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Case: 1:14-cr-00564 Document #: 103 Filed: 12/12/16 Page 1 of 53 PageID #:654
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                    IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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                    OR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
                              EASTERN DIVISION
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     UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
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                        Plaintiff,
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     - V S -
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                                          Case No. 14 CR 564
  7
     MOHAMMED HAMZAH KHAN,
                                          Chicago, Illinois
                                          November 18, 2016
  8
                        Defendant.
                                          1:30 p.m.
  9
                         TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
                 BEFORE THE HONORABLE JOHN J. THARP, JR.
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     APPEARANCES:
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     For the Plaintiff:
                             HON. ZACHARY T. FARDON
                             UNITED STATES ATTORNEY
 13
                             BY: MR. RICHARD MATTHEW HILLER
                                  MR. SEAN K. DRISCOLL
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                             Chicago, Illinois 60604
 16
      For the Defendant:
                             DURKIN & ROBERTS
                             BY: MR. THOMAS ANTHONY DURKIN
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                                  MS. ROBIN VALENTINA WATERS
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                             Chicago, IL 60614
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                             KELLY M. FITZGERALD, CSR, RMR, CRR
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           (Proceedings heard in open court:)
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             THE CLERK: 14 CR 564, U.S.A. v. Khan.
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             MR. HILLER: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Matt Hiller
    on behalf of the United States.
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             THE COURT: Good afternoon.
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             MR. DURKIN: Good afternoon, Judge. Tom Durkin and
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    Robin Waters on behalf of the defendant who is present and in
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    custody.
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             THE COURT: Good afternoon.
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             PROBATION OFFICER CHRISTIANSEN: Good afternoon.
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    Judge. Jason Christiansen, U.S. probation.
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             PROBATION OFFICER POHLMEYER: Good afternoon,
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    Your Honor. Aron Pohlmeyer on behalf of U.S. probation.
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             THE COURT: Good afternoon.
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             Are we ready to proceed with sentencing?
             MR. HILLER: We are, Your Honor.
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             MR. DURKIN: Just one second, Judge. There was a
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    question raised just a second ago. Could I have a second to
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    talk to Mr. Hiller?
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             THE COURT: Sure.
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      (Off the record.)
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             MR. DURKIN: Could I just have a minute to explain
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    this question?
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      (Off the record.)
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             MR. DURKIN: Judge, could we have five or ten
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              I apologize. There was a question raised that I
    minutes?
    have discussed with Mr. Hiller, but I just need to talk to the
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    client in private, if I could.
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             THE COURT: All right.
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             MR. DURKIN:
                          I apologize.
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             THE COURT: We'll take a brief recess.
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      (Recess.)
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             THE COURT: All right. Ready to move forward?
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             MR. DURKIN: Yes, Judge.
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             THE COURT: All right.
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             MR. DURKIN:
                          Thank you. I apologize.
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             THE COURT: That's all right.
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             The first thing we need to do is, Mr. Khan, could you
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    please stand.
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             And, Ms. Rone, would you please swear in Mr. Khan.
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             THE CLERK: Please raise your right hand.
      (Defendant sworn.)
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             THE COURT: All right. I want to start by making
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    sure I have reviewed everything that has been submitted.
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    addition to the plea agreement, I have reviewed the
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    presentence investigation report, the probation officer's
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    sentencing recommendation, the government's version of the
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    offense, the government's sentencing memorandum, the
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    defendant's sentencing memorandum, the defendant's
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    clarification to the PSR, the defendant's supplemental
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    sentencing submission, 15 letters of support that have been
    submitted on behalf of the defendant. I have also reviewed
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    the defendant's prior motion to modify the conditions of
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    pretrial detention and the government's response to that
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    motion.
             Is there anything that either party has submitted
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    that I did not include in that?
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             MR. HILLER: No, Your Honor, not that I'm aware.
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             MR. DURKIN: I don't think so. Judge, I don't
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    believe we've received the recommendation though, the
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    probation recommendation.
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             THE COURT: That was part of what was required to be
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    provided.
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             Do you --
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             PROBATION OFFICER CHRISTIANSEN: I can have it
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    submitted immediately, Judge.
             THE COURT: All right. I've got a copy here
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    somewhere. You can take a look at it for the moment.
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    Probation can get you a copy, but for the moment --
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             MR. DURKIN: That's fine.
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             THE COURT: -- you can take a look at that.
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             All right. Does either party intend to present any
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    witness testimony or call anyone to speak on behalf of
    Mr. Khan?
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MR. DURKIN:

No.

MR. HILLER: No. Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. I'm going to start then where the Supreme Court has directed trial courts to begin all sentencing proceedings, and that is by correctly calculating the applicable range under the United States Sentencing Guidelines.

As I understand it, there are -- the defendant had no objections to the calculation of the guidelines set forth in the presentence investigation report, correct?

MR. DURKIN: That's correct.

THE COURT: And the government objected to the recommendation that the enhancement for involving the use of minors in the offense, the PSR does not include that. The government believes that should be included, correct?

MR. HILLER: That's correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Having reviewed that issue, my conclusion is that the enhancement does apply, both by the terms of the Application Note to Section 3B1.4 and on the strength of the Seventh Circuit's opinion in *United States v. Ramsey*, which is 237 F.3d 853, which confirm that when a defendant's affirmative actions involved minors in his criminal activities, the application is appropriate. Here, Mr. Khan acknowledged in his plea agreement that he attempted to provide material support in the form of personnel, including himself and two other individuals. He expressly

acknowledged that in the factual basis to his plea agreement.

In addition, he also acknowledged in that factual basis that he obtained a job for the purpose of earning money to pay for not only his own ticket but the tickets of those other two minors, that he did, in fact, pay for the tickets of the other two minors, that he, in fact, booked the flights for the other two minors and that he also arranged for the issuance of visas for not only himself but the other minors. That -- all of those facts I think clearly suffice to show that Mr. Khan took affirmative actions to involve minors in his criminal activities, and the enhancement I think must be applied on that basis.

I'll also note that in *Ramsey*, the Seventh Circuit specifically rejected the argument advanced by the defense that Congress didn't authorize an enhancement for defendants under the age of 21. In fact, the Seventh Circuit specifically rejected that argument in *Ramsey*.

All of that said, as I'll go through the guideline calculation in a moment, the application of that enhancement is not material to the determination of the applicable guideline range here because whether that enhancement applies or not, the applicable guideline range here is the range that is capped at the statutory maximum penalty that can be imposed based on a conviction for this offense, which is 15 years.

