. CARTER: Yes. 5 THE COURT: Okay. All right. 6 And there are other people for whom the government 7 recommended either straight probation or probation with home 8 detention or people who, like this defendant, took photos 9 and videos, both outside and inside the Capitol, showing 10 that they are pretty happy to be there, right? 11 MS. CARTER: I have numbers if the Court wants 12 them. 13 THE COURT: Sure. 14 MS. CARTER: So with regards to photos or videos 15 outside the Capitol, and with regards to recommendations 16 that we have made thus far -- obviously, they're still 17 ongoing -- two were probation recommendations; eight 18 received home -- I'm sorry -- four received home detention 19 recommendations; eight received jail time recommendations --20 acknowledging that each of these factors are one factor in a 21 plethora of factors for each individual defendant --22 THE COURT: And what is --23 MS. CARTER: -- and with regards --24 THE COURT: Could you just explain -- I'm sorry. 25 You finish that, and I will go on to my next question.

Sorry.

MS. CARTER: That's okay.

With regards to witnessing, knowing of violence or threats against law enforcement, no probation recommendations have been made in those cases; five home detention recommendations have been made; and ten jail time recommendations have been made.

With regards to photos or videos inside of the Capitol, three probation recommendations were made; six home detention recommendations were made; and ten jail time recommendations were made.

And with regards to the short time in the Capitol, which is one of the factors that weighs on the opposite end, three probation, three home detention, and three jail time.

THE COURT: And the factor that the government is using of video or photos, either inside or outside the Capitol, what is it precisely about that conduct of taking a photograph that aggravates having breached the Capitol?

MS. CARTER: Yes, Your Honor.

So I think it's twofold in my understanding.

The first thing that I would point out is that the area that they are in when they're out there on the west front, specifically in this case, that's a restricted area; that's not an area where people normally are allowed to take photographs.

I can represent to the Court, having been on tours -- like, as a part of these investigations -- they don't let us take photographs there without specific permission for a particular case. I know that -- my understanding is that defense counsel tours have been told exactly the same thing; so I think that that's relevant, one point.

The other would be --

THE COURT: And that's a security precaution?

MS. CARTER: I believe so, Your Honor. I am not,
obviously -- I don't work directly with the Capitol Police;
but I just followed what I was told. I assume it has a
security reason behind it; I did not question them.

The other part of the larger issue I would argue is, why else would you take a photograph unless you are going to, like, use it in some way to either remember, or to show people, to advocate for whatever you have done. People take photographs to show other people; they don't usually take them and just go home.

It is possible that you could go home and just, like, look at them in your house; but, usually, that's not why in this age. Usually people are using them to post onto various social media to show their family and friends to broadcast what they have done.

In the context of committing a crime, I do think

that that is significant. Choosing to take those photographs to document what you are doing shows a pride in your action. And I would argue there is an inference that you are going to use that to, kind of, show everyone what you have done.

THE COURT: Okay. And the witnessing of the threats against law enforcement officers, so that is just another -- I view that -- the fact that people saw law enforcement officers being overrun, threatened, hit, attacked, you know, is just another big red flag to them: You shouldn't be here; but they already knew they shouldn't be there.

MS. CARTER: Yes.

THE COURT: So how does that, as a witness to it, make them an aggravator that should warrant jail time?

MS. CARTER: At that point they were on notice of what they were participating in; that it was no longer just: We breached a barrier; which is one thing -- which is definitely a crime in and of itself, to breach a barrier. But we breached a barrier, and now the group that I am with is attacking law enforcement physically; and I am continuing to choose to remain in that group, to act as a part of it -- that's significant.

THE COURT: Okay. So -- all right.

And then your third thing was taking photos or

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       videos inside the Capitol; but that's just part of your
       first factor, isn't it, just taking videos -- videos and
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       photos?
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                 MS. CARTER: Yes, Your Honor.
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                 I would note -- in all fairness to the defense,
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       the crypt is an area that you would go on -- publicly on a
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       tour, so that would be -- the part that I was talking about
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       with the security concerns would not apply to the crypt
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       specifically.
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                 THE COURT: And people are allowed to take
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       pictures in the crypt?
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                 MS. CARTER: Correct. Yes.
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                 THE COURT: All right. Let me just look and see.
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                 All right. Is there anything further, Ms. Carter?
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                 MS. CARTER: No. Thank you, Your Honor.
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                 THE COURT: All right. Mr. Ungvarsky.
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                 MR. UNGVARSKY: Thank you, Your Honor.
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                 Mr. Torrens is here before the Court on his
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       conviction of a Class B petty misdemeanor for his actions on
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       January 6th, 2021.
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                 Mr. Torrens was not just a trespasser that day;
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       but he entered the Capitol as a member of an out-of-control
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       mob in which others around him engaged in violence and which
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       his presence, by being present, helped enable and contribute
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       to that.
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I ask the Court to impose a sentence of probation with general and specific conditions in light of the sentencing factors of 3553(a), and the rest of 3553.

