Reports

Authored by Daniel Milton and Andrew Mines
April 2021

This report explores military experience among those arrested in the January 6 Capitol incident. While the Capitol Hill siege is but one event in a longer history of military populations’ involvement in extremism, it offers a useful snapshot through which we can examine the scale and diversity of the issue. The report presents findings for a number of metrics accordingly, and provides some considerations for military officials, the general public, and policymakers.

43 of 357 individuals (12%) charged in federal court for their role in the Capitol Hill siege had some form of military experience. Of these 43 individuals, the vast majority (93%) were veterans and not currently serving in an Active Duty, reservist, or Guard status. The majority had substantial service records of 4+ years, and over one-quarter were commissioned officers. 37% of individuals with military experience had affiliations to and/or leadership roles in domestic violent extremist (DVE) organizations like the Oath Keepers and the Proud Boys, around four times more likely to be a part of such groups than those without military experience. 

This report recommends that the Departments of Defense and Veterans Affairs lead a new combined task force to confront and combat extremism in the military community. The task force should have representation from a number of stakeholders including Congressional oversight bodies, military and federal judicial and investigative agencies, and civilian experts who have studied and piloted counter-extremism programming. It also recommends that the new task force collect information on criminal and non-criminal extremism-related incidents among active duty service members and veterans in a centralized, internal documentation system. The task force should leverage its findings and resources to help refine and expand current trainings and briefings related to extremism, and ensure that veterans are reached by these programs as much as possible. Finally, any findings should be disseminated through a joint Inspectors General report to Congress and the public.

Authored by Tara Candland, Adam Finck, Haroro Ingram, Laren Poole, Lorenzo Vidino, and Caleb Weiss
March 2021

This report systematically examines how the efforts of the Islamic State to expand globally and the aspirations of Musa Baluku’s Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) merged in a mix of push and pull factors that resulted in the ADF becoming the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) chapter of the Islamic State in Central Africa Province (ISCAP).

Based largely on primary sources, including a unique collection of defector and local source accounts, it tracks the ADF’s evolution from its Ugandan origins to being part of a formal province of the Islamic State, revealing unique insights into the group’s inner workings and its efforts to build transnational networks to support its operations. 

The report finds that the ADF’s ties with the Islamic State may have started as early as 2017. By 2018, ISCAP was acknowledged as a formal province of the Islamic State, and in April 2019, ISCAP attacks in the DRC were first formally claimed by the Islamic State’s central media units.

To read the report in French, click here. 

Authored by The Program on Extremism staff
March 2021

This report offers new details about the individuals alleged to have stormed the nation's Capitol, as well as a number of recommendations for how to address the events of January 6th.

At the time of writing, 257 individuals have been charged in federal court for their involvement. They represent a heterogeneous group, with individuals as young as 18 and as old as 70 charged. They came to the Capitol from 40 states, and 91% traveled from outside the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area. 33 individuals have known military backgrounds. Some face as many as 17 counts on their indictment, and charges range from trespassing and illegal entry on designated grounds to seditious conspiracy against the U.S. government. 

This report categorizes individuals according to three distinct categories: militant networks, organized clusters, and inspired believers. Based on the report's findings, we recommend that the U.S. government improve access to data on domestic terrorism investigations, conduct a systematic review of intelligence gathering and policy response to domestic terrorism alerts, and use existing structures to improve information-sharing between the federal agencies tasked with combating domestic violent extremism.

Authored by Alexander Meleagrou-Hitchens Bennett Clifford, Lorenzo Vidino
October 2020

This report examines the foundational nature of antisemitism in multiple violent extremist movements in the United States, both violent and non-violent. American extremists incorporate antisemitic tropes and narratives in every level of their worldviews, using them to
help construct “us/them” dichotomies and wide-sweeping conspiracies that are essential to their movements.

During the past several decades, the American extremist movements that have been among the most violent—specifically, far-right and jihadist groups—have used antisemitism to target Jewish people, Jewish houses of worship, Jewish community institutions, and Americans supporting the Jewish state of Israel. The report provides case studies of violent American extremists, representing far-right and jihadist movements respectively, which demonstrate that antisemitism can be an integral part of American extremists’ progression through the radicalization process and in
justifying terrorist attacks. 