So for the record, the presentence investigation

report reflects a total offense level of 37 and a criminal history category of VI. The government's objection to the PSR guideline calculation is sustained. I find the correct calculation to be offense level 39, not level 37, and criminal history category VI. But for the statutory maximum penalty that could be imposed on this conviction, that would yield a range of 360 months to life imprisonment. But, again, that range is capped by the statutory maximum of 15 years, or 180 months imprisonment. So let me work through this calculation again for the benefit of the record.

This is based on the November 2016 guideline manual. The base offense level is 26 pursuant to Section 2M5.3(a). That offense level is increased by two pursuant to 2M5.3(b)(1)(E), which is a provision which reflects the provision of support to assist a violent act.

There is a victim-related adjustment of 12 levels pursuant to Section 3A1.4(a) because the offense involved terrorism as that term is defined in 18, United States Code, Section 2332b(g)(5). And as I've just noted, there is also a role-in-the-offense adjustment of 2 pursuant to Section 3B1.4 for involving minors in the commission of the offense. There are no obstruction of justice enhancements, and that leaves us with an adjusted offense level of 42. The PSR recommends and I concur that a three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility is appropriate. That gives a final offense

level of 39. There are no criminal history points, but the defendant is in criminal history category VI by operation of Section 3A1.4(b). That makes -- the applicable guideline range is 180 months pursuant to Section 5G1.1(a) which is the provision that caps the guideline range at the statutory maximum. The supervised release range under the guidelines is one year to life. There is a fine range of 20,000 to \$200,000.

Those are the calculations of the guideline range.

Does any party have any comment or disagreement other than as you've already objected to the calculation of the guideline?

MR. HILLER: No, Your Honor.

MR. DURKIN: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Then let's move on -- well, actually before I move on to the discussion of the 3553(a) factors, I also note that with respect to sentencing agreements that bear on the sentence to be imposed in this case potentially, the government has agreed in the plea agreement based on cooperation that Mr. Khan had provided at the time of the plea and was expected to continue to provide and my understanding is has continued to provide that the government will move for a sentence -- that the Court impose a sentence not at the guideline range of 180 months but for a sentence of 60 months based on Mr. Khan's cooperation.

Assuming the government makes that motion, the

defendant still has the right to seek a lower sentence and to argue for a lower sentence. The defendant has also, as I understand it, waived -- if the government makes that motion, has waived most of his appellate rights. He has no right to appeal the sentence. His only appeal would be limited to an appeal based on involuntariness or ineffective assistance of counsel.

If the government does not make a motion based on the defendant's cooperation, the plea is still binding, and the parties are free to argue for any sentence. And there is a joint agreement between the parties that the sentence should include a term of supervised release of at least 180 months, but the Court is not bound by that joint recommendation.

Do I have those agreements correct?

MR. HILLER: You do, Your Honor.

MR. DURKIN: Yes.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. Then let's proceed to the discussion of all of the other factors that the Court is required to consider under Section 3553(a) of Title 18 in determining the appropriate sentence to impose in this case.

I'll hear first from Mr. Hiller for the government, then Mr. Durkin for the defendant.

And then, Mr. Khan, you will have the right but not the obligation to address the Court directly if you wish to do so, all right.

1 Mr. Hiller.

2 MR. HILLER: Thank you, Your Honor.

I will not repeat the arguments raised in the government's sentencing memorandum. But to highlight the 3553 factors, the government believes that a 60-month sentence of imprisonment followed by 15 years of probably the most intensive and customized supervised release ever imposed in this district is not only imminently fair but it's also necessary in light of the seriousness of the offense. Such a sentence, it strikes the right balance between Hamzah's background, which the government has outlined extensively in the sentencing memorandum; the graveness of his attempted plan, which is obviously addressed at length in the government's version of the offense. And it also addresses the value and the importance of his cooperation.

And Hamzah's cooperation is important for several reasons. First and most importantly, it benefitted active criminal investigations, and two of those investigations -- or the two investigations are described at length in the sentencing memorandum.

He benefitted investigations of important ISIL targets, two recruiters who are also located in ISIL-controlled territories and were fighters for ISIL. And also -- his cooperation also benefitted an important American foreign partner, and so he deserves credit for that.

His cooperation is also important because it's hopefully telling. It's the first concrete step that Hamzah has taken since October 4, 2014 in rejecting ISIS and rejecting ISIL.

We are cautiously optimistic -- and that's the critical importance of the lengthy supervised release -- that this is indicative of his future, that the education and things that Mr. Durkin addresses in his pleadings or his briefing will be taken advantage of, that he will speak out against ISIL and the recruiting and the propaganda that led Hamzah to attempt to join ISIL in Syria.

It's also important to highlight that his agreement and his attempt to cooperate publicly against a foreign terrorist organization like ISIL and to attempt to cooperate against the religious clerics, particularly Mizanur Rahman, they kind of give ISIL's message that religious credence, the obligation that Hamzah talked about in his letter and being willing to stand up in a U.S. or even a foreign courtroom to testify against ISIL operatives deserves significant credit. I mean, Hamzah left, or attempted to leave on October 4th because of what he believed was a religious obligation to support the Caliphate. And overcoming that and willing to testify against that is important.

That being said, cooperation alone cannot undo what Hamzah attempted to do. He attempted to support an incredibly

barbaric foreign terrorist organization, and his cooperation does not completely undo that. It also doesn't undo the fact that he was willing to give his life and the lives of his siblings for that organization, and that's an outcome that undoubtedly would have happened but for the FBI's intervention.

So in order to adequately address deterrence and the seriousness of the offense, the government believes a significant term of imprisonment is required, and it should be coupled with an extremely intensive period of supervised release. And that's why the supervised release terms were designed in which they were. They're long. They're hard, but they're set up with sunset provisions to incentivise him and reward him for good behavior if he is seeking his education, and if he is seeking employment and if he is complying with those intensive terms that probation will enforce, he should receive credit, but he must accomplish and overcome a lot of obstacles before those conditions are released. And we believe that the 60-month sentence combined with the 15 years of supervised release provides the best balance in light of all of the facts before this Court today.

Thank you.

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THE COURT: Thank you.

24 Mr. Durkin.

MR. DURKIN: Well, Judge, I don't want to have to

reiterate our pleading either like Mr. Hiller said, but there's a couple of things I want to point out.

I started out by saying this is a difficult case, extremely difficult case, and I think this goes to 3553(a), the nature and circumstances of the offense. It's an awful lot on both ways. But as I submitted in my memorandum, I think this is one of the problems trying to fit foreign policy into a criminal case. And that's just a fact. I'm not arguing it. I don't want to belabor it. I'm not condemning the government or any such thing, but we are dealing with an American citizen, a naive one, a foolish one, who was entirely seduced by online recruiters and provided with a cause bigger than himself. And that's a universal event. That's been going on for centuries. It goes to the lack of critical thinking skills that I have mentioned, again, which bases my request that sooner or later he has to be released, and he has to be trusted, and he has to change.

