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Hisba in Mosul:  
Systematic Oppression in the Name of Virtue

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Program on  
Extremism

## **Program on Extremism**

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## **About the Author**

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*The views expressed in this paper are solely those of the author, and not necessarily those of the Program on Extremism or the George Washington University.*

## **Executive Summary**

Following the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria's overt military surge on June 10, 2014, which took over Iraq's second largest city, Mosul, a strict interpretation of Shari'ah was imposed on the locals. "Diwan Al-Hisba"—Chamber of Morality Police—was immediately established and soon took on an organized form. Hisba members were deployed in public venues such as markets, parks, and even schools where they sought out violations of the religious code and imposed penalties varying from fines for minor misdemeanors, to execution in more severe cases. This paper attempts to demystify the work of Hisba in Mosul. While other works have extensively highlighted Hisba in other ISIS-controlled areas such as Raqqa, Aleppo, and Anbar, namely the work of Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi, this paper shall present accounts from trusted eyewitnesses and reflect on the social aspect of the practice. This paper also examines the psyche of Mosul's society prior to the Islamic State surge, taking a closer look at the various preexisting interpretations of social conservatism and whether, and if so how, the surge influenced the concept of Hisba.

## **Mosul before ISIS**

The conception of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and the origin of its roots in the Northern Iraqi city of Mosul remain topics of debate. Mosul witnessed anti-coalition and anti-government insurgency in the immediate aftermath of regime change, and much of that insurgency was affiliated with al Qaeda and other strands of armed jihad whose end goals, after “defeating the infidels and apostates,” revolved around establishing a Shari’ah-abiding state.<sup>1</sup> Thus, any date following April 9, 2003, does not offer an accurate illustration of Mosul before the phenomenon of overt religious violence.

Going back to Mosul in the 1960s, 70s, and 80s offers a different view of the city. The city was vibrant with art, culture, coffee shops, and social events. Segregation between men and women was rare and there was no pressure, legal or social, to live according to Shari’ah-leaning conservatism.<sup>2</sup> It should be noted, however, that there were hints of popular Islamist approval after the “Al-Shawaf” uprising in 1959.<sup>3</sup> Though Al-Shawaf’s revolt was led by Arab nationalists, the Communist-leaning Iraqi President Abdul Kareem Qassim’s excessive authorization of violence—which caused scores of deaths and unprecedented chaos in the city—led to an embrace of the then-marginal Muslim Brotherhood network in Mosul.<sup>4</sup> The influence of this network was not visible beyond a slight increase in the number of mosques constructed with private money and donations. The Muslim Brotherhood camp remained restricted to a few influential families who passed on their commitment to future generations.<sup>5</sup> Heavy monitoring by the Baath Party limited their effect on the city for the next three decades.

However, these families would exercise their influence nearly three decades later, when Saddam Hussein implemented the “Faith Campaign” in 1993.<sup>6</sup> The Faith Campaign included an overhaul of Islamic teachings in school and universities, the launch of higher education Islamic institutions, and the creation of a new set of regulations aligned with Islamic virtues, such as banning alcohol sales in public and closing nightclubs. While several analysts and experts contest that the Faith Campaign set the foundation for Salafism in Iraq before the invasion, the Campaign focused on the Iraqi Baath Party’s version of Arab National-centric Islam in what appeared to be an attempt to win over the religious camp in the midst of severe economic sanctions that were fueling public frustration.<sup>7</sup> In Mosul, the campaign offered a rare platform to the aforementioned affluent pro-Muslim Brotherhood Islamists whose influence was already evident as the sanctions following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait worsened.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Sinan Adnan and Aaron Reese, “Beyond the Islamic State: Iraq’s Sunni Insurgency,” *Middle East Security Report* 24: 18-22.

<sup>2</sup> Ma’an Abdel Qader Al Zakariya, “Mosul in the olden days: Mosul’s cafes and casinos between the thirties and seventies of the past centuries,” *Bayt al Mosul*, August 4, 2013.

<sup>3</sup> Karl R. Sorby, “Iraq: The Mosul Uprising of 1959,” *African and Asian Studies* 15(2): 133-151.

<sup>4</sup> Ibrahim Khalil Al-Alef, “The history and present of the society of Muslim Brothers in Iraq,” *Blog of Dr. Ibrahim Al-Alaf*, April 1, 2015.

