Violent Non-State Special Operations: a book talk with Craig Whiteside

The Program on Extremism at The George Washington University hosted Craig Whiteside, Professor of National Security Affairs at the US Naval War College, for an engaging discussion about his book, Non-state Special Operations: Capabilities and Effects, released in July 2025. Moderated by Omar Mohammed, this event took the form of a thought-provoking book talk that explores the evolving role of non-state actors in special operations.

Building on Craig Whiteside's extensive research on the special operations tactics employed by the Islamic State and other non-state groups, Non-state Special Operations: Capabilities and Effects introduces an interesting theoretical framework that categorizes and analyzes various types of Violent Non-state Actors (VNSA), including militants, proxies, criminal organizations, cults, and mercenaries.

This discussion provided a great opportunity to engage with a leading expert in the field and gain a deeper understanding of both the theoretical foundations and real-world implications of non-state special operations in global security.

On April 24, 2025, the Program on Extremism (PoE) at The George Washington University hosted a book talk with Dr. Craig Whiteside, Professor of National Security Affairs at the U.S. Naval War College. Moderated by Omar Mohammed, PoE Senior Research Fellow, the event explored the nature and evolution of violent non-state actors (VNSAs) and their use of special operations, drawing from Whiteside’s recently published book, “Non-State Special Operations: Capabilities and Effects.” 

Whiteside began by outlining the typology of his work, which classifies special operations by two key axes: actor goals, which are politically motivated or self interested, and actor agency, which are independent actors or those backed by patrons or sponsors. This framework helps distinguish the differences between militants, criminal groups, proxy groups, and mercenary groups as well as define VNSA’s special operations. Whiteside defined these operations as high risk, well resourced tactical actions designed to achieve strategic or operational effects. 

Throughout the discussion, Whiteside emphasized the similarities and differences between state and non-state special operations. He cited historical examples, such as the Doolittle Raid, where U.S. forces used conventional tools in unconventional ways, demonstrating how states innovate militarily. He also explained how non-state groups often adapt in other ways, using available technologies such as satellite imagery, Google Earth, and drones, to plan and execute complex operations.

Whiteside emphasized how VNSAs use surprise, deception, and symbolism to amplify their impact. He drew on ISIS’s 2012 Haditha raid as a key example of how such operations can deliver strategic effects and shape perceptions, especially in fragile states. He also noted a growing trend of groups learning from one another, citing Hamas’s October 7th attack as a shift toward more specialized, high-impact tactics.

Technology was another focal point of the discussion. Whiteside stressed that while technological advancements play a role, it is the combination of tools, timing, and creativity that defines successful operations. Revisiting the Haditha raid, Whiteside noted that ISIS was able to disguise themselves as Iraqi forces wearing uniforms and using night gear. He also raised concern over how drones are being used in surveillance and offensive roles. 

When questioned on how states can best respond to these operations, Whiteside underscored the importance of adaptability and vigilance. He argued that proxies – non-state groups backed by state sponsors – pose the greatest challenge due to their access to resources, training, and political cover. He noted that while criminal organizations tend to focus on profit rather than strategic disruption, they too can conduct strategic operations when seeking control. 

The conversation concluded with reflections on future threats. Whiteside warned that in fragile states, small-scale special operations could evolve into campaigns aimed at toppling governments or seizing territory. He emphasized the need for deeper understanding of how military tactics translate into military gains, and better understanding events like prison breaks that can alter the balance of power.