I first want to address nature and seriousness of the offense, and that the sentence should reflect the seriousness of the offense and promote respect for the law.

I appreciate the Court's comment from yesterday; and I respect the government's position that the application of this factor -- or these two factors supports incarceration and that their position, from their perspective, is a reasonable one.

And I appreciate the Court's -- I don't know if you made a finding, but what I understood to be the Court's finding or understanding or position that it's reasonable that that -- that those factors support incarceration.

I also take the position that the application of those factors supports probation with specific conditions as I laid out in my memo. In the memo I addressed those two factors in one paragraph; and I explained how I thought — and I believe this still today — that a probationary sentence with conditions which could include home confinement reflects the nature and seriousness of the offense and promotes respect for the law given the specific conduct of Mr. Torrens within the larger conduct.

THE COURT: I mean, I think -- I think the

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clear --

government's perspective, and mine as well, is that: Oh, my goodness, you participated in a mob that's overrunning police officers requiring, like, an entire branch -- an entire branch of a federal government to flee. Oh, my goodness, the default should not be probation; that should warrant at the outset, given the seriousness of that conduct, jail time; and then you have to look at the specific role of the defendants to say: Is that necessary? I think that was my point yesterday. I think it's the point that the government's been making, and that I actually agree with. So I am not sure we disagree, Mr. Ungvarsky; but just so that you understand my position. MR. UNGVARSKY: I totally understand the Court's position. And whether I disagree or not is irrelevant because you are the sentencing judge, so I just wanted to --I understand it. I do think that we then look at the specific -the application of the other factors as well as the specific application of that factor to the defendant who appears before you. I am not going to go at length here today orally because you have gotten so much paper from us, and it's so

THE COURT: I will say.

1 MS. CARTER: -- and it's so clear that you have --2 I mean, you have gone down to the footnotes. 3 THE COURT: And let me ask you, I know that in one of -- you said you have terrible back problems. Are you 4 5 comfortable? 6 You look like you are leaning very heavily on that 7 podium. If you prefer to sit down and use the microphone at the table to be more comfortable, that would be fine. 8 9 MR. UNGVARSKY: This is better actually, if I may, 10 Judge. 11 THE COURT: Okay. Fine. 12 MR. UNGVARSKY: Thank you, Judge. 13 So I don't want to go in -- you have clearly -- I 14 have now watched -- this is my third sentencing hearing on 15 the January 6th matter that I have watched -- one of yours. 16 And you are down in the weeds of the videos, the paperwork, 17 and the footnotes; so I am not going to go at length into 18 Mr. Torrens' background --19 THE COURT: Well, let me tell you, Mr. Ungvarsky, 20 I sort of -- I don't -- it was a surprise to me when I heard 21 yesterday that the government had just supplied this Court 22 with its position on the split sentence issue, which was a 23 puzzle to me; and it's a puzzle that there is not more case 24 law on it. And your briefing, by the way, has been 25 enormously helpful as I have been trying to think through

the split sentence issue; and there may come a case where that issue will have to be resolved by the judge. And it may resolved by me -- not in this case, and not in the case yesterday -- but let me -- I did want to compliment you on your briefing on that issue.

MR. UNGVARSKY: Thank you.

THE COURT: And it gave me a lot to think about, as did the government's briefing on the issue. And, ultimately, I did not have to resolve the issue of whether a split prison probation term is allowed under Section 3561(a)(3); but at least I now know that's a big issue.

My colleagues -- who also have been given a split sentence in one of these January 6 cases, resolved by the government with a plea to a petty offense misdemeanor -- have avoided giving a split sentence because they probably hesitate -- given the lack of clarity in the law about whether it's allowable, thereby putting the judges in the position that the probation office usually serves in ensuring compliance with restitution payment obligations and community service obligations.