Authored by Lorenzo Vidino, Jon Lewis, and Andrew Mines
September 2020

Dollars for Daesh analyzes both the tactics ISIS supporters in the U.S. used to raise and move funds, as well as the various types of networks from which individuals drew financial support. The authors drew on thousands of pages of court documents covering criminal proceedings dating from 2013 to the end of August 2020. The report was made possible through support from the National Counterterrorism, Innovation, Technology, and Education Center (NCITE). 

Overall, the report shows that U.S.-based ISIS supporters left a small and unsophisticated financial footprint, with a few notable exceptions. Furthermore, individuals tended to operate as lone financial actors or in small clusters, which has mitigated the effectiveness of counter-terrorism financing policies and tools that have successfully targeted the larger and more sophisticated financing mechanisms of groups like Al-Qaeda, Hezbollah, and Hamas. The low-level and largely inconspicuous nature of these actors will likely pose a unique challenge to law enforcement efforts going forward. This report is part of a new Program on Extremism stream of research into terrorism financing, which aims to assess and explore these trends across a range of various extremist groups and ideologies.

Authored by Jon Lewis, Seamus Hughes, Oren Segal, and Ryan Greer
April 2020

This report focuses on the recent arrests of domestic extremists, as well as current efforts by law enforcement to disrupt and counter the growing influence of racially motivated violent extremist ideology—specifically white supremacy—and analyze the current state of enforcement actions against two domestic networks: The Base and Atomwaffen Division.

In the accompanying policy recommendations, the authors outline administrative actions, legislative and policy changes, and other possible federal and state legal and prosecutorial powers that could allow for a more comprehensive and effective approach to countering these threats. 

Authored by Lorenzo Vidino
January 2020

In his forthcoming book, The Closed Circle: Joining and Leaving the Muslim Brotherhood in the West (Columbia University Press, 2020), Program on Extremism Director Lorenzo Vidino provides critical new perspectives on Muslim Brotherhood in the West gathered from extensive interviews with former members of the group in Europe and North America. 

In this excertped chapter, Dr. Vidino tells the story of Kamal Helbawy, a legendary figure in Islamist circles for more than 60 years and one of the most senior members of the Brotherhood to have ever operated in the West. Helbawy discusses how he joined the Brotherhood in the 1950s and his international work for the group, in addition to his key role in establishing core clusters of the Brotherhood in the West and, ultimately, why he left the organization in 2012. 

Authored by Seamus Hughes, Emily Blackburn, and Andrew Mines
August 2019

This study builds on previous work by the Program's researchers on Americans who travel to join jihadist groups. Using interviews with law enforcement officials and thousands of pages of legal documents, the authors found 36 individuals who traveled or attempted to travel to join jihadist groups outside of Syria and Iraq from 2011 to 2019. These "Other Travelers" predominantly traveled to longstanding hotspots of jihadist activity: the Af-Pak region, Somalia, and Yemen. As the landscape of the Salafi-jihadist movement continues to evolve, this report contributes to the field's understanding of the broader foreign fighter phenomenon.

Authored by Bennett Clifford and Helen Powell
June 2019

Telegram, an online instant messaging service popular among adherents of the Islamic State (IS), remains vital to the organization’s ecosystem of communications. The platform’s functional affordances, paired with relatively lax enforcement of Telegram’s terms of service (ToS), offers IS sympathizers a user-friendly medium to engage with like-minded supporters and content. This report examines 636 pro-IS Telegram channels and groups that contain English-language content collected between June 1, 2017 and October 24, 2018. While this time-bound and linguistically limited sample represents a sliver of the pro-IS ecosystem on Telegram, the subsequent findings have important implications for policymakers assigned to the dual tasks of countering IS’ online foothold and engaging with service providers like Telegram.

Authored by Asaad Almohammad
November 2019

Based on data gathered from eastern and northwestern Syria between January 2018 and April 2019, the author investigated the Islamic State’s covert operation to infiltrate and fold Tanzim Hurras ad-Din (Guardians of Religion Organization), an unofficial alQaeda affiliate, under its banner. Evidenced by internal documents and interview materials, this paper argues that the Islamic State has orchestrated and implemented this multifaceted operation since at least mid-January 2017. In the run-up to territorial defeat in eastern Syria, the Islamic State signaled its interest in relocating its operatives to Idlib. The group also developed scenarios to facilitate the movement of its members to northwest Syria in the case of territorial defeat. With the potential of a reduction in counterterrorism efforts against the Islamic State, such a plan, if implemented successfully, may allow the organization to put a contingency plan into action, one that facilitates its effort to regroup and rebuild its depleted capacities in Syria. This paper utilizes and demonstrates the value of the tribe building method in gathering data in warzones.

