In recent years, various European countries have experienced a sustained debate on the role of Islamism in their societies. This has not been the case in Spain. Due largely to the shock of terrorist attacks on Spanish soil –in particular in Madrid in 2004 and Barcelona-Cambrils in 2017– the country has paid substantial attention to jihadism, but very little to non-violent manifestations of Islamism of which the Muslim Brotherhood represents one of the most important manifestations. Nonetheless, throughout different periods of the last five decades the cities of Granada, Madrid, Valencia and Barcelona have served as significant enclaves on the map of Islamism in Europe.
As with the rest of Europe, Brotherhood activists in Spain constitute a relatively small group. Secrecy and opacity surround their militancy and therefore there is no formal association in Spain bearing the name Muslim Brotherhood. Those individuals and organizations identified as members deny their ties to the Brotherhood, aware of the negative consequences that they might incur. It is, however, a sophisticated network built on strong personal, ideological, and financial ties in pursuit of shared goals.
The first members of the Brotherhood arrived in Spain in the 1960s. This group comprised mainly of young Syrian activists fleeing repression in their home country, as well as students from the Middle East who decided to resettle in Spain. Some of the first associations founded by these pioneers were dedicated mainly to the student sphere, but have since positioned themselves to represent Muslim communities at the local level and, in many cases, serve as interlocutors vis-à-vis public institutions. In this respect, they adhered to a key Brotherhood strategy: create and operate entities that not only serve the objectives of its agenda, but also project a distorted image of its size and representativeness.
Today, the Muslim Brotherhood in Spain is far from being a granitic and homogeneous movement, with supporters and affiliates vying for positions of influence within both local communities and the political establishment. The trajectory of Riay Tatary, president of the Islamic Commission of Spain (Comisión Islámica de España, CIE) until his recent death, exemplifies the latter. Tatary, who maintained close ideological ties to Syria’s Islamic Vanguard, was among the first Brotherhood members who founded the Muslim Association of Spain (Asociación Musulmana de España, AME), the initial matrix from which different Brotherhood-related projects would arise. Tatary would eventually become a ubiquitous figure of institutional Islam in Spain, and although there are other manifestations of the Brotherhood in the country, his ambitions highlight the movement’s desire for positions close to decision makers and the political establishment.
While Tatary was forging relationships with high-level political influence, key Brotherhood nodes were busy building grassroots support. Among them weredifferent entities under the umbrella of LIDCOE (Liga Islámica para el Diálogo y la Convivencia en España) –the only Spanish entity officially attached to the FIOE (Federation of Islamic Organizations in Europe)– and the Valencian Islamic Cultural Center (CCIV). These entities connect local level activities with important ideological and financial support at the international level. Linked to local administrations and institutions, they focus on associative and grassroots work to increase their influence and impact. Generously financed from the Arab Gulf, they have been extending their model throughout different areas of Spain (Barcelona, Zaragoza, Logroño, etc.) with remarkable success, especially among the younger generations due to their dynamism, the wide variety of activities they develop, and the services they provide. As with other European organizations of the Brotherhood linked to the FIOE, it has been Qatar Charity –a Qatari NGO with strong ties to the Brotherhood– through its proselytizing program Ghaith that has channeled the funds that have enabled such growth over at least the last decade.
The social and political activism of these various actors in Spain is common to all Brotherhood networks in Europe. Where the Spanish Brotherhood network is somewhat unique, however, is in the consistent involvement of some of its members in jihadist activities. The network that revolved around Abu Dahdah (Imad Eddin Barakat Yarkas) provides the clearest example. After forming in the early 1990s, Abu Dahdah’s network would eventually become one of the most sophisticated and bestconnected jihadist networks in Europe of the last thirty years. Led by a close group of Syrian Brotherhood members based in Spain, the network devoted its activities to providing various forms of support to al-Qaeda. Some of its members would ultimately be tied to the Hamburg cell responsible for the September 11, 2001 attacks, and others were later involved in the March 11, 2004 attacks in Madrid.