I don't know how my colleagues are doing that because that is not their normal function; perhaps probation is helping them, I am not sure. But usually you have to impose a probationary sentence or a supervision requirement of some kind before the probation office is authorized to

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       provide supervision over full compliance with restitution
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       payments and community service obligations; but your
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       briefing has been helpful.
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                 It's a long-winded way to say the briefing has
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       been helpful. And it may be -- you may have another
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       opportunity to use that briefing either before another judge
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       or in front of me in the appropriate case.
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                 MR. UNGVARSKY: Thank you for that, Your Honor.
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                 Frankly, it's exciting as a lawyer and, sort of,
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       surprising to come across an open issue like that, and then
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       to be able to dig into it.
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                 THE COURT: In 2021, right?
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                 MR. UNGVARSKY: Right. I know.
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                 THE COURT: I know.
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                 MR. UNGVARSKY: I bought Scalia and Garner -- I
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       had to buy it by Amazon because they could ship it and get
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       it to me within 24 hours this week --
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                 THE COURT: Right.
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                 MR. UNGVARSKY: -- so I also have the benefit of
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       having that in the future; it turned out it's useful.
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                 So Mr. Torrens' background and character -- as the
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       Court knows, he has no prior arrests. He graduated from
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       high school; he attended some college, that didn't work.
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       left his home state of Florida to move to Tennessee to work.
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       And he has been working steadily and consistently there.
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He is the father of a daughter whose name I am not going to say on the public record. And he has worked hard to maintain 50/50 -- or have 50/50 custody of his daughter; and he is a very good and active father.

He has family support, and he has community support. And what I was really struck by in the letters that were provided to me through him -- I was struck mostly by two letters; one was the neighbor that he lives with who -- he helps her -- drives her places; and the second -- and her daughter plays with his daughter. And the second I was struck by was by his boss at his current job who talks about how he performs his job and how he's responded to his arrest in this matter to that boss.

I was struck by those two letters most of all because they're not family; they don't have the inherent bias of family. And I think they really speak well of him.

I was also, of course, struck by -- I have talked to

Mr. Torrens many, many, many times since the court appointed me to this case. And I have benefitted from those conversations in talking with someone who comes from a different background than I do and who lives in a different part of the country than I do; and he may have benefited from those conversations as well. I don't know because -- what I do know is I was struck by not just his regret, but his remorse; they are different.

Regret is often -- well, my daughter might not regret when I catch her doing something wrong; but I surely see no remorse when I see it.

But Mr. Torrens, it's clear that he feels remorse and shame; I think shame is a really powerful sentencing effect on people.

Judge Bibas, now in the Third Circuit -- when he was a law professor at the University of Pennsylvania, most of his writings are about the value of shame in terms of criminal sentencing. And I think Mr. Torrens really feels that; he feels it personally. He feels it because his family tells him that he has shamed them. And he feels it because he knows that he has shamed them; and he is going to have to live with it and, at some point, explain it to his daughter.

I don't think that specific deterrence requires an incarcerative sentence for Mr. Torrens; I think that's clear from his actions afterwards, and from all of the other materials.

General deterrence -- I put in my papers my position as to why I believe that one should be cautious in these cases about imposing jail time for general deterrence reasons because my life experience and viewpoint is that sometimes it's better to spare the rod and express compassion from position of authority to those -- and I am

not -- this isn't about -- this is general deterrence -- I am not talking about Mr. Torrens -- to spare the rod and to demonstrate compassion and patience to those who, for some reason, start off so distrustful of motives and actions.

That said, I recognize that my personal view is a personal view that comes from my experiences; it is not the traditional viewpoint of a sentencing judge. And I respect that general deterrence is a very significant sentencing factor for the Court.

And, of course, I am mindful of the Court's obligation to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities with other defendants convicted of the same offense who are not part of the same indictment number, and with Mr. Griffith who was sentenced yesterday who certainly is not -- does not have a more mitigating presentation to the Court than Mr. Torrens, even if not more aggravating as the government has suggested.

I ask the Court to sentence Mr. Torrens to probation. Now, he has been on pretrial -- I am going to ask the Court to sentence him to a period of probation from 12 to 24 months. Now, I have looked at the sentences -- probationary sentences that judges have given. Some defendants have gotten 36 months; some defendants have gotten 24 months. A defendant earlier this morning, in this courtroom, got 24 months. One defendant got two months;

that seems like a real outlier, though. A couple of defendants got sentences of 60 months; but Judge Walton told them that they could always move to ask to have that shortened.

It does appear that that's, sort of -- and I think
I saw -- it's in the memo I gave you; I think maybe one or
two defendants got 12 months. I think that 12 months --

THE COURT: Don't you think it's somewhat

tempting -- given what happened on January 6th, and it's

something that I have considered -- to have anybody who

participated in the riot, in the Capitol attack on

January 6th, who went all the way inside the Capitol

Building -- not just breached the grounds' perimeter, but

went all the way into the building -- that they be put on

the probation for the full five years to make sure that

there is no repeat performance the next time we have an

electoral vote count?

