



**IT'S A BIT TRICKY:  
EXPLORING ISIS'S TIES WITH  
BOKO HARAM**

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**BULAMA BUKARTI || March 2022**

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Program on Extremism

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2000 Pennsylvania Avenue NW  
Washington, D.C. 20006  
<https://www.extremism.gwu.edu>

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## About the Author

Bulama Bukarti is a senior analyst in the Extremism Policy Unit of the Tony Blair Institute for Global Change, where he focuses on violent extremist groups in sub-Saharan Africa. He has studied extremist groups in Africa for over a decade and has written many papers, commentaries, and op-eds on extremist groups' history, ideology, and strategy; deradicalization and reintegration of former fighters; and response to Covid-19, including for Foreign Policy, the Independent, the Telegraph, CNN, the Council on Foreign Relations, Hudson Institute, the National, War on the Rocks and the Washington Post.



A trained lawyer, Bulama holds a degree in common and Islamic law as well as a Master of Laws degree. He has taught law and jurisprudence, peace studies, and conflict resolution at Bayero University, Kano, and has practiced as a human rights and employment lawyer in his native Nigeria for half a decade. He is currently a doctoral candidate at the School of Oriental and Africa Studies, University of London, where he is researching Boko Haram through the lens of laws of war. He is a non-resident fellow with The Program on Extremism at George Washington University.

Bulama has facilitated workshops for Western diplomats working on sub-Saharan Africa and conducted private briefings for Western governments, policymakers, and relevant organizations. He is a regular guest on Hausa- and English-language channels, including Voice of America, BBC, Channel 4, Al Jazeera and Deutsche Welle; has spoken at the University of Oxford, Wilton Park and Chatham House.



## About The Program on Extremism and *Nexus*

The Program on Extremism at George Washington University provides analysis on issues related to violent and non-violent extremism. The Program spearheads innovative and thoughtful academic inquiry, producing empirical

work that strengthens extremism research as a distinct field of study. The Program aims to develop pragmatic policy solutions that resonate with policymakers, civic leaders, and the general public. This report is released as part of The Global-Local Jihadist Nexus project (*Nexus*). *Nexus* draws on a global network of subject matter experts and locally-based researchers to monitor Islamic State and al-Qaida affiliates across the Middle East, Africa, and Asia, as well as their support and enabling networks in the West. Our products analyze the interplay of several pairs of forces that have the potential to drive or constrain the global Islamic State and Al-Qaida nexus, including: global and local contexts, ideological and pragmatic drivers, individual and group appeals, leader-inspired and organizationally-enabled change, foreign influence versus local interest, and more.

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## Introduction

On 18 January 2022, the Islamic State (ISIS) released a 27-minute video titled "the empowered generation" from its West Africa Province (ISWAP),<sup>1</sup> which showcased the group's daily routine of religious indoctrination of children and highlighting its military training. The film is a graduation ceremony for the first set of its "cubs of the caliphate", who are trained "to love martyrdom and slaughtering in the path of Allah". Its third and final segment was the most ruthless. It showed three children separately executing three captive soldiers. The first executioner—who appeared as young as 10-years-old—cried, "O enemies of Allah! Do you think that the killing of my father and brother will make us stop?", in Arabic language. The child then puts his rifle to the head of a man in Nigerian army uniform kneeling tied up before him, and pulls the trigger. With this clip, ISWAP provided a window into its "transgenerational indoctrination programme", which took years to put together.

The production—which is ISWAP's first in 2022 and probably its most sophisticated, staged with drone shots and close-ups—is infused with marks of ISWAP's ties to ISIS. Shot against the background of ISIS's black-and-white flag, the first speaker opens with a reference to northeast Nigeria where the video was taped as ISIS's territory. Midway through the video, the children are shown raptly watching ISIS's documentary of the battle for the eastern Syrian city of Hajin— the last major town controlled by ISIS that was recaptured in December 2018.<sup>2</sup> It concludes with a rather dramatic display, in which the two dozen children present form a narrow circle around their instructor, clasp their right hands, and proclaim in chorus, "I give my allegiance to the Commander of the Faithful and Caliph of the Muslims, Abu Ibrahim al-Hashemi al-Qurashi, to hear and obey [him] in times of difficulty and comfort, in hardship and ease..." This is their oath of initiation.



*Image 1: ISWAP child soldiers are indoctrinated at one of the group's training facilities in northeast Nigeria.*

Thus did these 24 children swear on their lives to join thousands of others and serve as foot soldiers for a supposed leader in hiding over 5,000 miles away, who was killed in an American raid two weeks

<sup>1</sup> Islamic State Wilaya of West Africa. 2022 "The Empowered Generation." ISWAP Media Channel, January 18, 2022.

