This report examines how global jihadist organizations—particularly al-Qaeda—have incorporated the October 7 attacks and the war in Gaza into their official propaganda over the past three years. Drawing on data from the TITAN Project, the paper analyzes how al-Qaeda has interpreted the conflict, treated Hamas and its fighters within its own ideological framework, and connected events in Palestine to its broader strategic narrative. The Islamic State is included as a limited comparative case to highlight the different ways in which the two organizations have responded to the same conflict.
The analysis shows that al-Qaeda has moved beyond exploiting Gaza primarily as a source of grievance and mobilization, as it did during the early stages of the conflict. Over the following three years, al-Qaeda’s discourse progressively detaches October 7 from Hamas as an organization, selectively appropriating the operation, its fighters, and some of its leaders without resolving the underlying ideological differences with Hamas. Gaza also evolves from an object of mobilization into a source of strategic learning, most notably in al-Qaeda’s reflections on the wider militarization of society. At the same time, the organization uses the conflict to broaden its political and moral vocabulary, incorporating concepts such as resistance, liberation, international law, and boycotts from a wider pro-Palestinian repertoire while preserving its core religious and ideological positions.