I think 36 months is what I have seen as a fairly standard period of time, although five -- the full five years is also a temptation. So you can make your argument about why it should be less than 36 months, but we never want to see a repeat of what happened on January 6th, 2021.

MR. UNGVARSKY: I understand, Your Honor.

I am going to start with my argument as to why it should be 12 months, or in the range of 12 to 24.

I think that what we see, as those of us who work in the criminal legal system -- we see first that when problems arise on probation, they tend to occur within the first year; that, after that, it tapers; we have much less problems. It's that first year of probation which is the most important and valuable year.

Second, if someone is not doing well on probation, then what ends up happening is the probation officer sends in some report, and that probation either gets extended or a revocation hearing starts. So if someone is not doing well on probation, they're not only going to have probation for whether it's 12 months or 24 months, it's either going to get extended, or the Court is going to end up having a hearing potentially revoking and imposing some response.

So I think that when we set out these probationary sentences that exceed 24 months, that it becomes excessive. It becomes excessive as to time and costs for the probation department to monitor the person and --

THE COURT: If somebody is doing well on probation after the first year and the second year, I think the monitoring becomes much lighter on the probation office, and it also helps ensure compliance.

MR. UNGVARSKY: I concur with that, Your Honor.

I also am aware that people can move to make a motion to request a termination of -- probation be

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       terminated early.
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                 THE COURT: That happens regularly.
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                 MR. UNGVARSKY: I think, for someone like
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       Mr. Torrens, that would be extraordinarily difficult because
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       he is indigent. He is not going to have the means to have
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       counsel. His court-appointed counsel will have concluded
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       representation long before then, unlike the persons who were
       before Judge Walton last Friday who are people with means.
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 9
                 In any event, I am requesting a 12- to 24-month
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       period of probation.
                 THE COURT: Why is it that you can't continue to
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       represent him and just file a pro hac vice motion if I
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       transfer jurisdiction to where he is living now?
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                 You can file a pro hac vice motion; you can make
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       any motion that's appropriate, and you can get paid for your
16
       services. You can just put in a CJA voucher for it in two
17
       and a half years, if that's appropriate.
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                 MR. UNGVARSKY: I will say, I am happy to
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       represent Mr. Torrens in the future either by requesting a
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       Court appoint me --
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                 THE COURT: But we're getting way ahead of
22
       ourselves.
23
                 MR. UNGVARSKY: We're way ahead. We're way ahead.
24
       Or I would do it pro bono, I mean.
25
                 But I just -- I don't think that he is differently
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situated, in terms of the record he presents before you, that he will comply with probation than, for example, Mr. Gruppo, from this morning, who got 24 months. So I ask for 24 months for Mr. Torrens, not 36 months.

In terms of home confinement, I anticipate the Court will want and will impose a special condition of home confinement. I am going to ask that you -- the probation department -- in its recommendation, they listed a lot of exceptions, exclusions. I am going to ask you to make sure that those are clear in a couple of ways.

I agree with all of those exceptions, exclusions.

I ask the Court to make it clear that when it comes to attorney visits, court appearances -- and court and other obligations, that that includes not just for this court but, also, for Mr. Torrens' family court matter, custody matter, in Tennessee; and I can give you the name of the court if you'd like.

THE COURT: That's not necessary.

MR. UNGVARSKY: Okay. Because he does have ongoing, and he will continue to have ongoing court and legal obligations in Tennessee on a state court family matter, custody matter.

THE COURT: All right. I am going to add appropriate language.

MR. UNGVARSKY: Thank you, Your Honor.

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And next I would ask the Court to outline -- just to make it clear that, when the exceptions include things like education, medical -- that it's not just for Mr. Torrens himself, but when he is the custodial parent of his daughter, whose initials are V.T. -- and the Court has her full name, which I can say it if the Court wants me to -- so that he can take her to school, doctor's appointments, and the like. THE COURT: I am just going to add appropriate language. MR. UNGVARSKY: And finally, Your Honor, I ask that the Court add language that permits an exception for him to engage in the transfer of the custody of his daughter with her mother. You will recall from the paperwork that they alternate on Sundays; it's one week on, one week off. I think it's 6 p.m. on Sundays that they do a transfer and, also, that they do transfers on --THE DEFENDANT: Wednesday. MR. UNGVARSKY: -- Wednesdays -- Wednesdays, like, for the night. I'd just ask the Court to allow that he be able to do those transfers as part of --THE COURT: Right. Actually, every probation officer will approve that. So the language for "other activities" is preapproved by the officer. I am confident that will be approved without any necessity for me putting

