1	IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
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3	United States of America,) Criminal Action
4) No. 1:21-cr-00096-RC Plaintiff,)
5) <u>Sentencing</u> (via Zoom) vs.
6	Michael Stepakoff,) Washington, D.C.
7) January 20, 2022 Defendant.) Time: 11:00 a.m.
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9	Transcript of <u>Sentencing</u> (via Zoom) Held Before
10	The Honorable Rudolph Contreras (via Zoom) United States District Judge
11	
12	<u>APPEARANCES</u>
	For the Government: Alison Prout
13 14	(via Zoom) UNITED STATES ATTORNEY'S OFFICE FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA Richard B. Russell Federal Building
15	75 Ted Turner Drive, Southwest Atlanta, Georgia 30303
16	For the Defendant: Marina Medvin
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19	Also Present: Sherry Baker, Probation Officer
20	Stenographic Official Court Reporter:
21	(via Zoom) Nancy J. Meyer Registered Diplomate Reporter
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PROCEEDINGS

(REPORTER'S NOTE: This hearing was held during the COVID-19 pandemic restrictions and is subject to the limitations of technology associated with the use of technology, including but not limited to telephone and video signal interference, static, signal interruptions, and other restrictions and limitations associated with remote court reporting via telephone, speakerphone, and/or videoconferencing.)

THE COURTROOM DEPUTY: This is Criminal Action 21-96, United States v. Michael Stepakoff.

For the United States, I have Alison Prout. For Michael Stepakoff, I have Marina Medvin. Our probation officer today is Sherry Baker, and also joining us today is Special Agent Brandon Merriman. Our court reporter is Nancy Meyer.

All parties are present.

THE COURT: Good morning, everybody.

All right. Let's start with -- hold on one second.

Let's start with the colloquy for proceeding by videoconferencing.

The Chief Judge in this district has authorized the use of videoconference for sentencings because they cannot be conducted in person without seriously jeopardizing public health and safety. We're prepared to proceed by videoconference for this hearing.

Ms. Medvin, do you believe that proceeding today via videoconference rather than I mean, waiting until a hearing can be safely held in person is in the interests of justice?

1 MS. MEDVIN: I do, Judge. Thank you. 2 THE COURT: Okay. And let's make just a short record as to why it makes sense to proceed today rather than waiting 3 until who knows when, when COVID goes away. 4 5 MS. MEDVIN: Well, Judge, this case has been ongoing 6 for over a year now. My client has been on pretrial probation. 7 And, quite honestly, I think that -- considering the offense that he's facing and the conduct at issue, his background, I 8 9 think at this point the Court should decide whether probation 10 at this point is even necessary. I don't want his pretrial 11 probation to be a higher sentence than an actual sentence 12 imposed, quite honestly. 13 THE COURT: Okay. I agree with all that. 14 Mr. Stepakoff, do you agree, after having consulted with your counsel, to participate in today's sentencing hearing 15 16 using videoconference rather than --17 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 18 THE COURT: -- being physically present in the 19 courtroom? 20 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. 21 THE COURT: Okay. Are you comfortable with the 22 videoconferencing equipment made available to you? 23 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I am. 24 THE COURT: Do you have an ability to consult with 25 your counsel in private, if necessary, during this proceeding?

1 THE DEFENDANT: I do. I guess I would just text her, 2 if I needed to do that. 3 THE COURT: Okay. And the software, the Zoom software, also has an ability for the courtroom deputy to put 4 5 you and Ms. Medvin in a separate room, so to speak, in which 6 the other parties are not part of. So if you want to have that 7 sort of conference during the proceeding, just ask, and we'll 8 go ahead and do that. And you'll be in a separate room where 9 you'll have privacy to consult with her. Do you understand? 10 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. THE COURT: The Court finds that the use of VTC is 11 12 necessary because it is not practical to appear in person, and 13 proceeding by VTC today is justified because the interests of 14 justice will be harmed without a prompt hearing. And the 15 defendant, after consultation with counsel, has consented to 16 proceeding in that fashion. 17 Mr. Stepakoff and Ms. Medvin, have you reviewed the 18 presentence report as revised following the defense and the 19 government's submissions? 20 MS. MEDVIN: We have, Judge. 21 THE COURT: Okay. Are there any remaining disputes 22 other than those identified in the papers? 23 MS. MEDVIN: No. The ones that we submitted are the 24 ones that we dispute. 25 THE COURT: Same question for the government.

1 MS. PROUT: No, Your Honor. The government provided 2 a clarification, and it has been adequately, I think, noted and 3 addressed, and we have no objections. THE COURT: Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 4 5 32(i)(3)(A), the Court will accept the presentence report as 6 its findings of fact on issues not in dispute. 7 The defendant has pleaded quilty to a Class B 8 misdemeanor to which the sentencing quidelines do not apply. 9 Therefore, I will assess and determine the proper sentence in 10 this case by reference to and consideration of all the relevant 11 factors pursuant to the sentencing statute found at 18 U.S.C. 3553(a). 12 13 The defendant has pled quilty to Count 4 of the 14 information; that is parading, demonstrating, or picketing in a 15 Capitol Building in violation of 40 U.S.C. § 5104(e)(2)(G). 16 The defendant has no criminal history. The maximum term 17 of imprisonment for this offense is six months, and the maximum 18 fine is \$5,000. 19 Would the government like to address the Court regarding 20 sentencing? 21 MS. PROUT: Yes, Your Honor. 22 And -- and we would add as well that there is a maximum 23 term of probation of five years in this case. 24 Let me start by saying that I have reviewed the Court's 25 comments in its prior sentencing in the January 6th case, and

I'm familiar with some of the Court's questions in that case.

I will do my best to address those issues throughout my presentation today.

As the Court notes, we are here today because the defendant unlawfully paraded, demonstrated, or picketed inside the U.S. Capitol Building on January 6th.

And the focus of this sentencing, as in every sentencing, should be on this defendant and how the 3553(a) factors apply to him. And that is what I'd like to concentrate my presentation on. But before I get there, there are three brief points I would like to address in response to issues raised by the defense in its briefing for today.

The first is the defense's claim that it feels deceived by the government's sentencing recommendation today. As the defense is well aware, the parties' plea agreement expressly states that there are no other agreements between the parties. So there was never a guarantee that there would be a probation recommendation in this case. And, in fact, the defendant -- or defense actually asked the government to agree to a probation recommendation in the plea agreement, and the request was refused. So any claim that the defense was somehow tricked by the government's recommendation is baseless in this case, Your Honor.

The second point I'd like to address, as a preliminary matter, is the claim that this is a political prosecution.

This defendant is not being prosecuted for his political beliefs, period. Had he simply attended the rally at

The Ellipse on January 6th, he would not be here. Had he simply recorded his views about this house being our house or about making Congress think twice about what they are going to do today, he would not be here.

He is here solely because of his decision to enter the U.S. Capitol Building on January 6th and the consequences of that action, plain and simple; and I will address those consequences in detail in a moment.

But the third and final preliminary point I wanted to make was to address the claims of selective prosecution or disparate sentencing recommendations by the government when compared to other protests, as noted by the defense.

So I'll address the issue of sentencing disparities as part of my main presentation, but with regard to the defense's attempt to compare this case to the Portland protests and the Kavanaugh protests, as the Court may be aware, several other defendants have raised similar arguments in court and, in fact, have sought discovery regarding claims of selective prosecution.

Both judges who reviewed those claims have rejected them, Your Honor. In the David Lee Judd case, Judge McFadden considered the claim that the Portland protest was being handled differently than the January 6th protests, and

Judge McFadden rejected that claim and the defendant's attempt to show that the Portland defendants were similarly situated to the January 6th defendant.

Likewise, in the Garret Miller case, Judge Nichols heard the same argument, or similar argument, and found that the differences were, quote, obvious and that while the Portland rioters' conduct was serious, it did not target peaceful transition of power at issue in the January 6th case.

Now, likewise, attempts to compare January 6th to protests related to the confirmation hearing of Justice Kavanaugh failed. With regard to the Justice Kavanaugh hearings, the Capitol was open to the public in 2018 when he was being confirmed. It was not open to the public on January 6th. The individuals in the Capitol Building during the -- the protest that day stood in line for tickets to attend the confirmation hearing and passed through security screenings. There was no unlawful entry to the building. There were no reports of property damage or reports of law enforcement being assaulted. And, simply, the Kavanaugh protesters were not part of a violent mob that laid siege to the Capitol and shut down an official proceeding for hours.

As the Court is undoubtedly aware, multiple decisions from this jurisdiction have called out the unique and singularly chilling nature of the breach of the Capitol on January 6th. And the truth is, the events of that day do defy

comparison; and for that reason, the government submits that claims of selective prosecution or attempts to compare the disposition of this case to the disposition of cases related to those protests are unwarranted.

But now I'll turn to what I believe should be the true focus of the Court's sentencing consideration today, which is the 3553(a) factors. And I will highlight four of those factors for the Court's consideration: the nature and circumstances of the offense; the history and characteristics of the defendant; the need for general and specific deterrence; and the issue of sentencing disparities, that I know is one that is on the Court's mind.

So to begin with regard to the nature and circumstance of the offense, we understand that the defendant has repeatedly called for in sentencing pleadings that the Court should focus on what he saw and what he did that day. And to a large extent, the government agrees with that.

So to talk about what the defendant did and what the defendant saw, here's what we know: We know that the defendant visited the Capitol grounds the night before January 6th and that he saw that it was completely closed to the public. We know that the defendant took a video that day that captured the Capitol grounds, showing the fencing all around it with the signs stating that it was closed to the public. We know that the defendant commented about the certification of election

results and about the fact that former Vice President Pence would be at the Capitol that day. And so we know that he understood what was happening there that day.

We also know that as he approached the building on January 6th, he saw a downed barricade, the barricade that still bore the sign closed to the public, and we know that he thought it was noteworthy enough to take a picture of it because we found a picture of that downed barricade on his phone.