<sup>2</sup> Deutsche Welle. 2018. "Hajin, one of the last towns held by IS militants falls in Syria." *Deutsche Welle*, December 14, 2018. <https://www.dw.com/en/hajin-one-of-the-last-towns-held-by-is-militants-falls-in-syria/a-46737216>.

after the video was released.<sup>3</sup> None of them had ever seen the now-deceased former caliph,<sup>4</sup> but that does not take anything away from their passion to give their lives for his cause. For these children poisoned with a warped ideology, geography, race, or language, are inconsequential. Theirs is the latest display of a union that was formed six years ago. When ISWAP pledged allegiance to ISIS in 2015, the extent of the ties between the two became a hotly-debated issue among scholars, analysts and governments. Some dismiss it as mere propaganda; some portray ISWAP and other affiliates as “Islamic State cells across Africa”<sup>5</sup> or “The Islamic State Franchises in Africa”;<sup>6</sup> and others suggest that ISWAP is completely different from its parent group Boko Haram, claiming that the former is really a “Band of International Criminal Gangs”.<sup>7</sup>

By dissecting the history, nature, and depth of ISWAP ties to ISIS, this report argues that the truth lies in the middle between those two extremes. It submits that the relationship is neither empty propaganda nor is it deep enough to reduce ISWAP to a mere puppet. The duo are, rather, partners in an adhoc arrangement.<sup>8</sup> The essay discusses ISIS’s influence on ISWAP’s leadership, policy, and administration, and concludes that ISIS played a significant role in shaping ISWAP and, most importantly, keeping it from disintegrating. The essay draws on original materials—including internal communiques—of Boko Haram in Hausa, Kanuri and Arabic, recent literature based on extensive interviews with defectors, as well as recent reporting that potentially provides a window into the internal dynamics of the ISIS-ISWAP ‘unholy’ alliance.

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<sup>3</sup> BBC News. 2022. “Islamic State leader Abu Ibrahim al-Qurayshi killed in Syria, US says.” *BBC News*, February 4, 2022. <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-60246129>.

<sup>4</sup> Ingram, Haroro, Jadoon, Amira, and Mines, Andrew. 2022. “Islamic State leader killed in US raid – where does this leave the terrorist group?” *The Conversation*, February 3, 2022. <https://theconversation.com/islamic-state-leader-killed-in-us-raid-where-does-this-leave-the-terrorist-group-176410>.

<sup>5</sup> Warner, Jason and Hulme, Charlotte. 2018. “The Islamic State in Africa: Estimating Fighter Numbers in Cells Across the Continent.” *CTC Sentinel* 11, no. 7 (August 2018): 21-28. <https://ctc.usma.edu/islamic-state-africa-estimating-fighter-numbers-cells-across-continent/>.

<sup>6</sup> Foucher, Vincent. 2020. “The Islamic State Franchises in Africa: Lessons from Lake Chad.” International Crisis Group, October 29, 2020. <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/nigeria/islamic-state-franchises-africa-lessons-lake-chad>.

<sup>7</sup> Oshoko, Oghenahogie. 2019. “We have defeated Boko Haram & they will never come back as BHT; ISWAP is a band of International Criminal Gangs, we will chase & hunt them down like BHT – Buratai vows.” *Security King*, Mary 30, 2019. <https://securitykingng.org/security/we-have-defeated-boko-haram-iswap-is-a-band-of-international-criminal-gangs-we-will-chase-hunt-them-down-like-bht-buratai-vows/>.

<sup>8</sup> Ingram, Haroro, Whiteside, Craig, and Winter, Charlie. 2020. “The Islamic State’s Global Insurgency and its Counterstrategy Implications.” International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague (ICCT), *Evolutions in Counterterrorism* 2 (November 2020): 21-46. <https://icct.nl/app/uploads/2020/11/Special-Edition-2-2.pdf>.

## ISWAP's Origins, 2003-2015

Boko Haram, which later became ISWAP and other factions, was formed in 2003 by a collection of local Islamic preachers and activists in northeast Nigeria who were inspired by al-Qaeda and the Taliban.<sup>9</sup> They sought to establish a group that would violently pursue the establishment of a puritanical Islamic state in northern Nigeria. After years of aggressive grassroots recruitment and radicalization, Boko Haram turned violent in 2009 and has since killed an estimated 35,000 people,<sup>10</sup> plunging another 10 million—including the three million that its operations have displaced—<sup>11</sup>into a complex humanitarian crisis that has killed 340,000 people, of which 90% are young children.<sup>12</sup> Today, Boko Haram's factions—*Jama'atu Ahl al-Sunnah li al-Da'wati wa al-Jihad* (JAS), which is independent, *Ansaru al-Musulmina fi Bidad al-Sudan* (Ansaru), which is affiliated to al-Qaeda, and ISWAP, which is affiliated to ISIS—continue to devastate parts of Nigeria, Niger, Cameroon, and Chad despite efforts by national and regional security forces supported by Western partners, including the U.S. and the European Union.<sup>13</sup>

There are unsupported claims that Boko Haram's transnational links date back to its inception,<sup>14</sup> but the evidence shows that tenable ties were formed around 2010, seven years after its formation, when it reached out to al-Qaeda for help in the wake of its defeat at the hands of Nigerian security forces in July 2009. Boko Haram's Abubakar Shekau, who took over after the death of its first leader Muhammad Yusuf, pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda and received NGN 50,000,000 (about USD 77,000 based on the exchange rate at the time) and weapons.<sup>15</sup> Boko Haram began launching guerrilla-style attacks that

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<sup>9</sup> Bukarti, Audu Bulama. 2021. *Violent Extremism in Sub-Saharan Africa: Lessons from the Rise of Boko Haram*. Tony Blair Institute for Global Change, July 23, 2021. <https://institute.global/policy/violent-extremism-sub-saharan-africa-lessons-rise-boko-haram>.