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       that into the order.
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                 MR. UNGVARSKY: Understood, Your Honor.
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                 So I don't -- I think that concludes my requests,
       Your Honor.
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                 THE COURT: All right. Thank you.
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                 MR. UNGVARSKY: Thank you.
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                 THE COURT: Mr. Torrens, this is now your
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       opportunity to speak directly to me.
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                 THE DEFENDANT: All right. Thank you.
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                 I don't really do well with crowds, and stuff like
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       that, so I am just going to keep it really short. Thanks.
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                 Good morning.
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                 I just want to say how sorry I am. I had made a
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       bunch of mistakes that day. I shouldn't have gone to
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       Washington for a "stop the steal" rally just to support
16
       President Trump, and that was it.
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                 I shouldn't have gone to the Capitol; and, when I
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       got there, I should have left. People were throwing things
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       at the police; it was violent, and it was chaos. But I
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       didn't leave; and I went inside through a broken door. I
21
       shouldn't have done that; all of that was criminal.
22
                 I take responsibility for my presence that day and
23
       my actions that day. I apologize for what I did. I know
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       that I will pay for it today. I promise myself and you that
25
       you won't hear of me doing anything like that again.
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1 Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Torrens.

All right. You can just stay right where you are.

Mr. Ungvarsky, you can stand with your client.

I am going to explain the sentence I am going to impose, and then I am going to impose sentence, Mr. Torrens.

So after considering the sentencing memoranda -it's very extensive in this case -- the presentence
investigation report, the probation department's sentencing
recommendations, and hearing argument, I must now consider
the relevant factors set out by Congress in 18 U.S.C.
Section 3553(a) to ensure I impose a sentence that is -- and
I quote from that statute -- sufficient but not greater than
necessary to comply with the purposes of sentencing. And
those purposes include: The need for the sentence imposed
to reflect the seriousness of the offense; promote respect
for the law; provide just punishment for the offense; deter
criminal conduct; protect the public from future crimes by
you, Mr. Torrens; and promote rehabilitation.

So, in connection with assessing those factors and what the appropriate sentence should be, I am required to consider the nature and circumstance of the offense; the history and characteristics of you, Mr. Torrens; the types of sentences available; the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records

found guilty of similar conduct; and the need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense.

And I am going to begin with the restitution amount owed by this defendant. Given that the statute of conviction is not covered by the two general restitution statutes codified at 18 U.S.C. Section 3663 and 3663(a), the Court has no authority to determine any restitution amount, and is limited by what the government agrees to in the plea agreement.

The plea agreement provides for a restitution judgment of \$500, which this Court will order pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 3663(a)(3).

Regarding the nature and circumstances of the offense, as I mentioned yesterday, in your sentencing memo where you said that courts sentence the offender, not the offense; that's not precisely correct.

Sentencing must be particularized to each defendant, but Congress has mandated that the Court must consider the nature and circumstances of the offense, as well as ensure that the sentence imposed sufficiently reflects the seriousness of the offense; promotes respect for the law; and provides just punishment for the offense, among other relevant factors. So these statutory factors do make it a must that the sentencing court consider far more than just the history and certain characteristics of the

individual defendant offender. The seriousness of the offense conduct, the harm that it caused, must be considered.

I am not going to go into detail describing the nature and circumstances of the offense conduct on January 6th, other than to say what I have said before; that the rioters attacking the U.S. Capitol on January 6th, as part of a large mob, were not mere trespassers engaged in protected First Amendment protest, and they certainly were not tourists.

As countless videos make clear, the mob attacking the Capitol on January 6th, as Mr. Torrens has himself pointed out -- it was violent; they were attacking police officers trying to protect the building from being breached and protecting the people inside of it from being harmed; that includes the entire legislative branch of the federal government, and two Vice Presidents -- Vice President Harris who was there, and Vice President Pence.

As the government points out, the defendant himself recognized it seemed like people in the crowd were antagonizing or trying to, like, get a riot going, which they did. But even seeing that, Mr. Torrens didn't stop. He didn't turn around; he didn't leave. He didn't try to stop others from attacking the police and breaking into the Capitol. As he says, he made all those mistakes himself.

He kept going. He entered the Capitol through a door that had been broken in, with an alarm blaring; and he spent about ten minutes in the Capitol Building before exiting; taking the time to take at least one photo with his codefendant and friend to commemorate the experience.

Mr. Torrens did celebrate his actions. He was smiling; he was taking videos. He was screaming: We're going in, as he and his codefendants entered the Capitol. He certainly took advantage of the opportunity presented by this mob to overwhelm the police lines and enter the Capitol.

And I have already detailed what the harm was, both to the members of Congress, Vice Presidents who were inside, and also, basically, to the shocked nation and the world watching these events unfold.