The whole idea of trying to balance the barbarousness of ISIS against an 18-year-old who is seduced by very slick online recruiters -- and that's one of the reasons I submitted -- resubmitted our bond motion. You know, Dabiq magazine, we've shown you the slickness of that.

President Obama, which I pointed out in the bond motion, shortly before Mr. Khan and his sister and brother are arrested, goes to the United Nations and talks about

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brainwashing or propagandized American youth and how we have to do something. Not long after he is arrested, Attorney General Holder with President Obama's backing announces that there's going to be a White House summit on countering violent extremism. And I point that out -- and that summit was delayed considerably, but it's now beginning to happen, as I said in my memo, and there are at least three pilot programs in the United States -- Boston, Minneapolis, Los Angeles -- with respect to programs for countering violent extremism.

The other thing I pointed out in my memo in this regard is that while it is certainly easy for everyone to barbarize ISIS today in terms of its being a threat to the United States because of some of the attacks that have happened in San Bernardino and so forth, I do point out in my memo -- and, again, this is not to belabor, and it's certainly not in any way to argue in favor of ISIS -- but I do think if you put this in the right context, the comments I made in my pleading about the report from the Brookings institute and the Princeton scholar Cole Bunzel about what ISIS's status was around this time was more of the Caliphate. And as is frequently the case, in cases that don't go to trial, I believe we could have shown a considerable, if not major, portion of his desire and his sister and his other brother, and you know how much the sister had a part in this, was for the Caliphate. And, again, that's not -- I mean, you know,

it's an absurd Caliphate. It's an absurd Caliphate even under Islamic theology, as I understand it. But for an 18-year-old in Bolingbrook with his background and education, it was very alluring. The whole concept of going somewhere for a religious purpose with higher ideals and the youthful sophomoricness of, you know, I'm leaving this country because it's so filthy in its values and so forth, as I said also in my memo, anybody that has raised teenagers certainly understands how that works, at least that kind of looking for something else and how stupid the elder generation is and how stupid everything else in the world is. That's not to excuse it. None of this is an excuse, but it goes to context I think.

The fact that the people of ISIS are crazy and barbarous is a bigger fact today than it was then. And, again, I just don't want to belabor it. But I genuinely think that his motivation was religious and it was misguided. And would he have been dead? Probably. I do agree with the government on that, but, you know, in many ways for different reasons. Even in his statement, he talked about a number of things when he was first interviewed by the FBI that he could have done or expected to do. One was medical. There were a bunch of other social service issues, and then he said and probably some military training or words to that effect. So I get it. But that goes I think to the whole difficulty of this

case. And I don't know whether you took the time to read my law review article that I cited, but I think it's also difficult and dangerous to discuss war rhetoric or to use rhetoric in the criminal justice system. We're old enough to see what's happened with wars on crime, wars on drugs, wars on terror. Criminal courts aren't designed to fight wars. And I credit the government enormously for accepting that here in one way, shape or form.

I give tremendous credit, as I do in my pleading, to the U.S. Attorney's Office in Chicago for having the good sense to be reasonable. That has not been the case all over the country. It's not necessarily even the position of the National Security Division in Washington. But much to its credit, and the Khan family is extremely grateful for the wisdom, for some short -- no other term I think would apply to it, and I think it's largely Mr. Hiller, to see both sides of this case.

And I think that's where we're at. I think we have a case where neither side is that far apart. I'm only asking for 40 months, and I have I think a very reasoned approach for the 40 months, which is he needs to go to college desperately. And is it necessary as a deterrent to add 20 more months to that and run the risk that he gets further radicalized, if that's the case, in a prison? I cited Dr. Xenakis' reports. I cited some scholarly journals about that. That's a real

danger. It's hardly a coincidence that a considerable number of radical preachers in the Middle East were all radicalized in prison. I don't think any more prison beyond what I'm asking for will do any good, and I was very careful at what I selected because I think 40 months -- if the only reason we're talking 60 is for general deterrence, I have a hard time imagining that somebody is going to calculate whether, if he gets on a plane and wants to go to Istanbul to try to get into Syria to go fight with ISIS, that he's going to try to calculate, well, let's see, kid in Chicago got this, and somebody else got -- I just don't see the difference. I don't see the difference between 40 and 20 as meaningful in that.

And that's my request. I think it's -- I think what I'm asking for is not unrealistic in that regard. I don't think deterrence is an overriding factor here in light of all the circumstances if we're talking 3553(a). I think it's obviously a point you have to consider. But I don't think there's any specific deterrence you have to worry about because it's certainly not going to be helped by 20 more months, and from a general deterrence standpoint, I think it's as much the same. I mean, 40 months for a first-time offender who committed an offense when he was 19, and, you know, when this started with his sister's involvement two years before when he wasn't even an adult, I think a 40-month sentence is -- I'm not saying it's harsh by any stretch of the imagination

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because I understand the guidelines and you're correct on the guidelines. But there are all kinds of times when the guidelines just don't fit a case, and if there was ever such a case, it doesn't fit this case. It just doesn't. This is a terrorist case in the most technical sense of the term. think that's very, very tricky. And, again, I think it's part of this problem with going -- putting -- mixing up foreign policy with the criminal justice system, and I think it's trickv. These are difficult times we're in, but people have always been in difficult times. I couldn't help but think today, I read the Washington Post. There's an article in the Washington Post today that they're citing Korematsu as a basis for permitting a registry of Muslims in this country. Now, I'm not saying that's going into effect, and the article goes to that point. It was not an official transition team person, but it was a high-up contributor to a pack for the president-elect. I'm dumbfounded by that. I'm absolutely dumbfounded that in civil liberties discourse in this country today we could be talking about *Korematsu* as being precedent for anything. And that's the problem. That's the problem with the war on terror in the criminal context. It's -- we shouldn't -- and I hope you won't and I trust you won't --

give into, like, fear because that's what would happen if

somehow we were to apply the guidelines, if somehow we were to

have to scare everyone.

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The fact of the matter is that Hamzah Khan is either going to be okay or he's not. And the choice is his. As Mr. Hiller said, these are the most severe supervised release restrictions I have ever seen. I think I would venture to say they are the most severe. I could not disagree more with probation's recommendation of life. That would be a disaster. That would be a -- that would give in to the very fear that drives the same issue with talking about Korematsu and registries and everything else: Let's keep an eye on him to make sure nothing ever happens. And that's insane, with all due respect. And it's not only insane, it's dangerous. It is very dangerous to suggest that we have to then keep an eye on somebody. We have to keep some type of preventative detention. And you know as well as I do that that's right around the corner in this country because we don't know what we're going to do with Guantanamo. And these issues of incredible civil liberties importance are being litigated an issue at a time.