We know that once on the grounds, the defendant watched people scaling the walls of the Capitol. And, again, it was something he thought noteworthy enough to video. And I would add that the exhibit submitted to the Court reflecting that is the complete video that was found on the defendant's phone.

Nothing was cut. So it's not clear -- you know, the defense say once those rioters breached the top of the wall, they waved flags. We don't have video either way of that. All we have is what was submitted to the Court in that regard.

We also know that as the defendant approached the building, he saw a line of officers guarding the outside of the building. Again, that is a video that was submitted to the Court in its entirety based on what was found from the defendant's media. None of those officers greeted him. None of those officers beckoned him in. They were standing guard trying to protect the building and its lawful occupants that

day.

We also know that as he entered the building, he walked through a door that had been severely damaged. There was glass on the floor. And we know from a video, not taken by the defendant but taken by somebody else, that after he was there, about 20 to 30 minutes after, that there were — that video gave you a sense of the sounds that were present that day, including a persistent blaring alarm that was going off in the building, and particularly in the area of the Senate wing door that he entered.

Now, I want to make clear, the government does not have video with sound for the exact time that the defendant entered, and so I cannot provide that to the Court. And I cannot confirm with a hundred percent certainty that those are the sounds that the defendant heard. But I can say that the government has reviewed video from both before and after that time period in which the alarm was, in fact, constantly blaring, and so we believe it to have been the case when the defendant entered.

We know as well that the defendant did not go through a metal detector or any security checkpoint when he entered the building. Now, in his sentencing memo, it states that while Mr. Stepakoff was inside the Capitol hallway, there was no sign -- or sorry -- there was no violence or destruction in his purview. But he literally walked through a door that had been

forced open in which the panes of glass had been shattered.

As Your Honor has seen from the videos submitted of the entire time that he was in the building, which was about 5 or 6 minutes, we know that he stood within 1 to 2 feet of a knocked-down piece of furniture in the middle of that entryway. We know that people were climbing through the windows on either side of him. There were indications all around that the scene was dangerous and that Mr. Stepakoff should not have been there, but he went in anyway.

Moreover, others before him and after him have been noted on other videos noting the smell of tear gas in the air, both inside and outside of the building, and can be seen flushing their eyes all throughout the west terrace area that leads to the Senate wing door. So while it is correct that no officers blocked his path to entry, there were clear signs of violent entry.

And the government can find no support that the defendant has claimed that officers welcomed him inside or ushered him in. No officers shook his hand as he entered. There was, indeed, an officer who was seen shaking several people's hands in the video that was submitted, and I think both the government and the defense submitted the same 5-minute video of the Capitol CCTV.

What you can see from that video is that the officer appears to be trying to keep the peace and avoid escalation.

He is not approaching people to shake hands. But when people approach him to shake hands, he is accepting that. And for the most part, it appears that he's shaking hands as people are walking out, which, of course, the Capitol Police were trying to encourage. And we can see that Mr. Stepakoff shook the hand of a Capitol police officer as he exited. So that couldn't have been something that he relied on to believe that he was allowed inside. That happened on the way out.

We also know that some of the things that the defendant said about the riot afterward were not honest. And I'm not talking about things that he didn't know at the time and learned later. I'm talking about things that he did know. So, for instance, the FBI interviewed one individual who the defendant spoke to later that night. The defendant told that person that the Capitol Police had opened the main doors for him and others and that they welcomed them into the Capitol Building. But the defendant did not enter through the visitors' center or any other main door, and we have not located any video showing law enforcement welcoming him inside.

The defendant also texted his mother-in-law that, quote, things got out of hand when they brought in a busload of Antifa. But later in his interview with the FBI, he acknowledged that this was something he had actually just read about on Twitter and other news outlets, not something he had seen. So he perpetuated what he knew to be false narratives

about the Capitol Police opening the main door and welcoming people in after the fact.

And I think this is all very important context, particularly with regard to what the defendant has represented about what he knew and what he understood that day. Of course, we can't see through his eyes, and we can't know what's in his head. All we can do is look for the evidence of what was happening around him.

And the government agrees that every defendant should be and is being looked at according to his or her own specific facts and circumstances. This is part of what makes the question of avoiding unwarranted sentencing disparities both very important but also very challenging because not one of these defendants is identical.

Here the defendant is not being charged with some of the more serious conduct of other defendants who were there on January 6th. He is only charged with misdemeanors, and that is commensurate with his conduct. The sentence that the government is seeking, 14 days in prison, plus probation, is directly proportionate to the conduct of this defendant and the circumstances in which he was there.

And so I'd like to turn to the defendant's history and characteristics. It's absolutely correct that the defendant has no criminal history, and it's to his credit that he has been gainfully employed and appears to have helped provide for

his family for most or all of his adult life. The -- these are positive attributes, without a doubt, and he should be commended for these things, and the government has taken that into consideration in its sentencing recommendation.

But a review of the defendant's history and characteristics is not just about criminal history. As the Court is aware, the defendant is a lawyer. Now, whether he can be called a lawyer or former lawyer based on his current status, frankly, I'm not clear and I don't want to misrepresent that. What I can say is that Mr. Stepakoff absolutely practiced law in the state of Florida for approximately 16 years, including 10 years of which as a criminal defense lawyer.

And the point of this isn't to suggest that he would have necessarily studied federal misdemeanor code to know what statute we're here about today, but the point is that his lawyers were called upon all the time to evaluate situations based on our judgment and understanding of the legal framework at large. Not to mention that as a lawyer, he's presumably been in at least one or two courtrooms in other government buildings since 9/11, and some form of security is essentially always required to enter a government building, let alone the U.S. Capitol Building on a day that the joint session of Congress was meeting.

So the idea that the defendant believed that he could

enter that building without walking through a metal detector or other security under the conditions around him that day, I think, at the very least, shows some very poor judgment.

Now, I do want to address very briefly the issue of the defendant's suspension from the practice of law. And I don't want to belabor that point, but it is obvious that it is not every day that you have a defendant who has admitted to acts of dishonesty in a consent judgment, and that is what we have here. And because so much of the defense's argument is based on very specific assertions by the defendant about what he saw and what he understood, his credibility is at issue here. And I'll leave that there unless the Court has any further questions about that matter.

The third factor that I'd like to focus on for 3553(a) considerations is the need for deterrence, both general and specific, and I think that both are important in this case.

With regard to general deterrence, what we are talking about is deterring the next discontented group who's storming the

Capitol next time when, for example, we certify the results of our next election or when Congress is making a decision that certain people disagree with. We promote general deterrence by imposing consequences. Consequences are essential. They discourage future criminal behavior. And general deterrence is especially important here where the crime is so public and so widely known and closely followed, as the defense has pointed

out.

The defense makes a somewhat puzzling argument that the government's, quote, unyielding prosecution of all defendants is precisely what has a general deterrent effect in this case but then argues that the defendant need only receive a \$50 fine for his offense. This is a contradiction. General deterrence and the unyielding prosecution of all defendants, we submit, requires that the participants in the Capitol riot be held fully accountable by having real consequences for their actions.

With regard to specific deterrence, here I would focus very carefully on the statements in the defense's sentencing memorandum to get a window into how the defense views the severity of the defendant's conduct. Throughout those filings, the defense characterizes the defendant as a mere, quote, peaceful protester. And he characterizes the Capitol breach by saying that January 6th was, quote, a political rally that got out of hand. Frankly, and with due respect, that is an insult to the hundred law enforcement officers who were injured that day in the line of duty defending the building and its occupants.

And I think the fact that he continues to downplay the seriousness of the events of January 6th -- and I mean the events overall. I'm not talking about whether he personally participated in violent conduct -- the events overall in the

mob of which he joined is a factor for the Court to consider in specific deterrence.

Another point raised by the defense is that the defendant cannot be reprimanded for something he did not see. That's a bit of a platitude, and it's not really accurate when it comes to how the law works. It's like saying that a hit-and-run defendant can say it's not his fault because he didn't see the person in front of him; or a drug mule can say since he never looked in the bag, he can't be punished.

The defendant can and should be punished for his actions and the consequences of those actions. And that is really why specific deterrence is needed here, because it's not okay, in his words, to just follow the crowd when the crowd is committing a crime. And it's also not okay to just pay attention to what's literally in front of your face -- or I'm sorry -- to not pay attention to what's literally in front of your face just because that's not what you're focused on. It's remarkable that the defendant is able to call out handshakes by officers that were happening at the opposite end of the room from him but insists that he didn't see broken glass and broken furniture.

It's because we have to hold people accountable for the consequences of their choices and their actions that the government submits that specific deterrence is very important in this case. Every single person who was present without

authority in the Capitol on January 6th contributed to the chaos of that day and to the danger posed to law enforcement and to the civilians who were inside the building and to the peaceful transfer of power.

And I know that the defense wants to break down step by step the words, the steps, and the conduct of Mr. Stepakoff and say surely one man didn't have that effect, one man didn't contribute to the chaos, one man didn't contribute to the danger. But if we carry that argument to its extension, virtually everyone who was there that day could say that. Now, obviously, the violent protesters who fought with law enforcement are in a different category and have been charged in a different category.

But the events of January 6th still, I believe, could not have taken place the way they did without the nonviolent protesters and the presence of people like Mr. Stepakoff contributing to the crowd and the mob that day. And this, I submit, is a fact that the defendant refuses to acknowledge to this day; and that is why the government believes that a sentence of incarceration is important, and that the government does raise some questions about the degree of the defendant's remorse for his actions.

The final factor that I'd like to discuss today is the issue of sentencing disparities. The government will be the first to acknowledge that sentencing is not an exact science

and that no defendant can be boiled down to a mathematical formula. I will say, however, that the government has made a great effort to analyze the specifics of each defendant's actions and history and characteristics and other relevant 3553(a) factors in determining its recommendations and has been commended by some other judges for its work to make consistent recommendations.