There are many people who believe that any person who participated in that mob, who set foot inside the Capitol Building, should simply go to jail. And Congress could pass a law requiring a mandatory jail term of a minimum amount for offense conduct like that which occurred on January 6th, and then federal judges like me would do their best to apply that law fairly; but that is not the law I must apply here.

I am required by the law, in 18 U.S.C. Section 3553(a), to, quote: Impose a sentence sufficient but not

greater than necessary to comply with the purposes of sentencing.

And among the factors that I look at, in assessing the defendant's role in this overall mob action, and whether -- the government's recommendation of two weeks' incarceration, are the following factors and considerations:

This defendant was in the Capitol Building for about ten minutes. He didn't physically attack any police officer or other person; he didn't personally damage any property inside the Capitol. He didn't engage in chants or slogans or carry posters or signs or brandish a weapon of any kind to incite others to follow him into the Capitol.

He posted no inflammatory language on social media before -- or that there is evidence of -- before, during, or after January 6th calling on people to join the mob on January 6th, let alone any calls for political violence. He doesn't appear to have engaged in any preplanning or preparations for participating in violent confrontations on January 6th. He brought with him no dangerous weapons, or even defensive gear for participating in any kind of confrontation.

He fully cooperated with law enforcement after his arrest. He promptly agreed to enter a plea agreement and accept responsibility for his criminal conduct after an offer was extended by the government. He has expressed his

shame and his remorse, and accepted responsibility for his criminal conduct that day. He acknowledged he knows he shouldn't have entered the Capitol.

So, in sum, although the nature and circumstances of the overall offense, and the need for the sentence to reflect the seriousness of the offense and promote respect for the law would generally favor a custodial sentence, the particular circumstances of this defendant's conduct put him in a less troublesome category than other more aggressive rioters that day, and particularly given his lack of criminal history -- which I am going to go into next -- the need for specific deterrence is lessened -- less of a concern for this Court.

Regarding the defendant's history and characteristics -- as I said, he has no criminal history.

He has earned his high school diploma; he's taken several college courses. He has a steady history of employment, and he is fully employed; and he has partial custody of his daughter. He does have a history of substance abuse, but has sought, even recently, counseling and medical assistance to combat his addictions.

His conduct after the Capitol attack appears to show a sincere acceptance of responsibility and remorse for his actions, as I have said. He spoke voluntarily with the FBI. At the time of his arrest, he admitted his conduct;

freely disclosed all of the relevant details concerning how he got to D.C., who he traveled with, what he saw, and what he did. He has been compliant with his release conditions.

He is -- in addition to taking responsibility for his conduct through a guilty plea, he also included a personal statement describing his conduct and his remorse in the presentence investigation report and in a subsequent letter to the Court.

Unlike other January 6th defendants, including those for whom the government has recommended probation or a probationary period with some home detention, he didn't post any pictures of his time in the Capitol Building on social media and didn't boast about his criminal conduct to try and incite people to continue some form of political violence or advocate -- didn't appear to advocate for overturning a legitimate electoral process; and he didn't even appear to downplay the seriousness of his actions on January 6th.

Instead, he's expressed his apology -- and I quote: To the Congress members and the people inside the Capitol Building, stating: They must have felt threatened and been afraid of what was happening, and all of the people in the mob. He even apologized to the prosecutor s who have had to deal with these crimes that we made on January 6th -- that's a quote. And he's begun volunteering on the weekends to help contribute to his community and country in the wake

of the damage his actions caused.

Every single letter submitted on defendant's behalf demonstrates that he hasn't attempted to retract his remorse or downplay the seriousness of his criminal conduct on January 6th, and that he has the support of his family and his community, not just for something that he needs — not just for himself, but for the sake of his daughter.

The need for the sentence imposed to deter criminal behavior and protect the public from further crimes of the defendant are critical considerations for every sentencing judge; and the seriousness of the criminal conduct witnessed on January 6th only highlights the need for deterrence in the form of a sufficient sentence to deter the defendant and others from engaging in this kind of conduct in the future.

For numerous individuals like the defendant, who got caught up in the fervor of the crowd, it's also necessary for this Court to make clear that a lack of forethought and planning does not absolve people of criminal activity on January 6th, especially when their participation facilitates and amplifies the blatant and egregious criminal conduct of many others who did turn violent. There are consequences to going along with the crowd, a mob, when that mob is engaging in clear and obvious criminal conduct.

As I said, the Court does not find the need for

specific deterrence for this defendant that would favor a custodial sentence in light of his lack of criminal history; his lack of violent conduct during the offense; his lack of any promotion of his criminal activity to promote any kind of political violence; his cooperation; early acceptance of responsibility; and the fact that a disruption of his job when he doesn't make that much money to begin with, would not be helpful to him in maintaining his family.