<sup>10</sup> United Nations Development Programme. 2021. *Assessing the Impact of Conflict on Development in North-east Nigeria*. UNDP Report, June 23, 2021. [https://www.ng.undp.org/content/nigeria/en/home/library/human\\_development/assessing-the-impact-of-conflict-on-development-in-north-east-ni.html](https://www.ng.undp.org/content/nigeria/en/home/library/human_development/assessing-the-impact-of-conflict-on-development-in-north-east-ni.html).

<sup>11</sup> United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. 2021. "Lake Chad Basin Humanitarian Snapshot." OCHA Report, March 23, 2021. [https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/20210323\\_lcb\\_humanitarian\\_snapshot\\_en\\_covid\\_v2.pdf](https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/20210323_lcb_humanitarian_snapshot_en_covid_v2.pdf).

<sup>12</sup> *Assessing the Impact of Conflict on Development in North-east Nigeria*. UNDP Report. 2021.

<sup>13</sup> Bukarti, Bulama. 2021. "The destructive militant group sowing chaos across Africa." *Washington Post*, August 12, 2021. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2021/08/12/boko-haram-nigeria-niger-chad-cameroon/>.

<sup>14</sup> Bukarti, Bulama. 2022. "Revisiting the Beginning of Boko Haram." *War on the Rocks*, January 24, 2022. <https://warontherocks.com/2022/01/revisiting-the-beginning-of-boko-haram/>.

<sup>15</sup> Foucher, Vincent. 2021. "Last Words of Abubakar Shekau: A Testament in the Politics of Jihadi Extraversion." *Materials & Fieldwork in African Studies- Sources Varia* 3 (2021): 1-27. <https://www.sources-journal.org/684>.

targeted security personnel, politicians, and traditional rulers who played a role in facilitating their 2009 defeat. As the group officially named itself JAS and morphed into an insurgent group, its violence grew more indiscriminate, including its attacks on Muslim civilians. JAS's sheer brutality ruptured Shekau's relationship with al-Qaeda, culminating in the splinter of JAS and al-Qaeda loyalists who formed the offshoot Ansaru.

Under Shekau, JAS continued to grow independent of al-Qaeda and Ansaru by escalating attacks across Nigeria and expanding to parts of Cameroon, Chad, and Nigeria. By 2014, it had captured Nigerian



Image 2: An audio message released by JAS announces Shekau's pledge of allegiance to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.

territory equal to the size of Belgium and proclaimed an Islamic state. In 2015, Shekau pledged allegiance (*bay'a*) to ISIS's now-deceased caliph, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. His pledge was accepted within five days.<sup>16</sup> Consequently, JAS rebranded as Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) and Shekau became its first *wali* or governor, heralding a new chapter in JAS's history. Today, ISIS continues to shape ISWAP in important ways even as the latter remains largely localised in its messaging, agenda, and enemies.

<sup>16</sup> Alkhshali, Hamdi and Almasry, Steve. 2015. "ISIS leader purportedly accepts Boko Haram's pledge of allegiance." *CNN*, March 13, 2015. <https://edition.cnn.com/2015/03/12/middleeast/isis-boko-haram/index.html>.



## Shekau's *Bay'a* not an "Auction"

Shekau's allegiance to ISIS came at a time when the Nigerian security forces and their regional and international allies had escalated operations against JAS, eventually dislodging it from the territory it occupied to the fringes of Lake Chad. This led some scholars and analysts to see the move as the last kicks of a dying beast. At an international conference in which the author participated in Abuja in March 2015—the month of Shekau's *bay'a*—Professor Tijjani El-Miskin, a respected professor from Maiduguri where Boko Haram was formed, argued with vehemence that the step was a “cheap auction” by a group on the edge of a cliff. Other commentators dismissed it as a “mere propaganda posing no security threat”,<sup>17</sup> or as “more of a cry for help”.<sup>18</sup> Over a year after the *bay'a*, some American security and intelligence officials were still describing it “primarily as a rebranding exercise”<sup>19</sup> even when U.S. troops on the ground were ringing alarm bells over “one of [the] concrete examples of a direct link”.<sup>20</sup>



Image 3: Abubakar Shekau, flanked by Boko Haram militants, issues a speech to the group's followers.

But evidence that would later come to light shows that these dismissive comments could not have been more wrong, as JAS's move was first and foremost a product of ideological, rather than practical,

<sup>17</sup> Barkindo, Fr Atta. 2016. “Boko Haram-IS Connection: Local & Regional Implications.” *Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses* 8, no. 6 (June 2016): 3-8. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/26351424.pdf>.

<sup>18</sup> Tisdall, Simon. 2015. “Boko Haram-Isis alliance is nothing but superficial propaganda.” *The Guardian*, March 8, 2015. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/mar/08/boko-haram-isis-alliance-is-nothing-but-superficial-propaganda>.

<sup>19</sup> Landay, Jonathan, Strobel, Warren, and Stewart, Phil. 2016. “U.S. sees no major Islamic State links to Boko Haram, despite claims.” *Reuters*, June 9, 2016. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nigeria-security-usa-insight-idUSKCN0YVOBW>.