And I'm not trying to say the sky is falling on this case; just the opposite. You know, five years is -- you know, can we live with it? Of course we can live with it. We can live with anything. But it's do we give in? Do we give in to the fear that we just can't trust that this kid is ever going to change? That's a real scary country for me to live in.

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It's a real scary thought that we're going to have a 20-year-old kid on lifetime supervised release for wanting to go join the Caliphate. That is very frightening to me. And I think the government even acknowledges that. I mean, the plea agreement called for, what, a minimum of 15 years. legions of statistics even in just regular criminal justice statistics about the recidivism and dangerousness of people once they get into their 30s and 40s. You know, we don't demand of our criminal justice system or our law enforcement system that we stop every murder. We don't try to -- and God knows in Chicago we don't do much of a job of that at all. And we don't have that same demand because we haven't made a political promise that there won't be any more attacks. to give in to the idea of a lifetime supervised release is part of this whole fear of what happens if something goes wrong, and so, therefore, we're going to have to try to ensure that no attack ever takes place, I don't know how we do that because there's too many other societal issues connected to that, but we certainly shouldn't try to do it with the criminal justice system. And, again, I'm only speaking to the idea of a lifetime supervised release. I think that's incredibly dangerous, and I'm really disappointed that the probation office would react to that, particularly when they're going to be the same people conducting the CVE, or the Countering Violent Extremism. That doesn't mesh in my mind

with trying to help somebody. We're going to help you, but, you know, we're going to put you on a real short leash. We're not going to give you any incentive to get off of these conditions. I mean, the whole negotiation over these conditions had to do with giving Mr. Khan some incentive to show that he doesn't need these conditions, and I think 15 years is more than sufficient to do that. And I think there's just such great supervision you can impose during that time that would be really helpful.

I don't think we should lose our bearings over cases like this, and these cases have that danger. There have been some heavy sentences in these cases. I think usually they involve a lot worse things than this and a lot more evidence of danger. But I think this is a real dangerous time to attempt to fight a war. We still have individualized sentencing, and I know you know that. I'm not trying to demean any of this, but there's just -- I think I use the term "atmospherics" in our pleading. Those atmospherics make this difficult today.

This is an important case. It's an important case to the government. I understand that. But it's also an important case to all the supporters that came for the Khan family. This is a very, very important case I think even for Mr. Khan. I have seen your remarks in the other sentencings about how maybe he could appreciate the justice he has

received, and I trust that's what he will get.

And I'll leave it at that. I think he deserves a chance. I think he deserves mercy. I think he deserves the training, but most importantly, I think he desperately needs to go to college as soon as he possibly can. And that's why I selected August of next year because that's what he needs. His best thinking got him here. And if he doesn't change his thinking, then it's going to be only a matter of time. But I wouldn't, if I were king, and nobody has even suggested --

THE COURT: Thanks for the promotion.

MR. DURKIN: Pardon me?

THE COURT: Thank you for the promotion.

MR. DURKIN: That I wouldn't run the risk of more time in prison. I would rather run the risk to see whether he could get his act together. I think he will, and I think he deserves that chance.

Thanks.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Khan, could you come forward, please.

All right. Mr. Khan, you have the right but not the obligation to make any comments you wish to. So you have the right to do so but in no way are you required to make any comments or remarks at all.

THE DEFENDANT: Yeah. I don't wish to make any statements right now.

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THE COURT: All right. Then I'm going to discuss the factors that I think are material to the sentence to be imposed in this case.

Under Section 3553(a) of Title 18, I am required to impose a sentence that is sufficient but not greater than necessary to serve the objectives of -- that are set forth in that statute, which include the need for the sentence imposed to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law and to provide just punishment for the offense, to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct, to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant and to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner. These four considerations align with the four generally recognized objectives of criminal sentencing, which are retribution, deterrence, incapacitation and rehabilitation. And federal courts are required to fashion sentences that will achieve all of those purposes to the extent that they are applicable in a given case.

To do that, the Court must consider the nature and circumstances of the offense of conviction and the history and characteristics of the defendant. The Court is required to consider a variety of factors, such as the kinds of sentences available under the law, and that includes the applicable sentencing guideline range and the policy statements that

inform the operation of the sentencing guidelines, the need for the sentence imposed to avoid unwarranted disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct, and in appropriate cases the need to provide restitution to victims of the offense.

Many of the factors that bear on these objectives and many of the objectives themselves are overlapping. Some of the factors relevant to those objectives point in different directions, and it is the Court's task to balance all of those factors in a manner that best promotes all of the sentencing objectives as they are relevant in this case.

In doing that, I start with the nature and circumstances of the crime committed by Mr. Khan. And within that heading, I start with the seriousness of the offense. And I'm not going to belabor the point. Mr. Khan set off to join and aid a terrorist organization that believes it's appropriate and believes it's indeed holy to kill anyone who disagrees with its religious dogma, not just people of other faiths, such as Buddhists or Jews or Christians, but even other followers of Islam who deviate in any way from ISIL's interpretations of the Quran. That organization is a terrorist organization, and the fact that its message is religious or purports to be religious rather than overtly political is a distinction without a difference.

I understand, Mr. Durkin, your point on some level

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that Mr. Khan was inspired to join the Caliphate, but this is an organization where the distinction between the Caliphate and the distinction between a terrorist organization is nonexistent. To want to join the Caliphate is to want to join jihad, which is war. It's not the United States that has interjected metaphors of war into the equation. The war is -being fought by ISIL is jihad, and that can't be separated from the purpose of this organization. There wasn't a beneficent purpose to the organization and a maleficent purpose to the organization. This is one organization with one objective, and that objective is jihad. That's the organization, Mr. Khan, that you set off to join. I understand at age 19, 18, 17 when you were contemplating these things that you were young and impressionable, so much more so were the individuals that I think you were responsible for ultimately being with you in the airport on your way to Turkey in October of 2014.

So I find the seriousness of this offense to be quite troubling, and I don't believe for a second that you really believe that you would go to ultimately Syria and work as a chef or work as a cook, that this is an organization that would respect that kind of a wish of an able-bodied 20 year old. And as you told me during your plea, you were prepared to do anything called upon, including taking up arms. So, again, this was a serious offense, and I think you understood

what you were effectively signing up for when you headed to O'Hare Airport that day. You were 19 years old. You have been -- you have led by almost any measure a very sheltered life that, I completely agree with Mr. Durkin's assessment, leaves individuals like yourself vulnerable to be preyed upon by criminals, to be preyed upon by terrorists and be recruited into their ranks. I also agree with Mr. Durkin that that does not excuse your conduct. At 19 years old, for better or worse, we consider people adults, and they are accountable for their conduct.