These critical moments in which radical Islamist elements interact with, develop, and leverage the opportunities provided by the mainstream current of the Brotherhood in Spain are more than simple coincidences isolated to the past. More recently, an ongoing terrorism investigation unveiled connections between terrorist actors and some of the highest institutional representatives of Islam in Spain. The investigation, also known as Operation WAMOR, revealed the largest jihadist terrorist financing structure in Spain known to date. Law enforcement have targeted the Kutaynis, a clan led by a senior member of the CIE who also served as administrator of Madrid’s Abu Bakr mosque, and accused its members of belonging to a criminal organization, collaboration with a terrorist organization, financing of terrorism, money laundering, tax fraud, falsification of documents and favoring illegal immigration.
The Abu Dahdah network and the WAMOR investigation highlight the two faces of the Muslim Brotherhood in Spain –one mainstream and one jihadist– and the separation between the two is not always clear-cut. In both cases, their members used their influence within the institutions of Islam in Spain to develop structures and channels for financing terrorism on a large scale.
Despite the fact that actors within the Muslim Brotherhood in Spain have been involved in jihadist activities for the past 25 years, the majority of the movement has historically been engaged in entirely legal activities. In fact, the different associations and collectives close to the Brotherhood run an extensive network of mosques and Islamic centers that organize numerous activities and events from which local communities benefit immensely. At the same time, these positive outreach activities have enabled their consolidation as official or de facto representatives of local Muslim communities, which in turn helps the group to establish relations with different Spanish authorities and cement their position as legitimate and moderate interlocutors.
Despite its small size, the influence achieved by different elements of the Muslim Brotherhood in Spain rests on three fundamental elements: 1) the organizational sophistication of its networks, 2) the education of its members, and 3) the ample sources of available funding, which have grown increasingly diverse. In recent years, organizations linked to the Brotherhood in Spain have exploited legal and political blind spots and managed to increasingly benefit from public aid at the national, regional, and local level in order to implement integration projects, interreligious dialogue, and other similar programs. Moreover, Spanish Brotherhood-linked organizations work closely with Islamic NGOs such as Islamic Relief Spain and Human Appeal Spain, allowing them to expand their range of influence, increase their visibility as reference associations, and improve their knowledge of the local social fabric.
The underlying characteristic driving the Brotherhood’s success in Spain, as elsewhere in Europe, is its ability to connect and relate to the country’s political and business establishment. Pragmatism is a distinctive feature of the Brotherhood, and its members in Spain have been able to weave relationships with representatives of all sensibilities on the political spectrum not only at the national, but also the regional and local level.
Yet after forty years of organized associative presence in Spain, the movement is inexorably approaching a turning point. The older generation of pioneers no longer represents the sensibilities of the majority of activists today, most of whom were born in Spain and whose idiosyncrasies and nature are certainly distinct from those of their predecessors. A new batch of leaders is ready to take over, and although for the most part they have not yet acceded to positions of responsibility, they are already clearly identifiable. In addition to having overcome the existing fissures between several of the movement’s associations, these new leaders stand out for their familiarity with the Spanish social context, their reach and impact through new communication channels, their innovative initiatives, and the same determination and perseverance that defined previous generations. Collectively, these factors make the impending generational change in leadership unpostponable, and developments in this space must be followed closely.
So, do the Brotherhood and its activities constitute a threat to Spain? While the main objective of this study is to lay the foundations for a pending and necessary national debate within Spanish society, this question is unavoidable. The answer needs to be nuanced and balanced, as most associations and individuals linked to the Brotherhood in Spain operate largely within the limits of the law and their activities are protected by constitutional rights. The Brotherhood’s potentially negative impact on national security is mainly indirect and difficult to empirically measure; however, and as this report details, several of the longest-running terrorist cells in Spain’s recent history are rooted deep within the movement. Finally, special attention must be given to polarizing Brotherhood narratives that on many occasions only harden “us vs. them” belief systems, as well as to the movement’s ideological postulates, which–although not necessarily conducive to violence–seriously undermine social cohesion.