<sup>20</sup> Cooper, Helene. 2016. “Boko Haram and ISIS Are Collaborating More, U.S. Military Says.” *The New York Times*, April 20, 2016. <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/21/world/africa/boko-haram-and-isis-are-collaborating-more-us-military-says.html>.

considerations. Shekau did not pledge allegiance to ISIS because JAS was weak and desperately wanted to save face. In fact, he did so under serious pressure from his lieutenants.<sup>21</sup> When al-Baghdadi proclaimed the establishment of the Islamic State in June 2014, top JAS leaders saw it as their religious duty to follow him as the supreme leader of Muslims. Citing such Islamic scriptural authorities, including the Prophet Muhammad’s statement that “Whoever dies when he had not pledged allegiance to an imam (caliph) dies a death of ignorance (jahiliyya)”, the majority of JAS’s *shura* members—including its second in command Mamman Nur and founding leader Muhammad Yusuf’s son, Abu Mus’ab al-Barnawi—piled pressure on Shekau to give allegiance to ISIS.

Shekau argued that he had no religious duty to follow al-Baghdadi, stating that Islam permits them to maintain their separate caliphate and cited their bad experience with al-Qaeda as reasons for his hesitation. Given Shekau’s megalomania, it is possible that his resistance was partly out of fear that his authority as the overall leader of JAS (imam) who commanded absolute loyalty from its members would diminish under ISIS. After long and heated debates, Shekau required assurances from ISIS as a condition for his loyalty. Following exchanges of messages in which ISIS approved of Shekau’s ideology and accepted him as the potential *wali* of ISWAP, he reluctantly agreed.<sup>22</sup> In fact, talks about the alliance began when JAS was at its peak. The group’s abduction of 276 schoolgirls in April 2014 (over 100 of whom are still in the group’s custody) was the event that catapulted it to international attention. In the days and weeks that followed the kidnapping, Shekau exploited the opportunity to make headlines by threatening on camera “to sell” the girls, forcefully converted them, and more.<sup>23</sup>

One person piqued by this incident was Abu Malik Shayba al-Hamad, the head of ISIS’s Africa Media outlet. Al-Hamad claims to have facilitated JAS’s *bay’a* to ISIS, and chronicles how he midwived the JAS-ISIS union in a document he published on 27 March 2015 on his Twitter account (which is now suspended).<sup>24</sup> Al-Hamad explained that it was the abduction of the Chibok girls that changed his negative views of JAS to admiration for the group. After watching their videos, he successfully contacted a member of JAS’s communication team through a number he found on a thread (likely on Twitter). When al-Hamad mooted to him the idea of giving *bay’a* to ISIS, the member explained that JAS militants had been wanting to do so, but there were delays due to “some doubts” that they were working to resolve. This is most likely a reference to Shekau’s unwillingness to pledge allegiance at first. As the doubts were resolved through clarification and assurances from ISIS, Shekau announced his allegiance and that of his group. From this account, it was in fact ISIS that courted JAS because of the latter’s new global traction.

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<sup>21</sup> Kassim, Abdulbasit and Nwankpa, Michael. 2018. *The Boko Haram Reader: From Nigerian Preachers to the Islamic State*. New York: Oxford University Press.

<sup>22</sup> Foucher. “Last Words of Abubakar Shekau”. 2021.

<sup>23</sup> BBC News. 2014. “Boko Haram ‘to sell’ Nigeria girls abducted from Chibok.” *BBC News*, May 5, 2014. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-27283383>.

<sup>24</sup> Kassim and Nwankpa. *The Boko Haram Reader*. 2018.

## ISWAP are not a Puppet of ISIS

While analysts and U.S. officials were doubting the ISIS-JAS tie,<sup>25</sup> the Nigerian government was inflating it, with then President Jonathan claiming that JAS fighters had trained in ISIS camps in the Middle East.<sup>26</sup> Similar narratives have continued under the current Buhari administration. In its frantic bid to push its narrative that JAS has been defeated, then Chief of Army Staff of the Nigerian army asserted that JAS (or Boko Haram) and ISWAP are two completely different groups,<sup>27</sup> and that it was after the former had been defeated that “International Criminal Gangs” under ISWAP emerged to exploit the vulnerabilities that were created. Western media ran with headlines and commentaries suggesting JAS had been subsumed,<sup>28</sup> while other analysts portrayed ISWAP as an ISIS “cell” or “franchise”. These, in the author’s view, exaggerate the relationship between the two.

The debate as to the nature and extent of ISIS’s ties with groups in Africa is not just limited to the Lake Chad context. Following the development of ties between the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) based in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), doubts and debates on the veracity and depth of the ties between the two arose.<sup>29</sup> In a June 2020 report, the UN Group of Experts on the DRC reported that it “did not find any direct links” between ADF and ISIS.<sup>30</sup> A year later, the group reported that it did not find evidence of “direct support or command and control” with ISIS over ADF, even as it noted other evidence of ties such as communication, as well as shifts in ADF’s objectives and attacks strategy to align with that of ISIS.<sup>31</sup>

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<sup>25</sup> For statements by analysts, see: Campbell, John. 2015. “ISIS and Boko Haram.” *Council on Foreign Relations*, February 24, 2015. <https://www.cfr.org/blog/isis-and-boko-haram>; For statements by U.S. officials, see: Landy, Strobel, and Stewart. “U.S. sees no major Islamic State links to Boko Haram despite claims.” 2016.

<sup>26</sup> Stein, Chris. 2015. “Nigeria’s President: Boko Haram Trained with Islamic State.” *VOA News*, March 11, 2015. <https://www.voanews.com/a/nigerias-president-says-boko-haram-trained-with-islamic-state/2676217.html>.