So against those choices that you made, I also do consider the fact that you have absolutely no criminal record. The people who know you best, your parents, your friends, your relatives, the people who are here supporting you today, the people that have written letters to the Court I have no question were absolutely dumbfounded by your actions, which, by all accounts, are completely at odds with what everyone understood you to be and describes you to be, as a caring human being capable of love and friendship and generosity. And I have great difficulty reconciling those two pictures, a young man willing to go and join an organization whose professed goal is to exterminate anyone who disagrees with their religious dogma with the young man who tutors children in math, plays basketball with his friends in high school, accompanies his father to work. Those are two portraits that

are very difficult to reconcile, but that's what I'm required to do in assessing what the objectives of this sentence are.

I agree with Mr. Durkin that this is a case where deterrence perhaps is not the foremost consideration. While obviously there does need to be a sentence imposed that will speak to not only you but to others and will speak with a voice that says this is a serious crime, this is conduct that cannot be tolerated, the real issue here I think in assessing these factors is risk and what is the risk that you pose to the public going forward. And I agree again with Mr. Durkin, and I don't think the government disagrees either, that a sentence that never offers you the opportunity to prove yourself is a sentence that will, in all likelihood, be counterproductive and will increase the risk as opposed to decreasing the risk.

There has to be a prison sentence here. No one disputes that. There has to be a significant term of supervised release. No one disputes that. And there's -- again, I agree with much of what Mr. Durkin has said without endorsing any of the issues raised, the contextual issues that have been raised about the introduction or the juxtaposition of politics in the criminal justice system. The question here and the two competing visions of what's appropriate here, not that either of those define the range that the Court is bound by, are separated by a question of 20 months of imprisonment.

And it is difficult to -- when viewed at that level to discern a meaningful distinction that is going to meaningfully affect the calculus of when adequate deterrence has been reached, when adequate incapacitation has been reached in the relatively narrow difference between the parties with respect to the sentence to be imposed in this case. I think that the parties are in the appropriate neighborhood. I think that the praise that Mr. Durkin has directed to the United States

Attorney's Office here and its ability to consider this case in its full context is appropriate and deserved. I think the government has taken a very restrained, principled and compassionate approach to the prosecution not only of this case but of the other individuals who were involved in this conduct.

So when I sit here and I assess what is the prison sentence that is necessary, the question for me comes down to the question of, you know, what is -- is there a basis to think that an additional 20 months in prison is going to make a meaningful difference in the risk that Mr. Khan poses to society? I don't think it will. Mr. Khan committed this crime when he was 19 years old. He's never posed any other danger to society. And under -- even the level that the parties have agreed to, he's going to be under strict and extensive supervision for an extended period of time.

I agree again with Mr. Durkin that this crime is in

part explained by and due to the cloistered and sheltered existence that Mr. Khan has led which left him ill-equipped to address the -- or think clearly about the proposals that were being made to him. Again, it does not mean he's not responsible for those decisions, but the question, again, is how do we best remedy the problem that led him to the decisions that he has made. And I don't think that imposing years and years of prison time is a method that is best calculated to reducing the threat that -- and the risk that Mr. Khan poses.

We are prognosticating here to a large degree, and we can't know for certain what the future holds. Mr. Khan, as I sit here and I talk to you right now, I don't have a crystal ball. I can't read your mind. I don't know if you're sincere or not. I agree with the government that you have done what you are able to do to demonstrate as clearly as you can through your actions, if not your words, that you have come to understand the foolishness of your course of conduct. But ultimately you're going to have to demonstrate that, and you're going to have to live that. And your best chance for doing that and our best chance for you doing that I don't think comes after years of additional incarceration in this case, which while for some offers them opportunities that end up -- and I intend no indictment of our prison system, but this isn't what our prison system was made to do, to instill

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the maturity and judgment and life skills necessary to address these kinds of recruitment. That's not what the prison system does. What I think will more likely accomplish those objectives is treatment, education and supervision, the things that are going to be central hallmarks of a term of supervised release in this case.

Trust but verify. You've got to be given the opportunity to learn and to be exposed to a broader world than you have been exposed to so that you understand the limitations and the defects in the presentations that have been made to you about this religious utopia. Those are not skills that you're going to get by spending years more in prison. Those are skills that you're going to get by going to college, by undergoing counseling, by having exposure to family and friends who live responsibly in this world who can mentor you and continue to teach and guide you and by having a system in place that assures that if, despite our efforts, you don't seem to be getting it, if, despite our best efforts, you, in fact, do not and have not been sincere in your rehabilitation, then we will know that, and we will know that we have made the wrong call before it is too late and before anyone is harmed.

So I think the appropriate sentence in this case, I am going to impose a sentence of imprisonment that has been requested by the defense. I'm going to impose a sentence of

40 months of imprisonment, which, assuming your good conduct, will allow you to begin college in August of 2017. I don't want to be confused as suggesting that college itself is a panacea. It's one piece of the puzzle. It's one ingredient that is necessary but not sufficient to ensure that Mr. Khan does not, in fact, present a risk to the public going forward.

So I'm going to impose the sentence of 40 months.

Mr. Khan has served more than half of that. And, again,
assuming his good conduct for the rest of his prison term,
he'll be out on supervised release in time to begin going to
college.

I want to talk about -- the terms of supervised release that are set forth in the government's submission are generally I think adequate in some cases, though I have some specific questions about the implementation of several of these conditions, and I want to talk about that first.

I guess before we get to the specific conditions, however, the term of supervised release, the parties have agreed that it should be a minimum of 15 years. While I in no sense disagree with Mr. Durkin's assessment that a term of life supervision is inappropriate here, the issue here is, is in my view, again, not the question of incapacitating and imprisoning Mr. Khan for an extended period of time but trusting and verifying. At the end of 15 years, Mr. Khan will be roughly 35 years old. While that is an age that represents

and we all certainly hope will find Mr. Khan with much greater maturity and much better judgment than he has now, that is also a time when the risk of further criminality, the risk of further participation and attraction to this sort of conduct certainly can't be ruled out.

So from my view, the term of supervised release needs to be longer than 15 years. I'm going to impose a modestly longer period of time of 20 years of supervised release which will take Mr. Khan into his 40s. At that stage I think it's reasonable to believe that we would have a good sense of whether Mr. Khan's remorse, rehabilitation, role in the community, the indicia of his life would be adequate to suggest that further supervision is not necessary. And it may well be that those factors are evident to everyone's satisfaction before that term of supervised release has concluded. The agreement of the parties is Mr. Khan will not receive reduction in the term -- or early termination of the term of supervised release for a period of ten years, I believe.