Regarding the types of sentences available: The defendant was convicted of a petty Class B misdemeanor, so he's subject to a maximum term of imprisonment of six months and, also, up to five years' probation.

I am not going to get into the debate about whether he may also be subject to a split sentence, which is a matter that has taken up a lot of briefing in this case. And it is, sort of, this unusual situation, as was made clear in the sentencing of this defendant's codefendant yesterday, that even though the government takes the position that a split sentence is allowable for a petty offense, under 18 U.S.C. Section 3561(a)(3), the government hasn't recommended a split sentence for any petty offense conviction in this case, with this defendant or his codefendant, or in any other January 6th-related case.

So this is a very highly unusual position for the government in a case where the government is requesting

restitution payments, since a probation period provides supervision to ensure a defendant pays up in full; and, thus, whenever there is a restitution requirement as part of sentencing, the government normally demands a period of supervision to ensure full compliance. So this is a very unusual situation. But I am not going to resolve that debate, that legal issue here, as tempting as it might be — and as good as the briefing is from both sides on the issue because there is no necessity to given the planned sentence that I think is warranted in this case.

Regarding the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparity, the defendant raises the fact that other January 6th defendants charged with petty offense misdemeanors have received probationary sentences, and suggests that a custodial sentence here would be an unwarranted sentencing disparity; and given the specific facts related to this defendant's offense conduct on January 6th, I do agree and believe that a sentence of probation with a period of home detention would be appropriate, specifically because of the absence of any preplanning or coordination by the defendant prior to coming to Washington, D.C. from Tennessee, prior to entering the Capitol Building; the absence of any violent conduct during the offense by the defendant; the absence of any damage, theft, or incitement of damage by the defendant; his brief

time of only approximately ten minutes inside the Capitol Building; his decision not to enter any private offices or spaces in the building; his lack of promotion or incitement on social media or any statements before, during, or after of trying to encourage others to engage in similar mob activity that would provoke political violence; his lack of criminal history; his early acceptance of responsibility; his cooperation; his expression of contrition and remorse all weigh in favor of a sentence of probation here.

So based on my consideration of these and other factors, I will now state the sentence to be imposed.

Pursuant to the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, and in consideration of the provisions of 18 U.S.C.

Section 3553, it is the judgment of the Court that you,

Eric Chase Torrens, are hereby sentenced to a term of 36 months, or three years, of probation as to Count 5 of the information filed against you -- no -- it is an indictment in this case.

In addition, you are ordered to pay a special assessment of \$10, in accordance with 18 U.S.C. Section 3013.

While on supervision, you shall abide by the following mandatory conditions, as well as the standard conditions of supervision, which are imposed to establish the basic expectations for your conduct while on

supervision.

The mandatory conditions include: One, you must not commit another federal, state, or local crime; two, you must not unlawfully possess a controlled substance; three, you must refrain from any unlawful use of a controlled substance; you must submit to one drug test within 15 days of placement on supervision, and at least two periodic drug tests thereafter, as determined by the Court; and, four, you must make restitution in accordance with your plea agreement under 18 U.S.C. Section 3663.

I just want to remind you, Mr. Torrens, I don't know what the law is regarding marijuana in the state where you reside, but marijuana is still a controlled substance under federal law. So even if your friends are using marijuana because it may be legal where you live, it is illegal; it is a controlled substance under federal law. And while you are on your probationary period, do not use marijuana.

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am.

THE COURT: The Court authorizes supervision and jurisdiction in this case to be transferred to the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee.

You shall comply with the following special conditions:

You are ordered to make restitution to the

Architect of the Capitol in the amount of \$500.

The Court determined you do not have the ability to pay interest and, therefore, waives any interest or penalties that may accrue on the balance.

You must pay the balance of any restitution owed at the rate of no less than \$25 each month. You must pay the financial penalty in accordance with the schedule of payments sheet of the judgment. You must also notify the Court of any changes and economic circumstances that might affect the ability to pay this financial penalty.

Having assessed the defendant's ability to pay, payment of the total criminal monetary penalties is due as follows: Payment in equal monthly installments of \$25 over a period of 20 months to commence after the date of this judgment.

You must provide the probation officer access to any requested financial information and authorize the release of any financial information until the restitution obligation is paid in full; the probation office may share financial information with the U.S. Attorney's Office.

You must not incur any new credit charges or open additional lines of credit without the approval of the probation officer.