<sup>5</sup> Al-Sawaf, Al-Ni’ma, Al-Habbal and Al-Chalabi remain among the most influential Mosuli Muslim Brotherhood families.

<sup>6</sup> “Saddam Plays the Faith Card,” *beliefnet.com*, March 2003.

<sup>7</sup> Amatzia Baram, Director of Center for Iraqi Studies at the University of Haifa, Israel, addresses this claim in detail in his book *Saddam Husayn and Islam, 1968-2003: Ba’thi Iraq from Secularism to Faith*, Woodrow Wilson Center Press with John Hopkins University Press, 2014.

<sup>8</sup> Rasha al Aqeedi, “How Mosul Went from Carefree to Conservative,” *The National*, January 5, 2015.

The rapid change was particularly acute in the realm of “virtue”: within three years the majority of Muslim women in Mosul donned the hijab, Friday prayers were attended in masses, and mixing between males and females was semi-prohibited. Social conservatism was not enforced by law and those who opted for a different lifestyle were not subjected to penalties. But, with the continuing influence of the Faith Campaign and its pioneers, any objection to the newfound definition of virtue was highly frowned upon socially. The phenomena became the social norm, and individuals were praised or scorned based upon their degree of obedience. While the Iraqi government had a hand in facilitating social conservatism through its promotion of the Faith Campaign, in certain cases the Baath Party did not tolerate interference with personal choice.<sup>9</sup> For example, while two of the Faith Campaign’s most distinctive features were the closure of nightclubs and the prohibition of alcohol in public venues, private alcohol consumption continued to be tolerated.

The Faith Campaign era’s social norms remained in Mosul after the fall of Saddam in 2003. One could argue that certain ISIS practices in Mosul (such as the enforced niqab for women and the prohibition of alcohol) are not viewed as oppressive measures, as the society the Islamic State inherited as a result of the Faith Campaign was already relatively conservative compared to Mosul’s recent past.<sup>10</sup> That being said, it should be noted that there is no evidence suggesting the Faith Campaign pioneers served as incubators for the Salafist ideology behind ISIS, as some reports have suggested. In fact, the majority of families in Mosul affiliated with the Faith Campaign or the Muslim Brotherhood were targeted by jihadists after 2003.<sup>11</sup>

The first signs of enforced Shari’ah, or Hisba, appeared in late-2004, when a decree distributed in Mosul University threatened all female students with “harsh consequences” if they failed to meet the requirements of the Muslim dress code.<sup>12</sup> Unverified attacks on Christian women in local markets were circulated in the media and on the streets.<sup>13</sup> This particular decree was never attributed to a certain group, nor were the perpetrators ever identified. However, given Mosul University’s tight security measures at the time and the difficulty of accessing the campus if one was neither on the faculty nor a student, it was believed that the act was carried out by non-organized religious students who were expressing personal rejection to what they perceived as “deviance” from Mosul’s social norms.<sup>14</sup>

In December 2007, another decree addressed to Christian women was distributed on the University campus as well as secondary schools, public offices, hospitals, and markets. The warning threatened severe punishment to anyone violating the Islamic dress code and demanded

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<sup>9</sup> For example, in 1996, a female college professor at Mosul University was chastised by her male colleagues for her choice of dress. After continuous harassment, she filed a complaint with authorities. The professors in question were rebuked and received a notice that they would be dismissed if the act was repeated.

<sup>10</sup> Despite grievances at the hands of ISIS, a significant number of people interviewed believe the niqab enforcement is positive. This can also be deduced from social media comments and debates that defend the code, despite being imposed through threat.

<sup>11</sup> Omar Mahmood Abdullah Al-Saydali, father of the current Minister of Education of Iraq, was the Faith Campaign’s most active non-Baathist. Following the fall of Saddam Hussein he remained active within the ranks of the Islamic Party of Iraq. He was assassinated by jihadists in 2005.

<sup>12</sup> Zuheir Hajji Elias, “Threats in Mosul University of Enforcing Hijab,” *Ankawa Message Boards* [originally published by Bahzani], September 28, 2004.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid.

<sup>14</sup> Following the fall of the regime and introduction of Internet and satellite television, women in Mosul began conforming to fashion trends, accessories, and non-traditional styles of hijab.