MR. HILLER: That's right.

THE COURT: I may or may not be here in ten years.

The same could be said of all of us. Somebody will be here in ten years. And if there's an argument to be made --

MR. DURKIN: Your odds are probably better than mine.

THE COURT: Well, we'll see. If there's an argument

Mr. Durkin or someone in his stead will be available to make that argument, and I or someone else in my stead will listen to that argument and consider it. But at the outset, at this stage, given the uncertainties and the risks and the consideration of the public's safety, I think that a somewhat longer period of supervision should be implemented knowing that that can be revisited and shortened if the evidence is there to do that. So I'm going to impose the term of supervised release of 20 years.

Now, with respect to the conditions of supervised release, I am required to impose a variety of conditions, some of which I'm required to impose, some of which I imposed because they are prudent and I believe appropriate to ensure that effective supervision over that term of supervised release can be accomplished.

Mr. Khan, during the term of supervised release, you cannot commit any other federal, state or local crime.

You may not unlawfully possess any controlled substance, and you must cooperate in the collection of a DNA sample if the collection of such a sample is required by law. Those are mandatory conditions I am required to impose.

Now, there are a number of additional conditions.

You will be required to seek, and if you obtain work, to work conscientiously at lawful employment or to pursue

conscientiously a course of study or vocational training that will equip you for employment going forward.

You must refrain from knowingly meeting or communicating with any person who you know to be engaged or planning to be engaged with any criminal activity.

And you must refrain from knowingly meeting or communicating with any person who claims to be associated with a foreign terrorist organization, who claims to be involved with violent acts or advocating for acts of violence and with any persons who are located outside of the United States without the prior approval of the United States Probation Office. The need for that condition obviously is to preclude communications that led to -- of the sort that led to the commission of the crime that you have been convicted of.

You must refrain from possessing any firearm, destructive device or other dangerous weapon.

You must participate at the direction of the probation office in any mental health treatment program, and any such program may include, at the recommendation of appropriate professionals, the use of prescription medication.

You will be required to work and provide community service. I'm going to impose a community service -- an annual community service requirement of 100 hours. That's a slight reduction from what the government proposed of 120 hours, 100 hours per year of supervised release, for the first five years

of the term of supervised release. By that time I expect that you would be fully employed. I would also expect that work in community service would become a part of your life without the requirement of it being a term of your supervised release, someone who professes to care for their fellow man, who should be looking for opportunities to serve the community, whether they're imposed on you or not. I think the reward for community service, once you have -- it has become an ingrained part of your life will prompt you to continue that pattern, but I will not require it as a term of supervised release for more than the first five years.

There are a number of conditions that assure that the probation office can effectively monitor your whereabouts and your activities. Those include that you must remain within the district where you are being supervised, which absent further court order will be the Northern District of Illinois unless you're granted permission to leave by the Court or by probation. You must report to probation when you are directed by the Court or by probation.

You must permit probation officers to visit at any reasonable time at home, work, school or community service location or other reasonable location specified by probation. And during such visits, you must permit the confiscation of any contraband that the officers may observe in plain view.

You must notify probation within 72 hours if you

change your residence or your employer or your workplace.

And unless there is some constitutional or other legal privilege that permits you not to do so, you must answer any questions posed by the probation office.

You must also notify probation promptly, within 72 hours, if you are arrested or questioned by any law enforcement officer for any reason whatsoever.

You must also satisfy a number of other special conditions.

You are required to submit at any time, with or without a warrant, to a search of your person or any property, house, apartment, residence, vehicle, records, computer, electronic communication devices or other data storage devices or electronic media or social media accounts, electronic communications accounts, e-mail accounts or other electronic communication accounts by any probation officer or other law enforcement officer acting at the request of a probation officer who has reasonable suspicion concerning a violation of a condition of these terms of supervised release or a violation of state or federal law while in the lawful discharge of that officer's supervision functions.

The purpose of that is, again, to effectively enable probation to monitor your activities and to verify that you, in fact, are not conducting the sort of communications and activity that led to your conviction in this case in your

commission of the offense in this case.

You will be required to participate in job skill training programs at the direction of probation during the period of supervised release, unless you are registered as a full-time student pursuing an associate's degree, a bachelor's degree, a graduate degree or other vocational training.

If you're unemployed -- if you're not in school and you're unemployed for a period of more than 60 days, you will be required to perform additional periods of community service, up to an additional 20 hours per week until you either return to school or achieve employment. Again, it may not be a saying that you are familiar with, but it is -- there's a phrase, idle hands are the devil's workshop. You need to be working, studying, directing your energies, keeping busy in a productive life, not trolling the Internet, not not contributing in a productive fashion. So many of these supervision requirements are designed to make sure that you are doing the things that will reduce the risk that you pose of future criminal conduct and will increase the likelihood that you will have the tools and the education necessary to be a productive and contributing member of our society.

You must provide probation with access to any requested financial information necessary to monitor compliance with any of the conditions of supervised release that have been imposed.

Now, Mr. Hiller, one of the conditions suggested by the government here was that the defendant not enter into any agreement to act as an informant or a special agent of law enforcement. That's in special condition No. 11.

We also have special condition No. 14 which appropriately reflects the ongoing cooperation requirements set forth in the plea agreement. I'm not sure that the language that is set forth in the government's recommendation really reconciles those two obligations.

MR. HILLER: Paragraph 11 was meant to address proactive and any type of interaction with law enforcement that we would not be aware of. If Mr. Khan, which is highly doubtful, was asked to engage in proactive work, it would be the government's intention to petition the Court and advise the Court that we would be putting Mr. Khan in that type of situation. At this point in time, we don't think Mr. Khan associating with the types of individuals that made him responsible for this would be productive, and we just put it in as a condition. It's not necessary but just to be complete.

THE COURT: All right. What I'm going to do is with respect to that condition, I'm going to just preface it by saying except as set forth in 14a below, the defendant shall not enter into any agreement, et cetera.

Mr. Khan, understanding what Mr. Hiller has said, you

can't act as an informant or a special agent of law enforcement without the permission of the Court except as you are being directly supervised and directed by the United States Attorney's Office consistent with the terms of your plea agreement in this case. And I suppose -- I want to -- I'm going to add language that makes clear that any proactive cooperation requires court notification and approval.

The next recommended condition is the third-party notification. I am not going to impose requirement of third-party notification. Probation, if there is a concern, can raise the issue with the Court, but I'm not going to impose an affirmative obligation on Mr. Khan to make third-party notification. If third-party notification is appropriate, it can be authorized by the Court for probation to make as necessary. So I don't think that's a necessary term of supervised release.