But mathematical precision is not possible; and, at a minimum, we know that different individuals, be they judges, prosecutors, or the public, will give different weight to the different 3553(a) factors. And it's also very difficult to review some of those factors that go into an ultimate sentence by reading a cold case for the record because, of course, the genuineness or lack thereof of a defendant's address to the Court may be lost on a transcript.

Likewise, the impact of the victim statement or of a family's words who are present to speak on behalf of the defendant may not fully come across. And for these reasons, while we have attempted to review this case in the context of others already sentenced, we continue to believe that the primary focus for the Court should be on the conduct of this defendant and the specifics of his case.

For comparison, the government did identify two relatively similar cases that are discussed in the government's sentencing memorandum, the Mazzocco case and the Pham case.

Those are both cases where the defendant had no criminal history, records of gainful employment, and relatively brief periods inside the Capitol, though longer than this defendant. One was inside for 12 minutes. One was inside for 20 minutes. They had some different nuances to their cases, which are discussed in that sentencing memorandum, but the government believes that the recommendation it makes today is well in line with cases like those.

The defense has raised two cases that it submits for comparison to the Court, and the government believes neither of those is a good comparison. In the *Doyle* case, it is true that the defendant climbed through the window instead of the door and spent 24 minutes inside the building, but there are some important distinctions in the *Doyle* case. Primarily, the defendant claimed that she actually stopped another rioter from damaging property. The government didn't have evidence of that one way or the other, but if that's the case, that would be viewed as a mitigating factor.

That defendant had no social media posts glorifying the events of January 6th and, significantly, the Court noted a very -- a very sincere showing of remorse and found the defendant appeared to be truly sorry for her role in the actions of January 6th. And Ms. Doyle, of course, was also not a former attorney. All of those, we believe, are distinctions that prevent that case from being a good comparator to the case

at hand.

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The second case raised by the defense is the Rosa case. That was a defendant who spent 15 minutes inside the building. And, again, that defendant had no criminal history and was gainfully employed. There's a very important distinction in that case; and, that is, that on January 9th, three days after the protest, that defendant made the voluntary decision to walk into his local FBI office to confess and accept responsibility. There had not been any arrest warrant obtained in his case. Contacted the FBI on his own. And that is a dramatic distinction from this case where we know that the FBI had contacted an individual to begin its investigation of Mr. Stepakoff, and that individual reached out on two occasions to Mr. Stepakoff to let him know that the FBI was investigating him. Mr. Stepakoff did not come forward at that time. He did not speak to law enforcement at that time. He ultimately was arrested by the FBI. And it was not until a negotiated condition of his plea required that he speak to the FBI that he did so.

And so to sum all of this up, I think Your Honor has previously noted that the riot was successful in delaying the certification in large part because of the number of participants involved, which simply overwhelmed and outnumbered the law enforcement present. So regardless of the defendant's intentions, he contributed to those numbers and has to be held

accountable for his actions.

For those reasons, the government believes that a sentence of 14 days of incarceration and 3 years of probation, in addition to 60 hours of community service is warranted and not more severe than necessary.

Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. I have a couple questions for you.

One is, obviously, as you reference in your footnote about the difference between consecutive incarceration and intermittent, that COVID is a serious problem in -- in correctional institutions these days. Why would it make any sense to send a nonviolent defendant into a correctional institution in the middle of this COVID emergency? You want to give me your thoughts on that?

MS. PROUT: Yes, Your Honor. And I appreciate the Court's concern about COVID.

What I would say to that is that of course federal courts have continued to sentence defendants to custody throughout the pandemic. Given the report time typically seen for sentencings, we're likely to be several months out from where we are, and certainly there are reports that the Omicron surge is going to be substantially reduced by then. But I think what's important is that now that vaccines are available, the risk is greatly reduced from what it was. And at the same time, the need for deterrence and a just sentence does remain

as high as ever. And so we do believe that the concerns about the need for deterrence and/or just sentence outweigh the concerns of the pandemic, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And the other question I have for you, you indicated you read my questions in the other -- the one -- only the one other January 6th case which I have sentenced.

And, you know, one of the things I asked there was the government has recommended home confinement in a number of cases.

And, you know, your black-and-white chart doesn't make it easy to compare and contrast in any substantive way. But one of the things I asked that prosecutor was, you know, why are you asking for incarceration. And what they said is, well, one of the things we consider is what the person did while they were in the Capitol. And this defendant -- meaning the defendant in that case -- spent time in a private office of one of the Congress people, and we considered that as an aggravating factor.

Well, that's not present here. So I don't see any way of distinguishing the cases in which the government has asked for home confinement.

MS. PROUT: I understand the Court's question. And because of the vast number of sentencings and cases that we've -- that have come through the courts at this point, it is very difficult to come up with a way to sort of encapsulate all

of that information.

What I would say is the government's approach here is to look at each defendant very specifically from a lens of what are mitigating factors and what are aggravating factors and what falls somewhere in between. Mitigating factors, as I mentioned, would be attempts to stop violence that day. A mitigating factor could be, like, the case I mentioned of a defendant who self-reports to law enforcement without being under investigation or a defendant who expresses extraordinary remorse. Those are some of the mitigating factors.

Aggravating factors, the government has outlined a number of potential aggravating factors in its sentencing memorandum, including things like the length of time in the building, which, of course, in this case would not be aggravating. Visiting sensitive spaces; again, not one of the aggravating factors in this case. In this case what the government sees as aggravating factors is really the combination of the defendant's background as a lawyer, and specifically a criminal lawyer, someone who absolutely should have known better than to be there that day, combined with the defendant's, in the government's view, very nuanced and shaded expression of remorse.

The government has some real concerns about whether the defendant is acknowledging the role that his presence played in the Capitol that day. And those are the aggravating factors

that we believe take this into the category of incarceration.

And, of course, we are asking for essentially the very lowest amount of incarceration, more or less, that would even qualify as incarceration. But we believe that those aggravating factors do tip the scale in favor of the government's request for incarceration here.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

Ms. Medvin.

MS. MEDVIN: Yes, Judge.

I'll start with the government's oral argument in terms of responses, and then I'll work -- I'll make my way towards the arguments we've already laid out in the pleadings and just elucidate some of the points.

First of all, the government -- I'll -- I'll start actually towards the end. The government was making comparisons between Mr. Stepakoff's case and that of Mr. Rosa, for example. One of the issues with that case being compared to other misdemeanor cases was brought up at the Rosa sentencing. And the government at that sentencing told the Court that the reason he was getting a lenient sentence and a lenient plea offer is because he receives credit for coming to the FBI. He was originally charged with a felony offense. And that felony offense was then reduced to a misdemeanor.

And what the government explained to the judge in that case was it was reduced to a misdemeanor because, in fact, in

that case the defendant came to the FBI. But then they still requested incarceration. I believe it was 30 days in that case. And so it's not accurate to say that the reason he received a lenient sentence was because he went to the FBI. They still requested a high sentence in that case. But in -- and that's -- that's because that case started out as a felony.

In this case, the main comparison would be to

Ms. Danielle Doyle. She started out with misdemeanors and so

did Mr. Stepakoff. And her final plea offer was the same type

as Mr. Stepakoff received, except the difference is she went

through a window, certainly not an entrance that's known to the

general public as an entrance. Mr. Stepakoff walked through

open doors. And this is an important point and why the defense

keeps deferring to the video of this case, the government

security footage, is because actually watching as opposed to

having the government explain, well, you know, something

happened to the left, something happened to the right,

something happened 20 minutes before, something happened

20 minutes after.

But putting on horse blinders and observing the moment that Mr. Stepakoff observed when he walked in, from his perspective, that's what's relevant here. And we would like to play for the Court Government's/Defense Exhibit A, if we can do so digitally. Or if the Court has seen it, we can submit on that.

THE COURT: I have seen all the exhibits that --

MS. MEDVIN: Thank you, Judge.

THE COURT: -- both sides have submitted.

MS. MEDVIN: The video clearly shows two doors that are wide open, and the entrance is wide enough for multiple people to pass through at the same time. There's no one blocking. There's no officer standing to the side of the entrance. It's just a large crowd coming in and out. The crowd is walking in slowly and peacefully. They're waving flags. The individuals in the crowd are not committing violence. The individuals around Mr. Stepakoff in that moment when he walked in were peaceful individuals. They were peaceful protesters.

Now, were they committing an offense while protesting?

Yes, that's a misdemeanor offense that they committed while

protesting by entering that building, by protesting inside the

Capitol. It's a locational violation. But in terms of their

conduct, they were, nonetheless, peaceful. They were not

harming anyone. And, indeed, on the video defense counsel is

able to count seven defendants who were -- seven individuals

inside the Capitol who shook hands with an officer. Some of

them were shaking as they were walking out. Others were to the

side of the video, to the right, which is inside the Capitol

hallway.

That officer wasn't standing initially near the door.

He was standing in the middle of the hallway before walking towards him, shaking hands, speaking to him, and that is the environment around. The officers weren't pushing anyone out.

No one was fighting. No one was toppling any statues. None of that was taking place.

Mr. Stepakoff, for a good portion of the video, was actually looking at his phone. He wasn't talking on his phone. He was looking at his phone. And he was standing near the entrance, and then he walked out after shaking hands with an officer. And so from that perspective, what he observed in that area in that moment he was in the building is not what the government is describing.

And this is where the defense made a point. We make this point a few times in our pleadings; where the government is using evidence from other cases to create this exceptional story of what Mr. Stepakoff would have been part of, but it wasn't there. Now, after the fact, playing Monday morning quarterback, and we're seeing a bird's-eye view -- because that's one of the exhibits that the government has submitted -- a bird's-eye view of the event from above, seeing a very large crowd and seeing in some other portions, there's violent acts taking place.

That's not what Mr. Stepakoff saw that day. That's not what he was exposed to. And the government says, okay, well, there's people scaling a wall. And as we say, well, yes, and,

after the fact, they waved flags. The government says, well, we didn't see that on Mr. Stepakoff's video.