Christian women conform to the hijab.<sup>15</sup> The decree was attributed to “The Islamic Iraqi State,” the first incarnation of the group that would later be called the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria. This round of warnings was taken seriously amid chaotic violence and near complete absence of security in Mosul. Such threats remained consistent for the next six years or so. It is worth noting that while verbal threats were made to “deviant” men, no significant decrees or incidents of violent attacks targeting men were confirmed.

### **Mosul, the Capital of “Wilayat Ninewa” of the Caliphate**

Following weeks of heavy fighting in the outskirts of Mosul, Iraqi army units abandoned their posts in the city center. Militants from the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria secured their hold of both the eastern and western parts of Mosul within 72 hours. What seemed to be a minor military setback for the Iraqi army on June 8, 2014, turned into a major defeat for the country by June 10; Mosul was no longer under Iraqi sovereignty. Several narratives regarding the identity of the invaders quickly spread through the city. Some referred to them as “rebels” unrelated to any jihadist organization, who aimed to salvage the Sunni-majority of Mosul from the sectarian policies of then-Prime Minister Nouri Al Maliki. Another narrative claimed the armed militants were members of the “Al-Naqashbandi Army,” the military arm of the Arab Baath Party led by the Vice President of the Revolutionary Leadership Council during Saddam’s era, Izzat Ad Douri. It would take less than a week of rumors, legends, myths, and confusion for Mosul’s residents to identify their new rulers: ISIS.<sup>16</sup>

On June 13, ISIS began distributing what it called “Wathiqat Al-Madina,” or the Bill of the City, door to door. The document asserted the presence of ISIS in Mosul, and conveyed the organization’s seriousness in governing the city in accordance with strict Shari’ah. The following are some of the significant points related to Hisba included in the 12-article document:<sup>17</sup>

- To those asking: who are you? We say we are the soldiers of the Islamic State in Iraq and Sham, from the seeds of Islam we have taken upon us the task to revive the glory of the Islamic Caliphate and to end the grievances and injustice of the Safavid viper that has choked our families and brethren; we vow to amputate this snake and its followers.
- Our stance on tombs, shirk [polytheistic] shrines, and pagan sites, follows what Prophet Muhammed said: “Do not leave a statue but obliterated or a tomb but effaced.” It is prohibited to consume and trade alcohol and smoke.
- To the virtuous women: Allah Allah<sup>18</sup> in modesty and wide loose jilbab,<sup>19</sup> stay in your homes and do not leave them only in cases of necessity. That is guidance of the Mothers of the Believers and the dignified female companions, may Allah be content with them.

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<sup>15</sup> Fawzy Al Ardany, “Threats against Christian female students in Mosul University,” *Araden and all Sapna Message Boards*, December 10, 2007. See also Sot al Iraq, “A Tour in Mosul Province in the Islamic State in Iraq: Stories of Life and Death,” *Ankawa Message Boards*, June 30, 2007.

<sup>16</sup> One widely spread story in Mosul was that the armed militants were replacing the current Iraqi flag with Saddam’s post-Gulf War flag of 1991.

<sup>17</sup> A copy of the original document can be found in Appendix A.

<sup>18</sup> A way of asserting the indisputable importance of an issue.

<sup>19</sup> A wide gown that reveals neither skin nor physical shape.

Despite the Bill's circulation, there were no sightings of enforced obedience for nearly a month. Friday sermons, now given by clerics appointed by ISIS, did however use severe language when discussing practices deemed a violation of Shari'ah.

As with most Islamist stands on virtue, women received the vast majority of the focus: "staying at home" was emphasized repeatedly in sermons.<sup>20</sup> Other causes that received repeated attention included the prohibition of alcohol and smoke (cigarettes and shisha). In mid-July, ISIS militants ordered owners of women's clothing stores to halt sales of the merchandise they had, as it did not conform to the Islamic dress code. The following week, thousands of niqab sets were distributed to stores and an official decree ordering all women to don the niqab and gloves was issued.

During this period, the first Hisba vehicles used by ISIS militants began roaming the city. The majority of cars had been seized from Mosul's public sector when the city collapsed. Hisba vehicles are often seen today in public places such as markets, parks, coffee shops, schools (including Mosul University), and hospitals.