Mr. Khan, you will also be required to attend violent extremism counseling from providers as directed by the probation office. And you must also authorize as necessary the release of any mental health treatment records or violent extremism counseling records to the probation office. Again, that is so that the risk of recidivism here can be effectively monitored.

MR. DURKIN: Judge, could I just ask.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. DURKIN: I'm assuming it's implicit in this that probation couldn't otherwise share them with anyone without court approval?

THE COURT: That is implicit and is a requirement of law, I believe.

MR. DURKIN: I just -- that would be my only concern with that. You know, I don't know...

THE COURT: We'll add some wording, for the exclusive use of probation and the Court.

MR. DURKIN: Thank you.

And just to be safe, could we just say there will be no dissemination without court approval?

THE COURT: Yes. All right.

Now, there are also, Mr. Khan, conditions here that relate to your -- the requirement that you comply with the requirements of the computer and Internet monitoring program administered by the probation office. You must consent and with respect to any computers or devices capable of accessing the Internet that are in -- and I'm going to add this language -- that are in your personal possession, custody or control, that you consent to the installation of computer monitoring software on those computers. And by that I mean software that may restrict and/or record any and all activity that occurs on the computer, including the capture of keystrokes, the application information, the Internet use

history, e-mail correspondence and chat conversations. Notice will be placed on any such devices at the time of installation to warn others of the existence of the monitoring software, and you may not remove, tamper with, reverse-engineer or in any way circumvent such software.

Now, Mr. Hiller, I think that the term "in the defendant's personal possession, custody or control as necessary," we certainly hope that Mr. Khan will move forward with his life and have productive employment. And I don't think it's appropriate or reasonably feasible from a legal standpoint to impose monitoring software on a third-party computer like that. Does the government take any different view?

MR. HILLER: No. No.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. HILLER: The probation office is not going to be asked to put the monitoring software on a legitimate business' computers.

THE COURT: All right. So that's the purpose of adding in "the defendant's personal possession, custody or control." That would not extend to devices that are the property of an employer and subject to the employer's rights as opposed to Mr. Khan's rights.

In addition, as part of the computer and Internet monitoring program, you must allow probation to search any of

the devices or accounts that I have described that are in your personal possession, custody or control up to four times a month between 6:00 a.m. and 10:00 p.m. during the entire period of supervised release. And I'm going to add, again, just for clarity that this condition does not waive the right of any other person or entity with respect to such devices, accounts or property to ensure that any other entity that had a protected right would have the -- the government would have to address that right in order to carry out such a search. But that would not apply to any property -- personal property of Mr. Khan that is in his possession, custody or control.

Now, to the extent that any of the obligations under the computer and Internet monitoring program are released during the period of the term of supervised release, you will nevertheless be required to provide notice to probation within 24 hours of opening any new online or communication accounts that would enable you to communicate through electronic devices or online.

You will be required to seek prior approval by the probation office before you possess or -- before you possess any device that can access the Internet. Now, again, and I'm on paragraph F of condition 14, special condition 14. Both subparagraph (i) and (ii) purport to -- would require prior approval by probation for the use of any device that can access the Internet, as well as in subparagraph (ii)(2) that

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there be prior approval before accessing any website as well. I have a question -- I just question the feasibility of those restrictions. Given our hope and expectation that Mr. Khan will be employed at some point, will be a student at some point, how it's reasonably practical that he can obtain advance notification from probation before accessing a specific website?

MR. HILLER: I think it's a matter he's going to have to work out with probation as he crosses those milestones. I agree that functioning in an office environment or functioning as a bachelor's degree student at a college is going to require him to access the Internet and, in fact, many of his classes may be online. We contemplate for that. But I think he will be able to work through the computer Internet monitoring software with probation. It's going to require advance notice. It's going to require obtaining his syllabi beforehand and working through what his requirements are so that they can set the thresholds on the computer Internet monitoring so he can even access those, so he can physically access them because the program will limit where he is able to So if he's on his home laptop, he will just not be able to enter any website that he wants to and reach that website. He will be prohibited, will not be able to access those sites. So he's going to have to determine what types of sites and work through those things. And it will be hard, and there

will be a lot of obstacles, but I know probation is prepared.
And they've been working through these issues and will be able
to accomplish them.

I think we can come back to the Court to seek modification. Obviously my office understands the purpose of these supervised release conditions in furthering his education, and we're not going to stand in the way of that or his employment. But at the same time, it is just too impossible to allow him to access the web without extremely serious conditions at first. And then as time comes on, I think we can -- based on his response to the Court's conditions can modify those appropriately. But he wouldn't be able to take any computer class on day one. He wouldn't be able to take any job without working through those issues with probation. Just physically it wouldn't be possible.

THE COURT: All right. Well, again, it's not just a question of taking a computer class. It's probably a question of taking any class from the standpoint of, as you've said, you know, most of this material is online now. Even if you've got a syllabus for a particular course, you know, with a required reading, you know, there might be internal jump sites to reference materials, things like that. I mean, I don't know as a practical matter -- I mean, how are you -- and maybe this may be the way that the software works, and I don't understand enough about how the software works. And I -- I

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completely understand. I'm not suggesting the government is trying to set Mr. Khan up to fail here, but how is this, on a routine basis, handled in a way that permits someone to, you know, reasonably do the assigned reading in several college courses?

There is no routine basis because this MR. HILLER: is the first time that we have taken the computer Internet monitoring software and applied it to a situation like that. So this is a unique situation. Probation has spent a lot of time working through these issues already. I have spent a considerable amount of time working through these issues. We do realize that they will present obstacles, and I believe we'll be able to work through them. But I do think it's important that the conditions are restrictive initially and then we ask to modify upon understanding the situation at that point in time. When he comes in and if it's not practical, then we come to the Court and say, we're going to have to relax these to allow him to function as a student, as opposed to giving him that freedom now. We just don't know the situation he will be in. It could be a situation where we give him a lot of latitude but really prevent the communication applications. But we don't know where he's going to be in 40 months and what he's going to be asking to do so we would prefer those, the restrictions, to be at the highest level now and then allow us to either work through

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probation's discretion. They obviously maintain a lot of
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    discretion in applying the computer internet monitoring
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    program, and if it's not applicable, petition Your Honor for a
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    change in the conditions.
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             THE COURT: All right.
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             Mr. Durkin, do you have any --
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             MR. DURKIN: Well, we talked about this a lot.
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    don't profess to understand half of the sophisticated computer
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    monitoring, and obviously from a philosophical basis, I recoil
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    from it. But I think Mr. Hiller and I have been able to work
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    things out. I don't disagree with him that we should wait and
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    see where he's at. I think maybe if we -- I mean, we have a
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    record here. I think -- I guess, you know, I mean, we could
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    start parsing it but, you know, does it --
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             THE COURT: Well, it is obviously difficult to craft
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    the precise language at this stage.
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             MR. DURKIN:
                          Right.
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             THE COURT: All right. I'm satisfied at this point.
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    You understand where I'm at. If there is a problem that
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    poses, you know, a material impediment to Mr. Khan's ability
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    to do the work necessary to, you know, complete his
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    coursework, I mean, I think we're all in accord --
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             MR. DURKIN: Could I have a second to talk -- could I
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    just ask Mr. Hiller something?
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      (Off the record.)
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MR. HILLER: Judge, just to give you an example, without these conditions as restrictive as they are, if he's not working or if he's not in school upon his release or at some point during his period of supervised release, he would be able to access any computer that's not part of a computer Internet monitoring program and have free reign. So until he has a job or until he has a class that requires certain levels level of access to the Internet, we'd prefer to keep it strict. And at that point in time, we could say for purposes of this job, you're able to access the Internet once we understand what the job is going to be.