Well, the government has the defendants who were waving flags actually facing charges. And they have other videos of it that they submitted to the defense in discovery. We have all the discovery. We have videos of individuals, as they call, scaling the wall, climbing up the wall, to wave flags as they get up there. And so the government says, well, because they scaled up a wall, then they waved flags, which they claim they don't know the flags were waved, but they do because they provided us with those videos. And surely they're exposed to the same videos on YouTube that they provide in pleadings as well that we can see.

But the individuals waving flags are not, quote/unquote, dangerous to the point where the defendant should at this point realize that he should not be going inside, or whatever the government is trying to make an argument of. It just doesn't quite make sense. It doesn't carry water.

The government is fully aware that individuals involved in protests are surrounded by some individuals that will take part in civil disobedience. That happens in every protest.

There's civil disobedience that the government knows full well about that takes place in every known protest in

Washington, D.C. There's always police out for this reason; that someone will disobey the law and someone will be arrested.

And that happened here. That happened in the Kavanaugh hearings. People get arrested, and it's just a degree of conduct.

In this particular case, with this defendant and what he saw, he wasn't at this point thinking, oh, well, this is a dangerous scenario because somebody's waving a flag at the top of the Capitol Building. He's paying attention to what's around here. And the Court has to take acknowledgment of the fact that he's in a very loud crowd, and he's one individual in a very loud crowd. He can only know so much of what's going around him.

And, again, all the images that there -- the government has taken from his phone that we have shown to the Court in our pleadings as well show older individuals, families protesting. They have Trump memorabilia. They don't have weapons. Their faces aren't hidden.

One of the points we make to the Court is a man is not covering his face and shaking hands with a police officer, this is not a man who thinks he's committing an offense. He doesn't have his face covered. He is not trying to run. He's not wearing black clothing to match other individuals with whom he walked in because they're trying to commit an offense and not be identified. No. His face is wide open, and he's shaking hands with officers because he doesn't realize that he is committing an offense.

And the government says, well, he's a lawyer or was a lawyer and for that reason he must have known that this is unlawful. Mr. Stepakoff practiced criminal law 22 years ago locally in Florida, defending indigent defendants under the Florida code. He knows nothing about the Capitol Building or its rules; and, quite honestly, as Mr. Stepakoff advised them, he was not aware that it's unlawful to protest in the Capitol, actually pointing at other instances when saw individuals protesting in the Capitol. He didn't realize that going inside the Capitol Building without doing anything was unlawful.

He knew, for example, a Senate proceeding interruption would be unlawful, having walked inside and done what the Kavanaugh protesters have done. As we mentioned in our pleadings, those were in the Senate hearing. The Senate proceedings were taking place. And in that chamber, individuals stood up and disturbed the Senate proceedings. That's when they were arrested. They actually disturbed the proceedings.

Mr. Stepakoff was in a hallway which on other occasions does open to the public. There are tourists at the Capitol.

Some of the images provided to the defense for global discovery show defendants walking through red velvet ropes like tourists would. The environment in that particular moment when the defendant entered is a very different environment than the one painted by the government because, yes, there are things going

around, but that's not what Mr. Stepakoff was taking part of or seeing.

At the end of the day, he's still an individual who didn't come with a group. He didn't come prepared. And this is not an individual who's behaving as if he's attempting to commit a crime or realizes even that he's committing a crime. The government wants him to be more omniscient; he needs to realize what's going on around him.

There were some individuals coming through windows. He doesn't make eye contact with those individuals. And we can see as he enters, he's not looking to his right, which is where he would have seen the individuals entering, or to his left. He didn't do that. He's kind of looking around, and he's aloof, and he's incognizant. He's paying attention to his phone. And he's slowly -- or, kind of, in his own world. This is not a defendant that's highly aware of his surroundings. Should he have been? Maybe. But that's not his personality. At the end of the day, he is who he was born as, and that's his personality. And he keeps to himself, and he's more aloof than other people. And it is what it is.

The government wants him to be more aware. There's a statue that was, apparently, knocked down. And, quite honestly, it took counsel quite a bit of time to realize what the government was talking about. But that statue that was knocked down, they're saying, well, he walked past it. There

were other individuals between him and the statue as he walked past. There was a line of other defendants walking past between Mr. Stepakoff and the statue. It wasn't adjacent to it. There was people in between him and that object, whatever it was, on the ground.

And even still, I'm not sure that if we see a birds-eye perspective, we see from above, in -- that camera, I don't know what the perspective would have been of someone on the ground at eye level with that object. I'm not sure that it would have been visible. I just know that in the video that the government is referencing, the object is visible from above.

As far as the government saying, well, we can't trust the statements. It's a veracity issue. We can't trust it because -- and they point to two things. Today they mentioned, well, apparently, Mr. Stepakoff spoke to an individual -- who, by the way, the government did not provide a full name to the defense so we have no ability to actually cross-examine the statement. The government says, well, a statement was made [sic] to that individual. Well, that individual is not here today for the ability of the defendant to cross-examine the statement. So we can't rely on it.

The name of that individual was never provided to the defense. They provided initials. And so that statement is just simply an unreliable statement even under the rules of sentencing. So even though we have lower standards for

admissibility, it's simply unreliable. We don't know who the individual is. We don't know if he remembers correctly. We don't know if he has any kind of incentives to fabricate or change. We know nothing about this. We have the government telling us someone said something and we're going to accept that as truth, and that's just simply unreliable.

And the second issue is the defendant's veracity based on a 20-year-old disciplinary issue. Now, we submit to the Court that we have never seen the defense -- a career criminal defense attorney, Judge -- over 10 years of practice, I've never seen anything like this where the government will seek out a defendant's 20-year-old bar disciplinary paperwork and try to say that, well, because 20 years ago something happened and we think we can be -- characterized as dishonest, because that's one of the words in the title of his sentence, that that -- or his suspension, that that means the defendant today is unreliable, even though all of the video evidence corroborates what he says. The video evidence simply corroborates that.

We don't have any reason not to believe him. The government decided that the state bar of Florida, which only looks at the past ten years of disciplinary history, must be wrong. And so the Florida state bar only looks at ten years and says, well, it didn't happen in the past ten years. It's not even important enough to notify the public. And so we

submitted to the Court imagery from the Florida state bar public website what they show the public as far as practicing attorneys and what the bar believes is relevant for the public to know about practicing counsel who they can trust.

Mr. Stepakoff isn't even practicing law. Mr. Stepakoff hasn't practiced law in 20 years -- or in 16 years at this point. And he's -- he hasn't sought to renew his license, and the reason why, as the government is fully aware, that's because he is a practicing rabbi. Mr. Stepakoff has been a rabbi for well over 20 years. He was initially doing both rabbinical work and practicing law, and then he stopped practicing law altogether in 2006.

And since that time, for 16 years, he's been doing exclusively rabbinical work. That is all he has been doing. He's a full-time rabbi. That is his calling. That is all he's been doing. He has been a man of God for 16 years. The government is fully aware of that.

But the government wants to ask for this excessive sentence, and so they're bending over backwards to find information on him. As we call -- this is an attempted character assassination of Mr. Stepakoff, trying to find some dirt on him, something to try and justify this absolutely exceptional sentence that they're seeking in this case, and it doesn't make any sense. And that's why we say the government is bending over backwards to find this information.

You know, we cannot rely on 20-year-old bar disciplinary records as a reason to believe or not believe someone when the evidence in front of us clearly shows that we should believe him; and certainly the evidence they're relying on is so old that even the state bar of Florida is not relying on it. And so we don't think the Court should consider that in its veracity considerations.

But in this case, the video evidence -- the primary video evidence of Mr. Stepakoff does not show a man who's aware he's committing a crime. And I cannot state that enough. The imagery from that video is fairly clear. He is an aloof man who doesn't belong. He clearly -- he has no idea what is going on or what he's doing, walking around pointlessly and walking out.

And the government says, well, there's an Antifa sticker or something -- anti-Antifa sticker on the door that they submitted a photo of and there's a broken window. And they say, well, it's not something Mr. Stepakoff may have or may not have seen. We're just trying to show that that's what it would have looked like. How is that relevant, Judge? This image was taken 20 to 30 minutes after Mr. Stepakoff walked through a door, and this is an image of a window. What does that have to do with anything?

And this is where the government is reaching. They're reaching to other people's cases to try and come up with

evidence to use against this defendant when, in fact, this sentencing, this defendant's, is supposed to be limited to his conduct, to what he knew, to what he saw, not to what everyone else was doing. And the government says, well, the defense is minimizing what everyone else was doing and that's why we're adding this.

Well, the defense is responding to what the government is doing. So the defense is trying to reel reality back in because the government has made some outlandish claims in these cases. They've stated that nothing worse has happened to the Capitol; where indeed we know, well, yes, something did. We had a bombing at the Capitol. We had double the value of damage from that bomb. The bombing was a deadly weapon.

None of that is present here. These were individuals who came in without weapons and who were protesting -- some were fighting, but these were not individuals prepared for attacking police officers or the Capitol -- individuals around Mr. Stepakoff. That just didn't happen. They didn't have weapons. They didn't throw bombs. They -- no one was shooting anyone. None of that was taking place.

So the government says, well, just because some -somewhere else something violent happened -- there may have
been a fire extinguisher. There may have been something else
that's violent. Police officers were injured from hand-to-hand
combat. Some people were using tools, et cetera. Again, that

wasn't happening around Mr. Stepakoff. What was happening is a protest that got out of hand around Mr. Stepakoff. That's what was happening there.

What happened elsewhere I'm not even going to comment on as far as his case because it's not relevant to him. An individual in a crowd, whatever happens with that, is still responsible for his actions and what he would have known about the crowd. So if an individual is taking part in a mob beating because he's watching someone beat someone else up and he takes part in that, that's different.

Here they were peacefully walking in and around. We see the protesters around Mr. Stepakoff, and those protesters are calm. Those protesters are nonviolent. And those protesters are peaceful. And they're peacefully shaking hands. You see some of the protesters patting the chests and the back of the officers, in addition to shaking their hands. These are individuals who are not out to harm anyone. That's the scene around Mr. Stepakoff. That is a protest that got out of hand. They shouldn't have gone inside, but that's where he was. That's what the group around him was. That's what he was seeing.