Figure 1. "Al-Hisba" vehicle in Mosul<sup>21</sup>

### **Social and Class Breakdown of Hisba in Mosul:**

According to eyewitnesses and news outlets, at present the majority of ISIS militants hail from the outskirts of and rural villages far from Mosul's center.<sup>22</sup> "Sometimes Arab [non-Iraqi] fighters are with them. They are armed and they carry canes around with them, sometimes hitting people. They wear [customary] Afghan attire."<sup>23</sup> Witnesses claim that the "Arab" fighters in Hisba ranks are often more "humane" when approaching civilians, in stark opposition to the cruel and humiliating treatment at the hand of local Iraqis. As one eyewitness told the author directly, "They do not look pious like the Arab fighters. Sometimes they harass women even. But they enjoy publicly humiliating people from Mosul. They resent us."<sup>24</sup>

<sup>20</sup> "Updates from Mosul," *Mosul Eye Blog*, July 2014.

<sup>21</sup> Al Ghadeer TV, "Youth uses cigarette trick to kill 3 ISIS hisba (religious police) in Mosul," September 5, 2015.

<sup>22</sup> Rasha Al Aqeedi, "Caliphatalism?," *The American Interest* 10(4): 7-13.

<sup>23</sup> Fadel Al Nashmy, "This is how I live in the Caliphate state: exclusive story from Al Mosul to Al Nahar," *Al Nahar*, December 18, 2014.

<sup>24</sup> Male eyewitness residing in Mosul, interview with author via Skype, 2015.

This phenomenon was repeated by every eyewitness contacted for this paper. The recurring nature of this narrative suggests a trend: the revenge of the underdog, namely social outcasts from rural areas whom often felt like second-class citizens, ridiculed and looked down upon by urbanites. Whether its residents are motivated by feelings of marginalization or a lack of identity, rural Ninevah constitutes a serious security dilemma.<sup>25</sup> Studies and books written about these areas are often subjective in nature, and do little to explain why residents hailing from these areas have often rejected state laws. While apocalyptic and jihadist narrative has attracted scores of non-Iraqi fighters from the Arab world, Europe, and even the United States, the appeal of ISIS among local Sunnis is confined to two explanations: the “Islamization” of Iraq since the mid-1990s as a result of Saddam Hussein’s Faith Campaign and/or “Sunni rejection” of a sect-centralized Shia Iraqi government. Both explanations bear elements of truth, but neither explain why the majority of ISIS fighters, supporters, and enthusiasts are from rural Mosul, areas inhabited by tribal groups of different ethnicities that were not privileged during the Baath regime and were not known to be either religious or active during the Faith Campaign. Fieldwork research into the anthropologic and social aspects of the rural villages and towns where the majority of ISIS volunteers and fighters come from should be encouraged to better understand this phenomenon.

### **“Diwan Al-Hisba”**

In the Al-Maj-mu’a Al-Thaqafiya neighborhood, opposite Mosul University’s main campus, ISIS uses one of many confiscated pieces of real estate as the base for Diwan Al-Hisba. The diwan, or police force, operates as an official bureau with employees in charge of documenting the daily violations observed by the patrolling Hisba units in the city. When a person is issued a notice, they must either accompany the Hisba patrol unit to the diwan, or set a date for a Hisba “hearing” at the diwan. Once there, staff document the details of the incident: time, place, violation, and type of penalty. The “List of Ta’zir Penalties” (Fig. 2) includes violations with fixed penalties previously set by “Diwan Al-Quda’at,” the Judiciary House, in accordance Shari’ah or jurisprudential diligence.

Other violations deemed more “serious,” such as adultery, fornication, homosexuality, murder, theft, and refusal to pay zakat are referred to the Judiciary House for a judge’s verdict.

According to eyewitness accounts and a detailed report from Mosul Eye, penalties are often subjective in Mosul.<sup>26</sup> Cases of smoking and drinking caught by Hisba have often led to flogging despite the Ta’zir penalty issued by Diwan Al-Hisba stating that such violations are to incur fines and/or advice only. “There seems to be local variation in the degree of accurately implementing the penalty in many cases. It differs from Mosul to Anbar, but it is hard to say specifically why,” says Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi, an expert on official ISIS documents. This subjective issuing of Hisba penalties arguably plays into the notion that Iraqi Hisba members are driven by vengeance. However, at this point it cannot be verified with certainty whether severe penalties are the result of the urban/rural struggle in Mosul, or merely judged by context.