Authored by Alexander Meleagrou-Hitchens
October 2018

Salafism, a complex and multifaceted conservative global Islamic movement, has become a topic of increased interest among a range of scholars over the last decade. Although worthy of study in its own right, the Salafi movement often attracts attention because certain components of it provide much of the ideological inspiration for jihadist groups including al-Qaeda and the Islamic State (IS). This study is one of the first to focus solely on Salafism in the United States. Drawing on multiple primary sources, including interviews with leading American Salafis, it provides an overview of the history, evolution, and contours of the movement in America. In doing so, it also offers insights on the genesis of jihadism in the U.S.

Authored by Alexander Meleagrou-Hitchens, Seamus Hughes, and Bennett Clifford
February 2018

This study reflects the most comprehensive, publicly available accounting of Americans who traveled to join jihadist groups in Syria and Iraq since 2011. It identifies 64 travelers, the largest available sample to date. These individuals, and their stories, were uncovered during a multi-year investigation. Authors interviewed law enforcement officials, prosecutors, and defense attorneys, and attended relevant court proceedings. Additionally, they reviewed thousands of pages of legal documents, filing information requests and federal court motions to unseal records where necessary. Finally, the authors conducted several interviews with American travelers who returned from the territories held by the Islamic State (IS).

Authored by Audrey Alexander
October 2017

Until 2016, Twitter was the online platform of choice for English-language Islamic State (IS) sympathizers. As a result of Twitter’s counter-extremism policies - including content removal - there has been a decline in activity by IS supporters. This outcome may suggest the company’s efforts have been effective, but a deeper analysis reveals a complex, nonlinear portrait of decay. Such observations show that the fight against IS in the digital sphere is far from over. In order to examine this change over time, this report collects and reviews 845,646 tweets produced by 1,782 English-language pro-IS accounts from February 15, 2016 to May 1, 2017. This study finds that Twitter’s policies hinder sympathizers on the platform, but counter-IS practitioners should not overstate the impact of these measures in the broader fight against the organization online.

Authored by Sarah Gilkes
December 2016

While there has been a relative surge in the number of U.S. persons radicalized and recruited by the Islamic State in the last five years, other jihadist organizations, primarily al-Qaeda, remain popular and active. This suggests that, while group affiliation matters, the draw of the wider Salafi-jihadist ideology that al-Qaeda, IS, and other like-minded groups adhere to is equally important when analyzing the jihadist threat to America.

Authored by Audrey Alexander
November 2016 

The self-proclaimed Islamic State and other jihadist actors have identified several unique roles for Western women in their radicalization and recruitment efforts. This report finds that, while few conduct violent plots, many disseminate propaganda, donate resources, or travel abroad to offer their support. This report uses a wealth of primary and secondary data to examine the efforts of 25 jihadi women in America from January 2011 to September 2016. 

Authored by Lorenzo Vidino and Seamus Hughes
December 2015

The report consists of two parts. The first examines all cases of U.S. persons arrested, indicted, or convicted in the United States for IS-related activities. This section also looks at the cases of other Americans who, while not in the legal system, are known to have engaged in IS-inspired behavior.

The second examines various aspects of the IS-related mobilization in America. It analyzes the individual motivations of IS supporters, the role of the Internet—in particular, social media—in their radicalization and recruitment processes, whether their radicalization took place in isolation or with like-minded individuals, and the degree of their tangible links to IS.

Authored by Lorenzo Vidino and Seamus Hughes
June 2015

This report examines the status of CVE in the United States and explores what lessons and experiences the European CVE community can offer their American counterparts. The report dives into past efforts to develop local CVE frameworks at the city-level, targeted interventions, and the existing debate within American Muslim communities. The authors cover current challenges for CVE in America, and offer reccomendations for academics, policymakers, and practitioners.