The government does note that he took a photo of a fence that was taken down. We don't know the location of that, and it wasn't -- it was quite a bit of time before he got to the Capitol. So in terms of the relevance of that, to where he was

in -- there's no connection there, other than it's somewhere in D.C.

The government made a comment today that in -- on

January the 5th Mr. Stepakoff knew that the Capitol was closed

off. Yes, on January the 5th, Mr. Stepakoff knew the Capitol

was closed off, but on January the 6th Mr. Capitol -
Mr. Stepakoff also went to President Trump's speech where

everyone was then told to go towards the Capitol. And he, like

everyone else, did. They all went towards the Capitol. And

then once they got there, they were all trying to have their

voices heard. You hear a lot of shouting and people screaming

and protest type of behavior. That was -- that was happening

in front of the Capitol where Mr. Stepakoff was. So none of

that was out of the ordinary in terms of what he was observing

prior to.

And then eventually the doors are open and the crowd walks through, he follows them in. That, for purposes of this case, we'll say, yes, that was out of the ordinary. Except for Mr. Stepakoff, he's not used to protesting, certainly not in D.C. This was not something he was aware of. Now he's very much aware not to follow crowds. He's certainly learned his lesson. He will not be following crowds.

I think that the government actually made a comment, well, we don't know if we can trust Mr. Stepakoff now to make this mistake again. The government actually asked

Mr. Stepakoff at his FBI interview, "Are you going to go to the protest scheduled in D.C. for" -- it was September or October. There was a protest in D.C. in front of the Capitol, and he said, "Absolutely not." They said, "Would you recommend to someone else to go to that protest?" And he said, "No, I would recommend people don't go to those protests." That's what he said. That was their conversation.

And so for the government to have the audacity to say that, oh, well, we don't know if he's going to commit other such acts in terms of when he's taking part in protests, it doesn't make any sense. They literally tried to establish this during his interview. They were testing his, I guess, danger in terms of these protests. And he made it clear. He's not going anywhere.

He's a normal man, a man who has four grown children. His oldest just went off to college. I'm sorry. His youngest just went off to college. This is a grown man who's being arrested at age 56 who was -- has a search warrant executed on his house for coming into the Capitol. The government thinks that, oh, this is a danger, that he's going to repeat. Of course not.

This is a man who had to take down posts because he was so concerned about his congregation because he's a rabbi and he leads people. He was so concerned about the congregation and their -- the political divisiveness. That's why the posts were

taken off. And that was a conversation the FBI had with Mr. Stepakoff as well. Why were these posts taken down? He explained. I was told that it's really bad for the congregation, people disagree politically, and I didn't want to add to the division. And so I took down my political posts because I didn't want there to be so much division. And they have that conversation with Mr. Stepakoff. Why were those things taken down?

And so today we hear a lot of -- and also in the pleadings -- the government trying to paint Mr. Stepakoff as an uncertainty or someone dangerous, and none of that is accurate. And the government had complete access to Mr. Stepakoff. They know everything they could possibly want to know. They executed search warrants on his cellular device and on his computers. Whatever it is that they wanted to find, they looked for and they could not find.

So then they talked to him. Whatever they wanted to ask, I gave them complete access to ask whatever they wanted of Mr. Stepakoff. The government even started asking about future protests, and normally I would have cut them off, but I let them continue asking those questions because this man has nothing to hide. This [sic] is not a danger to society or to the FBI or anyone else.

And so, again, reeling the story back in to where we are, at the end of the day, this is a protester who walked into

the Capitol, albeit unlawfully, who stayed there for a period of 5 minutes. He looks on his phone. He shook hands with a police officer. The people around him were peaceful. The people around him shook hands with officers, patted them on the chest, and then he walked out. And then he went back to his hotel room.

And then when people were claiming, oh, well, there's violence at the Capitol. I mean, I didn't -- I didn't believe that. He didn't believe that it happened because that's not what he saw. He wasn't trying to spread false information, which, by the way, still doesn't justify a criminal sentence of jail time, even if that was the case. But in this case, it was clear he didn't see violence so he thought it was lies perpetuated to make conservatives look bad. Because he thought there was -- I believe the story relayed was buses of Antifa or someone else trying to pose as Trump supporters, and those were the individuals who were committing these acts.

It had to be, because certainly in front of him no one was committing the acts that he was hearing about on the news. That's not what he saw for himself. That's not spreading lies, Judge. That's spreading what he thought was the truth and an explanation for what others were saying. He's creating an explanation for why it would have been the case.

In terms of the government's statement that, well, we're comparing -- the defense is comparing the Kavanaugh protesters

and Portland protesters to Mr. Stepakoff and somehow that that is a bad comparison, that's also inaccurate. It's actually a very good comparison.

And the government actually brought out a decision that is on the record from Judge McFadden. And the government made it sound like, well, in that decision Judge McFadden said that these are not a good comparison. I'd like to read from that decision, Judge, because it actually is very relevant. The judge writes, ". . incredibly, the Government dismissed . . . charges against all three Portland defendants," who, by the way, Judge, were accused of violent acts against police officers.

The judge writes, ". . . he" -- the defendant -- "still faces greater charges than the Portland defendants, despite [the] key difference[s]." And this is suspicious, he writes. He writes suspicious. That's the word the judge used. The judge wrote, "That is the kind of 'different treatment'" quote/unquote "that might warrant discovery."

"The Government responds that it treated Judd and the three Portland defendants equitably because it filed felony charges against all of them. . . . The Government seems to think that the initial charges are all that matter, [but] not" --

THE COURT REPORTER: Ms. Medvin, you're going to have to slow down if you're reading. "The Government seems to think

the initial charges are all that matter, but . . . "

MS. MEDVIN: "The Government seems to think that the initial charges are all that matter. Not so. By that logic, the Government could avoid discovery of a race-based selective prosecution claim if it indicted similarly situated black and white persons, dismissed the charges against the whites, and prosecuted the black defendants to conviction or plea. The 'administration of a criminal law' is not limited to an initial charging decision. Nor is it so easily circumvented."

Judge goes on to say, "More, the Government's logic would allow it to charge similarly situated black defendants with felonies and white defendants with misdemeanors. But discriminatory effects include disparities in the 'crimes charged.' The Government's argument is thus absurd and untenable - that the Government originally indicted the Portland defendants does not erase the potential for discriminatory effect."

And later on, the judge concludes -- and we cited to this decision in our sentencing memorandum. The judge notes that none of the suggested -- none of the -- "None of this suggests that the distinctions" -- and at this point the judge is referencing the distinctions he's made between Portland cases and these cases -- "Judd highlights are irrelevant for all purposes." And he quotes another decision that he made in another case, United States v. Griffin. He says, "Disparate

charging decisions in similar circumstances may be relevant at sentencing."

And, Your Honor, we are bringing up the discrepancy at sentencing. We did not file any other dismissal motions in this case. We're bringing up the disparity, where it belongs, at sentencing. Judge McFadden has stated twice on the record that this belongs at sentencing, and that's where we brought it, at sentencing. And this is the standard that we're asking for the Court to consider, sentencing disparity, not charging disparity. And that is why we put forward this argument. So the government's argument as far as charging decisions, it's simply irrelevant because that is not what we have raised.

As far as the Portland cases, those cases are tremendously different, obviously, than Mr. Stepakoff's case. We had individuals who were attacking officers violently. Officers suffered injury, and the government dismissed charges against those individuals. I believe more than half of the individuals charged had their charges dismissed. The government made claims, well, it's hard to ascertain their identify because certainly they're wearing black, they were wearing matching uniforms, and their faces were covered. And so it's hard to ascertain identity.

But, of course, Judge McFadden pointed this out, as did some defendants. That didn't stop the government from finding who they were and arresting them; therefore, not having an

identity issue. So, indeed, someone with an identity that was strong enough minimally for probable cause was arrested, and then, of course, their charges were dismissed after the fact, after they completed community service or some kind of other dismissal program.

And a dismissal program, like that exists in the District of Columbia, as the defense points out in our pleadings, there is such a program of dismissal. And the cases are supposed to be considered on an individual basis. But Ms. Prout and other prosecutors have made it very clear that the January 6th defendants shouldn't even worry about that, that does not apply to them.

Their cases will not be considered individually even for the dismissals program. That will never simply apply to anyone involved in the January 6th prosecution, so contradicting their online website claim that they treat cases individually.

Because these individuals are not being treated as individuals. They're being treated as members of a group of people who came to the Capitol on January the 6th. So irrespective of their individual conduct, they need not apply for any kind of dismissal disposition.

And we certainly submit to the Court that that is not equitable and that that completely contradicts their policy statement. The government is treating these defendants differently for purposes of sentencing because this is for

purposes of disposing of the offense. It's a disposition issue.

As far as the Kavanaugh protester that -
Ms. Steingraber that we've pointed to in our memorandum, her

conduct was significantly more serious than Mr. Stepakoff's.

She was inside the Senate Chamber, and she disrupted the

proceedings, which are also constitutionally mandated

proceedings in that case. Different types. But, nonetheless,

those were disrupted by her behavior. And after the fact, she

boasted about it on the internet.

And the government says, well, the fact that the defendants in the January 6th cases boast about something on the internet or promote some kind of political ideology, that that should matter for sentencing. Well, it didn't matter that this boasting was taking place in other cases. This isn't the first time a defendant went into the Capitol politically and then posted something on the internet. That happens all the time. That's in the age of the internet what people do.

And at the end of the day, her conduct is more serious than Mr. Stepakoff's. But her conduct was considered a type of civil disobedience. She was charged under D.C. local code, and it was a post-and-forfeiture disposition where she posted \$50 and the case gets dismissed. It's not even an adjudication of guilt. So it's not even a criminal record for her.