<sup>27</sup> Oshoko. “We have defeated Boko Haram.” 2019.

<sup>28</sup> Maclean, Ruth and Abrak, Isaac. 2016. “ISIS tries to impose new leader on Boko Haram in Nigeria.” *The Guardian*, August 4, 2016. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/aug/05/isis-tries-to-impose-new-leader-on-boko-haram-in-nigeria>.

<sup>29</sup> O’Farrell, Ryan. 2021. “Neither Local, Nor Transnational, But Both: The Islamic State in Congo.” *Newlines Institute*, December 14, 2021. <https://newlinesinstitute.org/isis/neither-local-nor-transnational-but-both-the-islamic-state-in-congo/>.

<sup>30</sup> Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 2020. *Final Report*. United Nations Security Council. <https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/200602%20DRC%20GoE%20letter%20of%202%20June.pdf>.

<sup>31</sup> Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 2021. *Final Report*. United Nations Security Council. <https://www.undocs.org/en/S/2021/560>.

But as the ISIS-ISWAP case study demonstrates, “direct command and control” is probably the wrong connection to look for. ISIS has never claimed to have acquired direct operational control over ISWAP or of any of its provinces in Africa, and this is not its *modus operandi* in relation to African groups. The relationship instead is an “adhocratic” arrangement by which affiliates remain a localised group with a local agenda, which in turn feeds into ISIS’s global agenda. ISWAP continues to be independent in its day-to-day administration and operations, while ISIS gives it broad guidelines in the form of advice and input on ISWAP’s top-level decision-making. At the same time, ISIS has supported ISWAP financially and operationally, and shaped its leadership and policy.

## ISIS's Influence on ISWAP's Leadership

The first thing ISIS ensured in the wake of ISWAP's *bay'a* was setting up direct lines of communication via multiple Telegram groups. They used these to communicate virtually in real time about policy, strategy, and administration, giving ISIS an opportunity to feed into each. ISWAP has seen three major leadership crises since its association with ISIS, with the latter playing a significant role through each crisis. The first of ISWAP's schisms reached a turning point in 2016 when several top members of the ISWAP shura led by Nur— one of Boko Haram's founders and a contender for leadership in 2009 which Shekau won— and al-Barnawi accused Shekau of too extreme and ignorant interpretation of Islam, unjustifiable violence against Muslim civilians and misappropriation of ISWAP loots and rebelled against him. In the wake of this, ISIS arbitrated between Shekau and his rivals, including through exchange of letters. This culminated in a conference call between al-Baghdadi, Shekau and al-Barnawi.<sup>32</sup> When ISIS threw its weight behind Nur/al-Barnawi's smaller, rival faction, they quickly grew in strength and shortly surpassed Shekau's JAS, partly due to mass defections from JAS as ISIS's



Image 4: Shekau issues a message to his followers in a video recording from 2018.

recognition of the rebels boosted their credentials and legitimacy in the eyes of commanders and foot soldiers. The second crisis fell in 2018 when Nur was accused of sabotaging ISWAP — after failing in his ISWAP leadership bid — and attempting to defect by handing himself to Nigerian authorities. ISWAP preferred to either exile him or put him under house arrest because it believed executing Nur would be divisive, owing to his status in the group. But al-Baghdadi ruled that he should be killed.<sup>33</sup> ISWAP leaders were not receptive to this verdict, but still implemented it because they saw ISIS's decisions as binding.

<sup>32</sup> Foucher. "The Islamic State Franchises in Africa." 2020.

<sup>33</sup> Campbell, John. 2019. "New Audio Offers Potential Window into ISWA Decision-Making." Council on Foreign Relations, June 13, 2019. <https://www.cfr.org/blog/new-audio-offers-potential-window-iswa-decision-making>.

In March 2019, Ba Idrissa (known as Idris al-Barnawi) became ISWAP's new *wali*, while Abu Mus'ab al-Barnawi was demoted to a member of the *shura*. Neither ISWAP nor ISIS explained the reasons for this change, but Abu Mus'ab reportedly accepted the decision and assumed his new role. Then came unverified reports of another leadership crisis in ISWAP, one that reportedly led to the killing or detention of Ba Idrissa and the formation of a new leadership structure under Lawan Shayima. As a result, ISIS dissolved the new executive in 2021 and brought back Abu Mus'ab al-Barnawi as interim leader to carry out detailed reforms directed by ISIS. Al-Barnawi explained that ISIS was angered by past failures to follow its guidance,<sup>34</sup> and had given him detailed reforms in the administration of the caliphate, including justice and prison reforms, and policy relating to war spoils. By sending detailed reforms, re-appointing al-Barnawi, and ordering Shekau dead (see below), ISIS sought to make ISWAP more effective, strengthen its grip over them, and eliminate its key militant rival. These reforms were disrupted by al-Barnawi's reported death during a battle with Shekau's militants, but the fact that ISWAP commanders did not object to al-Barnawi's return, as well as the latter's eagerness to implement ISIS's guidance, is clear testimony to ISIS's influence on ISWAP leadership.