You will be monitored by the form of location monitoring technology indicated to run for a period of 90

days in home detention. You must follow the rules and regulations of the location monitoring program; the cost of the program is waived. Location monitoring technology is at the discretion of the probation officer, including: Radio frequency monitoring, GPS monitoring, including hybrid GPS, SmartLINK or voice recognition. This form of location monitoring technology will be used to monitor the following restriction on your movement in the community:

You are restricted to your residence at all times, except for your own or your daughter's employment, education, religious services, medical, substance abuse or mental health treatment, attorney visits, court appearances, court-ordered obligations for -- in connection with any judicial proceeding or family judicial matters, or other activities as preapproved by the probation officer.

Restitution payments shall be made to the Clerk of the Court for the U.S. District Court, District of Columbia, for disbursement to the following victim in the amount of \$500: Architect of the Capitol, Office of the Chief Financial Officer, attention Kathy Sherrill, CPA, Ford House Office Building, Room H2-205B, Washington, D.C. 20515.

The Court finds you do not have the ability to pay a fine and, therefore, waives imposition of a fine in this case. The financial obligations are immediately payable to the Clerk of the Court for the U.S. District Court, 333

Constitution Avenue, Northwest, Washington, D.C. 20001.

Within 30 days of any change of address, you shall notify the Clerk of the Court of the change until such time as the financial obligation is paid in full.

The probation office shall release the presentence investigation report to all appropriate agencies, which includes the U.S. Probation Office in the approved district of residence, in order to execute the sentence of the Court. Treatment agencies shall return the presentence report to the probation office upon the defendant's completion or termination from treatment.

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 3742, you have the right to appeal the sentence imposed by the Court if the period of imprisonment is longer than the statutory maximum. If you choose to appeal, you must file any appeal within 14 days after the Court enters judgment.

As defined in 28 U.S.C. Section 2255, you also have the right to challenge the conviction entered or sentence imposed if new and currently unavailable information becomes available to you or on a claim that you received ineffective assistance of counsel in entering a plea of guilty to the offense of conviction or in connection with sentencing. If you are unable to afford the cost of an appeal, you may request permission from the Court to file an appeal without cost to you.

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                 Are there any objections to the sentence imposed
       not already noted, for the record, from the government?
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 3
                 MS. CARTER: No objection, Your Honor.
                 I do have one brief factual correction.
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 5
                 The government recently learned that Vice
 6
       President Harris was in the building in the morning and in
 7
       the building when Congress reconvened, but not actually in
       the building during the riot itself.
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 9
                 THE COURT: Interesting. I didn't know that.
10
                 MS. CARTER: There were protected persons that
       were present, but not Vice President Harris. Just in case
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       that weighs in any way, I wanted the Court to know that.
12
13
                 THE COURT: It doesn't. It doesn't.
14
                 No. It doesn't change anything I have said,
       except thank you for that correction.
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16
                 MS. CARTER: Yes, Your Honor.
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                 THE COURT: I thought she was there as part of the
18
       Senate at that point still.
19
                 MS. CARTER: Yes, Your Honor.
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                 THE COURT: All right. Any objection not already
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       noted on the record?
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                 MR. UNGVARSKY: No objection from the defense,
23
       Your Honor.
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                 THE COURT: All right. You may be seated.
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                 Does the government have a motion to dismiss the
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       open counts?
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                 MS. CARTER: Yes, Your Honor.
 3
                 We move to dismiss Counts 2, 3, and 4 with regards
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       to Mr. Torrens.
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                 THE COURT: And that motion is granted.
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                 Does the government have anything else today?
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                 MS. CARTER: No, Your Honor.
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                 THE COURT: And Mr. Ungvarsky?
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                 MR. UNGVARSKY: Not from the defense.
10
                 Thank you, Your Honor.
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                 THE COURT: All right. You are all excused.
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                 PROBATION OFFICER: Your Honor, if I may ask
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       permission again, just for the record, that he can be placed
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       on location monitoring when he gets to Tennessee?
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                 THE COURT: Absolutely. Yes. Thank you very
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       much.
                 PROBATION OFFICER: Thank you.
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                 (Whereupon, the proceeding concludes, 12:25 p.m.)
18
                                CERTIFICATE
19
                 I, ELIZABETH SAINT-LOTH, RPR, FCRR, do hereby
20
       certify that the foregoing constitutes a true and accurate
       transcript of my stenographic notes, and is a full, true,
21
       and complete transcript of the proceedings to the best of my
       ability.
22
                This certificate shall be considered null and void
       if the transcript is disassembled and/or photocopied in any
23
       manner by any party without authorization of the signatory
       below.
24
           Dated this 8th day of November, 2021.
25
           /s/ Elizabeth Saint-Loth, RPR, FCRR
           Official Court Reporter
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