With Mr. Stepakoff, and other defendants similarly

situated to Mr. Stepakoff, they were prosecuted by the federal government; something that did not take place in any other kind of Senate disruption scenario. They received supervised pretrial probation. They were restricted from traveling.

Mr. Stepakoff's passport, for example, was taken from him.

They are restricted from possessing firearms, most of the defendants in these cases. They're treated very differently than someone who just pays \$50 and their case goes away without a record.

Then, none of these cases were offered a dismissal disposition. These cases were offered at the lowest -- the offense that Mr. Stepakoff pled to, which is the parading in the Capitol offense, and there is a mirror offense of this nature in the District of Columbia code, as we pointed out as well. That wasn't offered to the defendant. Plead guilty but under the District code. No. It was under the federal code so they could get a federal sentencing, because they have a harsher sentencing here in the federal court. Because, as the government noted, it's up to five years of probation as opposed to dismissal with not even a criminal record.

And so here we are with very similar conduct. And the government explains, well, the reason why is because it's part of January 6th. Fine. At this point, Mr. Stepakoff has already pled to the offense. He's already been on a year of supervised probation pretrial. He's already pled guilty. So

he already has a criminal record. These are punishments. His house was ransacked. That's a punishment.

He was publicly ridiculed on the government's website where they posted to -- all his documents. They created a web page with his name on it. They have an actual web page with Mr. Stepakoff's name on it in their website pages. So he's -- their department may choose when to remove it, if ever. And so this is what we called public tar and feathering at this point. Because why do we have that in these cases; right? It's never been done before.

So the government is treating them all very differently, and they're causing severe societal implications. You know, everything from the conviction to the one year of supervised release, pretrial probation, to these -- these websites, to how they discuss these cases, to going into a 20-year-old disciplinary proceeding from the state bar in Florida. All of this. How they're treating these cases is nowhere near how any other protester would be treated.

And on top of all of this -- because this is not enough. On top of all of this, he should also go to jail for 14 days and have a constitutionally impermissible additional sentence of three years of probation, which, as the defense pointed to the Court's attention, simply cannot take place. And the government even submitted in a supplemental authority submission to the Court yesterday, there's another court here

in this jurisdiction that also found that, indeed, the -- you cannot jointly have probation and incarceration.

But this is the government's position; that nothing is enough. Nothing is enough, and we need to go above and beyond, above and beyond. And at the end of the day, we're still back to the original offense at hand. And it's more than sufficient. And as we pointed out in terms of, you know, societal deterrence, as we pointed out in our pleadings, society has deterred. People aren't showing up at protests at the front of the Capitol. They're scared. There were more media and more police than protesters at the last protest in front of the Capitol.

These people are genuinely frightened of protesting. They're frightened of the federal government. The American people are frightened of the FBI. And we're seeing this play out in real time in front of the Capitol, in front of the protests that are scheduled. And to say that that is not enough, to say that society is still not adequately deterred, well, Judge, I -- I don't know what would be.

I don't see how putting everyone in jail and also telling people they should be afraid of protesting is what society needs as a deterrent. Because that's certainly not the case. And it should never be that individuals feel that they cannot protest. Because it wasn't the protest that is being

punished. It's a locational protest in this particular case or violence that came from it in some of the other cases. It's not the protest itself.

But when the government makes claims that, well,

Mr. Stepakoff isn't remorseful because he did not take back his

politics, now that is a problem. So that is something that

happened in this case where the defendant says to the

government, I wished I did not protest in the Capitol. I

wished I did not go in, because had I known that it was

unlawful, I would have turned around. He had this conversation

with them. He repeated this multiple times. He repeated it to

his pretrial probation officer. This was a constant issue.

And he's very remorseful this happened because he really wishes he didn't break the law. But what he did not say -- what the government wanted him to say -- is that he wishes he did not protest, period, or that he wishes he could reverse his politics or something of that nature. That wasn't done in this case.

And that's where the government all of a sudden is now making claims, well, he's not sufficiently remorseful. But, indeed, he is. He didn't know. He's not going to lie and say he knew. He didn't know; because he will not lie, not even to appease the federal government. He will not lie and say that he knew that it was unlawful to enter the Capitol. He simply will not say that. I will not allow him to say that, and he

doesn't want to say that because that's a lie. And we're not going to do that to this Court. He didn't know.

If the government wants to say that, that's a bad thing and he should be punished more severely than somebody who knowingly violated multiple laws, that's something different.

But he didn't know. And -- nor do I think he should be punished more severely for that, but that's a whole different issue. But it didn't happen.

What the government wanted for him to say is that he knew and he still went in and also he takes back his politics. And that's simply not the case here. He didn't know, and the politics isn't what caused for him to go inside the Capitol. He wasn't motivated by any kind of political nature to go inside. It was simply an extension of his already-there protest. He wasn't specifically going inside to achieve any kind of purpose. That's not alleged in the government's statement of facts either.

He personally didn't have any kind of purpose, other than following the crowd in and exiting, in his protest. It wasn't to achieve any other political means other than to continue his protest. It's just a locational issue for him. The location where his protest took place, that is what was unlawful. That is the evidence here.

In terms of the politics involved and the various allegations being made against the government in a variety of

these cases, that they're prosecuting these more harshly; and something we brought out as well compared to defendants with other politics. That's simply present; that we're simply seeing these prosecution disparities. And what are we supposed to do with that? What are we supposed to do when we see that? We have to highlight it for the Court, because the Court needs to see that defendants who committed more serious offenses inside the Senate chambers, those defendants are getting more lenient deals.

At the end of the day, what Mr. Stepakoff did was walk into a Capitol for 5 minutes unlawfully. He should not have been there. He shook hands. He walked out. That is his conduct. What he posted online afterwards doesn't lay claim to anything different than what he told the FBI.

None of his politics were any -- kind of extraordinary or dangerous. He wasn't claiming that anything violent should happen. The government actually conceded and actually made a point saying I don't believe the violence, but it might come to it. And he's saying that based on what -- the idea of these elections and whatnot. This is an individual who was present on January 6th. And instead of saying it already has come to it, he said one day it might come to violence. That is what he said because -- and that is further proof that he did not see on that day a level of violence. Because he thought all these people protesting might one day evolve into violence. That is

what he thought, and that is what he was warning.

And he said, "I don't believe in violence. I don't believe in violence." And why not? Because he's a rabbi, he's a man of God, and he's talking to his congregation at the end of the day. That's what these videos all were. He's communicating with his congregation, his people.

And he committed an offense. It's a locational protest offense. It was certainly on the wrong day; that we -- certainly wishes he wasn't there. He certainly wishes he didn't go inside the Capitol. But in terms of taking back politics or taking back any of that type of, you know, emotional connection to it, it wasn't part of why he entered the Capitol. And for that reason it's not something that he should have to take back or anyone else.

The government, I think, should be very concerned about society and the public. As we pointed out, too, in our pleadings, they owe a duty not just to an incarcerated defendant, but it's a duty to the people and also to the defendant. And that's where, you know, a lot of due process litigation comes from, a lot of Brady material. The government, for example, has to turn over evidence to the defense even if the defense doesn't ask for it. These are all obligations the government has to the defendant.

Because at the end of the day, it's supposed to be an equitable prosecution. It's not supposed to be a persecution.

It's not supposed to be disparate treatment. None of that is supposed to be taking place. But, unfortunately, that's what we've seen in a lot of these cases, especially with this one, as far as the sentencing requests. That's quite a bit of what we're seeing here. And so we did point that out to the Court because we have to. It's our duty to make sure that the Court is aware of what's been happening.

The government noted that the defendant should not feel deceived by the negotiations because the plea agreement did not have the sentence outline. We agree the plea agreement did not have that sentence outline. We didn't claim it did. We put it into a footnote what was taking place between the parties because it was such an unusual situation; where the government throughout their conversations with Mr. Stepakoff, two prosecutors -- multiple prosecutors conveyed to the defense we don't expect for the government to be seeking jail time in this case. Because we were all in the same boat where

Mr. Stepakoff's conduct certainly isn't very serious compared to other defendants.

We didn't expect jail time. And so we were reading about it over and over again. There was no promises, absolutely no promises made, but it was conversational. It was an understanding of the case. Unless, the government said, we find out something in his interview or something else comes up that we did not know about, and, of course, that's

understandable.

But that's not what happened here. What happened here is the government -- just hours before memoranda were due, the government notified the defense that all of a sudden they're requesting 14 days in jail, plus three years of probation. And that was just shocking because that certainly wasn't anything we discussed previously. And the factors that the government pointed to, the fact that he's a lawyer -- and all that was known to them. And the fact that he's a lawyer --

Another important point of consideration for the Court is the *Clinesmith* case. That was a lawyer. That was an FBI lawyer. That FBI lawyer committed an act of dishonesty while employed for the FBI and with civilian victims. Based on that, there's an additional lawsuit right now. Mr. Carter Page -- Dr. Carter Page is suing him right now.

And the government doesn't discuss that case. But in that case, the sentence is relevant as well. Because even in that case, where a lawyer lies in the course of the performance of his duties for the federal government with a civilian victim, he still did not receive jail time. He received one-year probation and some community service and a fine, I believe. I'm trying to recall the exact number of that. But there wasn't even jail time in that case, and it was one year of probation.

You know, certainly in terms of comparing the fact that

he's a lawyer wouldn't matter. It matters for sentencing disparity purposes. But the government ignores that case and says, well, no, Mr. Stepakoff is a lawyer. And he went into the Capitol 22 years after practicing local Florida law, which has absolutely nothing to do with the Capitol or federal law or any of that, and he should go to jail because of that. That doesn't make any sense. That's just completely outlandish.

And so the Court was saying, Mr. Stepakoff -- and I'll have Mr. Stepakoff make a statement shortly. He does wish to address the Court. We will have him address the Court.