Shekau's death is another example of ISIS's power over ISWAP. JAS and ISWAP have been embroiled in deadly infighting since their split. However, ISWAP did not seek Shekau's death until they received "direct orders" to that effect from ISIS in April/May 2021.<sup>35</sup> Once the direction came, ISWAP's foot soldiers killed Shekau within weeks. But even when Shekau was breathing his last breath,<sup>36</sup> he did not dissociate himself from ISIS, instead maintaining that he was the true leader recognized by ISIS and that both of the now-deceased caliphs al-Baghdadi and al-Hashimi were only misled by Shekau's detractors. Given ISWAP's constant state of leadership crisis—which started long before ISIS came into the picture—it is likely that ISIS's intervention as an arbitrator played a significant role in keeping ISWAP together after Shekau was deposed. Without an "outside" arbiter who is respected by all leaders, commanders and members, ISWAP might have broken into pieces. The key reform in ISIS's recent guidelines, according al-Barnawi,<sup>37</sup> was breaking ISWAP into four districts under four different *walis* reporting to one leader. This is apparently intended to ensure better efficiency and administrative convenience, but may also have been designed to resolve ISWAP's leadership tussle by giving major commanders some territorial control.

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<sup>34</sup> Islamic State West Africa Wilayah. 2021. "Explaining the Death of Abubakar Shekau." ISWAP Media Office, June 6, 2021.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*

## ISIS's Influence on ISWAP's Policy and Operations

Using the Telegram channels set up to make calls and exchange photos, audio, video and text messages, ISIS provided guidance on theology, operations, and administration, which were highlighted in an insightful report by the International Crisis Group.<sup>38</sup> These included *fatwas* (jurisprudential rulings) on both spiritual matters such as fasting and *zakat* (charity), as well as personal law issues such as marriage. ISWAP needed these rulings because it lacks in-house clerics versed in Islamic theology. In terms of strategy, ISIS was involved in developing a daily schedule of religious indoctrination, military training, and physical exercise for ISWAP recruits. Perhaps most importantly, ISIS helped ISWAP to change its policy of mobilizing soldiers to fight when called upon by founding a standing army housed in barracks. Telegram was also used to instruct ISWAP on how to operate drones and manufacture ammunitions.



*Image 5: Zenam Kelouri, Nigeria: Nigerian soldiers demonstrate their fight against Boko Haram. Photo: VOA/Nicolas Pinault*

Remote training was then accompanied by the deployment of trainers from Libya,<sup>39</sup> who spent months in the Lake Chad region building ISWAP's tactical and operational capacity. The trainers went out on battles alongside ISWAP foot soldiers, observing them and tutoring them. They recommended a routine of physical and religious education, changes in ISWAP battle tactics, and the creation of a military police brigade to monitor and interdict defectors, and eventually taught ISWAP anti-aircraft and infantry techniques, among others. Hundreds of ISWAP fighters were also deployed to Libya for training. In 2021, a report emerged claiming that 300 ISWAP fighters who had trained for months in Libya had now returned to the Lake Chad region.<sup>40</sup>

<sup>38</sup> Foucher. "The Islamic State Franchises in Africa." 2020.

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>40</sup> Our Reporters. 2021. "How 300 Libya-Trained ISWAP Fighters 'Conquered' Shekau." Daily Trust, May 21, 2021. <https://dailytrust.com/how-300-libya-trained-iswap-fighters-conquered-shekau>.

At the same time, ISIS gave ISWAP substantial financial assistance through regular disbursement of monies ranging from USD 10,000 to 100,000.<sup>41</sup> These payments likely came through transfers to ISWAP agents in Nigeria via the United Arab Emirates (UAE), as evidenced by a UAE court judgment in which six Nigerians were convicted for terror financing in 2019.<sup>42</sup> The Nigerians, who were bureau de change operators based in the UAE, were arrested in 2017 for transferring a total of USD 782,000.00 to two ISWAP agents in Nigeria. Court documents show that an Arab man who flew to the UAE from Turkey on different occasions handed the six men the amounts in cash, and then instructed their Nigerian associates operating at the bureau de change to pay equivalent sums to ISWAP undercover agents in Nigeria. These transactions took place since 2015—the year ISWAP’s relationship with ISIS started.

Since its 2016 splinter from Shekau, ISWAP stayed true to its criticism of the JAS leader by pursuing a civilian-friendly policy,<sup>43</sup> one that largely spared Muslim residents while Shekau’s JAS launched incriminate attacks including horrific assaults on civilians that triggered public outrages. This marked divergence in attack modus operandi—in addition to Shekau’s frequently provocative propaganda appearances and global infamy, which contrast sharply with ISWAP’s tactic of keeping a low profile—led to the assumption that JAS was a bigger challenge. As the Nigerian military focused on JAS’s areas,<sup>44</sup> ISWAP used the breathing space to build its capacity with the support of ISIS. Starting in 2017, ISWAP started targeting smaller military formations, looting weapons and supplies and gaining combat experience. In 2018, it began to assault larger military camps of 700–1000 soldiers, successfully overrunning many of them.<sup>45</sup> This contributed to “a notable drop in civilian casualties” and a rise in military casualties,<sup>46</sup> with over 750 security forces fatalities in 2019 alone.<sup>47</sup> Shekau’s death and the incorporation<sup>48</sup> of many of his fighters into ISWAP has allowed the group to consolidate its position with an estimated 4,000 to 5,000 fighters and step-up in attacks on states forces not just in Nigeria,<sup>49</sup> but also in Cameroon.<sup>50</sup>

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid* Foucher.