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<sup>25</sup> Districts such as Tal Afar and Rabi’a have a history of cooperation with jihadist groups.

<sup>26</sup> “Mosul Eye Monthly Report,” Mosul Eye, September 2015.



ديوان الحسبة تعميم ٢	
الدولة الإسلامية	
لائحة العقوبات التعزيرية (١)	
"العقوبة التعزيرية"	"القضية"
• إهراق المحل لمدة ٤٨ ساعة بأفعال توضع عند مركز الحسبة. مع كتابة إيصال يعطى للمخالف. ثم كتابة تعهد عليه.	• فتح المحل أثناء وقت الصلاة
• مناصحته وإزالة بالدهاب إليها.	• رجل جليط في أثناء وقت الصلاة خارج المسجد.
• مع عدم الاستجابة يُصطد ويوقف في مركز الحسبة لدعوته وتوجيهه.	• مخالفة الدخان.
• أ- إسلاف عليه الدخان ونصيحته وتوبيخه. وإزالة بالإخبار عن البائع.	• أ- المخاهر بالتدخين في الأماكن والطرفات العامة
• ب- يُغرم على كروزر دخان ألف ليرة، ويُحبس ثلاثة أيام.	• ب- بائع الدخان
• ج- مصادرة السيارة التي تحمل البضاعة إن كانت له. وإتلاف الكسبات + حبس ١٥ يومًا.	• ج- أصحاب بضائع الدخان
• أ- تصطف المرأة السافرة، وتوقف في مركز الحسبة من خلال نساء محسسات، ويُجبر ولها على شراء عباءة ويُغزر بـ ٢٠٠ جلدة أمامها.	• النساء السافرات.
• ضبطه وإيقافه في مركز الحسبة أقل من يوم + حلق رأسه + تغيير ملابسه باستدعاء ولته + جلده ١٥ - ٣٠.	• اللباس المخالف: أ- دافيه تشبه بالكفار أو بالنساء
• حبس ثلاثة أيام + جلده ٣٠ - ٥٠.	• ب- اللباس الضيق.
• مصادرة الجهاز المستخدم في المعصية + كتابة تعهد من غير جلبه للتوقيف.	• ج- لبس السلاسل والسوارات المحلّة
• حبس لهما وإيقافهما وحبس الرجل ١٥ + ٣٠ واستدعاء ولتي أمر المرأة وتوبيخه وكتابة تعهد عليه.	• د- حلق الفرع ونحوه.
• ٢٠ جلدة + مناصحه وكتابة تعهد.	• المعاكسات و التعرض للنساء.
• أ- إذا كانت الصور أجنبية: يعجلد ٣٠ - ٣٠ + مسح الذاكرة وتعتيها.	• المجاهر بالغاء.
	• الخلوة الواضحة بأجنبية في السيارة المصنعة أو العرف.
	• المعلقة أو الأماكن البعيدة.
	• الشاب الناعم.
	• الحامل لجهاز تكون فيه صور مخالفة للشرع والأداب

Figure 2. Unpublished “List of Ta’zir Penalties,” courtesy of Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi<sup>27</sup>

الدولة الإسلامية  
ولاية تونسي

١٤ / /  
٣٠ / /

وصل حجز مؤقت

اسم صاحب المادة /  
اسم الأخ المحتسب /  
المادة المحجوزة /  
السيب /

حلق اللحية

الدولة الإسلامية

ملاحظة: لا يتم تسليم المادة المحجوزة إلا بحضور صاحبها مع إحضاره الوصل

ديوان الحسبة  
مركز ولاية تينوي / الأسير

Figure 3. Sample of a notice for “shaving beard”<sup>28</sup>

<sup>27</sup> Complete translation in Appendix B

<sup>28</sup> The penalized in this document sent a copy of his notice. Name has been sealed for security reasons.

