Over the last three years Europe and North America have been hit by an unprecedented wave of terrorist attacks perpetrated by individuals motivated by jihadist ideology. The roots of this development are largely to be found in two, deeply intertwined phenomena: the military successes achieved by the Islamic State and its declaration of a Caliphate along with the large number of followers the group has managed to attract in the West.
This report identified 51 successful attacks throughout Europe and North America from June 2014, when the Caliphate was declared, until June 2017. From coordinated operations causing large numbers of casualties like the November 2015 Paris attacks, to the many acts of violence carried out by lone attackers, the attacks vary significantly in terms of sophistication, lethality, targets and connectivity to the Islamic State and other groups. Similarly, the profile of the 65 identified involved in the 51 attacks is extremely heterogeneous from both demographic and operational perspectives. In particular, this report found that:
The 51 attacks took place in a relatively limited number of countries (8). The country with the largest number of attacks was France (17), followed by the United States (16), Germany (6), the UK (4), Belgium (3), Canada (3), Denmark (1) and Sweden (1). Therefore, 32 attacks were executed in Europe (63%) and the remaining 19 in North America (37%).
The 51 attacks caused 395 deaths and no less than 1,549 physical injuries (with the exclusion of the perpetrators). While the average number of fatalities per attack is 7.7, the level of lethality varies considerably from one episode to another. France is by far the country with the largest number of victims (239), followed by the United States (76). • Despite a general trend that sees increasingly younger people radicalizing, at 27.3 years the average age of attackers is not unusually young. Almost one third (27%) of perpetrators was above the age of 30. Five of the attackers were underage at the time of attack.
- Despite a general trend that sees an increasingly active presence of women in jihadist networks, only 2 out of 65 individual perpetrators were female.
- 73% of attackers were citizens of the country in which they committed the attack. Another 14% were either legal residents or legitimate visitors from neighboring countries. 5% were refugees or asylum seekers at the time of attack. 6% were residing in the country illegally at the time of the attack.
- 17% of perpetrators were converts to Islam, with a significantly higher percentage in North America.
- At least 57% of attackers had a prior criminal background.
- Only 18% of attackers are known to have previously been foreign fighters. However, these individuals tended to be involved in the episodes with the highest lethality.
- 42% of attackers had a clear operational connection to an established jihadist group, in most cases the Islamic State.
- 63% of attackers pledged allegiance to a jihadist group, almost always the Islamic State, during or before the attack.
- Jihadist groups, almost always the Islamic State, claimed 38% of attacks.
From an operational perspective, the attacks that have hit the West since June 2014 can be divided into three macro-categories:
a) terrorist attacks carried out by individuals who were acting under direct orders from the Islamic State’s leadership: 8% of attacks;
b) terrorist attacks carried out by individuals with no connections whatsoever to the Islamic State or other jihadist groups, but were inspired by its message: 26% of attacks;
c) terrorist attacks carried out by individuals who had some form of connection to the Islamic State or other jihadist groups but acted independently: 66% of attacks.
Socio-economic and integration issues are important to consider when trying to understand radicalization patterns. But an analysis that focuses solely on them is incomplete. Somewhat counterintuitively, for example, southern European countries have experienced significantly lower levels of radicalization than most of their central and northern European counterparts, despite performing significantly worse in integrating their Muslim population. Similarly, within each country the mobilization of Islamic State supporters is uneven, with a concentration found in a few notorious hotspots.
The report shows that an analysis which takes into consideration the existence of radicalization hubs explains these seemingly puzzling differences. The formation of hubs often happens around organized structures (militant Salafist groups, radical mosques), charismatic personalities or, in some cases, tight-knit groups of friends. Dynamics are complex and change from case to case, but there are indications pointing to the presence or absence of these hubs rather than social conditions as the main factor determining the higher or lower levels of radicalization and mobilization of a country or a town.