<sup>42</sup> Our Reports. 2020. “6 Nigerians Convicted In UAE Over ‘B/Haram Funding’ .” *Daily Trust*, November 9, 2020. <https://dailytrust.com/6-nigerians-convicted-in-uae-over-b-haram-funding>.

<sup>43</sup> Pujol-Mazzini, Anna. 2021. “Boko Haram leader behind kidnapping of 300 girls seriously injured after trying to blow himself up.” *The Telegraph*, May 21, 2021. <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2021/05/21/boko-haram-leader-injured-possibly-dead-attempt-blow-evade-capture/>.

<sup>44</sup> International Crisis Group. 2019. *Facing the Challenge of the Islamic State in West Africa Province*. International Crisis Group Africa Report 273, May 16, 2019. <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/nigeria/273-facing-challenge-islamic-state-west-africa-province>.

<sup>45</sup> Foucher. “The Islamic State Franchises in Africa.” 2020.

<sup>46</sup> International Crisis Group. *Facing the Challenge*. 2019.

<sup>47</sup> Allen, Nathaniel. 2019. “How Boko Haram Has Regained the Initiative and What Nigeria Should Do to Stop It.” *War on the Rocks*, December 24, 2019. <https://warontherocks.com/2019/12/how-boko-haram-has-regained-the-initiative-and-what-nigeria-should-do-to-stop-it/>.

<sup>48</sup> PRNigeria. 2021. “Boko Haram, ISWAP reunite, pledge allegiance to AlKhuraishi.” *Premium Times Nigeria*, June 26, 2021. <https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/top-news/470116-boko-haram-iswap-reunite-pledge-allegiance-to-alkhuraishi.html>.

<sup>49</sup> Congressional Research Service. 2022. “Boko Haram and the Islamic State West Africa Province.” CRS Update, February 24, 2022. <https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/IF10173.pdf>.

<sup>50</sup> Fru, Afgh-Nwi and Tayo, Teniola. 2021. “ISIS takes aim at the state in Cameroon.” *Institute for Security Studies*, July 22, 2021. <https://issafrica.org/iss-today/iswap-takes-aim-at-the-state-in-cameroon>.



While the reduction in civilian casualties is good news in the short-term, it could be extremely dangerous in the medium- and long-term as ISWAP continues to pursue its “hearts and minds” approach.<sup>51</sup> In addition to actively protecting civilians from JAS’s predatory raids in exchange for paying taxes and obeying its rules, ISWAP is also engaged in distributing food, clothes and money,<sup>52</sup> while deliberately targeting aid workers in what appears to be a calculated move to monopolise charity.<sup>53</sup> At the same time, the group undertakes preaching tours to villages and on highway systems where it encourages people to migrate to its territory with promises of economic empowerment. These narratives are bolstered by civilian perceptions of governments closing markets and banning fishing in an attempt to stifle ISWAP, which risks making communities more desperate and vulnerable to recruitment. With this strategy, ISWAP could win not only more fighters, but also sympathisers and informants to help the group consolidate its finance and supply routes and intelligence capabilities. ISWAP’s recent drone photograph of a Nigerian army camp that it attacked indicates the group’s increasing sophistication in using technology to gather intelligence, and makes the possibility of future drone strike capabilities a not-so-unthinkable proposition.<sup>54</sup>

Despite ISIS’s significant influence and substantial contributions, however, ISWAP was never reduced to merely an ISIS puppet. While ISIS orchestrates ISWAP’s external-facing communications to global audiences, ISWAP maintains its local communications channels on Telegram, via newsletters and offline, sustaining its localized agenda. ISWAP has never changed its messaging to focus on ISIS’s global enemies such as the West. Instead, its messaging remains very focused on its local enemies. Even for ISWAP’s major decisions, ISIS’s role in most cases has been one of giving advice and consent, which ISWAP followed in most cases. For example, it was reported that al-Baghdadi first sided with Shekau in the schism that splintered ISWAP in 2016 by asking his rivals to remain under him. It was only after they refused that ISIS backtracked and supported them, but Shekau’s group did not cease to exist simply because ISIS had withdrawn its support from him.

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<sup>51</sup> Bukarti, Audu Bulama. 2018. “The Battle for Hearts and Minds in the Lake Chad Basin.” *Tony Blair Institute for Global Change*, May 24, 2018. <https://institute.global/policy/battle-hearts-and-minds-lake-chad-basin>.

<sup>52</sup> Sahara Reporters. 2021. “825 Packets Of Food Worth N3.4million, 353 Bundles Of Clothes Were Distributed To The Poor During Ramadan, Says Boko Haram.” *Sahara Reporters*, May 28, 2021. <http://saharareporters.com/2021/05/28/825-packets-food-worth-n34million-353-bundles-clothes-were-distributed-poor-during>.

<sup>53</sup> BBC News. 2020. “Nigeria’s Boko Haram crisis: Aid workers ‘killed’ in Borno state.” *BBC News*, July 23, 2020. <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-53511389>.

<sup>54</sup> Bukarti, Bulama. 2022. “ISWAP took this drone photo of the Nigerian army camp in Wulgo, which it attacked yesterday. The group claimed to have fired a total of 11 mortal shells at the camp, saying it killed and wounded seven personnel. It’s scary how tech-savvy ISWAP is becoming. Abuja needs to do more.” Twitter, published: February 17, 2022. <https://twitter.com/bulamabukarti/status/1494375862099230726>.