But as we go back to our pleadings that we submitted to the Court, I pointed out a variety of issues that are problematic on the government's side. We also pointed out to -- pointed to what the defendant actually did. And we're saying, yes, the penalty here should be \$50 because that is what the penalty was for other protesters who were similarly situated -- Ms. Steingraber and others like her -- and other individuals at the Capitol and those individuals who actually had done worse because they had disrupted proceedings.

Mr. Stepakoff -- and we discussed the proceeding issue tangentially here, but in terms of -- he was there at 3:00 p.m. So he personally did not disrupt the initial proceedings from ceasing. We also are not sure -- and I don't think the government knows full well, which they have not provided to us that information in any way, why the Senate and the House

recessed initially.

And it does appear from testimony from Congress that the House was recessed because of the pipe bombs that were discovered in the RNC and DNC buildings and there was concern there might be something around the Capitol as well, and that is why the House resumed proceedings later, technically resumed in the middle of this crowd convening to interrupt based on the government's timeline. Regardless, Mr. Stepakoff was there after 3:00 p.m. And so at that point, again, what is his conduct? And that's what we're trying to bring the Court's attention back to.

And so I do think that a \$50 fine is appropriate. And this is not his only penalty, because his penalty is also a conviction, a criminal record, a permanent criminal record. His penalty is also the one year of pretrial supervision that he's been on and, of course, the public ridicule and the media that's watching this hearing and all the other hearings and writing about it.

I mean, this is all public shame, and this is all part of the sentence, and this is all part of public deterrence, both for him and for the public. It's more than sufficient. It's more than sufficient. And I think that the \$50 penalty -- also considering that he's already paid the \$500 restitution, just to show good faith, I think all of that really points to the fact that Mr. Stepakoff's equitable penalty in this case is

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1
       $50, and that's how we should conclude this case.
2
              Thank you, Judge.
 3
                 THE COURT: All right. I'll hear from Mr. Stepakoff,
       but you put my court reporter through a Peloton-like workout.
 4
 5
       I'm going to take a five-minute break, and we'll come back and
 6
       hear from Mr. Stepakoff.
 7
                 (Recess taken.)
                 THE COURT: Back on now?
 8
 9
                 THE COURT REPORTER: (Nods head.)
10
                 THE COURT: All right. Mr. Stepakoff, you did
11
       want --
12
                 MS. PROUT: Your Honor, I did want to request an
13
       opportunity to very briefly respond to a couple of the points
14
       made by the defense. I didn't know if you'd like the
15
       government to do that before or after Mr. Stepakoff speaks.
16
                 THE COURT: Which points?
17
                 MS. PROUT: There were just a few factual
18
       clarifications that the government wanted to make regarding
19
       some of the evidence that the defense discussed. I can be very
20
       brief.
21
                 THE COURT: Let me hear from Mr. Stepakoff first.
22
                 MS. PROUT: Thank you.
23
                 THE DEFENDANT: Thank you, Your Honor.
24
              Entering the Capitol was a terrible mistake on my part.
25
       I deeply regret it. I wish I could take it back, but I can't.
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It was not done in defiance nor as an act of civil disobedience or anything like that but simply because I failed to properly appreciate the situation.

That day I went up Pennsylvania Avenue, along with throngs of people, and I followed the crowd and entered through an open door of the Capitol Building in the plain view of law enforcement, both inside and outside of the Capitol. People were being allowed to flow into the Capitol. No arrests were being made. No warnings and no instructions were given to leave the premises, which I would have done immediately. No violence was taking place, and there was a lot of friendly engagement between the protesters and law enforcement. All of what I describe is clear to see in the CCTV video.

Although in hindsight I now know that I was clearly mistaken, it did seem at the time that the protest, which I had come to D.C. to be a part of, was continually -- was continuing lawfully and without any objection from law enforcement inside of that -- that lobby, which I now know is called the Senate wing, which is where I entered.

I originally went to Washington to witness a historic event and to let my voice be heard as part of it. And this seemed like a pivotal and historical moment in our country.

And whatever the outcome, I just wanted to be a part of it and witness it, be able to talk about it over livestream and with friends back home. If the GOP candidate lost, so be it.

There's always another election two years and then four years later. That's America.

I was horrified to learn of the chaos and violence that broke out, which totally contradicted and undermined the whole point of the gathering. I had no part in any of that, nor did I witness it. If I had witnessed it, I would have made an immediate U-turn and returned back to my hotel. I accept that entering into the Capitol was not lawful, and I was wrong to think that it was. I did not exercise good judgment, even though I was only in there for a few minutes in one small area, and all I did inside was lean up against a wall and take some selfies. And even though -- I complimented the officers, I said thank you for your service, we love you, God bless you, and then I exited. Still, I had no right to be there, and I accept that. And that's why I pled guilty to the unlawful parading charge.

I do feel that I failed to properly assess and understand the situation, and I deeply regret it. I've got great remorse about it. There's a lot of things I have to live with because of it, hurt that I've caused to myself and to others, and I deeply regret it. I take full responsibility for that failure.

Thank you.

THE COURT: I have a few questions for you. And, you know, you and I are about the same age. In fact, I think we

overlapped for a year at Florida State. And you might recall when we were kids we used to watch a cartoon named Mr. Magoo, and that's essentially how your counsel has characterized you. You just stumbled through the events with -- oblivious to all the mayhem around you, which, you know, Magoo-like characters generally don't get through college and go to law school.

So it's a little bit hard to square what you're saying now and the arc of your life. You did not -- when you took those photos in front of the fence with the signs that said closed to the public, you did not understand that the Capitol was closed?

THE DEFENDANT: I didn't because I was flowing with the crowd. And I should have. I wish I had. I wish I had understood it and -- and wouldn't be sitting here right now, I guess. But I was flowing with the crowd. There were thousands of people in that area, and nobody was clashing with police or anything like that. So I just really didn't pay attention to it the way I should have.

THE COURT: You didn't hear the alarms going off?

THE DEFENDANT: No, Your Honor. There definitely were no alarms. I mean, that definitely wasn't happening.

And I -- I'll ask Your Honor to consider that I'm not a person that would take lightly the idea that I might be breaking the law. I mean, there's no way that I would take that kind of risk with my life, my career, my family to just --

1 just in a flippant way just ignore the law and put myself at 2 risk of being arrested and going through everything I'm going 3 through now. I just did not assess it properly, and I just didn't see it that way at the time. It was my mistake. 4 5 THE COURT: When you went through those doors, you didn't see that the glass had been broken out? 6 7 THE DEFENDANT: No, sir, I did not see that. THE COURT: How about chemical -- was there a 8 9 chemical smell in the air? 10 THE DEFENDANT: I didn't notice that, and I wasn't 11 wiping my eyes in the video or anything like that. I didn't 12 notice that. It seemed like a friendly environment. 13 I think, looking back on it, that what impressed me the 14 most was that -- the presence of law enforcement. Normally if 15 you commit a crime right in front of eight or ten police 16 officers, you're going to be arrested. And there wasn't any --17 anybody being arrested. There wasn't -- and I don't mean to 18 sound like I'm blaming someone else because I'm not. Those 19 brave and noble officers deserve all the credit in the world. 20 That's why I thanked them. 21 But if somebody had stood there with a megaphone and 22 said: Warning. You are trespassing on government property. 23 Leave the premise immediately, I would have gotten out of there 24 in a heartbeat. It just -- it just seemed like it was being

allowed at the time. I never said that they opened the doors

25

and ushered people in. That didn't happen where I was, but it just seemed like, at the time, that the protests that I had come to be a part of -- which the President said, you know, now we're going to peacefully and patriotically march to the Capitol, it just seemed like it was carrying on there. And I was wrong. I was mistaken, and -- and I regret it. And that was my state of mind at the time, sir.

THE COURT: So in the video, you spend a lot of time looking down at your phone. Were you following contemporaneous reports of what was occurring?

THE DEFENDANT: No. I was -- I believe I was trying to delete some pictures because the -- my phone had reached its capacity. And I was trying to take a few more pictures. I can't recall exactly. There were some cell -- cell phone messages that may have come in, but I don't -- I don't remember specifically. But I don't think I was getting good cell phone coverage inside there, but my -- my main focus was to try to take some pictures.

THE COURT: You didn't read any contemporaneous accounts that characterized what happened as a breach of the Capitol?

THE DEFENDANT: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. So let's start with the financial issues. So the restitution has been agreed to by the parties, and that's \$500, which I'm told has already been

paid.

With respect to a fine, the maximum fine is \$5,000. Although probation indicated that the defendant has an ability to pay, that given the expenses and income, they recommend only a modest fine. I intend to impose a fine to compensate the government for its supervision of defendant for the past year and into the next, which combined with -- amount to \$742.

The Court is to impose a fine -- rather, is to impose a sentence sufficient but not greater than necessary to comply with the purposes set forth in the subsection. I'm to consider the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and the characteristics of the defendant and impose a sentence that reflects the seriousness of the events, promotes respect for the law, and provides just punishment for the offense.

Of course, the offense is serious. A number of my colleagues have spoken very eloquently about this. Defendant took part in the mob riot that took place at the Capitol on January 6th, 2021. Many of the rioters engaged in violence and some destroyed property. I have watched numerous videos of rioters engaging in hand-to-hand combat with police officials.

It was not a peaceful event. More than a hundred law enforcement officers were injured on that day. Moreover, the Capitol sustained almost \$1.5 million in property damage. Many of the rioters intended to block the certification of the votes for President Joe Biden, and although the rioters failed to

block the certification, they delayed it for several hours.

The security breach forced lawmakers to hide inside the House gallery until they could be evacuated to undisclosed locations. In short, the rioters' actions threatened the peaceful transfer of power. That is a direct attack on our nation's democracy.

With that said, no evidence has been presented that shows the defendant assaulting law enforcement or destroying property. After entering the Capitol Building through an entrance at which law enforcement had been overwhelmed a short time beforehand, in which clearly showed evidence of forced entry, such as broken windows, defendant entered and lingered for about 5 minutes. The riot was successful in delaying the certification, in large part, because of the numbers of participants involved, which simply overwhelmed the outnumbered law enforcement officers present.