### **Famous Hisba Incidents Over the Past 18 Months in Mosul:**

- On September 24, 2015, 63-year-old restaurant owner “Karim Al-Umar” was flogged for repeatedly keeping his business open during prayers. During the flogging, he allegedly uttered “words of insult toward Islam and the Prophet.” As the Judge (Qadi) was present at the scene, his verdict was changed to “heresy,” and he received the death penalty by beheading immediately.<sup>29</sup>
- At an unspecified date in 2015, a young woman was brought to the main public square in Souk Bab Al Toub for flogging after being charged with fornication. The flogging appeared “too gentle.” The girl then managed to escape without being persuaded by Hisba, who claimed “The prophet said of those who commit fornication and flee out fear, then you may let them be.”<sup>30</sup> The bizarre scene was later said to have been orchestrated in an effort to give a merciful face to ISIS militants.
- In July 2015, a 19-year-old man was executed for treason after Hisba found images of a burning ISIS vehicle on his smart phone during a “random” check.<sup>31</sup> However, details revealed later indicated that the young man took photos of an ISIS convey burning from a coalition strike and then uploaded the images to a Facebook page, oblivious to the fact the page was administrated by ISIS sympathizers, who reported him. Hisba then claimed to have carried out a random inspection on smart phones that day and found the images. In the face of these details, Hisba accusing him of providing coordinates to the International Coalition.

### **Conclusion**

Diwan Al-Hisba in Mosul is not a spontaneous imposition of virtue on society, but rather an organized bureaucratic system used to oppress and humiliate locals. The authority granted to those within ISIS’s ranks is exploited to, what appears to be, settle social scores between those from rural Mosul and the city’s urban residents. Beyond creating an environment of fear, the impact of Hisba has been a further widening of the gap between different ethnic and social components of Ninevah, which in turns hinders liberation and guarantees the continuity of enmity among the residents, the main source of power for ISIS in all the lands under the organization controls.

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<sup>29</sup> Ibid.

<sup>30</sup> Eyewitness to the incident, interviewed by author via Skype, 2015

<sup>31</sup> First cousin of the victim in interview with the author in July, 2015.







