Joint Terrorism Task Forces and the Preventive Model of U.S. Counterterrorism

Over two decades after their post-9/11 expansion, the FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs) remain the central platform for operationalizing U.S. counterterrorism strategy. This webinar explored how the JTTF model has matured into a preventive framework designed to detect and interdict threats before they materialize - shifting the paradigm from reactive response to proactive disruption.

Through two case studies - the 2009 plot by Hosam Smadi to detonate a vehicle bomb in a Dallas, TX high-rise, and the 2011 WMD conspiracy involving Khalid Aldawsari - this session with Tom Petrowski, FBI Supervisory Special Agent (Retired), and Jennifer Baker, Senior Research Fellow, examined how JTTFs integrate intelligence, investigative tools, and interagency collaboration to identify threats at the earliest stage. These case examples illustrate the continued relevance of the JTTF model as terrorism threats evolve, reaffirming prevention as the organizing principle of domestic counterterrorism practice.

On August 26^th, 2025,the Program on Extremism at The George Washington University hosted a webinar marking the 45th anniversary of the FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF). The event was moderated by Senior Research Fellow Jennifer Baker, a retired FBI special agent, and featured retired FBI Supervisory Special Agent Tom Petrowski, former head of the North Texas JTTF.

Baker opened by emphasizing the JTTF’s role as the cornerstone of U.S. counterterrorism since its creation in 1980, describing how it unites federal, state, and local partners in a preventative framework. She introduced Petrowski, whose career included leading the Dallas JTTF, serving in Iraq, working with the CIA’s Counterterrorism Center, instructing at the FBI Academy in Quantico, and serving as chief division counsel in Dallas.

Petrowski traced the history of the JTTF, noting that between 1980 and 9/11 the United States experienced more than 250 terrorist incidents, yet significant systemic change did not occur until after the September 11 attacks. While the 1993 World Trade Center bombing should have served as a wake-up call, he argued, transformation only came in the aftermath of 9/11. The number of JTTFs grew dramatically, the FBI deepened coordination with the CIA, and the Patriot Act dismantled the so-called “wall” that had previously blocked information sharing between intelligence and law enforcement. According to Petrowski, this shift turned American counterterrorism from a reactive model into a preventive one, designed to identify threats before they materialized.

He illustrated this through two case studies. The first involved Khaled Aldosari, a Saudi national whose attempt to purchase suspicious chemicals was detected through the JTTF’s “tripwire program.” This discovery led investigators to his bomb lab in Lubbock, Texas, and prevented planned attacks on Dallas nightclubs and Times Square in New York. The second case involved Hosam Sami, a Jordanian national radicalized online who plotted to detonate a vehicle bomb at Dallas’s Fountain Place skyscraper. An extensive undercover operation revealed his intent, and behavioral analysts ranked him as one of the most dangerous suspects in the country. Sami was eventually arrested after attempting to detonate what he believed was a live device. Petrowski emphasized that the true success of both operations lay not in the arrests themselves but in the intelligence systems that identified the threats before attacks could occur.

In the discussion that followed, Petrowski reflected on the lessons of these cases and the broader JTTF mission. He described how interagency cooperation improved dramatically after 9/11 once information sharing barriers were removed, and he rejected the notion that federal support for JTTFs is declining, noting that they remain well-staffed and highly active. He explained that while fusion centers are distinct from JTTFs, they maintain close relationships in support of counterterrorism work. He also stressed that JTTFs must continue to adapt to evolving threats, particularly online radicalization, the rise of domestic extremism, and the growing challenges posed by encrypted communications and artificial intelligence. He noted that concerns about entrapment in the Sami case had been anticipated and effectively neutralized, with even the defense conceding there was no issue. He also reflected on the troubling reality of youth radicalization, which remains a persistent challenge worldwide. Finally, he highlighted the crucial role of FBI legal attachés abroad in linking international intelligence with domestic JTTFs.