Regardless of the defendant's intentions, because he contributed to these numbers, he must be held accountable for his actions and the results to which his actions contributed.

Otherwise, defendant has no criminal history. He's a 56-year-old man with a bachelor's degree and a law degree. He practiced law for a number of years and now serves as a rabbi. In his sentencing memos and today, he attempts to diminish his culpability by portraying himself as a Mr. Magoo-like character that stumbled into and entered the Capitol oblivious to the

mayhem around him. The government has presented persuasive evidence indicating that this characterization is highly suspect. The defendant is a highly educated individual who the Court finds is highly unlikely to have been so oblivious.

Otherwise, defendant's background is unremarkable. He grew up in an intact and loving family. All of his needs were provided for, and he received an advanced education. He has always been gainfully employed and appears to have a strong family support system in place.

The Court is to impose a sentence that affords adequate deterrence to criminal conduct, protects the public from further crimes of the defendant. The events of January 6th involved a rather unprecedented confluence of events spread by then President Trump and a number of his prominent allies who bear much responsibility for what occurred on that day.

Since defendant's arrest, he seems to have done well on release status, and the Court is confident that given his prior lack of criminal history and lack of a violent past that he is unlikely to reoffend, will not be emotionally swept up in irrational actions, and will pose no risk to the public.

With respect to general deterrence, the Court does not believe that incarceration is necessary to deter other nonviolent protesters from crossing the line to law breaking. The defendant's ordeal through the criminal justice system, fines, restitution, community service, and probation with home

confinement should serve as an adequate deterrent to those that can be deterred.

No one has brought any issues to my attention concerning a need for education or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner.

The Court is to consider the kinds of sentences available. Given the nature of the crime and the defendant's lack of criminal history, the Court is considering a period of probation that contains restrictions and imposes home confinement for a period of time. Even if the Court were inclined to consider a short term of incarceration, it would not be prudent to impose such during the COVID pandemic.

The Court is to consider the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range established for the applicable category of offense committed by the applicable category of defendant set forth in the guidelines. As indicated and agreed to by all, the guidelines do not apply in this case, and no pertinent policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission have been brought to my attention.

The Court is to impose a sentence that avoids unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct. The government has provided a chart that lists a number of the January 6th defendants' sentencings. But as I indicated previously, there is not enough granular information to make

apt comparisons. However, the list does make it clear that the government has recommended noncustodial home confinement probation sentences in a number of these cases. And the Court finds it hard to distinguish those cases from this case.

But the Court finds given the size, scope, and impact of the January 6th mob riot presenting a direct challenge of this country's bedrock democratic principles, the defendant's attempt to compare and contrast the treatment of the January 6th defendants to that of the defendants who attempted to derail the Kavanaugh confirmation hearing falls flat, and the Court doesn't find those defendants comparable to the defendants in the January 6th cases.

We've already dealt with restitution. And I will now indicate the sentence to be imposed, but counsel will have one more opportunity to make any legal objections before the sentence is actually imposed.

Ms. Medvin, do you have any objections to any of the factors I'm considering?

MS. MEDVIN: I -- I believe the issue of home confinement is still an incarceration. And so I -- I understand -- with the Court's indulgence, I'll pull up the code section to review it once more considering the judge's consideration of home confinement. But my understanding of that is while it can be ordered with probation to supervise, nonetheless, it's a type of incarceration.

And for purposes of Class B misdemeanors, which are petty offenses, I think it would amount to a higher penalty than if he had been sentenced to a more serious offense. And so it might be an issue specific to Class B misdemeanor, petty offenses.

THE COURT: I disagree. It will be part of the probation, but you can preserve that argument.

Ms. Prout, do you have any objections to any of the factors I've considered?

MS. PROUT: I do not, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Stepakoff, it is the judgment of the Court that you are hereby sentenced to serve a 12-month term of probation on Count 4. This term of probation shall include a 2-month term of home confinement with location monitoring.

You are further ordered to pay a special assessment of \$10 and a fine of \$742 as to Count 4. The special assessment and fine are payable to the Clerk of the Court for the U.S. District Court, District of Columbia, within 30 days. You are ordered to make restitution to the Architect of the Capitol in the amount of \$500, although I understand that that has already occurred, but it will be in the judgment and commitment order. Within 30 days of any change of address, you shall notify the Clerk of the Court of that change until such time that the financial obligations are paid in full.

While on supervision, you shall not use or possess an illegal controlled substance; and you shall not commit another federal, state, or local crime. The mandatory drug testing condition is suspended based on the Court's determination that you pose a low risk of future substance abuse.

You shall also abide by the general conditions of supervision adopted by the U.S. Probation Office, which will be set forth in the judgment and commitment order, as well as the following special conditions: During your period of home confinement, you will be subject to location monitoring in order to enforce that requirement of home confinement, and you shall be monitored by radiofrequency or GPS monitoring at the discretion of the probation office supervising your probation, and shall abide by all technology requirements for a period of two months.

This form of location monitoring technology is ordered to monitor the following restrictions on movement in the community, as well as other court-imposed conditions of release. You are restricted to your residence at all times except for employment; education; religious services; medical, substance abuse, or mental health treatment; attorney visits; court appearances or court-ordered obligations, including community service; or other activities as preapproved by the probation office.

There will be a requirement of financial disclosure

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1
       until the financial obligations are paid and satisfied, and
       those will be set forth in the judgment and commitment order.
2
 3
              You must complete 60 hours of community service within
       6 months, and the probation office will supervise the
 4
 5
       participation in the program by approving the program, and you
 6
       must provide written verification of the completed hours to the
 7
       probation office.
 8
              Counsel, any reasons other than those previously stated
 9
       and argued why the sentence should not be imposed as stated?
10
              Ms. Medvin?
11
                 MS. MEDVIN: No, Judge.
12
                 THE COURT: Ms. Prout?
13
                 MS. PROUT: No, Your Honor.
14
                 THE COURT: The sentence is as stated.
15
              I gather that charges in Counts 1, 2, and 3 need to be
16
       dismissed as -- from the information; is that correct?
                 MS. PROUT: Yes, Your Honor. The government so moves
17
18
       now.
19
                 THE COURT:
                             (Inaudible) as well.
20
                 THE COURT REPORTER: Judge, we couldn't hear that
21
       first part.
22
                 THE COURT: I understand that charges in Counts 1, 2,
23
       and 3 of the information need to be dismissed, and we'll do
24
       that as part of the judgment and commitment order.
25
              So, Mr. Stepakoff, you were convicted by a plea of
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guilty. You can appeal your conviction if you believe that your guilty plea was somehow involuntary or if there's some other fundamental defect in the proceedings that was not waived by your guilty plea.

You also have a statutory right to appeal your sentence under certain circumstances to the extent not waived by your guilty plea, and your guilty plea has waived a number of appellate rights. But if you're inclined to appeal, consult with your attorney.

You have the right to apply for leave to appeal in forma pauperis. That means without -- without cost, and if you request and qualify, the Clerk of the Court will prepare and file a notice of appeal on your behalf, although I note that you're represented by very able counsel who can assist you in that process.

Most importantly, with few exceptions, any notice of appeal must be filed within 14 days of the entry of the judgment, and I expect that the judgment will probably be entered early next week. So 14 days from that point.

Probation has requested that the jurisdiction for the supervision be transferred to the Middle District of Florida. Does anyone have any objection to that?

- MS. PROUT: No, Your Honor.
- MS. MEDVIN: No, Judge.
- THE COURT: I'll go ahead and submit the paperwork

1 for that once it's submitted to me from probation. 2 Anything else that we need to accomplish today, 3 Ms. Medvin? 4 MS. MEDVIN: Two things. I wanted to bring to the 5 Court's attention that my client's passport was taken in the 6 Middle District of Florida and, apparently, was sent to the 7 District of Columbia, and now there's a transactional problem in terms of where to file to -- for the return of the passport. 8 9 And so we ask if the Court can somehow mention this -- the 10 release of his passport as part of his conditions. So that's number one. 11 12 And number two, the issue of the release of the CCTV 13 footage that we relied on as evidence. It's under highly 14 sensitive designation under the protective order, and now that 15 it's been part of the proceedings, we'd ask that it be released 16 from the confines of that order. 17 THE COURT: Ms. Prout. 18 MS. PROUT: Your Honor, the government has no 19 objection. 20 And -- and on the same subject, the government does ask 21 to formally admit the government's exhibits that were submitted 22 in chambers as well. 23 THE COURT: I'll formally admit both parties' 24 exhibits, all of which I've reviewed prior to today's hearing.

And I will submit an order making the CCTV exhibit and all the

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1
       other exhibits I relied upon available as I've done in other
2
       matters. Let me write that down.
 3
              Okay. If nothing further, you're excused.
 4
              Mr. Stepakoff, I don't expect to ever see you again,
5
       except for perhaps at a Florida State alumni event. But good
 6
       luck to you, sir.
7
                 THE DEFENDANT: Thank you. You won't, Your Honor.
              Can I ask one thing? How do I proceed from here?
 8
 9
       Should I get in touch with Ms. Baker or someone --
10
                 THE COURT: Get in touch with your counsel.
       She'll usher you through any issues you need.
11
12
              All right. Thank you.
13
                 (Proceedings were concluded at 12:55 p.m.)
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1	CERTIFICATE OF OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER
2	
3	I, Nancy J. Meyer, Registered Diplomate Reporter,
4	Certified Realtime Reporter, do hereby certify that the above
5	and foregoing constitutes a true and accurate transcript of my
6	stenograph notes and is a full, true, and complete transcript
7	of the proceedings to the best of my ability.
8	
9	Dated this 27th day of January, 2022.
10	
11	/s/ Nancy J. Meyer Nancy J. Meyer
12	Official Court Reporter Registered Diplomate Reporter
13	Certified Realtime Reporter 333 Constitution Avenue Northwest
14	Washington, D.C. 20001
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