٧. علماؤنا وشيوخ عشائريتنا المتنا وعظماؤنا تاج الرؤوس وأنس النفوس : هلموا إلى وقفة مشرفة ينصت لها التاريخ ويشرق منها محيا الدهر... إلى وقفة جادة صادقة لصد العدوان الرافضي المسموم هلم إلى لحة إسلامية تنصهر في بودقة الجهاد والإمداد ولكن صفاً واحداً مرصوفاً كما أحب ربنا وأمر فلنسير في ركب واحد واليه.
٨. حذار حذار من مراجعة العمالة ومغازلة الحكومة فقد بان الطريق واتضح وباز الكفر والنقض ونحن ابتداء اليوم والتائب من الذنب كمن لا ذنب له ، كما ويحرم الاتجار والتعاطي بالخمر والمخدرات والدخان وسائر المحرمات .
٩. وأما المرتدون من الجيش والشرطة وبقية الأجهزة الكفرية فنقول لهم باب التوبة مفتوح لمن يريدنا فقد خصصنا أماكن خاصة لاستقبال التائبين وبشرطها وضوابطها ، أما من أصرّ وبقي على رذيله فليس له الا القتل ، لقول النبي صلى الله عليه وسلم : ( من بدل دينه فاقتلوه ) .
١٠. وأما المجالس والتجمعات والرايات بشئ العناوين وحمل السلاح فلا نقبلها البتة لقوله صلى الله عليه وسلم : ((من أتاكم وأمركم جميع على رجل واحد يريد أن يشق عصاكم أو يفرق جماعتكم فاقتلوه)) رواه مسلم ، وفي رواية أخرى لمسلم : ((فاضربوه بالسيف كائناً من كان)).
١١. أمر الله تعالى بالجماعة والائتلاف ونيل الفرقة والخلاف، وكسر الجماعة خير من صلو الفرقة، والإنقسام من فحاح الشيطان وتشرد المسلمين مدعاة ضعف وفي الائتلاف تحت راية نقية العقيدة صافية المشرب خير كثير فضلاً أن تعدد المشارب والأهواء يثير النزعات والأهنة مما يختزل من العمل الجهادي بركه ولذته والله المستعان.
١٢. إذا مكئ المولى سبحانه لأوليائه النافرين في سبيله بسطوا سلطان الشريعة وحكموا بالعدل والقسط وحفظوا الأغلال التي أثقلت كاهل الناس من القوانين الوضعية العفنة، وحدّ يعمل به في الأرض خير لأهل الأرض من أن يمتطروا أربعين صباحاً.
١٣. موقفنا من المشاهد والمراقب الشريكة والمزارات الوثنية هو ماصح عن النبي صلى الله عليه وسلم: (أن لا تدع تماثلاً إلا طمسته ولا قبراً مشرفاً إلا سوته ) يحرم الاتجار والتعاطي بالخمر والمخدرات والدخان و.
١٤. إلى النساء الفضليات الكريمات : الله الله في الحشمة والستر والجلباب الفضفاض فالقراز في البيت وملازمة الخدر وترك الخروج الا لحاجة هو هدي امهات المؤمنين والصحابيات الجليلات رضي الله عنهن أجمعين.
١٥. وارفلوا وانعموا في حكم اسلامي مقسط ووادع واسعدوا بارض فيها للمسلمين الصولة والجولة والاحكام والإبرام.
١٦. وفي الختام نظرت ديباجة الوثيقة ونقول: أيها الناس إنكم قد جريتم الأنظمة العلمانية كلها ومرت عليكم الحقبة الملكية فالجمهورية فالبعثية فالصفوية وقد جريتموها وذقتم لوعتها واكتويتم بنارها وسعارها، وهاهي الآن حقبة الدولة الإسلامية وعهد الإمام أبي بكر القرشي وسترون بحول الله وتوفيقه مدى الفرق الواسع الشاسع بين حكومة علمانية جائرة صادرة طافات الناس وكملت افواههم واهلرت حقوقهم وكرامتهم وبين إمامة قرشية اتخذت الوحي المنزل منهجاً والقضاء به أبهى اللج، وتسمع النصيحة من الصغير والكبير والحر والعبد لافرق بين أحمر واسود، ونقيم الحق على أنفسنا قبل غيرنا كما قال ربنا عز وجل : ((يَا أَيُّهَا الَّذِينَ آمَنُوا كُونُوا بِالقِسْطِ شُهَدَاءَ لِلّهِ وَلَوْ عَلَى أَنْفُسِكُمْ أَوِ الْوَالِدَيْنِ وَالْأَقْرَبِينَ إِنْ يَكُنْ غَيْبًا أَوْ قُرْبًا فَاللَّهُ أَوْلَىٰ بِهِمَا فَلَا تَتَّبِعُوا...)) النساء ١٣٥ ، والله من وراء القصد

الدولة الإسلامية في العراق والشام

المكتب الإعلامي لولاية نينوى

## **Appendix B**

Translation of “List of Ta’zir Penalties,” shown in Figure 2:

<b>Violation</b>	<b>Ta’zir Penalty</b>
Opening store/shop during prayers	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Locking the store/shop for 48 hours, notifying the accused, pledging to never repeat the violation</li></ul>
Locating a man outside the mosque during prayers	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Advising the man to attend the mosque</li><li>• If he refuses, he shall be notified and summoned to the Hisba Center</li></ul>
Not confining to women’s Islamic dress code	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Taken into custody in Hisba center, male custodian forced to buy her “abaya<sup>32</sup>,” custodian flogged 20 times in front of her</li></ul>
Men who wear: <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Clothes which resemble those worn by infidels or women</li><li>• Tight clothes</li><li>• Shaved beards</li><li>• Accessories such as bracelets and chains</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• To be held custody in Hisba center for a day</li><li>• Shave his head</li><li>• Change his clothes in the presence of his custodian</li><li>• Flogging 15-30 times</li></ul>
Harassing women	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• To be held in custody for 3 days</li><li>• Flogging 30-50 times</li></ul>
Singing	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Confiscating the device used</li><li>• Signing a pledge to not repeat the action</li></ul>
Catching a non-married couple (male and female) alone in a vehicle or closed room	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Flogging of male 15–30 times, summoning the custodian of the female, both to sign pledges</li></ul>
Plucking eyebrows (male)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Flogging (20 times)</li><li>• Advising</li><li>• Signing a pledge</li></ul>
Carrying a device with images that violate Shari’ah	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Foreign images: flogging (20-30) times</li><li>• Deleting images</li></ul>

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<sup>32</sup> An abaya is a long and loose black garment that covers the entire female body.