THE COURT: Sure.

MR. HILLER: So that really underlies the purpose.

THE COURT: All right. So I'll leave it as is, understanding that if there is some material impediment that you're not able to work out, that can be brought back and addressed. I'm satisfied everyone is on the same page here, that no one wants to impose that sort of impediment to Mr. Khan getting what everyone agrees is the necessary education to equip him to move forward productively.

All right. So those restrictions as set forth, you cannot possess or use any device that can access the Internet without prior approval of probation. You must seek prior approval by probation to access websites or online applications.

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You may not view any online social media, chat services, blogs, instant messaging or other communications, applications or sites without prior approval from the probation office. You may not use any encryption services or online encrypted communication applications without prior approval of probation or the Court. You may not use any service or application that is designed to disguise, mask or anonymize your online activity without prior approval of probation or the Court, and you may not use any online gaming services or systems without prior approval of probation or the Court. And, finally, with respect to those requirements, if you have any questions about whether activity relating to the use of computer services or accessing online sites or services or application, all such questions should be addressed with probation and/or the Court before resolving them on your own. I think that was it for the terms of All right. supervised release. As set forth in and based on our discussion, Mr. Durkin, do you have any objections to those terms of supervised release? MR. DURKIN: No, Judge. THE COURT: All right. Are there any aspects of the sentence to which you object at this point? MR. DURKIN: No.

THE COURT: All right.

The government, in requesting the sentence to be imposed of five years, I don't know if you ever expressly made the motion, but I understand the government moved to --

MR. HILLER: Absolutely.

THE COURT: -- have the sentence depart from the applicable guideline range to a sentence of five years. I have actually gone below the government's recommendation. The government has made the required motion.

The defendant is therefore -- his right to appeal the sentence or his conviction on any basis other than the voluntariness of his guilty plea or ineffective assistance of counsel, which would face a hard road in light of Mr. Durkin's very fine service, has been waived, but if any appeal is to be taken from the judgment in this case, it must be done within 14 days of entry of judgment on the docket, which will be entered in all likelihood on Monday.

Mr. Durkin, are you seeking any recommendation regarding the place of incarceration for the balance of the term of imprisonment?

MR. DURKIN: I would ask that he remain at the MCC.

THE COURT: Okay. I'm happy to make that recommendation.

Mr. Khan, you need to understand that I do not have the authority to dictate to the Bureau of Prisons where they

1 put you for the remainder of the prison term. That is up to 2 them. 3 From probation's perspective, is there anything I've 4 neglected to offer? 5 PROBATION OFFICER CHRISTIANSEN: No, Judge. 6 MR. DURKIN: Judge, there is an issue that Mr. Hiller 7 raises regarding --8 MR. HILLER: Just with respect to recommendation that 9 Mr. Khan has publicly been named as a cooperator for the 10 government, so the Bureau of Prisons takes that into 11 consideration. 12 THE COURT: All right. 13 MR. HILLER: That was a discussion Mr. Durkin and I 14 had some number of weeks ago. 15 THE COURT: Okay. There are many factors the Bureau 16 of Prisons has to take into account, that being one of them. 17 They will also consider my recommendation, but ultimately they 18 are responsible for the security and management of those 19 institutions, and they have the final say in terms of where 20 somebody is designated. So it may end up being the MCC. 21 may not. 22 All right. Anything else, Mr. Hiller, from the 23 government's perspective? 24 MR. HILLER: Judge, just imposition of special

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assessment. That would be it.

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THE COURT: Thank you. I am not imposing a fine. I don't believe Mr. Khan in the foreseeable future will have the resources to pay a fine.

Restitution is not an issue in this case.

I am required, however, to impose a special assessment on the count of conviction of \$100.

Mr. Khan, I have made similar remarks before. You have not been present for -- on those occasions, but I want to end this proceeding by expressing my hope that you appreciate what has happened in this case, which may be somewhat difficult for you to do standing there in custody. But I want to think about this: You are standing there as someone who was on his way to joining an organization that would like nothing better than to destroy the United States. And you, who professed to regard this country as your enemy, have not been treated as an enemy. You have been treated with compassion and respect by the representatives of this government, and that is certainly not the treatment a defector would have received at the hands of ISIL. Instead of a public beheading, you have been given a public trial proceeding. You have had the benefit of able counsel. Your family and your friends have had the right to be heard and have had the right to be present here for every proceeding in this case.

You have been sentenced only after consideration of your personal history and characteristics, and the sentence

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that has been imposed in this case is far lower than the sentence that the law would allow. And as part of that sentence, you are going to be provided with support and resources to help ensure that the mistakes you have made that have put you in this circumstance will not haunt you for the rest of your life and will not drag you down for the rest of your life.

The enemy government has not tried to kill you. has tried to help you. And I don't think there is anything that can demonstrate more eloquently or more powerfully this country's respect for the dignity and worth of all human beings than the justice and compassion that it extends even to those who would seek to destroy it. Nothing can better expose the moral depravity that is ISIS than to contrast its barbarism with the very highest standards of civilized behavior, and those are the standards that the government of the United States has met in this case. And it is my profound hope that by providing such clear evidence of the contrast between civilization and barbarism that you will actually help the world oppose and defeat ISIL rather than promoting it. That would be the best penance that you could possibly perform for the commission of this crime, and I hope you will continue to do it.

We are adjourned.

MR. DURKIN: Thank you, Judge.

1	MR. HILLER: Thank you, Your Honor.
2	(Which were all the proceedings heard.)
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4	CERTIFICATE
5	I certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript from
6	the record of proceedings in the above-entitled matter.
7	/s/Kelly M. Fitzgerald December 12, 2016
8	Kelly M. Fitzgerald Date
9	Official Court Reporter
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