In fact, there are instances in which ISWAP inspired ISIS's policy. In August 2020, ISIS explicitly declared humanitarian aid workers as a legitimate target, labelling them as "partners in combat even if their personnel do not carry weapons", and instructing its fighters to attack them. As the editorial of *al-Naba* magazine for 13 August shows, this proclamation was an endorsement of ISWAP's new practice of deliberate attacks on aid workers. The piece followed ISWAP's video in July 2020 in which the group executed four aid workers in cold blood and threatened to "continue to ambush and abduct" and kill them.<sup>55</sup> ISIS not only defended ISWAP, but went on to make it policy for its provinces to adopt the same practice. ISIS itself has killed aid workers prior to 2020,<sup>56</sup> as did its other affiliates like the Islamic State Khorasan Province,<sup>57</sup> but it was not until ISWAP embarked on its campaign that ISIS issued an explicit proclamation the following month. Just a month after ISIS's declaration of aid workers as legitimate target, its affiliate in central Sahel started to implement the movement's new edict by murdering six French aid workers and their local guides after capturing them.<sup>58</sup>

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<sup>55</sup> Abdullahi, Murtala. 2020. "ISWAP Kills Humanitarian Workers After Failed Negotiations." *HumAngle*, July 22, 2020.

<https://humangle.org/iswap-kills-humanitarian-workers-after-failed-negotiations/>.

<sup>56</sup> Botelho, Greg. 2014. "ISIS executes British aid worker David Haines; Cameron vows justice." *CNN*, September 14, 2014.

<https://edition.cnn.com/2014/09/13/world/meast/isis-haines-family-message/index.html>.

<sup>57</sup> Dearden, Lizzie. 2017. "Isis 'kills at least six Red Cross' aid workers in Afghanistan." *The Independent*, February 8, 2017.

<https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/isis-islamic-state-afghanistan-wilayat-khorasan-red-cross-aid-workers-killed-shot-gunmen-massacre-a7568791.html>.

<sup>58</sup> Staff and agencies in Paris. 2020. "Isis claims murder of French aid workers and their guides in Niger." *The Guardian*, September 17, 2020. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/sep/17/isis-claims-of-french-aid-workers-and-their-guides-in-niger>.

## Conclusion

ISIS has shaped JAS and then ISWAP in fundamental ways and continues to do so today. From its communications and operations to its administration, ISWAP now bears the hallmarks of ISIS in important ways. Not only has ISIS enhanced ISWAP's effectiveness through remote and in-person training and financial support, but it is also likely that ISIS's intervention kept ISWAP from completely disintegrating into smaller factions comprising fighters in the low hundreds. In the midst of internal schisms, ISWAP leaders turned to ISIS for arbitration, and they have largely complied with ISIS guidance even when it did not favor them. However, ISIS's support to ISWAP is not existential in the sense that even without it, ISWAP would not have vanished or rendered incapacitated. This is clear from the fact that the group that became ISWAP predated ISIS. If the reported death of al-Barnawi towards the end of 2021 turned out to be true—perhaps the most zealous ISIS loyalist among ISWAP leaders—ISIS's plans would have been impeded. However, this is not likely to be a long-term rupture, nor will it fundamentally affect ISIS's influence on ISWAP as communications between the groups continues unabated.

Having enjoyed relative success with its first affiliate in Africa, ISIS appears poised to roll out the ISWAP model across the continent, including in Mozambique and the DRC. Groups with expansive local roots are co-opted and enhanced in a way that achieves ISIS's global objectives but maintains the affiliates' independence, local relevance, and embeddedness. In these ways, ISIS has become a sort of a “gig terrorism platform” hosting groups with different—even contradictory—modes of operation.<sup>59</sup> Inflating or downplaying these dynamics will not help matters. The best policy approach must address the affiliates' localized nature and agenda, while at the same time acknowledging and focusing on their transnational facilitators. Thus, the U.S. and other western countries and organizations' designation or listing of these groups as global terrorists, and as ISIS affiliates, should be prioritized. At the same time, such designations do not and should not in any way diminish the localized nature of the challenge.

One important takeaway for counterterrorism efforts is that direct information on ISIS's substantive support to ISWAP only began to be uncovered starting in 2020, five years after their relationship first formed. This is due in part to the fact that both ISIS and its affiliates across Africa are secretive groups that have mastered the art of clandestine operations: use of encrypted messaging platforms, circumventing the conventional banking system, and employing undercover agents. Thus, efforts to establish “direct evidence” of tangible links between ISIS and its affiliates are likely years behind the curve, which has serious implications regarding the recent dynamics surrounding the ADF and in similar cases. From these and other ongoing situations in the Lake Chad region, it may be accurate to assume that researchers and policymakers experience a three- to five-year lag when it comes to the internal dynamics of jihadi groups in Africa. Experts and policymakers need to engage in more inductive research and analysis techniques to generate possible models that start from assuming the worst rather than hoping for the best.

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<sup>59</sup> Bukarti, Bulama. 2021. “Learning the Lessons of Boko Haram's Rise and Resilience.” *Newsweek*, July 23, 2021. <https://www.newsweek.com/learning-lessons-boko-harams-rise-resilience-opinion-1612274>.

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